# Beyond the Façade of Policy Implementation: Explaining the Intractability and Occasional Success of Post-Communist Civil Service Reforms

by

Svetlana Inkina

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

UMI Number: 3709139

UMI

Dissertation Publishing

UMI  3709139

ProQuest®

www.manaraa.com

# ABSTRACT

Beyond the Façade of Policy Implementation: Explaining the Intractability and
Occasional Success of Post-Communist Civil Service Reforms

by
Svetlana Inkina
Doctor of Philosophy, Political Science, University of Toronto, 2015

Building on the prolific literature of post-Communist change, cross-country comparisons and an in-depth analysis of the Russian case, this dissertation identifies the sources of regional and cross-sectoral disparities in civil service reform implementation after the Soviet Union collapse. The study draws attention to the role of contextual variables of policy change, such as political leadership and institutional capacities of the post-Communist governments. It argues that quality improvements in bureaucratic organization emerge as a result of reforms, which pursue genuine rather than symbolic goals to improve the culture and operation of state institutions. Civil service reforms, in particular, require meaningful efforts to build support among various policy actors (public sector organizations). Thus, in order to succeed, these efforts have to rely on a coherent reform strategy, which starts from a smaller issue, or a juncture of issues (incremental rather than comprehensive approach), followed by efforts to create effective policy control and appraisal mechanisms.

The study revists several generations of policy implementation research in order to bridge the division between Western policy literature and the body of the post-Soviet scholarly work. The main contribution of this work consists of aggregating various factors and variables of public policy change into a few broad categories, such as domestic and global pressures, state capacity, policy leadership and others. The study situates the discussion in a broader framework of agency-strcuture debate, which shapes the dynamics of post-Communist transition. This approach combines a variety of qualitative methodological instruments to assess the impact of key variables on civil service reform implementation. The basic research method employed is representative case study (Russia), which relies on the study of primary and secondary sources, the method of process tracing and original interviews collected in Russia in 2010.

## Acknowledgements

Words are not enough to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to all those who made this dissertation possible. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Professor Peter Solomon and my committee members Lucan Way and Matthew Light for their accurate, engaging, and thought-provoking comments. I find the scholarly achievements of my colleagues genuinely inspiring, which is the reason I am so enthusiastic about advancing knowledge in the field of post-Communist studies.

I would like to extend my gratitude to the individuals and organizations that participated in my field research in Russia, including experts from the Higher School of Economics, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow State University (MGU), the Russian Academy of Science (RAGS), the Institute of Strategic Analysis, and others. Some interviewees spent a considerable amount of time sharing their experiences with me. I am sincerely grateful to all those who were open-minded, thoughtful, and willing to help in the advancement of my research.

This dissertation would not have been possible without my earlier experience as a Masters student at Carleton University, where I first began specializing in Russian politics. In this respect, I am grateful to the brilliant and energetic Professors Joan DeBardeleben and Piotr Dutkiewitz for engaging me in meaningful scholarly research and for inspiring me to proceed with an academic career. Overall, I thank all those I have studied and worked with in my graduate and undergraduate programs, including Professors Ed Schatz (University of Toronto), Linda White (University of Toronto), David Pond (University of Toronto), Roberta Rice (University of Torotno), Marco Fonseca (University of Toronto), Jeffrey Kopstein (University of Toronto), Jeff Sahadeo (Carleton University), Vladimir Popov (Carleton University), Vera Uvarova (Orel State Technical University), Nadezhda Frolova (Orel State Technical University), and many others. All of them were truly inspirational and played a large part in my intellectual development as a PhD student.

# Table of Contents

# List of Tables

# List of Figures

## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| CA | Central Asia |
| CEEC | Central and East European Countries |
| CS | Civil Service |
| CSA | Civil Service Agency/ Civil Service Act |
| CSL | Civil Service Law |
| CSSD | Czech Social Democratic Party |
| CSO | Civil Service Office |
| CSR | Civil Service Reform |
| DV | Dependent Variable |
| EC | European Commission |
| EU | European Union |
| FIDECZ | Hungarian Civic Alliance |
| HI | Historical Institutionalism |
| HR | Human Resources |
| HRM | Human Resource Management |
| HRD | Human Resource Development |
| IDA | International Development Agency (World Bank) |
| ICRG | International Country Risk Guide (PRS rating) |
| IPMN | International Public Management Network |
| IV | Independent Variable |
| MDF | Christian Conservative Democratic Forum (Hungary) |
| MERT | Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Russia) |
| MINFIN | Ministry of Finance (Russia) |
| MINTRUD | Ministry of Labor (Russia) |
| MINZDRAV | Ministry of Health and Social Development (Russia) |
| NAPA | The National Academy of Public Administration |
| NPM | New Public Management |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation |
| ODS | Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic) |
| OF | Civic Forum (Czech Republic) |
| PA | Public Administration |
| PAR | Public Administrative Reform |
| PCS | Public/Civil Service |
| PRS | Political Risk Services |
| PSL | Polish People's Party |
| ReSPA | Regional School of Public Administration |
| SAS | Freedom and Solidarity (Slovakia) |
| SI | Sociological Institutionalism |
| SIGMA | Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (OECD and the EU joint initiative) |
| SLD | Democratic Left Alliance (Poland) |
| SNS | Slovak National Party |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNPAN | United Nations Public Administration Network |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WB | World Bank |
| WGI | World Governance Indicators (WB) |

# CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

*"To fully appreciate the dynamics of policy change, it is essential to study the system as a whole rather than just one part of it. Approaches that focus on a specific institution risk overlooking important processes and decisions occurring elsewhere."*
*(Frank Baumgartner, 2011, p. 953)*

*To provide an effective overview of the policy system, two things are required. First, the characteristics of policy to be explained must be specified…Second, we must link the factors to each other, trying to delineate both their inter-relationships and their independent contributions to explaining the central dimensions of policy. (Richard Simeon, 1976, p.555)*

## 1.1 The Puzzle of Civil Service Reform: Russia and Beyond

At the end of the twentieth century, most post-Communist societies had undergone a process of rapid political transformation, bringing about fundamental changes in the organization of the state. The institutional reforms that swept away former Communist countries have undermined the ideological bases and operational capacities of national governments. This painful and convoluted adjustment to the principles of economic freedom has served as one of the major reasons for the 'defeat' of policy efforts, which, at some point, aspired to make the post-Communist states truly democratic.

While the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred in December 1991, public administration and civil service reforms did not take place until the middle of the 1990s. Random initiatives transpired in early stages of political transition to rebuild and rationalize state institutions in line with Weberian principles. However, the trajectories of change were often ill-defined. It is quite striking, for example, that some reform strategies across the region were 'locked into' the ideology of the New Public Management approach (NPM), which encompasses theoretical goals (political decentralization, citizen/customer orientation, community empowerment, and the introduction of market forces), opposite to the Weberian paradigm. It is also important to note that the history of post-Communist transformation presents us with a set of policy openings and developments, which extended national governments' elbowroom to experiment freely with various policy initiatives and allowed them to switch back and forth from one reform model to another.

1

Interestingly, reforms throughout the post-Communist region should not be described as universally unsuccessful. First of all, we still know very little about 'hybrid' policy-making systems and their outcomes.[1] Secondly, the post-Soviet scholarly discourse on civil service reform (CSR) is quite puzzling. Evidence suggests that cases of occasional reform progress, which happened in some places as a result of gradual adjustment, were closely intertwined with a systemic failure to overcome policy implementation paralysis. In this respect, it is not quite clear whether the focus of analysis should be confined within the geographical boundaries of exceptional nation states, or if it is more fruitful to analyze selected aspects of civil service and public administration reforms across multiple countries. According to the growing body of post-Soviet scholarship (Beblavy 2002, O'Dwyer 2006, Grzymala-Busse 2006, 2008, Meyer-Sahling 2009 2011, Johannsen and Norgaard 2001,etc.), the strategies of positive and negative cases have recently converged around similar principles. However, these developments by no means resulted in identical processes and outcomes. Every national government faced similar difficulties in their efforts to introduce the ideas of political neutrality and meritocratic recruitment into their civil services over the past twenty years. However, the reasons for varying obstacles and their consequences diverge tremendously from one case to another, depending on the given institutional and ideational policy settings.

It is unsurprising that discussion of post-Communist reforms refers quite often to such fundamental problems as corruption, bribery, and nepotism in public administration (Ledeneva 1998, Obolonsky 2006, etc.). This mode of research stems from contingent political developments, which have steadily dragged Russia, along with some of its neighbours, down on the scale of worldwide governance indicators (World Bank 2013). In 2012, for example, "Transparency International (TI) ranked Russia 133rd out of 174 countries on its Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and last place out of 22 in the latest TI Bribe Payer Index (BPI)" (Ledeneva 2013, 1135). These indicators reflect the survival of bad governance practices, which proliferated behind the scenes of democratic transition during the 1990s.[2] It is important to note, however, that the study of corruption is very challenging, due to the difficulty of obtaining and validating relevant ethnographic material. Global indicators are not particularly sensitive to the relationship between the process of policy-making and the immediate political constellations

---

[1] By these I mean a range of policy-making patterns in semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian and autocratic political systems.
[2] In recent years, various aspects of informal governance, described by Ledeneva as informal incentives, affiliations, agendas and signs, amalgamated into "effective yet illegitimate shortcuts," which "undermined the efficiency and legitimacy of formal institutional channels"(1144). These shortcuts have allegedly served to create "power networks," which expanded into the market economy and public sector administration.

affecting political and economic relations. Neither do these measures account for variations within, rather than between, country cases.

Taking into consideration the difficulties observed above, I suggest that the study of post-Communist civil service reforms is valuable on its own, as it provides us with an opportunity to recognize the implications of policy-making systems in a wide range of hybrid regimes. The field of civil service research is sensitive to issues of power, and it may throw light on questions about where power resides, or whose decisions prevail in sensitive policy areas (three dimensions of power, derived from Steven Lukes).[3] In this respect, a basic question concerns whether civil service reform should be viewed as a uniform process, indicative of other processes at the level of individual nations, or if it would be more sensible to focus research on its constituent parts (specific areas within the sector of civil service). As I mentioned earlier, the risk of ignoring diverse policy consequences within a single policy area may push us toward generalization, thus limiting our capacity to analyze specific problems in a strictly defined setting. By contrast, as Frank Baumgartner observes:

approaches that focus on a specific institution risk overlooking important processes and decisions occurring elsewhere…[Thus] to fully appreciate the dynamics of policy change, it is essential to study the system as a whole rather than just one part of it (2011, 953).

Generally, it is important to strike a balance between idiosyncratic and nomothetic approaches to the study of CSR, because the prospects of both strategies are quite promising. It is equally significant to focus on the dynamic of policy-making and its implications, rather than just on bureaucratic organization, as the latter may limit the scope of interdisciplinary contribution my study suggests. To clarify, if we chose to focus on a narrow aspect of public bureaucracy, including its structure and composition, we risk coming out of this research empty handed. To clarify, civil service is an elusive concept, which is defined inconsistently from one policy context to another (to be discussed in Chapter 2. Civil servants, in turn, may not arrive at comprehensive understanding or knowledge of various aspects of the policy process; the nature of bureaucratic organizations is "exclusive," which tends to create difficulties for any sort of systematic social inquiry. As Simeon (1976) argues:

---

[3] To remind, Lukes' 'radical' view of power (1975) included three dimensions, i.e. 'overt power,' demonstrated in a state of conflict (winner takes all); 'covert power,' consisting of control over what gets decided (control over agenda setting), and the power "to shape desires and beliefs, thereby averting both conflict and grievances," which is also covert in nature. These ideas have usually been applied in the field of political theory and international relations; however, they could also be used to imaginatively capture the intersections of power and policy-making processes at the domestic level.

obviously, bureaucratic agencies are central elements in the policy-making process, and no study of policy could ignore them. But bureaucrats and politicians operate within a broader political framework, defined by such factors as prevailing ideologies, assumptions and values, structures of power and influence, patterns of conflict and division, and so on. They make critical choices, but from a rather limited set of alternatives (549).

Elaborating on these views, a study of the policy-making process in transition should be broader than the focus on issues of bureaucracy and public administration. Thus, if we are interested in political dimension of bureaucratic reform, it is important to factor in such issues as power, conflict, ideology, formal and informal institutions, as well as the role of civil service in a bigger map of politics.

The approach, which tackles CSR from a political angle, is certainly not new. O'Dwyer (2006), for example, quite recently noted a robust relationship between instances of political patronage in civil service and the sequence of structural developments in post-Communist states, such as the processes of democratization (political pluralism) and the consolidation of the state apparatus (x).[4] In a similar vein, Grzymala-Busse (2006, 2008) has dealt with issues of political neutrality, arguing that both the institutionalization of the political party system and the strategies of the former dominant Communist party resulted in a delay of policy relevant implementation measures. Both accounts serve as significant breakthroughs in explaining various cases of state formation and restructuring after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, neither of these explanations moves beyond a single dimension of political neutrality. The nexus of politics and administration is treated as an isolated variable, which has nothing to do with other areas of civil service. In this respect, scholars omit the role of interactive processes within the area of public administration, as well as choices made voluntarily as a result of either innovative or path-dependent thinking.

The most prolific body of literature in the field of post-Communist studies, including the area of public administration, deals with the legacies of the past, which have combined gradually into a matrix of intractable institutions, norms, and patterns of individual and group behaviour. For example, it is well known that after the Soviet Union's demise, most post-Communist states inherited a public administration, which was problematic in several different ways: it displayed a high degree of formal political discretion; it was unaccountable to the public; and it lacked professional and competent staff due to the declining prestige of the civil service (Beblavy 2002).

---

[4] Pressures were stronger in those countries where democratization preceded the consolidation of the state apparatus.

In order to address this situation, some national governments have put significant effort into replacing the 'old guard' of Soviet bureaucrats with a new generation of public sector employees. In other places, the 'old guard' have remained in their former posts, helping the new political elite to rebuild and realign their power bases. Reformers have also attempted to redesign civil service personnel systems so as to assist in developing new incentives, and to train and equip civil servants with the skills necessary for the new economic and political system. These efforts covered rules that govern the allocation of civil servants within the administration, civil servants' duties and responsibilities, procedures for determining civil servants' remuneration, and rights of state bureaucrats with respect to participation in policy-making process.

One of the greatest challenges of the early 1990s concerned the legacy of 'hollow' decision-making, which tended to produce laws that went nowhere in terms of implementation. For example, a great number of policy initiatives at the time were marred by the problems of hidden conflict, policy ambiguity, and a lack of knowledge and expertise in the area of law enforcement. The implementation stage, in turn, involved a great degree of civil servants' 'creativity', which included an open list of strategies, such as avoidance, delay, and other forms of non-implementation. Solomon (2008, 115) argues that public bureaucracy has turned out to be highly inventive in many places, including Russia, as a result of numerous loopholes in the body of laws, which have tended to empower civil servants with excessive regulatory functions rather than limit their discretion with strictly enforced rules.[5] This tendency, which was also commonplace in the Soviet era, has become even more entrenched since the end of Communism, and has proven to be one of the greatest obstacles to policy implementation progress in diverse areas of the public sector. As the body of scholarship cited above suggests, by the end of Communist rule, "East European communist governments had 'rule-creating' bureaucracies, rather than 'rule-observing' ones, and this characteristic made them not only powerful, but also 'deviant'." (116)

Quite recently, scholars have started questioning the strategies of the reforms, pointing out that not all of them were contextually appropriate or reasonably adjusted to pre-existing institutional capacities (Nunberg 1999). This debate has intensified in recent years, considering that some Central and East European countries (CEECs), including Russia, have demonstrated difficulties in the strategic reconfiguration of their entire government systems. Reforms turned out to be highly fragmented, were rarely designed in a consistent and mutually reinforcing fashion, and, moreover, failed to achieve any significant breakthrough in the operation of national public

---

[5] Apparently, it was much easier to substitute the old rules for the new ones, rather than to enforce them with contextually appropriate tools and mechanisms.

administration systems. In this context, research focus has shifted to the *rationale* behind diverse policy initiatives, as well as to the explanations why national governments ended up delaying or ignoring the implementation process.

The discrepancy between hidden and obvious agendas, as well as their intended and unintended effects, has been most obvious in case of Russia, where at least two recent stages of CSR were initiated immediately following the elections of two new presidents. The first stage took place during the 1990s, and was hampered by rapid changes in other policy sectors, a lack of vision, and, most importantly, an absence of political commitment to the reform.[6] Since 2003, however, CSR has become an essential component of another big project, i.e. public administrative reform (PAR), which aims to comprehensively restructure the post-Communist state apparatus. In July 2004, the Federal Council passed a law, "On Civil Service in the Russian Federation" (Federal Law No. 79), which became the focal point of the reform and its management. However, as Beblavy (2002, 58) points out, "it would be a mistake to treat all policy measures as a reform." Scholars observe that civil service reform in Russia included ambiguous and contradictory goals, and it has never been fully implemented despite the adoption of legislative follow-up documents. The political leadership, in turn, has approached the reform as a way to strengthen its own power base.[7] In this respect, to understand the trajectory and major outcomes of CSR we have to examine various actors' ideas and strategies, as well as their interaction effects with a wide range of structural constraints.

Evidence suggests that a great number of recent policy initiatives in Russia and beyond originated recently in Western practices as a result of the policy diffusion process. While some countries in Central and Eastern Europe were strongly encouraged to engage in extensive government improvement programs as a part of the EU enlargement process, the reform trajectories of the remaining nations of the former Communist world were influenced by internal dissatisfaction with the state of their respective public administrative systems. Many reform efforts have been driven by economic crises, which explains the inclusion of new public management mechanisms in the newly developed reform packages. However, in all cases,

---

[6] The majority of federal laws adopted during this period (The Law 'On the general principles of self-organization' (1995), The Law 'On the basic principles of the civil service in the Russian Federation' (1995) and others) has been characterized by their lack of implementation measures and were rarely fulfilled in a systematic fashion.

[7] Some of the law's progressive measures included: the appointment of permanent civil servants on a competitive basis; the development of pre-qualified employee pools; the creation of job descriptions and contracts for civil servants; and other features of the new public management paradigm (Konov 2006, Kotchegura 2008).

6

legitimacy concerns prevailed, and they have driven reforms on a path of nominal rather than real change.

One obvious problem associated with the processes of 'policy transfer' and 'policy diffusion' in post-Communist states concerns the fact that although many of these countries are involved in similar reform efforts, each of them has its own unique history and political system. Individual nations also find themselves at different stages of development and face different problems, and yet, to a surprising degree, they still employ similar concepts, approaches, and strategies of reform (Kamrack 2003).

The problem of contextually inappropriate policies, which often emerge as a result of rushing modernization projects or ideational crises within a nation's policy elite, is usually downplayed because various countries all over the world share similar problems. Meanwhile, the adoption of inappropriate strategies, or strategies that are not particularly well thought through, results quite often in cases of non-implementation, and this problem is as consequential as policy processes underpinned by insufficient implementation capacity or the lack of genuine political commitment to the reforms. One example would be the tendency of post-Communist states to haphazardly intermix the goals of rationalization and new public management mechanisms so as to cope with the 'double challenge' of 'fitting in' and 'adjusting to' the conditions of post-Communist transformation.

Interestingly, the existing scholarship rarely places Russia within the context of international public policy trends, such as the growing popularity of the new public management or the global governance reform movements.[8] Questions about the reform leadership, including its strategies of coping with a wide range of internal and external pressures, are even more obscure. My study suggests that international context (global developments, external pressures and the way in which leaders respond to them) is empirically significant, as it enables the researcher to identify the origins of public officials' commitment to reforms, and to understand the tactical and strategic choices made by them at various stages of the reform; moreover, the study of international trends may be helpful in disaggregating between nationally unique and international policy developments. For example, one of the basic features of the CSR policy field (to be discussed further) is that it requires a long-lasting commitment on behalf of policy leaders, which extends further than external pressures or legitimacy concerns. In this respect, in order to explain cases of variation amidst a nearly universal 'race to the bottom' and situation of policy

---

[8] Scholars omit, quite often, that countries, which represent the baseline of comparative cross-national analysis do not necessarily satisfy the requirements of an 'ideal bureaucratic model.'

implementation paralysis, we have to consider the ways in which foreign-born ideas are 'filtered' through national decision-making structures (for more information, see chapter 2).[9]

All things considered, it is important to mention that the study of international trends is not a focal point of my research, as it only serves the purpose of identifying causal candidates and alternative explanations. While such avenues of research could inform the core hypotheses of this work, my dissertation in fact revolves around the issues of policy leadership, strategies, and institutional settings of the policy-making process. In this respect, the most important goal of my study is to examine the driving forces of change and factors that account for policy continuity (or the lack of thereof) and the policy implementation progress. I suggest that policies driven internally enjoy greater stability than practices pressured by external actors. At the same time, both types of reforms may be equally unsuccessful. Another important question of my study concerns the often-neglected relationship between democratization, public service reform, and governance. Though it is not possible to measure this relationship in a rigorous fashion, due to the intractable nature of CSR implementation, I assume that various patterns of administrative transformation are deeply entrenched in the process of social, political, and economic change. Thus, an argument can be made that scholarly explanations of the mode and the scope of administrative reform must consider such broad variables as political development and democratization.

This analysis focuses on the 20-year period since the fall of the Communist regimes of the Soviet bloc, and more specifically, on the past 10 years, which have been marked by the attempts of Russia (representative case), to launch comprehensive administrative reforms. In the remaining part of this chapter, I specify my research question, hypotheses, methods, and data to be used in this dissertation.

### 1.2. Research Question and Hypotheses

As discussed earlier, the literature on civil service reform in post-Communist states addresses several important issues, such as: the timing, content, implementation strategies, and outcomes of reforms, as well as the transformative capacities of local bureaucracies. However, the fundamental question of why civil service reform has lagged behind other important reform

---

[9] It is equally important to combine structural and voluntaristic approaches in explaining the reasons for and consequences of nationally unique public policies. Interestingly, issues of civil service have never been viewed as part of a more general framework, where the driving forces of post-Communist change collide. Therefore I suggest filling this gap by looking at policy process as a way to tackle the agency-structure debate that has continued to engage scholars since the 1960s-1970s.

projects, and particularly, <u>why diverse outcomes have emerged amidst conditions, which projected an image of nearly universal policy implementation paralysis</u>, have yet to be fully explained. It is quite obvious that the dynamic of CSR legislation and its implementation measures have not been the same in various countries, as well as across policy sectors, such as ethics, recruitment, pay, career opportunity, and bureaucratic performance. However, we still know very little about the cross-regional variations of CSR (i.e. whether similarities are more pronounced than differences throughout the post-Communist region). Scholarly discourse on this particular subject is quite inconclusive.

My dissertation identifies and explains the reasons for cases of occasional success and failure of the CSR implementation process on a cross-national basis. To elaborate on this question, I explain the role of key factors influencing civil service reform management in post-Communist societies, such as political leadership, including its decisions and non-decisions, and the institutional capacities of post-Communist states (by these I mean institutions with entrenched interests). These factors affect civil service reform indirectly, and they have to be disaggregated from key variables, such as the lack of a normative consensus among significant national players, the role of formal and informal institutions, the transformative capacities of national bureaucracies, reform management tools, and so forth.

The central theme of my work concerns policy implementation dynamism in a transitional political context. I suggest that the current political science literature, which contains useful explanatory frameworks on issues of post-Communist regime change, has blindly omitted the nature and outcomes of semi-democratic (or semi-autocratic) policy-making systems. These systems rest upon a unique set of formal and informal institutions, and they include both rational and semi-rational policy-making mechanisms. The study of institutions as a part of the policy cycle is promising field of research on its own; but it is even more interesting when analyzed within a 'hybrid' political context.

The empirical puzzle of my work concerns the inconsistent and largely intractable reform progress across the countries and sectors of CSR, which, in some cases, included significant policy achievements, whereas in other cases, were indicative of reform failure. As mentioned earlier, nearly all countries of the former Soviet world experienced profound difficulties in reforming the areas of ethics, political neutrality, and meritocratic recruitment. However, the reasons for the lack of progress in these policy sectors (political interests, path-dependent thinking, the nature, goals, and purposes of CSR) were not necessarily the same. Reform consequences, which may be tracked with the use of regulatory quality, effectiveness, and the rule of law, are equally puzzling, as they do not show any difference between countries that

9

implemented civil service reforms immediately following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and those that waited. For example, Hungary, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic usually rank well on the scale of World Governance and Transparency International indicators (WGI and TI accordingly; see appendix). However, the timeline of reforms in the first two countries coincided with that of 'runaway' Russia; while the Czech Republic, in spite of beginning democratic reforms early on, turned out to be one of the most obvious laggards in terms of CSR implementation (see Chapter 4). Apparently, there is no reason to believe that civil service reforms are completely inconsequential for the rule of law, political neutrality, and other democratic principles in public administration. Thus, the very composition of indicators described here might not be sensitive to the variables we aim to explain.

Given the difficulty of tracking the impact of varying reform strategies and the timelines of reform outcomes, it is reasonable to suggest that the key to persuasive explanation rests beyond the façade of new legislation, which may or may not be underpinned by the process of incremental change. In this respect, to explain variation, it is important to focus not only on reform outputs or strategies, but also on a wide range of tactical choices made by various actors engaged in the process of policy implementation. Generally, output indicators, however imperfect, may be used to identify opposite cases to ensure variation on the dependent variable. In this context similar cases, such as Russia, Moldova, and Belarus, may be used effectively to accumulate additional data, whereas opposite cases, such as Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others (discussed in this dissertation) may be used to elaborate on a range of explanatory variables. Overall, the choice of cases should be sensitive enough to both reform strategies and reform outputs, as both can be employed to measure the dependent variable of reform progress.

It is important to note that both dependent and independent variables may diverge from one policy area to another. However, there should be a number of sound reasons for the discrepancies between policy strategies and outcomes. I observe that voluntary choices of reform model and the institutional prerequisites of reforms capture some of the most plausible reasons for policy implementation dynamism in any political context. Political and policy leadership is particularly important, and it is probably more pronounced in a 'hybrid' political setting, where institutions are often in flux. Ultimately, the choice of direction (a course of action described as policy) is usually a choice of the values leaders decide to follow. Thus, the lack of policy continuity and its ambiguous goals may be symptomatic of an ideational crisis (a lack of vision) or a hidden conflict (resistance), whereas the absence of implementation tools in any specific document, which forms part of the policy implementation strategy, may stem from limited

10

institutional capacities, such as a lack of expertise, or interests interfering in the reform progress at the implementation stage. The Russian case <u>stands out because of the internal driving force associated with the change of political leadership in the early 2000s, the size of its public bureaucracy, its super-presidential constitutional design, and the wide array of problems with its federal administrative system</u>. The Russian case is somewhat unique due to these institutional features; however, it is also representative of other post-Communist systems in terms of their shared legacies and the history of post-Communist transformation. The purpose of my study, in this context, is to delineate various factors behind policy-making dynamics, and to create a useful analytical framework to explain public policy change in a dynamic political setting. The specific objective of my work is to account for the differential implementation success of administrative reform components and thereby improve our understanding of administrative reform and implementation theory.

I suggest that factors, such as political leadership, including its decisions and non-decisions, as well as the institutional administrative capacities of individual states, may be effectively combined to explain the lack of reform process in the area of CSR. Specifically, I contend that reform implementation emerges from the interaction between policy actors' choices (strategies, decisions) and institutions with entrenched interests, such as the system of policy-making and administrative and political institutions. Political leadership, in this sense, represents the driving force of reform initiation, whereas the features of reform strategy indicate the level of both state capacity and political commitment to reforms at the stage of policy implementation. The Russian case substantiates this argument, suggesting that CSR is a part of Russia's conflicted state-building project. My goal is to examine the way in which all of these factors matter in a haphazardly changing political setting.

It should be mentioned from the very beginning that "administrative reform" and "civil service reform" are separate, though closely related, policy domains. Public administrative reform (PAR) encompasses measures to reorganize and downsize the structure of executive bodies, including the principles of operation and the ways in which they interact with one another, the citizenry, and with other organizations. Civil service reform (CSR), on the other hand, focuses exclusively on issues concerned with the formation and management of the civil service, including recruitment, training, pay and promotion, discipline, and the security of tenure (Tompson, 2007).

I answer my research question by examining the case of civil service and public administrative reform in Russia and other former Soviet states. By looking at the Russian case in a comparative perspective (against the experiences of other nations from the former Soviet bloc),

I explain: a) the reasons for diverging policy strategies and outcomes on cross-regional and cross-sectoral bases (if any), b) whose decisions prevail at various stages of policy formulation and policy implementation, and c) whether decisions discussed here have an impact on achieving substantial reform outcomes. On a practical level, my study attempts to establish a dialogue between the design and implementation processes. It explores what the designers of administrative reform can learn from implementation research.

The study elaborates on three major hypotheses, inspired by empirical observation of cases of post-Communist transformation (Beblavy 2002, Krasnov 2003, Barabashev 2005, Obolonsky 2006, Kotechgura 2008, Temmes 2004, Oleinik 2009, Meyer-Sahling, 2009).[10]

The first hypothesis revolves around the concept of policy leadership, including the origins of political leaders' willingness to initiate and sustain contextually appropriate reform projects. I suggest that the new political elites in most former Soviet states were quite reluctant to support civil service reforms due to the lack of vision, stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union and as a result of their status quo preferences. I also argue that political leadership and structures of political power, while frequently part of a problem, are also part of a solution to building more efficient, more effective, and responsive states. Thus while the process of reform initiation may entail efforts to symbolically appease some population groups, the ultimate results of the reform depend on leaders' genuine commitment, which is manifested in policy actions, such as the amount of legislative support, reform funding and reform communication strategy. Generally, it is useful to distinguish between the 'strategic' and 'ideational' commitment to the reform, which means that policy leaders who publicly endorse the reform may not necessarily include these reforms on the list of their top priorities. In addition, outcomes of the reform largely depend on leadership style and the way it fits into the existing policy-making system.[11]

*An alternative hypothesis* presented in my study suggests that the outcomes of civil service reform depend upon the nature of national and regional bureaucracies in each particular country and the type of institutional system developed in these countries in recent years. This hypothesis is derived from scholarship on the role of post-Communist heritage in political transformation. It is also a subtype of a structural (institutional) explanation of public policy change (Krasnov 2003, Obolonsky 2006, Gaman-Golutvina 2008, Jakobson 2010). Based on the literature, it may be argued that each national bureaucracy is not a uniform entity; it is split into

---

[10] These hypotheses were developed by author, and they generate knowledge from various streams of scholarly work, rather than any of the existing theories of policy-making process. For more information on the empirical foundations of my hypotheses please see Introduction and the following Chapters.

[11] In this respect, political commitment to the reform may be evaluated on the basis of congruence between the official public discourse and the follow-up support.

groups with distinct transformative capacities (Knill 1999), which influence their ability to access policy-making decisions. These capacities are defined by a combination of political factors, such as the strength of the executive, the amount of discretionary power allocated to regional and local bureaucracies, the unity of the regional elites, and the ability of such elites to influence policy-making decisions. Conditions that help to determine the transformative capacity of national and regional bureaucracies may include the way in which power is divided between political elites and civil servants (politician-civil servant nexus), the independent political power of regional bureaucracies, organizational attributes, corruption, clientelism, and so forth. For example, if a national bureaucracy suffers from a high level of political discretion, policy makers will encounter officials' resistance to reform. At the stage of implementation, the likelihood of reform may decrease with the level of autonomy that subordinate administrative levels enjoy when implementing political decisions.[12] Overall, the conditions for the successful implementation of public administrative reform are inextricably linked with a nation's pre-existing institutional framework, and manifested in the attributes of national and sub-national bureaucracies. This point of view contends that the origin of resistance to reform lies within the body of public service, or to be more specific, within the constellation of both formal and informal institutions that define the role of public bureaucracy. This explanation accounts for the attempt of public bureaucrats to block the policy implementation process; it may also be related to the specific organizational characteristics of the post-Communist system.

Finally, the *third hypothesis* of my study is borrowed from policy implementation literature (Chackerian 2001, Matland 1995, etc.), which suggests that the extent of reform success, including success of the policy implementation process, is influenced by interactions among reform components and that these interactions are influenced by the sequencing of reform measures and by the institutional environment (*reform strategy*). Content, timing, and sequencing issues are primarily determined by the fact that it is impossible to conduct comprehensive policy change if the conditions for such change are not right. Scholars suggest that one of the main preconditions for civil service reform is that at least a rough consensus exists within society and among the political elites that civil service reform is necessary. The lack of a normative consensus among bureaucrats may lead to the adoption of self-defeating reform designs or incoherent (fragmented) policy implementation[13]. At the same time, it is also important to adopt

---

[12] In this case, autonomy is defined by the amount of discretionary powers allocated to the public administration, rather than by the extent, in which bureaucracy is insulated from political pressures.

[13] At the same time, there is no 'right time' for civil service reform because many other issues arise during the policy implementation process. As one can see from APPENDIX 1, countries in Central Europe are extremely varied in their timing of civil service reform.

contextually appropriate reform strategies, which depend on the driving forces of change, including the willingness and capacity of policy leaders to reform public administrative system. [14]

Assumptions Underlying Hypotheses

Change in vocabulary does not mean much in a sense that it does not necessarily invoke real change
H1: Not all reforms emerge with the goal to achieve any real change (motivation)
H2: Some of the best ideas appear to be unfeasible
H3: Institutions with entrenched interests create difficulties in all areas of public sector

When analyzing civil service reform programs in post-Communist countries, it is critical to understand that the goals of reforms significantly differ from the 'ideal-typical' bureaucratic organization imagined in Western scholarship. Political interests underpin the majority of administrative reform efforts, and therefore, such reforms have to be evaluated within the broader context of political transformation. For example, Taylor (2011) argues that "from the first days in office as Russia's second president, Putin made strengthening the state the primary goal of his rule" (71). The first stage of this process aimed to restore control over the Russian regions featuring *siloviki* (top level power ministers) as a power base. The second stage, starting from 2008, involved public sector reforms meant to improve the state's capacity and ability to govern. Generally, the step-by-step reform strategy was so comprehensive that it entailed a great degree of conflict between reform processes and outcomes. This conflict came about as a result of an 'urgent' decision-making style, which sacrificed the means of reform to their goals, such as control and subordination in the executive branch of power.

Leadership is, of course, not a single actor with conflicting or hidden interests, which affect policy outcomes. One of the most important questions, in this respect, concerns the sources of bureuocratic power and influence over the Russian policy-making process. It is well known that political leadership, in any context, is contrsainted by the quality of governance structures, the size and autonomy of its public bureaucracy and a wide range of other formal and informal institutions. Formal constraints include a state's constitutional design (written versus unwritten constitution), its administrative system (federal versus unitary system), and its governance structure (parliamentary versus presidential republic). Informal constraints include both the functional and dysfunctional norms inherited from the past, such as the level of trust between

---

[14] This hypothesis evaluates the effectiveness of reform strategy, including the unintentional mistakes made at the stage of policy formulation (when policy leadership is genuinely committed to the reform).

politicians and state bureaucrats, the extent of institutionalization of the executive (the strength and freedom they enjoy in the policy-making process), as well as the views and values of key actors in the policy-making process (politicians, bureaucrats, civil society).

The role of public bureaucracy varies from one country to another depending on the design of major political and social institutions. In some states the body of state bureaucrats is politically intertwined with the executive; in other cases, it is not. In this context, it is difficult to distinguish between the typical and nationally specific reform processes. For example, the informal role of public bureaucracy may be growing as a result of the diminishing capacity of state representative institutions (legislatures), or as a result of external pressures, including a range of global political and economic crises. In this sense, the Russian case might share a lot in common with both democratic and non-democratic political regimes, which experience significant pressures from the ever-expanding public bureaucracy (Solomon 2008).

Civil service reform is one type of reform where state employees as a group have direct interest in policy outcomes. For example, when considering pay raises and other measures to increase the attractiveness of the civil service to potential employees, civil servants have to assess these potential benefits against the risks of increased competition (Beblavy 2001). In terms of the ultimate goals of civil service reform, post-Soviet bureaucrats are more likely to equip existing public administration employees with the necessary professional skills than to replace them with new recruits (sometimes they are even less likely to invest in education than in salaries). Bureaucrats' greatest influence is exercised at the stage of implementation (Beblavy 2001). However, patterns of this involvement are difficult to identify and interpret.

All in all, my dissertation aims to contribute to the body of literature on the driving forces of policy change. It also aims to develop a dynamic perspective that would accommodate both agency and structure in a single explanatory model. The first and most important step in this process requires bringing together several mutually reinforcing perspectives that would accurately reflect the processes of policy continuity and policy change. The second step is to use this model to explain real policy developments in a transitional context. In what follows I elaborate on this theoretical approach further.

## 1.3 Theoretical Approach

To fully understand the trajectory of administrative change within the post-Communist region, one has to consider such factors as the continuity and evolutionary qualities of public institutions. Temmes (2004) argues that there are two prominent approaches in historical institutionalism literature for explaining policy continuity in post-Communist states: the

evolutionary and the path dependency approaches. An evolutionary approach focuses on incremental adaptations within the national institutions and the ability of actors and institutions to actively participate gradiual transitions. A path dependency approach argues that the destiny of a nation's transitional development depends on the starting points of change, regardless of of how far they stand from the starting point. Paul Pierson (2000) suggests that **path dependence** may be defined in two ways – first, as a set of developments firmly grounded in the past (the 'history matters' argument), and secondly, as a set of social processes invoked by the dynamics of "increasing returns" ('a tree rather than a path' argument) (252). Pierson's predecessor, Margaret Levi, emphasizes the difficulty of changing developmental paths, saying that "once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high" (28). Both approaches are useful in explaining the variety of incremental policy adaptations in the area of PAR and CSR.

It is important to note that historical institutionalism perspective does not explain all types of institutional change. The greatest flaw of this approach is that it downplays the role of voluntaristic factors of policy reform and development, and its crucial explanatory tool, the mechanism of path dependency, is only capable of explaining one type of change: gradual *path dependent transformation*. In this respect, the other variety of the new institutionalism – sociological institutionalism (SI) - turns out to be more helpful. This perspective employs vocabulary, which revolves around the notion of *rule and leadership*, which means that any change in the public sphere contains voluntary choices of actors informed by the norms of either remote or immediate institutional history.

To elaborate on these ideas, it would be a mistake to assume that the new institutionalism is useless in accounting for social change. The two varieties of the same approach – historical institutionalism (HI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) – share the same conceptual apparatus, but contain certain analytical differences. Historical institutionalism describes institutions as "historically determined rules, norms, values and expectations that, at later historical stages, may independently affect outcomes when actors become wedged between old and new standards of behaviour" (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Peters 1999, Nogaard 2000). The sociological definition of institutions sheds light on formal and informal arrangements, which affect the mindsets and behaviour of individuals and social groups. In this perspective, the mechanism of path dependency is important insofar as it affects the reproduction of social norms and values, and it may be used as an effective tool in explaining the different logics of reform initiation and reform implementation.[15]

---

[15]According to my analysis, leadership is important at all stages of the policy-making process.

One of the most interesting peculiarities of SI is that it emphasizes the importance of external variables in explaining cases of policy variation. This is particularly relevant in a contemporary world, where reforms may not be driven internally, but rather reflect a search for legitimacy on behalf of individual nations. To be more specific, most reforms in recent years are driven by the so-called *'rationality by diffusion'*[16] process, which is not a reflection of perfect rationality. Rational thinking compels reformers to choose mechanisms that have already been successfully applied in other countries, to follow the logic imposed by international lending organizations, or to accept the logic imposed by internal political and economic developments. However, most of the time, reformers do not have complete and unbiased information about the potential consequences of the application of a given reform process in their own countries, and unintended consequences often emerge when the link between the contextual factors and the implementation process is not sufficiently thought through. Overall, the SI perspective is useful for two reasons: the importance it attributes to the role of leadership, and the fact that this perspective does not disregard the role of contextual variables in the policy-making process.

Furthermore, given the fact that the core hypotheses of my research revolve around agency-structure debate, it is useful not to choose one, but to combine the two perspectives of HI and SI in explaining random interruptions in a course of path-dependent policy process. This approach promises to disaggregate among the varying pressures of change, (exogenous versus endogenous forces), which affect the decisions of socialized rather than perfectly rational actors.

To remind, various scholars have pointed out at the difficulty of coping with the history of post-Communist states. However, the meaning of history, or legacies of the past (which is an essential part of endogenous structural moving force) has rarely been defined. In this study, I suggest using history in a way, in which Johannsen and Norgaard (2001) have operationalized it, i.e. as a matrix of path-dependent institutions, consisting of 1) pre-communist patterns, such as mentalities or social structures, which outlasted the communist period; 2) communist instiutions, comprising of a common heritage in all post-communist countries, 3) the norms and conditions during the post-Soviet period (the long-term effects of radical ruptures varying across countries), and 4) the actual policy and institutional choices that were made after reforms were launched. The notion of endogenous pressures is certainly more complex than history in its pure form (if any), and I suggest that the former is understood as a system of complex relationships among the diverse institutions and interests they have produced. All institutions, mentioned here, represent part of a wider context of 'virtuous' and 'vicious' circles of good and poor governance, which for the reason discussed later, emerge within the realm of seemingly identical legacies of the past.

---

[16] For an explanation, please see the Chapter 2.

## 1.4 Dependent Variable (Implementation versus Outcomes?)

The main difficulty in my study is deciding what exactly constitutes civil service reform progress in post-Communist countries. Hoppe (1987) argued that all explanations for the success or failure of the policy implementation process could be divided into two categories, i.e. *control* and *learning* options. In the former, successful implementation occurs when policy implementers comply 100 percent with what has been designed by researchers. In the latter option, finding an optimal learning strategy is what guarantees the overall success of policy implementation (Hoppe, 588).

My dissertation identifies two types of criteria for civil service reform success, including the *technical criteria* (compliance and control), and the *substantial criteria* such as the quality of institutions and bureaucratic performance. To analyze issues in civil service reform implementation, I also delineate between the factors and variables of policy implementation progress, pointing out that factors (leadership, legacy and the strategy of reform), unlike variables (the role of formal and informal institutions, the lack of a normative consensus among key national players, the transformative capacities of national bureaucracies, reform management tools, etc.) affect civil service reform indirectly. To reiterate, the empirical puzzle of my work concerns differentiated CSR progress in a wide range of non-democratic and semi-democratic systems. The main challenge at this stage is to explain how various indicators of reform progress can be defined and how to best measure them.

Cross-country empirical analyses demonstrate that the best way to achieve greater results in terms of economic performance is to improve the quality of state institutions (Brewer, 401). However, the means to achieving greater efficiency and greater effectiveness are not clear. While many nations have implemented administrative and civil service reforms, few have tried to measure the results in a systematic fashion (Brewer 2004, 403). The criteria of success remain vague and may not necessarily indicate any clear correlation between administrative reform and good governance. In post-Communist states, in particular, these problems are complicated by the fact that there are too many variables associated with parallel reforms. In this context, it is difficult to decide where exactly obstacles to civil service reform progress originate. Brym (2009), Rauch and Evans (2000) and others, for example, point out the advantages of a traditional public administration system, which include meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion, and

career stability as important prerequisites of good governance (Brewer, 401).[17] By contrast, Court, Kristen, and Weder (1999) argue that bureaucratic performance improves in relation to a set of criteria, including agency power and autonomy, better career opportunities in the public sector employment.

Knack (1995) uses three criteria to measure bureaucratic performance in their cross-national analysis: "the quality of bureaucracy", "corruption in government", and "rule of law". High scores on the quality of bureaucracy indicate "autonomy from political pressure" and "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services." This measure also includes "the existence of an established mechanism for recruiting and training" (Brewer, 407). Corruption in government indicates various forms of bribery that could be identified depending on whether high government officials are likely to demand special or illegal payments. Finally, rule of law (law and order tradition) "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicates disputes" (407).

It is obvious that some indicators mentioned above (the quality of bureaucracy, corruption in government and bureaucratic performance) represent substantial measures of policy implementation progress (these are policy outcomes). Other indicators (meritocratic recruitment, promotion, agency power and autonomy and others) are the means of achieving reform progress.[18] [19] For example, there is an overwhelming consensus among scholars that a state's bureaucracy should be more or less independent (autonomous) from political pressures to ensure a successful policy implementation process. However, the consequences of bureaucratic autonomy, according to the literature, are far from straightforward. According to Knill (1999) bureaucracies should be independent, yet not fully autonomous, in order to fulfill political projects, especially when these projects aim to achieve comprehensive paradigmatic change.

---

[17] Gimpelson, Magun and Brym (2009), for example, provide us with the following explanation: "State officials become efficient, competent, and highly motivated only if a certain set of institutional preconditions prevail…Sociologists subsequently demonstrated that the higher the degree to which state bureaucracies approximate the Weberian ideal, the more benefitial the state bureaucracy's effect on macroeconomic performance as measured by GDP growth. Key aspects of 'Weberiannes' examined in this connection are procedures governing entry intro, and promotion in the civil service. Such procedures included *meritocratic and competitive recruitment, life-long tenure, and career predictability* as measured by the filling of medium- and top-level positions mainly by means of promotions in what labor economists call "internal labor markets" (Rowney and Huskey 2009, p.232).

[18] The literature does not really distinguish between the two.

[19] This model invokes some criticism, because efficiency implies speed and productivity, not necessarily quality. In a neo-Weberian model, the dichotomy between effectiveness and professionalism (or meritocracy) could be riversed (the latter will be the goal; the former will be the means).

Rule of law is one of the most problematic measures, as it may be viewed as both a prerequisite of good governance and a result of improved bureaucratic rationalization. It is not possible to reform the government, which is deeply corrupt, whereas attempts to improve the rule of law require substantial improvements in the quality of public bureaucracy. The core attributes of this measure (in its 'thin' version) include open and legitimate procedures for law making, legal hierarchy, transparency of laws and regulations, clarity, consistency, stability, and enforcement of laws (Solomon 2008). Not all of these features are developed equally well in all countries, and the differences may be observed even at the sub-national level (some of the sectors and regions could be regulated better then others). All in all, the rule of law measure reflects public trust in government, and institutional capacity to govern. Efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and responsiveness can be viewed as generic measures of bureaucratic performance, which is indispensable from the quality of public bureaucracy and may be used as a 'proxie' of the desired reform outcomes.

Taking into consideration the difficulties associated with measuring reform progress (uncertainty of policy outcomes in the preliminary stages of reform, the lack of clarity in CSR model (Weberian versus NPM mechanisms), and subjectivity of individual evaluations), in this study, I use categories of 'success' and 'failure' of reform in a way so as to increase variation on the dependent variable. Specifically, I suggest that reform progress has to be described and operationalized not as a dichotomous variable consisting of success or failure, but rather as a continuum, where a degree of implementation could be measured with the use of policy outputs (the timeline and content of implementation measures) and policy consequences (rule of law, regulatory effectiveness, corruption in government, etc.). I also question the ability of policy leaders to establish contextually appropriate and feasible goals of the reform (which may be reflective of the degree of technical expertise, e.g. success on its own, considering the state of institutional capacity in post-Communist states), in addition to policy implementers' ability to comply with the goals established by the reformers (implementation capacity). In this respect, the parameters of success are somewhat stretched, encompassing not only the realm of policy implementation, but also the stage of policy formulation. This is done in view of the fact that my primary goal is not measuring outcomes (as outcomes usually result from multiple parallel reforms), but rather understanding whether reform progress has been achieved (to what extent it was achieved and where it stopped) and how the varying degrees of implementation could be explained.

It is important to mention that I use terms, such as success and failure rather extensively in my substatinve chapters where I reflect on interviews summarizing experts' opinions and to

describe variation on the dependent variable. However, I also recognize that variation includes a large number of cases appearing in-between the two extreemes of a continuum. This approach may be useful in evaluating the preliminary outcomes of reforms (when decisive answer is not possible). In addition, **we would not be able to say much about policy implementation dynamism unless we adopt a more flexible approach toward the cases of reform success and failure**.

Independent variables revolve around the concepts of leadership, strategy and institutions (based on the hypotheses). In this respect, reform leadership and reform strategy may partially coincide when we try measuring them with the criteria of reform funding and legislative support. I distinguish between the two [leadership and strategy] with the goal of identifying the original intent of policy leaders (genuine commitment versus symbolic effort) and miscalculations made in the reform strategy, in case of when political commitment to the reform is present. All in all, this approach seems to be useful, because it is sensitive to motivations of policy leaders, and views implementation as a process, which is continuously informed by tactical and strategic choices of policy formulators.

## 1.5 Methods and Data

### 1.5.1 Case Selection

This study combines a variety of qualitative methodological instruments to assess the impact of key variables on civil service reform progress in post-Communist states. The basic research method employed in my dissertation is representative case study, which also relies on original interviews (collected in Russia in 2010), the study of primary and secondary sources, the method of process tracing and cross-country comparisons.

To analyze the civil service reform process in a consistent way (as much as it is possible for a study aiming to not only test, but also generate hypotheses) and to increase the variation on the dependent variable, I focus on several comparative cases of post-Communist transformation, including Central and East European states and Central Asian states. Countries chosen have shared many things in common in their past, even though the pace and outcomes of their transformative process considerably diverged. The reason I included these groups of states in my research is that they provide a great opportunity to test the initial hypotheses of my research. Moreover, at his moment, it is not easy to find successful cases of CSR on the territory of the

former SU. Thus the study of Hungary or the Baltic states serves the goal of not only accumulating research data (CA), but also substantiating causal factors of CSR progress.

Interestingly, the preliminary analysis of post-Comunist region allows identifying a great variety of polar opposite cases, where diverse policy choices resulted in similar reform outputs, or, by contrast, similar strategies have caused completely different repercussions. None of the aforementioned cases could be described as fully successful (at least, prior to this research); thus my current choice is quite generic, and it pursues the goal of gathering more information on the history of adoption and implementation of civil service laws.

As mentioned earlier, the Russian case stands out because of the internal driving force associated with the change of political leadership, the size of it's public bureaucracy, it's super-presidential constitutional design and a wide array of problems of it's federal administrative system. The reason I chose Russia as a major focus of my in-depth research concerns the fact that the nation's political leadership has devoted much effort to strengthening administrative capacities of the Russian state in recent years. Reforms in this country have been driven internally rather than by the EU accession process; however, most of them were unsustainable in the expected results. All things considered, this case may be described as both representative and outstanding, even though not completely paradigmatic, and it may provide a wealth of information on various aspects of civil service in a controlled environment. The study of policy-making system in Russia is valuable on its own, because some features I have mentioned (the driving force of reforms and a change of leadership in the early 2000s) are critical to my explanation. At the same time, I am not so much interested in a way in which isolated formal institutions (presidential versus parliamentary system, etc.) affect policy outcomes. My interest lies within the range of informal conditions, which shape reform processes and outcomes. Moreover, I suggest that it is generally impossible to build theoretically informed explanations based on a single case of Russia only.

Out of two general strategies in comparative analysis – method of difference and method of agreement (i.e. the Most Similar and Most Different Research Designs) - only the first one is reliable enough to substantiate causality.[20] Scholars assert that, in many cases, the researcher is unable to manipulate variables, and, as such, the method of difference in its direct and rigorous application is untenable. A common response to this problem has been to apply the so called *indirect method of difference*, which involves a sequential application of the method of agreement

---

[20] Mill distinguishes between two strategies of comparative research. His method of agreement is to search for a single common condition among cases that agree on the outcome. His method of difference is to search for a single distinguishing feature among cases that disagree on the outcome (Ragin, 36-42).

– first on positive cases (to identify a causal candidate) and then on negative ones (to ascertain that the causal candidate is absent) (Stokke, 2).

My study uses a similar technique, though the letter is compromised by the nature of inconclusive research available at the moment. To explain the differences in reform processes and reform outcomes, I first examine the two groups of cases, so as to confirm the presence of comparable factors behind similar trends (the groups of CEE and CA states are completely different, yet each of them includes most similar cases to be discussed in-depth). I then focus on Russia, which shares many things with the groups discussed earlier. At this stage, I am trying to identify the basic factors affecting PCS (civil service reform in particular) in a step-by-step manner. Obviously, the study observes some 'outliers' among the cases of post-Communist transformation, which include not only specific countries, but also Russian regions. This method is not a systematic comparative study; however, it extends the scope of analysis, proving that Russia should not be viewed as an isolated case of post-Communist transition.[21]

As mentioned earlier, the first most obvious reason, which makes former Soviet states both useful and interesting for comparative research is that they share similar histories and dynamics of post-Communist transformation. It is well known that immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, the structure of bureaucratic organization in post-Communist states remained cumbersome and chaotic, and it was overloaded with such issues as a *lack of professionalism, excessive politicization, corruption, and a culture of pervasive and irresistible intervention*. Beblavy (2001) argues that the real heritage of Communism was not a hierarchical and disciplined public sector with a distinctive culture and ethos, but rather a chaotic free-for-all system. In this system, organizations enjoyed legally defined autonomy, their managers remained responsive to political pressures, and their staff enjoyed very little political accountability. On the whole, after the collapse of the USSR, public administration employees lacked skills and the information needed to participate in policy-making in the new world of market democracy (58-59).

Some scholars (Beblavy 2002, Kotchegura 2008) argue that the overarching strategy and rationale of governance and administrative reform, which attempted to change the role of the state and the level of government involvement in economic and social affairs, exercised the most important influence over post-Communist civil service. In an attempt to remedy some of the

---

[21] While it is difficult to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful stories, it is important to understand the reasons for the differential implementation progress in various places and contexts. Overall, my study attempts to avoid broad generalizations describing all experiences as being successful or unsuccessful; it is rather concerned with the differential implementation progress in a comparative perspective.

major imperfections of the post-Communist system, state authorities have repeatedly introduced measures to cut down public sector employment and government involvement in the civil society. These cuts were smaller than the actual decrease in financial resources available to governments, but they significantly affected the level of funding, prestige, and stability of the civil service (59).

Paradoxically, consecutive public bureaucracies after the collapse of the Soviet Union have successfully adjusted to the new conditions and have managed to consolidate their positions in the economic, social, and political realms. Mendras (2001) argues that "at all territorial levels, they [public bureaucracies] have come out of those years of change and turmoil **stronger and more immune** to political pressure and legal constraints" (2). As a result of this process, the administrative structure in some post-Communist states, turned out to be not hierarchical as has always been assumed by the scholars, but rather horizontal, i.e. penetrated by a complicated set of informal networks. This process was particularly evident in Russia, where the growing influence of horizontal bureaucratic networks accompanied the process of political recentralization.

One of the most obvious problems associated with the process of post-Communist transformation in Russia concerns the fact that the level of strength and influence within public bureaucracies (at the top level) has allegedly grown alongside a process of political recentralization*.* Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of ex-Soviet bureaucratic organizations have accumulated a significant amount of power over the last several decades, while state institutions have remained weak. The combination of these two competing processes has undermined the state's *capacity* to formulate and implement consistent reform strategies.[22] An important premise associated with this observation is that bureaucracies have managed to strengthen their positions, and they possess a functionality of their own, i.e. they perform tasks that are absolutely crucial to the state, society, individuals, and businesses (Mendras, 2001). Alternatively, bureaucrats effectively pursue their own interests, thus being capable of resisting pressures for change, including the will of political actors.

It is important to note that comparing policy implementation processes in post-Communist states is not an easy task, due to the fact that each nation operates within a unique institutional and political context. First of all, there are a large number of countries in the former

---

[22] Parison (2000) suggests that over the years of transformation, post-Communist administrative systems have accumulated "too much power in too many places." Thus discretion and discretionary powers, inherited from the past, in an unclear, contradictory, and complex legal environment have created an unbalanced power pyramid and a system which is far from being merit-based, transparent, service-oriented, and accountable to the public. It would be reasonable to say that the state has lost control over bureaucracy. According to the unofficial figures, more than 70% of corruptive practices were centered in local bureaucracies by the end of Yeltsin's presidency; over time, these corruptive practices have shifted to the central level.

Communist world, each of which underwent the process of democratization to highly varying degrees. Secondly, the policy processes and policy outcomes of each country vary not only at the national level, but also across and within their regions. My preliminary research demonstrates that *the driving forces of change, timing and the sequence of steps* in the area of PAR and CSR were different across the post-Communist region. Thus it is important to clarify the role of these explanatory variables in policy process.

The difficulty of comparing Russia to the rest of the former Soviet republics stems from the fact that it is the only Federal state among them with a super-Presidential administrative system.[23] At the same time, experiences of Central and Eastern European states suggest that such generic factors as  state-building efforts, the process of democratization, institutional change and others, matter in all cases of post-Communist transformation. Thus in order to understand the reasons for the success or failure of CSR, we have to consider various aspects of state formation, even though these aspects might not be the crucial explanatory variables of policy change.

As it was mentioned earlier, the cases of my research are countries, though I also focus on various aspects of CSR and PAR reform projects – de-politicization, anti-corruption, meritocratic recruitment, personnel policies, and so forth. The Russian case is one of the most complex cases of post-Communist transformation, and it systemically examines the key variables of my research (leadership, strategy and institutional legacies). In the study of the Russian case I first identify the stages of civil service reform, the key actors in the reform process (bureaucrats, politicians, interest groups), and the specific factors affecting the policy implementation processes. Second, I look at the key explanatory variables of policy implementation. This analysis underscores the varying reform outcomes witnessed across and within each nation.

*1.5.2 Sources and Data*

A large part of my research draws upon anonymous *semi-structured interviews* with senior public officials and civil service experts in Russia, who were involved in the process of policy formulation and implementation over the last several decades. The sample of interviewees included 30 experts referenced in major public policy reform committees, academic journals, and within circles of public policy professionals both in Canada and Russia. All interview themes were linked with the basic variables of my research, i.e. political leadership, institutional legacies and the strategy of the reform process, but the topics discussed covered other relevant areas such

---

[23] Central Asian States are also examples of Presidential and semi-Presidential systems, but most them are unitary, not federal, states.

as the conflict of interest among major reform stakeholders, informal practices that enabled the old guard to expand their sphere of influence, transformative capacities of national and regional bureaucracies (institutional framework, collective and individual action, resources available), the choice of policy instruments, sources of ideational change, and so forth.

The sites of interviews included Institute of Strategic Analysis (Institut Strategicheskikh Razrabotok), Higher School of Economics, the Russian Academy of Science under the President (RAGS), Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow State University (MGU) and others. Civil servants (most of them former civil servants) were also recruited from the circle of experts who had sufficient knowledge of the Russian policy-making system and were willing to participate in interviews.

One of the main shortcomings of my research is that I was only able to secure interviews with a few top-ranking public servants. These actors were generally reluctant to answer my questions in view of recent legislative changes prohibiting civil servants to discuss their work in public. In addition, top-ranking officials would not be able to give an accurate account of the policy implementation process, and therefore, they would refer me to other mid-level or low-level public servants. The group of civil servants experts in Russia is also very limited (generally, there is a lack of civil service experts in Russia). This problem constitutes an obvious, yet inevitable potential bias of my research.

Additional method employed in my study to collect data included *policy analysis and process tracing,* which provide us with multiple opportunities to understand and explain the choices made by the post-Communist officials. The method of process tracing can be defined as a type of 'within-case' analysis to evaluate causal processes. According to McKeown (1985), this method not only relies on the comparison of variations across variables in each case, but also "investigates and explains the *decision process* by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes" (1). George and Bennett (2005) suggest that the method of process-tracing attempts to establish the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (205). Overall, this research method provides one with useful analytical tools to understand actors' preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions (Faletti, 1).[24] Collier (2004) argues that "the descriptive component of process-tracing begins not

---

[24] According to George and McKeown, "the process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual

with observing change or sequence, but rather with taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments" (824). Critically, the researcher is given the opportunity to trace unfolding events over time.

In this study, the method of process tracing, which enables a researcher to achieve several goals at the same time (identify novel political and social phenomena, evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses, gain insight into causal mechanisms, and so on), is used to assess the role of political leadership in policy implementation, which covers such processes as (1) reform funding; (2) legislative support and (3) the style of policy-making over the time span of reform. The major idea behind this study is that not all policy is designed to fulfill the promises policy-makers make, and policy analysis represents a study of the *implicit choices* a given community makes about its valued interests and goals.

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. (1) Chapter One represents an introductory chapter, which elaborates on the objectives, research questions, hypotheses and methods of my research. (2) Chapter Two presents the context of my study, setting the analytical boundaries of my research and placing the cases of post-communist transformation into a wider perspective of the world governance trends. (3) Chapter Three outlines the conceptual framework dealing with alternative explanations of policy implementation dynamism in a transitional context. (4) Chapter Four elaborates on causal candidates and presents the analysis of civil service reforms in a range of post-communist states, including Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the countries of Central Asia. (5) Chapter Five reviews major CSR developments in Russia, based on interviews, as well as the study of primary and secondary sources. (6) Chapter Six conducts an in-depth analysis of major explanatory variables of policy implementation process (leadership, legacies and the strategy of CSR). (7) Chapter Seven analyzes the cross-regional variation of policy implementation dynamics during the years of Putin's presidency. Finally, Conclusion (8), synthesizes the findings and discussion presented in earlier chapters and relates these findings to the literature discussed in Chapter Two and Three.

---

behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, behaviour, and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour" (George and McKeown 1985, 35)

**Table 1: Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables**

| Independent Variables | Operationalization (IV) | Dependent Variable (DV) |
|---|---|---|
| Political Leadership of the Reform Process | Conditions that help determining political commitment to reform implementation:<br>1) Official policy discourse reflective of the government's priority-setting process;<br>Policy decisions (follow-up support):<br>2.1 Legislative support to the reform process;<br>2.2 Allocation of funds during the time span of the reform;<br>2.3 Reform communication strategy | Criteria of success:<br><br>1. Formalized, clear and transparent rules (personnel policies, bureaucratic behaviour and conflict of interest regulations)<br>2. Application of norms in line with the existing guidelines<br>-3. The quality of governance and bureaucratic performance (indicators rather than criteria)<br><br>Criteria of failure (failed or unsuccessful cases): |
| Resistance from within (institutional structure with entrenched interests) | Institutional design, i.e.:<br>(a) Separation of powers;<br>(b)The strength of the executive<br>(c) The place and role of public bureaucracy (target group) in the existing institutional system<br>    2) Values and behaviour of civil servants<br><br>Indicators of transformative capacity of state bureaucracy (selective): 1) the capacity of national bureaucracies to shape policy formulation; 2) the capacity of national/regional bureaucracies to shape policy implementation process | **Cases of non-implementation** (considerable delay in concretization of norms, refusal to implement, distortion of goals or intent, etc.<br>Lack of transparency or consistency in the newly emerged norms<br><br>**Characteristics of the reform progress:** 1) Comprehensive vs selective treatment of reform priorities (variation in policy outcomes, if any); 2) Delays in implementation or concretization of norms; 3) Implementation measures (coherency, progression, funding, as well as gaps and contradictions in the newly emerged regulations). |
| Reform strategy[25] | The scope and the time frame of the reforms;<br>The sequence of reform measures;<br>Policy instruments | |

---

[25] Rstrategy is used twice in this study, first, to operationalize leadership (H1), and second, to operationalize state capacity (H2, H3). Strategy, however, may not be fully equated with any of those.

28

# CHAPTER 2

# STATE, GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION REFORM: CONCEPT FORMATION

## 2.1  Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to provide useful theoretical and empirical background for the analysis of policy-making processes in a variety of political contexts. In what follows, I set the boundaries of PAR and CSR and make several important claims concerning the real world developments leading to implementation deadlock of the contextually misaligned reform projects. First, I claim that a great number of reforms tend to rationalize public bureaucracies via the mechanism of policy diffusion (reforms are often triggered by the external forces). Second, the reform strategies predominant throughout the world attempt to change public bureaucracies comprehensively (reforming nearly all aspects of public bureaucracy at once). These strategies emerge quite often as a result of a perceived crisis; however, they rarely succeed, due to excessive legacies of post-Communism, such as informal cultural bareers, structure and organization of the decision-making process. My third claim contends that international policy discourse, regardless of its authoritative nature, is getting 'filtered' through policy preferences of individual national leaders and political elites, who are certainly capable of using similar policy ideas and tools for a wide range of instrumental reasons. In this respect, the role of external pressures is most obvious during the starting points of change, where the goals of nearly all states coincide. However, the real mening of new policy initiatives becomes obvious from the decision-making process at implementation stage. Consequently, the more convergence happens on the formal side of public administration; the more obvious the informal individual attributes of these practices, which define their national particular features turn out.

Considering the unproductive nature of civil service reform implementation across nations, it is important to understand how and why various policies get enacted (i.e. whether they are driven by real or symbolic policy efforts); and in what way they get interpreted and implemented at the domestic level (do they mean the same thing in various contexts?). The main argument derived from the field of developmental studies suggests that in order to overcome resistance it is important to build stronger links between institutional prerequisites of public policy change and the actual political, social and economic conditions in each country. I argue

29

that this statement, which is certainly relevant for the former Soviet Republics, is complemented by the concept of domestic **'filters', structuring the process of decision-making at implementation stage**. Findings, distilled from this research, may apply to a wide range of coutries, participating in state modernization agenda, regardless of whether they become members of the EU. The reason is that domestic policies consider international CSR agendas and solutions nearly everywhere in the world. Thus the only reason to disaggregate among states actively involved in Europeanization project or not is to 'factor in' the strength of external pressures of socialized rather than perfectly rational policy actors.

To assist the development of my argument, this chapter asks the following questions. What are the boundaries of PAR and CSR? How does the meaning of PAR and CSR vary from one country to another? What are the driving forces and the obstacles to reforms on a global scale? The reason I deal with these questions at first place is to **disaggregate between international policy trends and those conditions, which appear to be nationally specific**. I suggest that this approach contributes to a more accurate analysis of causal mechanisms within PAR and CSR in a transitional context.

## 2.2 The Nature of Reforms We Are Dealing With

Administrative reform is one of the most dynamic aspects of modern state, as it deals with the core public sector, the administrative side of the government and public management (Khan 2011, 37). The importance of administrative reform is obvious from the fact that it affects the relationship between the state and society, thereby bringing fundamental changes in the existing political structure. The success of administrative reform largely depends upon the will of the key national players to properly manage policy implementation process. Issues of timing, content, and implementation strategies are equally important.

Since its introduction in 1960, administrative reform has been used as a popular strategy to bring about major changes in entrenched bureaucracies. Scholars have examined the variety of factors triggering public policy change, and this helped them arrive at varying definitions of PAR and CSR processes. For example, Caiden (1969) defined PAR as the "artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance" (Caiden 1969. 65). Lee (1970) has pointed out at the role of ideas in implementing policy change. Abueva (1970) emphasized the role of power, authority and influence in changing the *goals, structures and procedures* of modern democracies. Finally, Ndue (2005) elaborated on the so called "moral content" of public administrative reform

that seeks to create a better system by removing faults and imperfections in the previous one. Today, most experts agree that public sector reforms are driven by diverging reasons, and the term "administrative reform" is used as an umbrella notion for the process of complex rebuilding of public administration grounded in ideational, institutional and interest-based processes.

The trend of change that occurred between 1980 and 1990s in Western European countries has been guided by the ideas of New Public Management (NPM) approach directed toward a more flexible and more complex societal organization. Although reform programs varied across states, most of them were trying to solve similar problems pertaining to economic inefficiency, poor service delivery, lack of responsiveness, accountability and fiscal pressures. In transition countries, the main development has also encompassed radical decentralization measures (Temmes 2004).

Christensen and Lægreid (2009) identify the two waves of NPM and post-NPM administrative reforms, whith the fist wave focusing on structural devolution, market-based pronciples and economic efficiency; and the second wave dealing with issues of central capacity, control and coordination within and between public sectors (2). The authors associate the stages of reform with the shifts in democratic accountability patterns ('from input to output democracy'). However, this observation does not apply to countries beyond the world of North America and Western Europe, where the waves of centralization-decentralization occurred earlier in time (to be more specific, there is a gap of more than ten years between the starting point of managerial restructuring in the West and elsewhere else).

One of the most interesting questions, in this respect, concerns the source of change and reasons for the adoption of innovative reform strategies. In line with the existing empirical observations, government reforms originated, historically, either at the top or at the bottom of society, depending on a political and social context. For example, American government reform originated in public dissatisfaction with the government (bottom-up process); in Europe, a similar reform movement was initiated by the European Union (top-down process). In recent years, however, there has been a growing number of external pressures to reform. In this context, Manning and Parison (2003) assert that the reforms in the area of public administration have never been a self-evident priority; neither have they emerged as a result of pressure or national mobilization strategy:

"Given the enormous difficulties entailed in shifting *vested interests*, there is no intrinsic reason why administrative reform should rank alongside structural reforms or social reforms as a priority for action. There is of course a growing recognition that institutions are more important for development, but it is not at all clear which institutions are the most crucial and there is very little evidence that the specific details of government structure and accountability arrangements affect growth (World Bank 2006, p.6)."

Nigro and Kellough (2006) identified three categories of reasons for administrative reform worldwide – ideological, technical and political (315-318). (1) The first of this is ideology, or a belief on the part of policy makers and their associates that "a particular way of handling the human resources needs and functions of state government is inherently superior and will lead to better outcomes of all sorts" (315)[26]. (2) A second category of reason for reform is political. In this case, administrative reforms originate in the intention to build or realign power of the actors and stakeholders who find themselves in a symbiotic relationship with state bureaucrats (317).[27] (3) Finally, the third set of reasons for administrative reforms is technical (318). It encompasses a wide range of efforts to improve human resource and public management system so as to adjust to the changing environmental conditions.[28] The distinction among these motives of reform is purely theoretical, as it has always been a combination of contextually determined efforts aiming to achieve some fundamental change in national administrations.

Almost all policy initiatives aiming to adjust state administration in Western and Eastern Europe have recently been driven by *economic crises*. Meanwhile, some of the states engaged in extensive governmental reform as a part of Europeanization (or democratization), whereas others have focused on issues of state legitimacy and performance. For exmaple, in many places, the notion of civil service reform has been closely intertwined with the concept of good governance and the process of political and economic transformation. This is explained by the influence of the international development reform community, which uses civil service reform (CSR) instrumentally as a method to bring about greater stability and economic austerity to financially unsustainable regions.[29]

In a more recent literature on public sector reforms, attention has shifted from the descriptive analysis of NPM to the discussion of paradoxes associated with implementation of this strategy (the relationship between administrative reform and democracy, discontinuities and unintended effects of reforms). Barzelay (2002, 2001), Pollitt (1995, 2003, 2007), Peters (2004, 2008, 2009), Christensen and Laegrid (2001, 2007, 2009) have greatly contributed to this body of research. Interestingly, nearly all of them have viewed civil service as a single (though essential) part of comprehensive administrative reform project, which covered the principles of formation

---

[26] The best example would be the post-Communist system change during the early 1990s.

[27] Examples include some of the post-Communist states (quite recently), as well as the new members of the EU.

[28] These are most reforms all over the world.

[29] Any reform is a context-bound process. Thus to build a model of public sector change one has to take into account specific institutional settings, actors and their strategies, i.e. one must go beyond the ideological, political and technical components of the reform (318).

and management of public bureaucracy.[30] Therefore, while the scope of CSR is broader than the scope of PAR (with the former covering all civil servants; and the latter covering the executive), the fields of state administration and civil service have not been clearly disaggregated.

Evidence provided by the aforementioned accounts suggests that the number of countries, which managed to resolve their governance issues at once with the use of NPM mechanisms has been strikingly insignificant, although innovative and all-inclusive public policy changes were attempted nearly everywhere. Some of the very technical areas of PAR, such as e-governance, proved to be more successful than others. However, the majority of states have faced severe obstacles in tackling the problems of poor performance management, politicization of the civil service, corruption in government, and lack of trust. Re-defining the role of the state in economic and political development proved to be equally difficult.

The meaning of public administration and civil service reforms varied from one country to another, despite the adoption of similar instruments and mechanisms. For some countries, government reform was all about structural change and innovation (among these cases were Western democracies and some developmental states, such as Singapore); for others, it was all about establishing greater control and subordination of civil servants to the top level political executive. In Post-Communist societies, the challenge has been to rationalize large, outmoded bureaucracies, even though reforms have been commonly framed with the use of policy discourse borrowed from parallel reform projects. For example, in the Czech Republic of the early 1990s, public administration changes have blended with the reform of territorial self-government and regional administration (Kotchegura 2008, 126). Starting from the early 2000s, the New Public Management discourse with its emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency concerns prevailed in most CEE states, including Russia.

Frustration with the status quo, financial and political problems feature prominently among the reasons for reform. In this respect, some of the mainstream published accounts extend the list of reasons to such common problems as sluggishness of state structures, inflexible government, the lack of sensitivity to changing human needs and circumstances (Caiden 1991, 1), etc. Evidence suggests, however, that in defining the meaning of reforms, much depends on policy preferences of individual national governments, and as I have said earlier, reforms may be adopted with the goal of realigning political powers bases, or with the goal of achieving substantial reform outputs (depending on how serious policy-makers' concern over the crisis of

---

[30] The principles of formation and management of public bureaucracy cover such issues as recruitment, training, promotion, discipline and the security of tenure (in some cases, revenue and expenditure management system.

state administration is). Thus despite the existence of considerable resemblances in the proposed solutions (or reasons to reform), change in vocabulary does not mean much in a sense that it does not necessarily invoke real change in policy formulation and policy implementation process. Ultimately, public sector reforms may serve hidden goals, and therefore, not all of them get a chance to pass through implementation stage.

Recent research on the 'state after communism' demonstrated that many public bureaucracies in post-communist Europe appeared to be resistant to any kind of change, and even more so to the wholesale transformation, which posed questions on the utility of "western-style" models that could be transferred to other countries (Nunberg 1999, 265). Problems associated with the reform commonly originated in the complexity of the required change, the lack of vision, and finally, strategic and tactical choices that policy makers have to take at each stage of policy formulation. In this respect, the range of questions varied from those which are profound and fundamental, i.e. the model of public administration they are trying to build, to the process of micro-implementation, which includes setting up the goals, strategies, activities and contacts of the actors involved.[31] My interest lies in the opportunity to identify and explain cross-national and cross-sectoral variations of civil service reform progress, which occur in a context of internationally homogenous policy discourse. I am particularly interested in finding ways to explain in what way decisions made by political leaders at the domestic level respond to a wide range of external and internal pressures (if any), and if the former could be used instrumentally to achieve varying yet seemingly congruent policy outcomes.[32]

### 2.2.1 Setting the Boundaries of Civil Service Reform

Public administration and civil service reforms represent separate, though closely related, policy domains. Administrative reform encompasses measures to reorganize and downsize the structure of executive bodies, including principles of operation and the ways in which they interact with one another, the citizenry, and with other organizations. Civil service reform, by contrast, focuses exclusively on issues concerned with the formation and management of the civil service (in all branches), including bureaucratic recruitment, training, pay and promotion,

---

[31]A major constraint on CSR for economic and social development is the rising politicization of the civil service. However, the focus of the reforms is nearly always something else, not the principles of political neutrality.

discipline, and security of tenure (aimed at improving state administrative capacity and the quality of state service) (Tompson, 2007).

Historically, "administrative reform" and "civil service reform" have been used almost interchangeably. Quite recently, however, these notions were embraced by the so called "good governance debate" which is used as an all-inclusive framework for making policy decisions more effective in terms of accountability and citizen participation. Interestingly, the notion of civil service reform has become closely intertwined with the process of political and economic decentralization. The reason for this is the influence of international development reform projects, which commonly use CSR instrumentally, as a method to bring about greater economic austerity to the financially unsustainable regions. For example, one of the United Nations publications (MDGD 2001) argues that CSR contributes to "macroeconomic stabilization by restoring budgetary stability, strengthening revenue collection, managing aid, and improving development performance" (11). At the same time, CSR may contribute to the design and implementation of programmes for social development, which is conditioned by the fact that both capacity of civil servants and their morale are significantly improved.

Internationally, CSR encompasses varied practices for setting up efficient systems of budgeting, service delivery, recruitment, promotion, payroll, and other aspects of an effective civil service. In many cases, these processes are closely intertwined with economic liberalization projects, as well as the process of democratization.

Trying to set clear boundaries between my own research and the mainstream of international reform projects, I would like to mention that the actual linkage between civil service reform, economic development and democratization has never been clear cut. For example, scholars (Christensen and Lægreid 2009, Peters 2010 and others) traditionally pointed out at the conflicting tendencies within national bureaucracies and the process of democratization; the influence of CSR upon the process of economic development has always been difficult to prove. Meanwhile, I assume that CSR can eventually lead to the process of democratization, in case it assists strengthening the administrative capacity of the state[33]. At the same time, there should be clear ideological reasons for the reform, bringing about the new ways of thinking about the state, bureaucracy and the national policy-making systems.

The literature on Central and Eastern European transition (O'Dwyer, Gzymala-Busse and others) provides interesting accounts of democratization process affecting the speed, the timing and content of CSR. These studies suggest that the process of democratization (specifically, the

---

[33] State administrative capacity is defined here as rational legality within the bureaucratic and administration system.

process of institutionalizing party competition) is more likely to result in a stable, politically neutral civil service. Thus, even though the actual linkage between various aspects of reform and the process of democratization is not fully explored, it is obvious already that the process of democratization may not only result from PCS reforms, but also serve as a precondition of transitioning to a new model of rational (modern) bureaucracy.[34]

Generally, despite the fact that there is an obvious juxtaposition between bureaucracy and democratic governance, civil service reform may indeed be used as an instrument fostering democratization process in the transitioning states. First of all, CSR is essential to promoting and sustaining pluralism in political life and ensuring the participation of citizens in public activities. Second, the lack of political neutrality, the increase and the pervasiveness of corruption among politicians and civil servants are all hindering the development of democracy in many countries. Civil service reform promises to resolve these problems by establishing clear and transparent rules of the game for a great number of policy actors (political actors, individual bureaucrats, civil society, bureaucracy as a uniform entity and others). Specifically, this process is supposed to connect the two varieties of democracy, i.e. 'input' democracy, which is exercised through the election channel, and 'output' democracy, which is built upon a direct connection between public officials and citizens (Peters 2008). A major challenge to CSR is devising an appropriate reform implementation strategy, as well as incentives to ensure that civil servants fulfill their responsibilities according to the newly established institutional constraints.

It is important to emphasize that comprehensive reform of governance systems requires commitment from political and administrative leaders, which is difficult to plan ahead of time. In this respect, policy-makers worldwide have recently advised in favour of incremental policy adaptations, suggesting they are less likely to be defeated by the lack of proper planning mechanisms, political or financial support at any point of time. The UN policy analysis, for example, concluded that comprehensive strategies were "neither possible nor desirable" in a wide range of transitioning and developmental states, given the difficulties of agreeing on a reform package and then implementing its elements (MDGD 2001). In this resepct, the study suggested focusing on a set of realistic and popular issues that could generate both political and administrative support to the subsequent reform developments. "This issue package [which starts from popular measures] can then serve as a CSR 'entry point', simply because most policy issues are interrelated: performance relates to both capacity and motivation, which, in turn, relate to

---

[34] These cases will be discussed in-depth in the following chapters of my study.

training and systemic environment. Once positive results are achieved in some functional areas, these can "snowball" in reinforcing efforts in other [policy sectors]" (31). [35] [36]

It is important to mention that the difficulty of CSR implementation originates in the nature of policy field and resources involved in the process of reform implementation. First of all, CSR belongs to the range of policy issues that rarely appear on public policy agenda "through social mobilization and pressure, although the involvement of domestic and international organizations is almost universal" (Thomas and Grindle 1994, 53). Second, CSR goes beyond institutional processes and structures, and it deals with human behaviour, which is difficult to change in a short period of time.

One of the reasons, which make CSR particularly difficult, is that it belongs to the range of problems with the costs concentrated within the government, whereas effects of these reforms are not immediately visible. Thomas and Grindle (1994) exemplified this type of public policy reform with the use of population policy in 16 developing states. Specific examples from this research demonstrated that policies with concentrated costs, which do not produce immediate results, endanger reactions from the body of state bureaucrats (62). In case of CSR, the situation is even more difficult, since public bureaucracies have a direct interest in the ongoing policy changes.

Some of the most obvious characteristics of this type of reform include, according to Thomas and Grindle: (a) "concentration of costs in government"; (b) "dispersion of benefits (long-term effects of the proposed policy changes)"; (c) "high administrative and technical content (policy requires coordinated efforts of public officials and institutions to ensure that it is carried; it is nearly always technicaly complex)"; (d) "public participation is limited (unlike in population policies)"; (e) "long duration of the reform process ('the longer time needed to implement a reform program, the less likely it is that conflict and resistance will emerge in a public arena and the more likely that administrative compliance and capacity within the system will determine the ability to implement and sustain the reform" (based on Thomas and Grindle 1994, 64). All in all, CSR, along with other similar policy domains, requires additional efforts at mobilizing political and public support. Therefore it is important to think about the ways in which problems of policy field (concentration of costs in the governments, measurement problems, etc.) are disaggregated from problems originating in a transitional or developmental context (flexible

---

[35] In both administrative and governance reforms, civil service component is essential in terms of reshaping the behaviour of policy actors and achieving some degree of reform sustainability.

[36] Regardless of the scope of reform processes, they should rely on a flexible system of policy-making process, which is capable of providing reasonable feedback and quick adaptations to the changing environment of these reforms (Brunsson and Olsen 1993, 32).

37

and informal institutions, the lack of policy implementation expertise and other issues discussed in the next chapter).

### 2.3 Implications of the Global Governance Movement

Before we proceed with the discussion of PAR and CSR global trends, it is useful to observe the ideal model of public bureaucracy and whether any of the existing types of bureaucracy (east and west) fits this model under the common trends altering the structure, dynamics and capacities of public governance systems all over the world.

The ideal model of public Bureaucracy described by Weber (1864–1920) distinguished among 6 principles of bureaucratic governance and control: (1) a formal hierarchical structure, (2) management by rules; (3) organization by functional specialty; (4) an "up-focused" or "in-focused" mission; (5) purposefully impersonal; (6) employment based on technical qualifications; (7) predisposition to grow in staff "above the line", etc. (Abazi 2012). Generally, none of these features are strongly present in any of the contemporary nation states. However, for analytical reasons, it is still useful to distinguish among democratic and non-democratic public administration systems.

One of the most important issues that help identifying the type of bureaucracy in a *democratic context* is the use of bureaucratic powers, which has to include limits on the discretionary powers of state bureaucrats. Impartiality, transparency of decision-making process, as well as the service-oriented operation principles are the hallmarks of democratic administrations (Abdellatif 2002). The latter are also commonly preoccupied with the task of creating fair conditions for economic development via regulation and by establishing a competitive private sector.

Public administration in a democracy, functioning in a market economy, should sustain at least the following basic qualities: (a) guarantee of fundamental rights, (b) legal certainty and predictability, (c) balance of powers, (d) instruments of accountability and control; (e) coherence within government transparency" (Romero-Perez 2002). All of these functions are crucial, yet problematic, as they depend on the extent to which the rule of law prevails. It is well known that communist administrative structures were based on a set of principles that were opposite to democratic governance and control, and therefore some of the former Soviet states still experience problems in establishing strong and competitive bureaucracies. The heritage is usually a part of the explanation why reforms rarely succeed. Some functions (particularly, horizontal government functions, such as the law-drafting process, the staffing and management of

www.manaraa.com

personnel in the administration, the budget process, financial control and policy-making process in general, need time to develop. Inheritance of post-Communism, which includes such features as a degree of formal political discretion associated with the dominance of the executive; rule 'by the law' (Solomon 2008); the lack of accountability, ethos and public distrust as a consequence; etc. make the aforementioned transition even more difficult.[37]

Control over discretion determines the effectiveness with which bureaucratic powers are used in various policy contexts. In this respect, views diverge on specific problems and risks associated with an excessive bureaucratic discretion. Critics on the left argue that discretion permits powerful social interests to impose their will upon the society. The political right, on the other hand, argues that bureaucracies are active and overwhelming; they are "excessively rigid and dogmatic and impose their own priorities on the private sector, especially on private businesses" (Peters 2008, 132). It is important to note, however, that in a democratic context, the rule of law is more important than the need to be accountable to the high-ranking officials. Many post-Communist states, in this respect, suffer from the same problem of moving reforms further than 'ordering' their civil service systems in line with the principles of executive accountability, which is easily confused with loyalty and patronage.

Representational role of public servants may be seen as inappropriate from the point of view of a traditional model. Meanwhile, street level bureaucrats have a much greater contact with population at large than the conventional political institutions do. Some types of public bureaucracies (primarily, democratic administrations) are capable of channelling information to their clients. By doing so they create alternative mechanisms for democracy, improve civic engagement and foster democratic politics.

It is important to note that Western democracies have recently encountered similar trends altering the structure and capacities of their public governance systems, which pushed these countries further toward employing similar reform strategies. Common trends in public governance structures include (a) the increasing segmentation of governing and administration – amidst attempts at centralization (this feature has been prevalent in some of the CEECs); (b) the shift in control mechanisms and public engagement; (c) decentralization, and (d) the increasing influence of public bureaucracy upon the decision-making processes, etc. The last trend (the

---

[37] It is important to note that post-Communist states vary in terms of their governance patterns with Bulgaria, Moldova, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine ranking lower on the rule of law and corruption in governance indicators than others (for more information, see Chapter 4 and World Governance Indicators 2013).

expansion of state bureaucracy) is one of the most widespread developments all over the world; therefore it belongs to the group of *typical rather than specific* policy settings.

The conventional working model of democracy has traditionally recognized the need of voters to control decisions made by the elected politicians. In this model, bureaucracy was expected to take orders from the highest levels; it also remained accountable to those who were in power. In recent years, however, Western democratic systems experienced an opposite trend, which empowered state bureaucrats and equipped them with the decision-making powers. Structural changes in both democratic and non-democratic states have shifted the locus of accountability from the elected politicians to state bureaucrats. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as an 'output' democracy model.

In addition to the shifting nature of accountability patterns, during the 1980-1990s, public bureaucracies all over the world started decentralizing their institutional structures. In many cases, they succeeded in shifting the responsibility from the top to the bottom, yet it would be a grave generalization to say that they became more democratic. One of the obstacles to public engagement is that people lack in understanding on how exactly control over the state apparatus may be exercised. Traditions of secrecy in the developing and transitioning states, in particular, exacerbate this problem even further. Thus depending on a historical context, the model of public administration, political regime and traditions of civic engagement, the level of public involvement varies from one country to another**.**

 Some scholars view the expansion of public bureaucracy as neither good nor bad, but rather inescapable in modern era. Peters (1996), for example, argues that bureaucratic power "may simply be a prerequisite of effective government in contemporary society" (8).  Even Weber, who feared the expansion of bureaucratic power, observed that there was no known example of a bureaucracy being destroyed except in the course of a general cultural decline (Lynn and Stein 2000), which proved that bureaucracy is ever lasting. Garvey (1993) argues that the paradigmatic problem of contemporary democratic state is finding the right balance between capacity and control of administrative transformation (control over responsiveness and accountability). Democracy would have no chance to survive without bureaucracy, because it would not be able to carry out programmatic promises of the system (Friederich, 1940, in Lynn and Stein 2000). Therefore, the expansion of public bureaucracy should be viewed as a consequence of a global trend toward rationalization.

Overall, changing accountability patterns, i.e. transformation of control capacities and democratic processes, is just another manifestation of a shift toward *legitimating via bureaucratic system*. Due to the shifting nature of democracy, public bureaucracies become the channel for

40

public representation. Traditional institutions (parliament, the executive system) that exercise control over bureaucratic discretion prove to be increasingly incapable of doing so, and therefore much depends on the involvement of public in policy-making process. The rise of interest in policy-making process compensates for seeming alienation from the state; however, this process does not completely eliminate the risk of undermining the fundamental principles of liberal democracy.

The *strategies* employed by the national governments to remedy inefficient public bureaucracies have also converged recently around similar principles and methods.[38] In this respect, one obvious problem associated with the global government reform movement is that the countries involved in similar reform efforts have different histories and different electoral systems. They also find themselves at different stages of development and face different problems, yet, to a surprising degree, they are employing similar concepts, approaches and strategies (Kamrack 2003).

The problem of *contextually inappropriate policies* is usually downplayed by the fact that various countries all over the world share similar problems. Meanwhile, the adoption of wrong strategies usually results in harmful unintended consequences. In this perspective, the question of "why similar reforms lead to different outcomes" is even less important than the question of why similar models appear to be adopted by various governments at first place.

Lynn (2010) argues that the notion of convergence which describes the tendency on behalf of national reform leaders to adopt similar reform strategies, and programmes (involving similar terminology), is reinforced by the variety of actors, such as the OECD, the International Institute for Administrative Sciences, NAPA and its Alliance for Reinventing Government, the International Public Management Network (IPMN), and the UN". What follows from this analysis is that the "choices of administrative arrangements may be a resultant of socialized rather than rational choice with organizational fields, of imitation, coercion, or ideology rather than of calculation and analysis"(116). Indeed, nation-states, these complex creations of modernity, appear to be shaped and re-shaped by the variety of non-state actors. The pool of actors involved depends on the following factors: political regime, the stage of development, institutional

---

[38] Government that costs less is probably one of the most desirable outcomes of the ongoing administrative reforms worldwide. Trying to resolve the problems that came into existence as a result of fiscal crises, most governments are trying to cut the cost and the size of government, impose strong financial controls and improve their budget process. Behind many of the budget reforms is an attempt to create a more rational set of incentives – ones that will reward, not punish, public servants for saving money. Quality government, professional government, digital government, government with regulatory reform and honest and transparent government – all these features represent the universal goals of government reform, even though implementation strategies may vary from one country to another.

structure, international political arrangements. All of these are 'filters' of the domestic decision-making, suggesting that reforms, which are not tailored accurately to the specific national conditions, are not likely to succeed.

On a theoretical level, recommendations devised by the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations, are clearly a mixture of neo-Weberianism and New Public Management strategy. For example, one of the concepts that is heavily advertised by the world leading institutions - 'good governance' - is not completely neutral. At the very basic level, it appears to be linked with the New Public Management strategy of reform, and it provides a set of important recommendations based upon this strategy.[39]

Nicodemus (2011) argues that the emergence of the new non-state actors as key stakeholders in governance issues and agendas has been reinforced by the weakening of the state legitimacy, which is also one of the causes for policy diffusion process. However, absolute governance without government is a myth. It is more likely that in future, the state will not only continue coordinating and implementing decisions that will be coming from various governance actors (as Nicodemus suggests), but it will proceed 'sorting out' ideas and decisions, according to instrumental reasons of domestic politics. "Governing the Hollow State" is a metaphor advanced by Milward (2000) for the increasing use of third parties, often non-profits to deliver social services and generally act in the name of the state. Flexibility is the strength of the hollow state, even though the idea of state hollowness is only partially valid.[40]

Regardless of the actual public policy content, there may be observed at least two contradictory trends toward rationalizing public bureaucracies in line the Weberian principles and modernizing them in line with NPM mechanisms. In developing countries, the process of rationalization happens as a consequence of a rushed modernization process, whereas transitioning states rationalize their bureaucratic systems as a result of policy diffusion. International experience suggests, however, that a tradition, or a *spirit of rationality* cannot be

---

[39]Several important international organizations engaged in policy making in this area, most notably the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations, have put anticorruption very high on their agendas (Bukovansky, 2006; Smith, 2007).

[40] Contrary to discussion provided above, some scholars strongly argue that convergence actually happens in the forms and aims of governance (on the formal side, which covers both institutional and ideational dimensions). For example, Ingraham (1996) insists that despite obvious differences in national experiences, "the commonalities are more important than the differences" (1996, 4). Indeed, globalization creates similar challenges, tasks and problems, which lead to the development of a common reform paradigm (paradigm of change). The implication of it is that differences emerge due to national political developments, and one needs to scrutinize the relationship between the global movement for governance reform and local political developments. Even though many countries rely on a similar set of norms, concepts and legal frameworks, most of them appear to be shaped, re-shaped and transformed by the domestic political processes.

easily copied, which is an important pre-requisite of the existing policy-making process, i.e. policy research and assessment of strategies and outcomes.

Some argue that in case convergence happens, the re-definition of rationality would be completely necessary. The latter would require the fundamental transformation in the role of the nation state, the force of nationalism, the socio-political and economic transformation that would make this shift possible. O'Flynn (2007) suggests that if convergence happened around NPM principles, the state would have to be substituted by quasi-markets, founded on a set of premises which are different from a rational legal bureaucratic logic (post-bureaucratic paradigm): "if the bureaucratic system is legal and rational, than the new paradigm must re-define the forms of rationality, the jurisprudential principles, the ways of allocating property rights, a different ideal toward the role of the state in protecting individual rights and creating collective goods" (193-194). Given the fact that the strategy of NPM was largely discredited in recent years, it is difficult to imagine convergence around it's principles.

There is an interesting question whether the logic of analysis conducted above provides any reason to believe that there is a cross-national convergence of governance structures. Empirical observation suggests that reform focus varies from one country to another, and convergence of both reform strategies and reform outcomes might be nothing but a grave generalization. First of all, it happens in a conceptual field only, which means that governments tend to borrow foreign terminology as quickly as it appears in public discourse[41]. Second, the focus of reforms in each country is always unique.[42]Non-state actor involvement does not guarantee the quality and success of reform process. Overall, to help national governments avoid the useless waste of time and effort it is important to understand how exactly various types of change appear to be constrained by the complexity of political, social and economic transformation.

The cross-national variation of structures and practices within public bureaucracies persists over time, and this is not about to change in the near future. The more convergence happens on the formal side of public administration, the more we talk about the informal individual attributes of these practices, which define their national peculiarity. Specifically, we may clearly identify models of civil service with Chinese, Japanese, French, German, Nordic and other characteristics.

---

[41]Some scholars observe that in some cases, reform language is being borrowed without even translating it from the American to the local language.

[42] Technocratic versus liberal model of reform; efficiency versus anti-corruption, etc.

43

## 2.4 Conclusion

Summarizing the findings of the second introductory chapter of my study, it is necessary to highlight common trends in the global governance movement and the difference between the groups of *typical and nationally specific reform conditions* (the role of external pressures, as well as domestic 'fliters' and constraints imposed on a wide range of domestic policies[43]). The chapter observed that boh western liberal democracies and transitioning states have recently encountered significant changes altering the structure and capacities of their public governance systems. These developments, which included the increasing segmentation of governing and administration, the shift in control mechanisms and public engagement, decentralization, and the increasing influence of public bureaucracy upon the decision-making processes, have certainly been 'processed' and 'appropriated' by national political systems. In this context, it became difficult to understand whether decisions taken (or non-decisions) emerged as result of increased vulnerability of nation-states, or as a result of domestic politics and shifting priorities of national political elites.

Solutions to the observed problems have also been similar, despite the variety of policy contexts in which they transpired. However, none of the existing similartieis in policy agendas and proposed solutions entailed identical consequences on a cross-naitonal basis. Specifically, regardless of the actual public policy content, there were at least two conflicting processes within the framework of PAR and CSR on a cross-national scale. One of them was the trend toward *rationalizing* public bureaucracies in line the Weberian principles; the other included *modernization strategy* in line with New Public Management mechanisms. In a wide range of transitioning countries, the goal of rationalization advances as a consequence of a rushed modernization process, which has commonly been informed by the distinct logic of policy diffusion. However, international experience suggests that some features of raitonal modern democrtacies, such as a tradition, or a *spirit of rationality,* take time to develop; these conditions cannot be easily copied from one state to another, and therefore, we have to consider the presence or absence of thereof as an important prerequisite of the reform.

Global governance reform movement has definitely affected the meaning and content of reform packages, narrowing down CSR to the process of political and economic decentralization. However, I insist that the notion of CSR is interpreted more broadly, as a set of measures aiming at conflicting, yet not irreconcilable goals, such as empowering civil servants and establishing control over the body of state bureaucrats with the use of personnel management techniques, including the principles of recruitment, promotion, reimbursement, rules of conduct and other

---

[43] Regime, the stage of development, institutional structure, etc.

aspects of bureaucratic organization. It is also important to point out that the more convergence happens on the formal side of public administration, the more obvious the informal individual attributes of these practices, which define their national peculiarity, become. Not only the meaning, but the reasons and the obstacles to public policy change vary from one country to another. For example, research on the 'state after communism' demonstrated that public bureaucracies in post-communist Europe have been resistant (though unevenly) to any kind of change, and even more so to the wholesale transformation, which questioned the utility of "western-style" models that could be transferred to other countries (Nunberg 1999, 265). In this context, both varying or similar policy solutions might have brought the desired outcomes only in those cases, where the origin of public officials' commitment to the reform included substantial and real concerns (such as performance), which have presumably went beyond the goals of political legitimation.

One of the most important developments in recent years has been the expansion of public bureaucracy and it's interference in the decision-making processes. This trend has challenged the foundations of liberal democracy, including the principle of separation of powers, even though it has also promised to compensate for the so called 'democratic deficit' due to the increased communication between public officials and the state. The relationship between CSR, bureaucracy and democracy in particular has not been sufficiently explained. According to the existing literature, "an effective democracy may require an effective and well-functioning bureaucracy" (Peters 2010), whereas the ever-expanding public bureaucracy challenges the foundations of liberal democratic states, which may lead to the lack of democratic representation and accountability. In this context, one of the major problems of contemporary democratic state is finding the right balance between capacity and control of administrative transformation.

It is important to mention that the reasons of specific decisions and their interpretantions may be distilled from the very context in which they emerge, even though the latter is a multi-layered concept (to be discussed in the following chapter), which may contribute to subsequent implementation processes in multiple ambiguous ways. For example, in a context of repeated economic crises, comprehensive public administrative reforms have become widespread policy strategies to tackle CSR problems, because crises have always been associated with comprehensive policy changes. However, these strategies are neither possible nor desirable, as they require paradigmatic shift in the ways of thinking and doing things. Civil service reform, in particular, requires a great amount of political support in all stages of policy-making process, due to the specific characteristics of CSR policy field (concentration of costs in the government, high administrative and technical content, limited participation of the public and a long duration of the

reform process). Thus policy efforts, which are "locked" into systemic inefficiencies, are likely to progress only in case there is an unequivocal political support for the reform, or when significant changes occur within the national policy-making setting. None of these two prerequisites are easily attainable in a semi-democratic context, where policy preferences quickly change, and the quality of reform projects is far from perfect.

# CHAPTER 3

# IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS IN AUTOCRATIC AND HYBRID REGIMES

## 3.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesizes ideas underlying hypotheses of my study, dealing with the role of political leadership, institutional heritage and the strategy of the reform process. The discussion starts with an overview of major approaches to policy implementation research; it proceeds with the analysis of major policy implementation variables, concluding with the study of policy implementation process in a non-democratic political context. The chapter bridges the division between the Western scholarly literature on policy implementation and the body of the post-Soviet scholarly work. My contribution consists of aggregating various factors and variables of public policy change and linking those factors to the context where institutions appear to be in flux (transitional, semi-democratic or semi-autocratic policy contexts).

The stage of policy implementation involves a great deal of uncertainty associated with the lack of data and policy appraisal tools. In a transitional context, these problems seem to be more obvious due to the fact that the field of policy-making is theoretically and conceptually underdeveloped. Scholars suggest that in order to understand the results of implementation, we have to study bureaucratic behavior, including the way bureaucrats think and act. I suggest that we have to consider both top-down and bottom-up approaches toward the study of policy implementation process, because it is important to understand the perspectives of all participants of the reform. Focusing on both stages of policy formulation and policy implementation, in turn, allows considering reforms in a dynamic perspective.

## 3.2 The State of Implementation Research

The study of implementation process is continuously challenged by the fact that the field is theoretically and conceptually underdeveloped. It lacks concepts to compare policy implementation processes across nations and group diverse phenomena into separate classification systems; and it is not persuasive in explaining policy implementation dynamism. One of the problems challenging our ability to study comparative state government reform

effectively is that scholars have failed to provide a plausible definition of *successful implementation process*. Matland (1995) suggests that a policy field followed over many years can change so radically that it bears little resemblance to its initial form (152). In this context, it would be difficul to assess reforms progress based on conventional means, such as the goal attainment.

To remind, all explanations of what constitutes 'good implementation' may be divided into two categories, i.e. control and learning options (Hoppe 1987). In the former, successful implementation is confined within the 100 percent compliance with what has been designed by researchers (it presupposes some sort of accountability strategy to ensure the compliance of implementers and target groups). In the latter option, obeying the rules is not that important. By contrast, finding an optimal learning strategy is what guarantees the overall success of policy implementation (Hoppe, 588).

Ingram and Schneider (1990) suggest that implementation may be considered successful in one of the following cases: a) when agencies comply with the directives of the statutes; b) when agencies are held accountable for reaching specific indicators of success, goals of the statute are achieved; and c) when local goals are achieved, or there is an improvement in the political climate around the program (Matland 1995). Overall, these are just technical criteria of policy implementation success, and the failure to identify what is meant by successful implementation may serve as a source of considerable confusion in public policy analysis.[44]

Given the difficuly of measuring reform success and failure, contemporary scholarship has focused heavily on a wide range of policy prerequisites (conditions of reform), which emerge in distinct stages of policy formuation and policy implementation. In this recspect, until recently, there has been an obvious division between the so called 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' theories, centering on two separate stages of policy-making, and accordingly, on two categories of policy actors. Proponents of a top-down model (1) assumed that "clarity of goals and control by the policy makers lead to more effective implementation and greater success in addressing problems (Recesso, 1999). The implementation analysis that was located in this model tended to focus on factors that could be easily manipulated by policy makers at the central level (Elmore, 1980;

---

[44] Conditions for success or failure of policy implementation are equally ill-defined. For example, Rodrick (1996, discussed later in this chapter) argued that reform progress depends on the ability of national governments to build legislative and interest group support bases, whereas Kingdon (1995) proposed a different model, 'featuring in' subgovernmental politics as a component of policy-making (or a framework), which significantly alters original objectives at the implementation stage.

Gornitzka et al, 2002; Sabatier, 2005).[45] By contrast, supporters of the bottom-up approach (2) emphasized target groups and service deliverers, arguing that policy change is in fact made at the local level. They started from a policy problem and then examined the strategies employed by relevant participants at different levels of the government as they attempt to deal with the issue consistent with their objectives (Sabatier 2005).

Interestingly, actors and processes, entrenched in various stages of reform, have recently re-aligned in a growing body of research, dealing with issues of policy implementation dynamism. The first step in this process occurred as an attempt to conceptualize interaction effects between policy and setting in a dynamic stage of policy implementation. The second most significant reason was the difficulty of constructing any single policy theory that was "*context free*" (Matland 1995, 149). In view of the observed developments, a growing number of scholars have emphasized the necessity to bridge a natural division between the top-down and bottom-up units of analysis; and even though the means of doing so have never been clear, some interesting and theoretically useful efforts transpired in establishing *a dialogue between the design and implementation processes*. Hoppe (1987), for example, asserted that the major problems at the stage of policy implementation emerged due to the *disconnected cognitive levels* and maps of reform designers, implementers and target groups. In this respect, implementation research promised to significantly improve high-level policy-makers cognitive maps of the genealogy and ecology of policy outcomes (582). The process of cognifive mapping, which seems to be quite curious on its own, is rooted in the idea of policy making as a continuous learning process, which starts from attempts on behalf of various actors of the reform to interpret data and transform it into action-oriented knowledge (or empirical and normative knowledge).[46] The continuity of the entire process of learning is extremely important as it ensures a dialogue between intentions and actions. The process is understood as simultaneous problem identification, problem definition and problem solving, interrupted by all sorts of discontinuities, when programs are unrealistic and do not match the resource capacity of implementers.

One of the most significant attempts to bridge the gap between the top-down and bottom-up research has been made recently by Chakerian (2001) and Matland (1995) who demonstrated that various factors interact to produce public policy change. Specifically, Matland (1995)

---

[45]Top-down theorists see policy designers as the central actors and concentrate their attention on factors that can be manipulated at the central level.

[46] Hoppe suggest that policy implementation process consists of three stages: (1) First, one transforms uninterpreted data into relevant information. (2) Second, one combines ideas with action-oriented knowledge. (3) Third, one transforms empirical and normative knowledge into specific public actions (582).

provided a valuable synthesis of processes that lead to the success or failure of policy implementation, based on the following implementation strategies, i. e. administrative implementation (low conflict-low ambiguity), political implementation (high conflict-low ambiguity), symbolic implementation (high conflict-high ambiguity) and experimental implementation (low conflict-high ambiguity) (145). Similar to Matland, Chakerian (2001) asserted that different reform components have to be properly assessed and combined to ensure successful policy implementation. Building on such criteria as resource inputs (i.e. their size and similarity) and the time frame of policy implementation process, the author identified three possible effects emerging from interaction among reform components, i.e. 'synergy', 'tradoff' and 'avoidance'.

Findings of scholars, mentioned above, are useful in understanding of how the process affects policy outcome, and what the relationship between the reform design and implementation is. However, these studies ignore the reasons for the adoption of specific policies and their implementation (in other words, the role of policy actors, ensuring policy enactment, consistency of the newly adopted measures, policy continuity and coordination). In this respect, I find another approach, offered by Rodrick (1996), quite useful. Based on Haggard, Rodrick (1996) distinguishes between the processes of policy *initiation and the process of reform consolidation*, and suggests that "successfully initiating reform and sustaining reform may depend on different approaches" (9-41). In this perspective, the process of policy initiation requires strong leadership (independence or autonomy for the executive), while consolidation of reform necessitates "building of legislative and interest-group bases of support" (in Williamson 1994, 468). Legislative support means that all necessary regulations are taken in order to develop reform initiatives. Interest-group support means that there is a consensus on the aims and the means of reforms, and major actors take decisions in line with their consensus (Williamson, 1994).[47]

The argument advanced in Rodrick is taken to the extreme by Joan Nelson, who says that "it may be inevitable to be somewhat autocratic in the early stages of reform", even though Rodrick doubts Nelson's extreme view and asserts that excessive role of political leaders at the very start of the reform process could actually damage the confidence in democratic institutions (Court with Cotterrell 2004). All in all, the role of political leadership in this explanatory model is

---

[47] Williamson's collection of the most obvious reasons for reform failure (1994) (cited in Rodrick) includes such aspects as a lack of "a strong political base, visionary leadership, and a coherent economic team." Disproved factors (i.e. factors that do not exercise any influence over the reform implementation process) are the hypotheses that reform requires authoritarian regimes or that it is an exclusively right wing enterprise.

the key component of implementation progress. The ability to build 'reform alliances' at the stage of policy implementation is equally important:

> '[Policy-makers] face two other conventional wisdoms: first, reforms become sustainable when they generate "winners" with a stake in their continuation. Second, and this one is the downer, reforms tend to make things worse before they make them better' (21). [Sometimes the costs are concentrated within the most powerful groups, and therefore they challenge the existing power structures].

Bringing together the views developed by Rodrick, Matland and Chakerian, political leadership may be viewed as a *condition*, which is needed at both stages of policy formulation and policy implementation (a necessary condition of a successful reform). The decision-makers' involvement varies depending on the amount of change required by the initiative, as well as on the number of interested actors involved in the process of policy implementation. One of the crucial challenges, in this respect is coping with resistance. Rodrik (1996) and Krueger (1993) propose that interests limit or enhance the scope of reform by working selectively and "targeting specific issues depending on the extent to which reforms threaten them". Therefore, at any stage, disappointed interests may block reform programs.[48] In some countries, these processes could be overcome with the use of appropriate tools and mechanisms on behalf of policy makers; thus, in any situation, *reforms need to be politically consolidated* to sustain the pressure of dissatisfied interests.

Thomas and Grindle (1994) contributed greatly to our knowledge about the role of policy leadership in the process of policy-making, suggesting that the extent to which political actors (described as policy elites) should be involved in the process of reform implementation is influenced by the extent of *legitimacy* and *autonomy* of the existing government. First, if regime is stable, it is more likely to generate wide-ranging support for the program. Second, if it depends on a few extremely powerful interest groups, it would be more difficult to ensure consensus among the top-level political elites concerning the goals of reform. The assessment of the political resource needed to support reform program also requires consideration of who supports and opposes reform program, as well as the degree of support required for reforms to take place. In addition to the political support, bureaucratic, financial and technical resources must be evaluated:

---

[48] Alesina and Drazen (1991) demonstrate that in case there is uncertainty about the consequences of reform, especially if it takes place with regard to the distributional implications of reform process, a "war of attrition" may emerge between two opposing groups. Similarly, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) demonstrate that individual voters would not support a reform that would benefit the majority if they didn't know who would benefit. Overall, none of these issues is exclusively important for the success of reform process (i.e. there is no simple answer to the question under scrutiny).

"…Policy elites are of crucial importance to the setting of agendas and decision-making about reform. These elites should become equally involved in designing implementation strategies and mobilizing resources to carry them out. Unfortunately, policymakers often assume that once decision has been taken, it will be carried out automatically by program managers and be readily accepted by at least part of the population…[However], if decision-making elites genuinely desire [reform implementation], then they must consider resources that can be mobilized in support of their objectives." (Thomas and Grindle, 65).[49]

Following up on this analysis, I suggest viewing implementation stage as a process of continuous interactions among policy actors and their strategies. I also suggest disaggregating among the necessary and sufficient conditions of change, where high quality leadership promoting reforms through implementation stage is a required prerequisite, while implementation strategy and all other features, discussed in the remaining part of this chapter, are those things, which assist in reform progress.

Two distinctions are crucially important in my study: (a) distinction between the stages of policy formulation and policy implementaiton, and (b) physical location of reform processes. First, although it may be conceptually useful to separate the two stages of the reform, I see them as being mutually dependent. The process of implementation is bigger than what we are used to think of it, as it starts, in my perspective, from the point of policy enactment (it could be any framework document outlining a course of action). Programs, laws, and other elements of the decision-making process, including but not limited to administrative decision-making, are part of implementation stage. Second, policy implementation depends upon the real place (or location) where it happens. The geographical location of the reform process conditions the general context of policy-making. Specific policy-making context is influenced by the involvement of policy actors and various policy fields. In this respect, reforms that are concentrated within the government require different resources if compared to those reforms that take place in other arenas of policy-making process. Most of these issues will be elaborated further in my study.

---

[49] Thomas and Grindle (1994) have also described the reasons to reform as value orientations of policy elites, the characteristics of the country, and cultural context. I do not utilize these preliminary distinctions in my research, focusing instead on leaders' commitment, motivation and strategies in the subsequent chapters of my study.

## 3.2 The Dynamics of Policy Process- Shaping the Outcomes of Reform

### 3.2.1 Driving Forces of Change

Until now we still know little about the driving forces of change and factors, which make the processes of goal attainment possible. Thomas and Grindle (1994) demonstrate that many reform issues emerge when policy elites believe that a crisis exists and that they must do something about a situation or face grave consequences in the short term. But reform issues also emerge under conditions that can be described as politics-as-usual, in which "change is considered desirable but the consequences of inaction are not considered immediately threatening to the decision-makers or to the regime" (59). *Circumstances of crisis* or of *politics-as-usual* alter the dynamics of decision-making by raising or lowering political stakes for policy elites, altering the identity and hierarchical level of decision-makers, and influencing the timing of reform' (59). In this respect, incremental changes in policy tend to dominate politics-as-usual agenda-setting circumstances, in which governments give sanctions to activities that were already under way within the public sector. By contrast, comprehensive reform projects are usually driven by the sense of crisis, which is also influenced by the initial attributes of policy elites, i.e. the ideological predispositions, the expertise and training, the positional resources, and personal attributes and goals of the decision-makers (60).

The role of leadership in policy-making process, and specifically, it's ability to achieve substantial policy goals is greatly influenced by a set of decisive moments in policy process (Court and Cotterrell 2004). It is often noted that 'timing is everything' in policy impact. In this respect, Lindquist (1988) has argued that decision modes in policy processes can be categorized into four types – routine, incremental, fundamental or emergent (15). (1) At one end of the spectrum (routine policy change), there is little scope for reform, since policymakers merely repeat previous decisions. (2) Incremental decision-making processes ('muddling through', by Lindblom 1959) are where policymakers deal selectively with issues as they arise. (3) Fundamental decisions provide an opportunity for policymakers to re-think approaches to policy domains (these changes are rare and even exceptional). (4) Finally, emergent decisions refer to situations where policymakers have to deal with completely new policy issues.[50]

---

[50] Court and Cotterell (2004) have argued that with regard to the emergent decisions, "there is often limited research to draw upon, but there is also substantial scope for impact since there are less vested interests or institutionalization" (p.17).

Each of the types listed above is associated with diverse policy instruments and actors involved in decision-making. For example, first-order and second-order change (routine and incremental types) may involve a great degree of bureaucratic involvement, whereas the change in policy goals (fundamental and emergent decisions) is more likely to be dependent on political leadership and its commitment to reform. The extent of political involvement in implementation process is subject to debate. For example, Temmes argued that implementation should not be overly political, i.e. dominated by the executive leadership, yet patterns of administrative reform may be indicative of more general trends, which exercise an independent influence upon the process of reform implementation. For example, countries that have strong central bureaucracies and limited transitions toward democratic politics may retain a more top-down pattern of reform, while liberal democratic regimes tend toward more balanced approaches. This assumption, however, should not be accepted without debate, as administrative styles affect the types of reforms selected in various ways.

The distinction between paradigmatic and incremental approaches does not account for the whole variety of the ideal typical change. The reason is that public policies evolve over time, and these changes profoundly affect the normative foundations of public institutions (thus any type of incremental change may end up in a profound systemic transformation). Any *paradigmatic reform strategy,* in this context, requires developing some common normative bases, or an agreement on how the proposed policies are justified. Ruger (2007), for example, argues that paradigmatic reform strategy requires forging agreement on at least three levels: universal principles and goals, mid-level justifications of the ends of proposed policies, and finally, policy instruments or instrument components used to achieve all of the above. This should be combined with an appropriate assessment of target population in order to construct an effective policy strategy.

Building on the scholarship discussed above, I suggest that resources involved in paradigmatic type of reform strategy might be different and require some sort of shift in understanding of the goals and rationale of bureaucratic system that is being transformed.[51] 'Paradigmatic shift' entails the transformation of both formal and informal institutions (not only the ways of doing but also the ways of thinking). Thus the notion of 'paradigmatic shift' allows bridging the gap between various theories of public policy change. It also eliminates some of the questions traditionally asked in comparative politics scholarship, such

---

[51]Thomas Kuhn first used the term 'paradigmatic shift' in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) to denote changes in the basic assumptions of the ruling theory. It became increasingly popular among various theories of change in such diverse disciplines as sociology, economics, political science, etc.

as 'Do institutions shape ideational change, or vice versa, ideational change transforms institutions'? By linking ideas with actions, it helps understanding how ideas and institutions connect in their impact upon the process of policy implementation.

It is important to note that both formal and informal institutions represent part of the inheritance that state reformers have to deal with when launching broad based reform measures. Institutional analysis, in this respect, highlights the importance of interactions between the strategies of the actors and the fundamental rules that constrain human behaviour. First, this approach examines the relationship between the past, present and future of social organizations. Second, it provides useful analytical tools to study resistance of public institutions to any policy change. The notion of path dependency, for example, points out at the fact that comprehensive policy change is highly unlikely, while minor changes nearly always emerge as a result of multiple incremental adaptations.

Getting back to the discussion of forces, which assist in reform progress, it is important to note that the new institutionalism literature distinguishes between institutional and wider structural factors, which shape and mediate the impact of mid-level processes (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 11, Bell 2002). For example, historical institutionalism insists that such aspect of bureaucratic behavior as rationality cannot be developed a priory, since it is 'embedded' in larger structural factors and processes. In this perspective, rational and utility-maximizing behavior is constrained by the "embeddedness" of individuals in social, economic and political situations. Thus rationality is contextual in nature, and it is dependent upon its environment (Koeble 1995).

Thelen and Steinmo (1992, 16) accounted for the following "exogenous [wider structural] variables" of policy change: (1) 'broad changes' in the socioeconomic or political context, which can make previously latent institutions salient' (minor changes produce multiple changes at all other levels depending on the structural location of institutions experiencing change); (2) 'broad changes' in the socioeconomic or political context, which put old institutions in the service of different ends', and, finally, (3) 'exogenous' changes, which produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions' (Bell, 12). The driving forces of change described here are fully informed by the logic of historical institutionalism perspective, which describes change as a result of contextually driven 'exogenous' shocks to the system.

One of the forces that trigger reforms is a variety of social, political and economic crises. Crises create opportunities for change (decisive moments in the policy process), and they represent one part of an 'emergent decision mode' of policy-making process discussed in Court and Cotterrell (2004). The link between crises and reform has always been so strong that it led to the natural supposition that crisis is the instigator of reform (1996,11). Policy-makers, whether

risk- averse or self-interested, always act once they are in trouble – as soon as they feel pressure for change and improvement. Also, crises may help break a stalemate regarding a contested policy, or lead to an agreement among political groups to take painful but necessary steps (Drazen and Grilli, 1993). Generally, situation of an emergent decision mode shapes the reforms that were not feasible or appropriate under preceding 'normal' circumstances (Drazen and Grilli, 1993).[52]

It should be emphasized, however, that crises may not only trigger reform process, but rather impede the success of it. In the vast majority of countries, advocacy of fundamental civil service reform is outweighed by the overwhelming influence of bureaucracy over the national power structure. As crisis situations persist, political officials rely all the more upon the loyalty of civil servants, as well as their expertise and resourcefulness in order to stay in power. Therefore, the role of exogenous shocks to the system should not be overestimated in cases we deal with the reactionary historical forces, such as bureaucracy.

Summing up, the driving forces of change may vary depending on the existing political, social and economic settings. Structural and contextual variables (change of circumstances) create conditions, which assist the in the development of reform agendas. Political leadership, in particular, may influence the process of policy formulation and implementation independently, or it may be 'pressured' or even subverted by other policy actors, depending on the content, scope and meaning of the ongoing policy developments.

### 3.2.2 Reform Strategy

Policy making literature does not explain well enough why certain strategies work for one type of society, whereas they fail in another type. In many cases, policy-makers need to choose between the two options – either understand and adjust their models to the existing value structure in a system undergoing reform (what works and what does not work in a particular system); or wait until the existing value structure changes and becomes more democratic. Traditional view is that good implementation is a matter of proper administration. However, developing design

---

[52] Nelson (1994), Haggard and Kaufmann (1995) note that regime change, which is a prime example of a political crisis, produces the so-called 'honeymoon period' in policy-making system. Interests associated with the old regime are discredited and disorganized, thus providing an opportunity for reform that would not otherwise be there. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) observe that crises may increase the demand for policy research and analysis. The greater the sense of crisis the greater the chance that policy-makers will be thinking 'outside the box'. Core policy changes are more likely to happen than secondary changes (discourse, vocabulary, rationalization), whereas research findings are more likely to be efficiently utilized (Court and Cotterrell,15) Indeed, top political elite is much more perceptive to research findings at the time of crises, such as the final years of Communism, or years following the financial crisis in Russia.

appropriate for a specific reform context (incentives that work for a particular type of behavior) is equally important.

Both research and policy making are linked in a way so that they share some working assumptions about individual behavior. In this respect, wrong incentives may be adopted because of such reasons as problems in causation during the process of policy diffusion (in this case, specific policies may not be appropriate); the mismatch between the goals and the means of reform (in this case, implementation process may be blocked); narrowing down the goals of reform to symbolic and political motivations (most problems discussed in Mazmanian and Sabatier), etc. Other variables may also stumble reform process, yet they are not as easily controlled as those, which are more obvious at the stage of policy formulation. Rushed decisions produce the majority of ineffective reforms; and the effects of 'rushed' or 'pressured' modernization projects are most elusive and intractable.

Generally, governments all over the world share one common trend in reform movement, which is an attempt to modernize their administrative systems. In developing and transitioning countries, this process happens as a consequence of a rushed normative adjustment and as a result of a policy diffusion process. This phenomenon, which may be described as "rationality by diffusion' process (introduced in Chapter 2) involves numerous mistakes in causation process, and it proves that some aspects of a modern state, i.e. tradition and spirit of rationality, which is important in policy research and assessment of strategies and outcomes, cannot be copied from one country to another. "Rationality by diffusion" rests on the existing misassumptions regarding human behaviour, and therefore, induces wrong incentives for public sector reform.[53]

Scholarly literature discussed earlier (Pressman and Wildawsky 1973, Matland 2005, Chakerian 2001, Shofield 2001, Sabatier, 2005, etc.) identifies several reasons for the lack of progress in CSR implementation process. For example, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) pointed out at systemic problems, which emerge as a result of a lack of congruence between the stages of policy formulation and policy implementation. In a generic model, schoars established 16

---

[53] Speaking of assumptions about human behaviour, institutionalism theory, particularly rational choice institutionalism, has had very significant impact on recent major reforms in public sector management all over the world. The typical starting point in such exercises is to assume the worst about human behaviour and create reform projects with 'built in disincentives' regarding such behavior (Bell 2002, 11). The main difficulty with applying rational choice theory to policy-making is that as Simon (1957) pointed out, the policy process is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity and individual policy actors neither have perfect information about problems and alternatives, nor perfect computational abilities. Decision makers also display a 'bounded rationality' – i.e. they intend to be rational but are vulnerable to mistaken choices due to unclear or incomplete information (Ostrom, 1999,46). In such cases, information is the critical factor in improving the quality of decisions and strategies towards desired outcomes (Zahariadis, 1999).

variables that allowed policy-makers to view the reasons and consequences of implementation stalemate. A summary of these variables, divided into six catergories of reasons included: (1) Clear and consistent objectives; (2) Adequate causal theory; (3) Implementation processes legally structured to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups; (4) Committed and skillful implementing officials; (5) Support of interest groups and sovereigns; (6) Changes in socio-economic conditions which do not substantially undermine political support or causal theory (Sabatier1986, 24-25).[54]

Antero (2008) divided these and other variables in line with the 'managerial' and 'policy-action' models of implementation, which emphasize the interactive and negotiative processes, including such attributes of implementation as the nature and the type of policy field [important in this particular research], the nature and the type of organization, feedback mechanisms, actors that have different perspectives on policy formation, bureaucratic discretion and others (19-20). All variables discussed above belong to various 'generations' of policy implementation research, and they may work well as 'enablers' or 'impediments' to success, depending on the existing policy-making context.

Interestingly, various theoretical perspectives rarely catagorize implementation obstacles according to the origin of problems that they potentially create, and as I have mentioned earlier, these models do not 'factor in' such essential features of policy process as <u>motivation</u> of policy leaders. In this respect, it is important to emphasize one more time that not all policy is designed to fulfill its official goals, and a great number of public sector initiatives may be just a *symbolic attempt* to appease certain segments of the populace rather than to improve the quality of public administration (Edelman 1964). When political leadership is missing, there is a distinct possibility that a set of reform measures will end up having no material impact. Thus regardless of whether there is a problem with the degree of consensus among the top-level public officials ('the unified nature of political will to reform'), or the quality of decision-making at the top level (it's autonomy and insulation from societal pressures), policy leadership dilemmas are highly consequential for stages following the process of policy enactment. In this respect, implementation difficulties may emerge because politicians depend on a single or a few powerful groups promoting diverse agendas, or because leaders switch their attention to other areas, in an attempt to pursue alternative or hidden agendas, or as a result of hectic decision-making style.

---

[54] In this synthetic model, first three variables could be dealt with at the stage of policy design, whereas the remaining three play role at the stage of policy implementation.

Problems, mentioned earlier, e.g. material, structural and contextual variables, which shape the content of implementation measures (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; 1983), are equally important; however, these are mostly unintended consequences of reforms, which reflect upon the state of policy-making expertise. One of the biggest flaws of the dynamic policy implementation models, in this respect, is that they ignore the difference between intended and unintended effects of policy implementation, and as such, they do not contribute significantly to agency-structure debate.[55][56] Another significant weakness of this approach is the lack sensitivity with which this model tackles the difference between policy context and a wider framework of path-dependent transformations (the nature and type of bureaucratic organization, the level of discretion, the nature of the existing policy-making system, feedback mechanisms, political and bureaucratic culture (defined as a set of informal institutions) and so on. Strictly speaking, conditions of path-dependency are slightly different from the notion of context, as the former cannot be analytically discerned from actors and strategies of the reform (i.e. their ways of thinking and doing things).

Interistingly, policy-making process nearly always results from a combination of actors' preferences and political context, including 'selective' problem definition and implementation based on a perceived salience of an issue (Court and Cotterell, 16). In this respect, much of the existing literature links policy process with the system of 'institutional capacities' of a state undergoing political, social and economic transition. The concept of *state capacity* refers to the ability of a state to achieve its own goals, therefore it may serve as a structural and contextual variable at the same time. Institutional factors define and underpin state capacity (in this case, rational legality associated with bureaucratic and administrative capacity). The particular types of institutional capacities in question overlap to some extent with the policy network dynamics noted above, particularly, in relation to the institutional attributes of the state.[57]

---

[55] The authors suggest that the group of material, structural and contextual variables shaping the content of reform strategy could be held accountable for the lack of reform progress. Material variables include technical difficulties, target group behavior, amount of behavior change required. Structural variables include clear and consistent objectives, incorporation of adequate causal theory, hierarchical integration within and among implementing institutions, decisions rules of implementing agencies, recruitment of implementing officials, initial allocation of financial resources, and formal access by outsiders. Finally, contextual variables include public support, socioeconomic variables, support from legislators, and commitment from implementing officials.

[56] Some scholars observe that there is a structural mismatch between policy goals and policy instruments (i.e. Caldwell 1970; Dryzek 1987; Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977; Sagoff 1988). Thus even when a policy achieves it's goals, policy outcomes may be far from what is expected (for example, cutting down the number of public service employees may save the budget, yet economic and social outputs associated with these changes may be far from certain). Overall, impediments to successful policy implementation rest on a reverse side of the coin where the description of 'policy enablers' is placed.

[57] The literature on state capacity is broad ranging, but researchers have focused on a number of critical institutional foundations of state capacity (Evans 1995, Weiss 1998), i.e. (1) State autonomy, which implies

Another important factor, affecting the process of policy-making in a profound way, is the existing administrative structure and the national political system. For example, Silberman (1993) argues that historically, the rationalization of administrative processes, i.e. the creation of the norms of bureaucratic system, was the consequence of political struggles, which "attempted to redefine the structures of power and the criteria for access to them by groups of leaders who sought to reduce the uncertainty over their status and power" (425). Heady (1995) supports this idea, saying that "what has become more and more obvious is the extreme importance of variation among political regimes as a major explanatory factor for variation among public bureaucracies" (472).

Generally, in the contemporary policy-making literature, there is no agreement on the constituent parts of policy-making context. For example, Court and Cotterell (2006) distinguish between the macro political context and the specific context of policy-making process. This model is outlined in the following table.

**Table 2: Policy-Making Context**

| Macro political context | The system of governance, the extent of democracy and political freedoms (includes politics, the impact of civil society, the culture of evidence use, volatility of the national political context, the extent of conflict and other elements of the existing political organization).[58] |
|---|---|
| Specific policy context | The stage of the policy process, the extent of policymaker demand; the degree of consensus or resistance; climate of rationality (political culture); the openness of the policy processes and the importance of the issue to society (Court, Julius and Cotterrell, Lin, vii). |
| Implementation | The nature of bureaucratic processes (transparency, accountability, participation, corruption); the incentives, capacity and flexibility of organizations to implement policy or not; the degree of contestation; the existence or not of specific mechanisms to draw in evidence in policy implementation; the feasibility and perceived legitimacy of a specific policy reform |
| Decisive moments in the policy process | The character of the policy process on an issue (i.e. the extent the issue requires routine decisions or fundamental changes, or whether it is a completely new policy area); the predictability of the policy process; and the existence of policy windows; and the sense of crisis on an issue. |

a degree of insulation from societal pressures and political opponents, which in turn implies that such states have the capacity to push through policy reforms, despite opposition; (2) State authorit, which implies that such autonomy has a degree of popular acceptance and (3) state legitimacy, which requires public acceptance of the existing political regime. It is assumed that relatively autonomous and authoritative states have the capacity to initiate reform projects and overcome the resistance of self-interested actors. **Therefore, state capacity is one, though not a single, basic pre-requisite of the existing political will to reform.**

[58]It may be argued that the distinction between the democratic and non-democratic political settings is more useful than an economic differentiation between the developing and prosperous systems.

| *The way policymakers think* | Extent that policy objectives and cause-effect relationships are clear; openness to new evidence; capacity to process information; policymaker motivations; and types of evidence they find convincing (Court, Julius and Cotterrell, Lin, vii). |
|---|---|

Source: Court and Cotterrell (2004)

It is interesting that Court and Cotterrell (2004) view policy implementation as a separate contextual variable. In practice, however, context matters in all stages of policy-making process, therefore, it would be reasonable to include the stages of policy making process, decisive moments in policy-making process and the way policy-makers think into the group of specific policy issues.

For example, in policy formulation stage, there is a number of important contextual issues, such as a climate of rationality (Weiss, 2003); a shared commitment to public policy goals; actors' involved (government, bureaucracy, NGO, etc.); extent to which the issue is a priority and on decision-makers agenda, etc. (Hanney et al, 2003). Implementation stage, in turn, is highly political and it may feature political conflict in a transitional context. The success of policy implementation process depends on the capacity of national governments to consolidate their efforts in achieving public policy goals and on the way policy implementers interpret the meaning of top-down initiatives (i.e. the way policy makers think).[59]

The definition of policy context largely depends on the focus and the level of analysis. In this respect, the stage of policy-making may be viewed as a context in explaining bureaucratic behavior; at the same time, bureaucratic behavior (the amount of change required prior to the reform) may be viewed as a material component of policy implementation strategy. The most effective way to describe policy context would be using the concept of formal and informal institutions, which shape policy-makers decisions and choices. A problem at any of these many points could potentially derail the implementation of a policy, and if these factors are not carefully considered by policy leaders during the preliminary stages of reform, then a policy may not be effective at achieving its goals. [60][61]

---

[59] Solomon (2001) argues that "Public officials affected by the reform have their own perspectives, individual or agency-based, on the policies at hand, and these perspectives may influence how they behave. In this respect, the positions of officials may be based on many factors, not only merit or self-interest, but also their views of how best to accomplish the goals embodied in policy or even the appropriate hierarchy of values" (121)

[60] Policy leadership may also be viewed as a resource, which is needed at both stages of policy formulation and policy implementation. In this perspective, the process of policy initiation requires strong leadership (independence or autonomy for the executive), while consolidation of reform necessitates "building of legislative and interest-group bases of support" (in Williamson 1994, 468). Institutions are part of a wider policy-making framework. Therefore they could be utilized effectively to link contextual variables with policy implementation process.

*3.2.3 Policy-Making Context*

Previously I suggested disaggregating between the reform processes in a democratic and non-democratic political setting. However imperfect, this approach focuses on a wide range of contextual factors, which set aside processes and conditions of institutional transformation. For example, public administration in a democratic political context requires sustaining a guarantee of fundamental rights, legal certainty and predictability, balance of powers, instruments of accountability and control, coherence and transparency of the existing governance system (Romero-Perez 2002). All of these functions are crucial, yet problematic, as they depend on the extent to which the rule of law prevails. In "hybrid", or "competitive authoritarian regimes", multiple violations occur in electoral, legislative and judicial arenas. These imperfections create the "unequal playing field" for major participants of political process, and they diminish state capacity to achieve any significant policy outcomes (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

The most important challenge that policy-makers face in 'hybrid regimes' is ensuring consistent and continuous implementation process. Thus, even though nearly all stages of policy-making may be equally flawed, it does not seem to be difficult to initiate ambitious and ambiguous reform programs. By contrast, sustaining reforms in the long run is what poses insurmountable problems, such as control, resource allocation, adjustment and others.

In addition to implementation obstacles mentioned with regard to the well-established democracies, there is a great number of factors endangering policy implementation process in the transitional and developmental contexts. These context-specific factors may be described as follows: 1) "the whole policymaking system for an issue may be corrupt or oriented away from public interests"; (2) the system may exist under conditions of economic and ideational scarcity; (3) there may be a high degree of political volatility impeding the process of political consolidation; (4) other issues in the components of policy-making process (the lack of consensus, special interests, the spirit of rationality, policy window, the lack of freedom, the way bureaucrats think, etc.) may also stumble reform process (Court and Cotterell 2006, 9).

---

[61]Some scholars observe that there is a structural mismatch between policy goals and policy instruments (i.e. Caldwell 1970; Dryzek 1987; Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977; Sagoff 1988). Thus even when a policy achieves it's goals, policy outcomes may be far from what is expected (for example, cutting down the number of public service employees may save the budget, yet economic and social outputs associated with these changes may be far from certain). Overall, impediments to successful policy implementation rest on a reverse side of the coin where the description of 'policy enablers' is placed.

It is interesting that the most common approach, taken by the variety of international agencies to cure "pathologies of bad governance" (corruption, patronage, abuse of power, etc.) has been linked with such political measures as providing societies with "more democracy assistance, i.e. reconfiguration of a political system undergoing reform process. Intuitively, policy-makers understand that the change of administrative system is inextricably linked with the improvement of a political system, which includes political climate and values. However, it is not quite clear which of the two processes is more important, and whether one of them entails the other. The majority of reforms dismiss the fact that cultural factors lay deeper than formal institutional configurations, and they tend to neglect factors exogenous to the system of public administration.

Overall, political context has an important systematic impact upon the existing institutional structure, access to information, political competition and policy-making system. Thus it is important to build stronger linkages between the processes of policy making and the contextual variables of public policy change. Court and Cotterrell (2004) identify some of the following features of the developing and transitioning states. These features are combined with the effects that contextual variables exercise upon the process of policy-making.[62]

**Table 3: Linking contextual factors with policy implementation process**

| Non-democratic political context | The impact upon the process of policy-making |
|---|---|
| (1) Less representation and weaker structures for aggregating and arbitrating interests in society – even in countries seen as democratic (Hyden et al, 2004; Grindle, 1980)<br>(2) Remote and inaccessible policy-making processes – limited scope for input except at implementation stage (Grindle, 1980; p.15)<br>(3) Limited channels/processes for participation (these are viewed by political leaders as 'illegitimate or inefficient') yet many policies have direct distributive/redistributive implications (Grindle, 1980: p.17)<br>(4) Greater competition due to resource scarcity (Grindle, 1980, p.15)<br>(5) Centralized and relatively closed policy processes, especially in terms of policy formulation;<br>(6) 'The availability of information and access to it have long been associated with power' (Grindle and | (1) Less accountability to the public at policy implementation stage, less room for an effective political management of reform process;<br>(2) Lack of engagement;<br>(3) Limited control over policy implementation process<br>(4) 'Who Gains What' logic<br>(5) Ideational crisis, the lack of creativity and innovation<br>(6) The climate of rationality is constrained; traditions of rational policy-making system are absent or emerging<br>(8) Agency-based approach to policy-making process<br>(9) Incremental (routine) policy changes may be interrupted by sudden shifts in policy agendas depending on political |

---

[62] Author

| | |
|---|---|
| Thomas, 1991);<br>(7) Information, critical in the decision-making process, is generally in short supply and is often *unreliable*, so that decision-makers are often operating within 'structures of uncertainty' (Grindle and Thomas, 1991);<br>    (8) Policy elites play much more decisive roles in policy-making;<br>    (9) Donors play a particularly large role in some developing countries' policy processes (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Porter, 1998). | leaders' preference; |

*Source: Based on the contextual variables discussed in Court and Cotterell (2004)*

Nearly half of variables discussed above reflect upon the two intertwined factors of policy-making process, i.e. political regime and state capacity. Political regime creates institutional and cultural underpinnings for the rational or irrational use of power, whereas state capacity affects the ability of the state to strategize and allocate necessary resources to the appropriate areas of policy-making process. The ways in which these fundamental features affect policy process may be demonstrated in the following examples.

First, societies, characterized by the weak representation system are less likely to use scientifically based research in their policy-making process, and therefore they are more likely to construct highly irrelevant, or self-defeating reform projects (there is a trade-off between the speed and the quality of reforms). Second, societies, which are prone to corruption, are more likely induce interest-based thinking and to follow the "who gains what" logic, which may turn out to be particularly damaging at the stage of implementation. In each case, the ways of 'making policy work' depend on the specific national traditions. However, there is one feature characterizing nearly all transitioning and developing states, i.e. the inability of the state to carry out it's systematic reform programs. Overall, corruption in government affects the likelihood of interest-based thinking, whereas the type of bureaucratic design is a condition that shapes the use of information, communication strategy and the behaviour of civil servants.

One of the most significant features of any transitioning state is a sense of ideational crisis, which deprives policy elites of a clear vision of the goals and the means of reforms. This crisis, which may last for generation or two, instigates policy-diffusion process and the so called 'analogical thinking', which may generally assist in the development of new norms, yet lead to the adoption of reform programs that are not completely adjusted to the conditions prevailing in a specific transitioning state.

In theory, state apparatus may work effectively even in a stable authoritarian context. Yet in a wide range of hybrid regimes, individual leaders appear to be unconstrained, whereas policy elites are composed of a few powerful groups (or a single group), which are more likely to pursue hidden goals with the use of politically popular reform programs. The policy process is characterized by greater uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity and political volatility. Individual policy actors do not have perfect information about problems and alternatives, nor perfect computational abilities" (Court and Cotterrell,16). Therefore, the system is more prone to multiple social, economic and political crises, and unexpected changes in policy-making context are more likely to happen. Overall, most contextual and structural variables, which appear to be closely intertwined, profoundly influence the behaviour of major policy actors. It should be expected, in this respect, that bureaucrats will behave according to the logic of the existing political regime. Authoritarian regimes provide institutional and cultural underpinnings for the irrational use of power, which significantly affects conherency and material effects of implementation stage.[63][64]

One of the most important questions with regard to the existing public administrations is the way bureaucratic power is exercised. Instrumental rationality, central to the Weberian perspective on modern state, is an important characteristic feature of modernity, in which bureaucracy uses it's power instrumentally in order to obey the rules and contribute to the common good. Bureaucracy, in Weber's view, exercises an extremely high degree of control over society on the basis of scientific and technical knowledge. Yet it does not take decisions without any reference to the existing rules of the game. By contrast, modern bureaucracy applies it's power instrumentally so as to establish systemic relationships between the state and society.

The mere notion of **rational action** largely depends on the context, cultural and institutional underpinnings of the existing political system. Therefore, it is difficult to expect actors immersed into authoritarian, or semi-authoritarian political context, follow the logic of rationality appropriate for a more democratic political system. By contrast, policy-makers in a democratic political system would be more likely to adhere to the logic of instrumental rationality discussed above.

---

[63]Informal institutions play an important role in the developmental and transitional context; therefore they may be effectively utilized in linking contextual variables with policy implementation process.

[64] Previously it was observed that informal institutions may be utilized effectively in linking contextual variables with policy implementation process. Some features, such as the irrational style of policy-making, abuse of power for private gain, as well as "who gains what mentality" and patronage in public service– could be easily derived from the context in which policy-making process occurs. The impact of these institutions and practices on the process of policy implementation is highly detrimental. However, it is difficult to observe, as most of this behaviour is hidden within the network of formal institutional arrangements.

That said, it is important to note that the gap between libreal democratic and transitioning states is commonly overexaggerated, and it would not be fair to suggest that the spirit of rationality is missing in what is framed as a non-democratic transitioning state. In many societies policy makers are all rational in their own way (rationality is either politically manipulated or highly ritualized). They interpret social reality according to the logic of a system in which they live; thus these actors cannot be described as being completely irrational, unless it is a highly centralized totalitarian state where all decisions pursue the goal of survival. What is interesting, in this respect, is finding out what bureaucrats think, how they take decisions and interact with the Government. What strategies do civil servants use as the main clandestine participants of the reform? How congruent are their 'cognitive' maps with those of other policy actors? Finally, do they exercise any control over the policy-making process thus accumulating significant sources of power and influence? In Post-Communist societies, these problems are most likely to emerge as a result of path-dependency, which may translate into either passive compliance or hidden resistance to the reform. Overall, unless there is an unequivocal and comprehensive transition toward democracy, it is difficult to expect any significant change in policy consequences (or if it is achieved, it is most likely to maintain the old ways of thinking and doing things).[65] Path-dependency, in this respect, should be viewed as an *important intervening* variable in practically all stages of policy process.

## 3.3 Conclusion: Summing up Obstacles to Policy Implementation in a Non-Democratic Political Context

Explanations of policy-making progress in post-Communist states coincide greatly with some of the findings in Western liberal democracies. However, critics observe that in a wide range of hybrid regimes, reformers tend to experiment freely with the newly available instruments of public policy, which allow for a wide range of self-defeating reform projects that end up nowhere in terms of implementation. In this context, public administrative reforms risk impeding the operational capacities of national governments, and they paralyze reform efforts in other policy areas.

---

[65]Based on this study, approach toward reform may be completely different from what is conventionally adopted. It may start from an attempt to overcome the dysfunctional practices associated with informal institutions. One of the ways to achieve this would be creating the code of behaviour and other mechanisms that would make the informal norms more transparent. The structural location of change is also important. By introducing minor changes into the key areas of public service, policy makers may transform some of the ways of thinking about bureaucracy, thus creating an overwhelming driving force for change.

Nearly all explanations of policy implementation dynamism include structural, institutional and voluntaristic components. For example, a growing body of research, dealing with interaction effects among reform components (Matland 1995, Court and Cottrell 2004, Sabatier, 2005) attempt to move further than a single-level analysis, and establish a dialogue between the stages of policy formulation and policy implementation. Theories of policy diffusion, which originate in the field of developmental studies (Zhang and Straussman, 2003, DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, etc.), argue that policy efforts are context-bound, and they cannot succeed unless adjusted to the specific nationally unique conditions. Finally, a significant portion of post-Communist research (Huskey 2001, 2009; Solomon 2008; Kotchegura 2008; Oleinik 2009 and others) suggest a wide range of explanatory factors, which center on the role of bureaucratic actors and informal institutions in policy-making processes. These studies account for the discretionary powers of state bureaucracies, including their intractable path-dependent features.[66]

As this chapter demonstrates, one of the most important weaknesses of recent attempts to realign the top-down and bottom-up processes of policy analysis is that they all ignore the reasons for the adoption and implementation of specific policies (enactment, consistency, continuity and coordination). In this respect, my study refers to Rodrick (1996), Thomas and Grindle (1994) et al., who viewed policy leadership as a required condition of change. Trying to see how useful these accounts are for the hypotheses of my work, this chapter elaborates on a wide range of policy implementation variables from at least three generations of policy implementation research. It is important to note, however, that the categorization of problems of policy implementation presented in this chapter is very schematic, and it is done for the purpose of simplifying reality, which is, in fact, very complex. A closer look at selected variables demonstrates that policy actors and strategies engage in a process of interactive exchange so that the extent of political commitment to reform (leadership), which is treated as a <u>necessary condition</u>, could be measured with the use of reform strategy, or alternatively, with the use of control mechanisms employed by policy formulators. Decision-making process, in this prespective, emerges from interaction between preferences and policy setting, a process, in which actors account for selective reinforcement of reform priorities, whereas policy settings encompass

---

[66] The number of explanatory variables advanced by the field of post-Communist studies is immense, and not all of them fit within a single theoretical framework. These variable vary from the model of public administration state reformers are trying to build, to the process of micro-implementation, which includes setting up the goals, strategies, activities, and contacts of the actors involved.

a wide range of structural (or institutional) factors, including crises and their influence on institutional capacities of individual states.[67]

The study arrives at several important conclusions related to the dynamic of policy change and the role of key variables underlying this process. One of these observations suggests that the level of leadership engagement with implementation is contextually determined, and it is crucial in specific policy circumstances (e.g. conditions, where institutions appear to be in flux, or policy fields with no obvious reasons for change, entrenched interests and costs concentrated in the government). Policy settings, in turn, may be described as ever-changing conditions, which are shaped and re-shaped by the choices and preferences of various policy actors. Thus reforms, which pursue hidden or alternative agendas, are not likely to have any material impact.

Importantly, the study suggests that the gap between democratic and non-democratic systems should not be overexaggerated, because the survival interests motivate actors in most societies. In this respect, what is crucial for the reform progress is re-aligning a wide range of formal and informal institutions in policy designs, as well as understanding how various groups of actors think, behave and interconnect. Interestingly, it would not be practical to draw a clear analytical line between the groups of policy formulators and policy implementers in systems, where the process of policy formulation is heavily 'skewed' toward the executive, or where the pattern of patronage is prevalent in public administration. In this respect, my study intentionally blurs the distinction between the two groups, suggesting that implementation starts from the very point of policy enactment, where each subsequent program, or law, could be described as an importnat step in a course of policy goal attainment. All actors, in this perspective, (experts, political elites, state bureaucrats, etc.) engage in legislative or administrative decision-making process; however, the salience of individual participants varies depending on a specific policy context (policy making stage).

---

[67] It is noteworthy that the majority of the empirical cases advanced by the leading policy-making institutions, such as the World Bank, or the UNDP program, emphasize the role of reform strategies, which originate in political choices (decisions of key policy actors) concerning the scope, sequence, instruments and implementers of reform measures. These accounts do not use strategies as a measure of reform commitment; instead they assume that the process of goal attainmenet is a mere practical issues.

# CHAPTER 4

# CIVIL SERVICE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES: EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter pursues the goal of maximizing variation on the dependent variable (reform progress) in my study, while restricting the type of cases to those countries that have gone through the process of democratization (control variable), accompanied by rapid economic reforms. The rationale behind this comparative chapter includes the following two considerations: a) the case of Russia should not be considered in isolation, because one of the purposes of academic research concerns facilitating comparisons across nations; b) the number of cases discussed in the current literature is insufficient to enable scholars to arrive at reliable conclusions regarding the reasons for the success or failure of public sector reforms. This chapter avoids broad generalizations, which describe comparative experiences as either successful or unsuccessful; instead, it accounts for the varying dynamics of public policy change and contributes to the larger body of literature on policy implementation processes in a transitional context.

This chapter focuses on two groups of countries: (a) Central and Eastern European states, which experienced the process of rapid political democratization prior to EU accession, and (b) Central Asian states, where public sector reforms have been accompanied by a process of political centralization. Bringing together these groups of states presents us with a unique opportunity to account for varying reform developments in a controlled environment (i.e. democratic versus non-democratic political contexts). The very aspect of democratization is not crucial for the purposes of this study; however, it is included in this analysis for a more nuanced assessment of public administration and civil service reform progress.

Data for this research was gathered from both primary sources (government decrees, official reports, newspaper articles) and scholarly research available on cases of post-communist transition. These include Staronova and Gajduschek 2013?; Matei and Lazar 2009; Ghindar 2009; Meyer-Sahling 2004, 2009; Emrich-Bakenova 2009; Kotchegura 2008; Duvanova 2007; O'Dwyer 2006; Gryzmala-Busse 2004, 2006, 2008; Verhejen 2006; Verheijen and Dobrolyubova 2007; Majcherkiewitz and Gadowska 2005; Majcherkiewicz 2005, 2001; Schatz 2004, Goetz and Wallmann 2001; Staroňová and Milakova 2001; Vanags and Baloff 1999; Győry 1999, and

others. It is important to note that Central Asian administrative reforms have not been sufficiently examined in the existing scholarly literature; thus, when dealing with this group of countries, I also rely on primary sources available in Russian, including newspapers. I use both primary and secondary sources to accumulate data on problem categories and policy implementation variables; these variables are used to identify the causal candidates to explain varying policy implementation outcomes via the method of 'indirect difference' outlined in Chapter 1.

## 4.2 The Choice of Cases

During the 1990s, all countries of the former Soviet bloc were subject to similar historical legacies, characterized by widespread clientalistic networks penetrating public organizations, the abuse of public office, and the selective enforcement of civil service legislation (Kotchegura, 13). One common weakness shared by the majority of Post-Communist states was their inability to successfully design and effectively manage public policies. In this context, the range of policy options was limited to random and sporadic decisions taken to address urgent issues in related policy areas.

The variation of reform strategies and outcomes across Post-Communist states may be explained by dissimilar factors behind major administrative changes. For example, Kotchegura (2008) argues that civil service reforms in post-Communist countries have been driven by at least two major perspectives: *performance*, which aims to provide the necessary conditions for economic development and *legitimacy*, which strives to ensure a process of rapid democratization. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs regarding these two aspects of governance was the main reason for CSR in many countries in recent years: "No matter what type of reform has been implemented or attempted, and no matter in what political, economic and social context, civil service reform in general aimed at improving performance of the civil service and the legitimacy of government action" (25). Other variables considered by Western scholarship include: the pressure of the EU accession; party politics; institutional legacies of the former Soviet state; and leadership and its decisions in the area of policy implementation.

As concerns Central and East Europe, there were just a few exceptional cases where reforms could be described as being relatively successful. Hungary embarked on civil service reform much earlier than other countries in the region (1992), and managed to swiftly implement these changes. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were pushed to reform by the EU accession process, but encountered significant problems at the stage of policy implementation (fast-track

www.manaraa.com

reform process). Bulgaria and Romania passed their Civil Service Laws in 1999 (also motivated by the prospect of accession to the EU); the Czech Republic adopted relevant legislation in 2002, but only started implementing it in 2004 (Meyer-Sahling 2009, 71-72).

External pressures, such as the politics of EU conditionality, exercised significant influence over reform progress. However, only ten states within the CEE region have had a strong likelihood of being granted EU accession; moreover, none of them was strongly pressured to adopt CSR legislation.[68] For example, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states became part of European Union on the same date (May 1, 2004), even though their experiences with CSR were completely different. Hungary, as previously mentioned, started implementing civil service laws during the early 1990s (before it became part of the EU), while the Baltic states progressed slowly from one stage to another in conjunction with the process of EU accession. Finally, the Czech Republic lagged behind despite its accession to the EU. Overall, CSR has not been part of the EU's conditionality politics (Meyer-Sahling 2012), therefore it is impossible to explain reform progress with the impact of foreign actors alone. Contrary to conventional wisdom, external pressures have influenced CSR indirectly.

The pace and dynamics of democratization have influenced the process of public administrative change in several different ways. O'Dwyer (2006) observes that the pressures of political patronage were extremely harmful to the quality of the state (Taylor 2011), and that such pressures were strongest in those countries where democratization preceded the consolidation of the apparatus of the state (x). Grzymala-Busse (2006, 2008) similarly argues that both the institutionalization of the political party system and the strategies of one of the main subjects of path-dependency in the CEE region – the Communist party - affected the quality of public bureaucracy and the process of democratization.

In what follows, I will discuss several exceptional cases within the CEE region, based on the speed and content of reform strategies. Hungary and the Baltic states will be compared to the Czech republic, because reform experiences in these countries were completely different in spite of the similar reform prerequisites (comparatively successful in Hungary, relatively successful in Estonia and the other Baltic states, and quite unsuccessful in the Czech Republic). The choice of cases presented above offers an interesting opportunity to account for the diversity of factors affecting civil service reform progress. My decision to focus on similar nations is an intentional and important feature of this study - I plan to demonstrate that reforms in post-Communist societies are politically bound (i.e. reform results are dependent on the unique combination of

---

[68]In this context, one can identify the impact of at least two separate processes: the process of democratization and the process of Europeanization.

such features as state capacity (which results from state-building efforts), political commitment (which is influenced by such factors as party politics and individual values), and the legacies of the past (which are more likely to take over when the two former variables are not in place). In this respect, the relative uniformity (or the discrepancy) of reform experiences (if any) suggests that this study has to identify the presence of common (or diverse) causes and effects, and that findings from my analysis may be generalizable to other nations and time frames (Brewer, 2004).[69]

**Table 4: Civil service regulations in countries of Central and Eastern Europe**

| No. | State | Legislation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Hungary | Civil Service Law of 1992 (separate law covering civil servants); Code of Ethics for Civil Servants |
| 2 | Lithuania | The Law On Public Officials 1995; Civil Service Law 1999 (July); Code on Professional Ethics and Conduct for Public Servants |
| 3 | Estonia | Civil Service Law of 1995; Public Service Code of Ethics of 1999 |
| 4 | Latvia | Civil Service Law (1995); Civil Service Law (2000) |
| 5 | Czech Republic | Civil Service Law of 2002 (abandoned in 2007) |
| 6 | Romania | Constitution of 1991 (revised in 2003); Civil Service Law of 1999; Deontological Code for Civil Servants of 2004 |
| 7 | Bulgaria | Civil Service Law of 1999; Civil Servant's Code of Conduct, December 2000. |
| 8 | Poland | Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997; Civil Service Act, December 1999; Public Service Act, Code of Civil Service Ethics of 2002 |
| 9 | Serbia | Civil Servants Law of 2005; Code of Ethics for Civil Servants. |
| 10 | Republic of Moldova | Constitution of Republic of Moldavia of 1994; Public Service Law No. 334-XIII, May 1995; Law on Civil Service and the Statute of the Public Servant 2009; the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants 2008. |
| 11 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | Civil Service Law in the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2002; Code of Ethics for Civil Servants |
| 12 | Republic of Macedonia | Civil Servants Law of 2000; Codes of Ethics for Civil Servants of 2002 |

*Source: Matei and Lazar (2009, 6)*

---

[69] According to Brewer (2004), one of the greatest advantages of the most similar system research design is that it allows to avoid arriving at "false-positive findings", i.e. confirming the null hypothesis.

72

## 4.3 Central and Eastern European Countries

### 4.3.1 Hungary

Hungary is viewed as an 'outlier' based on at least three criteria: the speed, the content, and the impact of its civil service reforms. The first legislative act concerning Hungary's post-Communist public administration – The Civil Service Act – was adopted in 1992, following the concept act enacted earlier in 1989. Reforms in this country were driven internally (Gyory 1999, in Verheijen 1999), rather than by EU conditionality politics. Moreover, the Hungarian Civil Service Act was the earliest CSR legislative document in Central and Eastern Europe to introduce the principle of political neutrality in public administration (Verheijen 2006; Malíková and Staroňová 2005).

Scholarly literature identifies two waves of Hungarian public administration reforms. The first wave took place immediately after the collapse of the Soviet system (1992-1997), with an attempt to establish a career-based civil service system. The second wave, starting from approximately 1997-2001, aimed at the reform of a traditional model with the use of NPM principles and mechanisms. Both waves contributed to the process of increasing professionalization; however, the same reform efforts have allegedly ended up perpetuating clientalistic principles in public administration, which was opposite to the initial goals of the reform. Meyer-Sahling (2001), in this respect, describes Hungary's progress during the 1990s as a transition from the system of open politicization to the process of hidden politicization. This situation was characterized by policy leadership being either unwilling or incapable of promoting the agenda of political neutralization.[70]

Hungary's earliest CSR legislation (1992-1997) built upon the principles of a traditional continental system with the hierarchy and control mechanisms outlined by the neo-Weberian doctrine. However, the very principle of political neutrality originated in the so-called Anglo-Saxon system of public administration, which was, at least in theory, less politicized. In line with the newly adopted law, the civil service profession constituted a "mission in life," which meant that "civil servants were employed for an indefinite period in a long-term system" (Gyory 1999, 136). Moreover, those who were chosen for a vocation in civil service had to give an 'oath of allegiance,' the process which emphasized the role of moral values rather than (but not excluding) the principles of competitiveness and performance.

---

[70] This tradition was mostly apparent under Horn and Orban governments. For more information, see Ghindar (2009), 140-147.

Beginning in 1992 (and up until recently), recruitment of civil servants in Hungary was founded on merit-based principles, such as job applications and fair competition. Civil servants also enjoyed immense opportunities for the advancement of their careers, based on their years of experience and job performance (security of tenure). All these features, in combination with a significant level of job security, acted as successful anti-corruption mechanisms. Interestingly, civil service in Hungary has never been centralized. Individual public administrative bodies made decisions related to the recruitment, career, and dismissal of civil servants at the local and central government levels. As such, decision-making in the area of personnel management was bottom-up rather than top-down.

It is important to note that major changes in Hungary took place in 2001, 2006-2008 and in 2010 respectively. In 2001, the government introduced a performance appraisal system (NPM mechanism of changing salaries +/-20% (that is 40% variation), which has lifted performance payments to the extreme unknown in Western Europe. As a result, conditions of civil servants' work significantly changed. In 2006, the Socialist-dominated Hungarian government denounced the traditional model of public administration as non-efficient, and decided to move further toward the New Public Management model; this announcement led to the increase of performance bonuses up to 50%. Finally, the Orban cabinet, which came into power in 2010, reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of meritocracy; however, in practice, it continued to develop NPM mechanisms and abolished and/or changed some of the existing regulations of meritocratic recruitment, including systematic recruitment and tenure. Major changes took place with regard to the dismissal of civil servants, whose contracts could now be terminated without giving reasons (the same as was done in the private sector). All measures were accompanied by regulations aimed to increase wage levels, professionalism, and recruitment objectivity in public administration. Staronova and Gajduschek (2013) observe that these measures were highly complex, and they confused the trajectory of civil service development (4-5).

When explaining the sudden shift in reform policies and priorities closer to the end of the first transitional decade, it is important to observe that Hungary, similar to other post-Communist states, has gone through the process of painful transformation, which has led to the growing disillusionment with the initially adopted public sector reform model. For example, OECD paper (1997) suggests that the Hungarian public administration reform has generally "improved the democratic operation and openness of public administration, the respect for human rights and the relationship between citizens and public administration" (83). At the same time, such issues as "efficiency, effectiveness and promptness of public administration have not improved significantly" compared to the period prior to the Collapse of Communism. (84). Furthermore, the

paper suggests that public administration "has become disorganised and the co-ordinating activities of government have decreased significantly. The Prime Minister [had] to quarrel several times with his own ministers in order to implement government decisions. Public administration has been fragmented into sectors; the flow of information [was] incidental; and officials' discipline has weakened" (84). The most 'stubborn' feature of the Hungarian civil service and public administration (similar to other post-Communist states) was its treatment of policy decisions and norms as self-reinforcing mechanisms. This feature has become even more pronounced during the time of a political transition.

The most troubling development of the first transitional decade concerned the size and the system of personnel management, which changed so rapidly after the 1989 that the capacity of the state was not enough to accommodate those changes. For example, the number of civil servants increased "from 65 000 in 1989 to 95-100 000 in 1995", yet the financial capacity was not enough to pay decent salaries to everyone. Equally flawed was the system of training and education, which had to adapt quickly to the changing political, social and economic conditions. The reasons for the increased number of civil servants relate to the very process of administrative reform, which was the starting point of major changes in the Hungarian public sector since the early 1990s. This reform included the process of the "decentralization, the multiplication of administrative organization, local self-governments and the lack of a human resources policy in public administration" (OECD 1997, 94).

It is important to note that the Communist system of civil service in Hungary (before 1989) has been operating in a stable manner, regardless of all the negative features associated with the lack of political neutrality and rule of law mechanisms. For example, the system of training and education has targeted various levels of public administration, including the central and local levels; this system has also included a specialized institution (the National Institution for Training Leaders), which dealt with the training and education of administrative leaders. Most *institutional structures that were developed under the Communist rule, have quickly disappeared after the 1989,* and even though the Hungarian reforms were rapid and systematic, they could not immediately replace the system as old as the half of the century. On the positive side, however, it is important to note that the creation of rational public administration in Hungary stretches back to the 15$^{th}$ century, when the practice of hiring civil servants with degrees in higher education was first established. This history, which was carried through to the stages of decentralization (16-18$^{th}$ century), the separation of powers (19$^{th}$ century), and the unification of civil service (between the two World Wars) has definitely served as a precondition for a more successful institutional reform path at the end of the 20$^{th}$ century. Ultimately, the process of professional development in

Hungary in recent years has been more dynamic than in many other neighbouring regions and states.[71]

When explaining the reasons for the dynamic process of PAR and CSR in Hungary, Staronova and Gajduschek (2013) observe that the main difference between this country and the rest of the CEE states during the early 1990s was that the notion of a depoliticized civil (and public) service system in Hungary became a major value in and of itself, and was a "central tenet in the democratic transition" (2). The country's political leadership adhered (at least, until recently) to the proposed new principles of public administration, and managed to adopt one of the region's most coherent and systematic reform models.[72] The speed of change is another interesting point. Meyer-Sahling, in this respect, suggests that the Hungarian leadership, similar to leadership of the Baltic states, has rushed to replace the old Soviet bureaucrats with the new generation of state employees during the early 1990s; thus the new civil service legislation came about in these countries earlier than anywhere else.[73]

Speaking of the obstacles to the reform process, it might be useful to differentiate between the last two decades in terms of various actors' strategies and their influence upon the process of policy formulation and policy implementation. For example, when the first wave of reforms started, the Antall government in Hungary experienced significant obstacles in adoption of the new Civil Service Law, due to the actions and decisions of radical factions within Antall's own party, the MDF (Christian-Conservative Democratic Forum). These factions did not have decisive influence over the policy-making process, but they were reluctant to commit themselves to fast-track reform, and tried to create significant obstacles to reform enactment. Meyer-Sahling argues that "it was only because of the desire of the political and administrative elite to follow the new model of public administration that the reform did not fall altogether" (91). Moreover, the civil service system that existed at the time included a great number of discretionary policy instruments, which impeded the realization of the principle of political neutrality.

---

[71] Interestingly, the process of civil service depoliticization has started in Hungary prior to the collapse of the Soviet regime; this process has also gradually changed the Hungarian civil service system for the better. The only case Hungary could be compared to (in terms of historical developments preparing the ground for civil service reform prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union) is Poland.

[72] The main goal of the Civil Service Act was to create "politically neutral, highly professional, impartial civil servants that follow strictly the legal regulations" (Staronova and Gajduschek 2013,2).

[73] Meyer-Sahling, for example, discusses Hungary and other cases of post-Communist transformation in a broader context of party politics immediately after the collapse of Communism, arguing that the initial points of transition, as well as the prospects of democratization, have pre-determined the relationship between the new political elite and the body of civil service, as well as the speed of PAR and CSR processes (to be discussed more in-depth further).

On the topic of civil servants' engagement in policy formulation stage, Gyory (1999) observes that, during the early 1990s, "those who wanted to identify themselves with the new political forces often temporarily 'put aside' their position as civil servants and practiced politics in a way that was contrary to the standards of incompatibility introduced in the Civil Service Act" (145). Politicians were also ambivalent on the issue of civil service: on the one hand, they agreed that impartiality represented a useful principle of quality governance; on the other hand, they feared and distrusted the former Soviet administrative staff, and many politicians favoured a change in personnel. The development of civil service legislation in the 1980s followed the course of democratization; and the political leadership in the early 1990s was more decisive about the model of public administration it wanted to create than the leadership of other neighbouring states.

Recent developments, which started since the late 1990s – early 2000s, as it was mentioned earlier, demonstrate a change in political leadership and its willingness to move along the lines established in the early 1990s. In this respect, one of the major obstacles could be related not to the role of bureaucrats, but rather the change of leadership and the trajectory (vision or the lack of thereof) on behalf of the key policy players. Evidence suggests that some of the decisions taken by recent cabinets contradict the initial trajectory of change toward a traditional system of public administration, and each year, the system of the Hungarian civil service and public administration becomes even more 'hybrid' or 'mixed up'.

The sequence of bureaucratization and democtratization processes, pointed out by Meyer-Sahling, Grzymala-Busse and O'Dwyer, may be considered as completely persuasive in terms of their influence upon the process of establishing the principles of political neutrality in civil service. However, each of these studies points out at the variety of reform obstacles, which may not be necessarily linked with the adoption of civil service laws. O'Dwyer (2006), for example, observes that the pressures for political patronage (meaning the delay of reforms) were strongest in those countries where democratization preceded the consolidation of the apparatus of the state (x). Grzymala-Busse (2006, 2008) similarly suggests that both the institutionalization of the political party system and the strategies of one of the main subjects of path-dependency in the CEE region – the Communist party - affected the quality of public bureaucracy and the process of democratization.

Overall, it is obvious that the pace and dynamics of democratization profoundly influenced the process of public administrative change. However, this explanation only works well if the other variables mentioned above - political leadership and the legacies of public administration - are also considered by scholarly explanations. Why did the shift in public

administrative policies become possible at the beginning of the 1970s (prior to the SU dissolution)? Who was in charge of public administration at that time and immediately prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union? Could reforms initiated in the early 1990s be successful in a nation without a long history of rationalization prior to Soviet rule? Answers to these questions may be found in a more systematic study of Hungary's case, as well as in comparisons with other former Soviet republics.

### 4.3.2 Estonia and the Baltic States

The reforms in Estonia had a strong market-oriented focus, "with the aim of developing a market economy and improving living standards" (Randma-Liiv and Tonnison 2006, 2). In contrast to the rest of CEE states, where the principles of bureaucratic organization were disjoined, reforms in Estonia *were coherently structured around the concept of a minimal and open government*, where candidates were recruited for a particular post and allowed to enter civil service at any level, including the senior civil service. Estonia's first Public Service Act (1995) introduced a *position-based civil service system,* which relied on the principles of merit, competitive recruitment, salary scales, regular appraisal, and common grading throughout the civil service. It also followed the general decentralization trend in the central government by leaving personnel management up to individual ministries and agencies.

The goals and priorities of Estonian public administrative reform have changed over time. While the early 1990s were characterized by an attempt to minimize the role of state apparatus in social and economic affairs, in recent years the emphasis has shifted toward improving the quality and effectiveness of public institutions. Most recent developments have focused on the quality and accessibility of public services, the issues of accountability and control in providing public services, and measures for cutting costs within the administrative system.

When dealing with the case of Estonia's civil service, it is possible to identify the structure and outcomes of civil service reform, as well as the reasons for the country's comparatively enthusiastic implementation of the new laws. One of the most obvious developments of CSR during the early years of Estonia's political transformation was the decrease in the number of civil service personnel and the increase in the level of prestige of civil service. Public opinion surveys indicate that, several years after the start of reform, people began to apply for government jobs more often, as salaries in public sector became more competitive and the system as a whole became more transparent. This is stark contrast to the early 1990s,

78

when legacies of the past, along with ongoing political crises, made the civil service appear unattractive to a new generation of Estonian citizens.

Competing explanations of Estonia's (comparative) progress include issues, such as: party politics ('trust in government' is a sub-type of this explanation); the coherency of the reform model adopted by policy-makers; the government's efforts to quickly replace the old guard with a new generation of civil service employees; and, finally, the efforts of the Estonian government to increase the level of trust between political and bureaucratic actors.

Party politics have much to do with the state of distrust among bureaucrats and politicians at the central level, and have been one of the most significant obstacles to successful policy implementation in almost all former Soviet republics (Meyer-Sahling 2004).[74] It is well known that the new post-Communist governments demonstrated little willingness to continue to work with administrative staff that served their predecessors. Moreover, until recently, neither governments on the left or the right nor the new generation of senior bureaucrats had an incentive to engage in efforts to de-politicize the post-Communist civil service.

Meyer-Sahling, in this respect, observes three scenarios (or strategies) that winning political parties have used when dealing with the old Soviet bureaucracy: (1) "sticking with the old guard"; (2) "getting rid of the old guard"; and finally (3) "from pact to de-politicization" (80-86). While these scenarios reflect strategies used by national leaders in dealing with the inherited bodies of public bureaucracy, they also effectively explain the *motivation,* or the range of incentives, associated with the adoption of the new civil service laws.

The first post-Communist scenario concerns "the first democratically elected government that was not troubled by problems of political trust and chose not to replace the senior bureaucrats in office" (Bulgaria and Romania) (82). Transition toward democracy, in this case, was led by the Communist successor party, which held special relationships with the old guard of ex-Soviet bureaucrats; therefore, when these ex-communist leaders came to power, they sought to take advantage of existing bureaucratic expertise rather than replace their subordinates (82).

The second scenario of post-Communist transformation is described as "getting rid of the old guard," which occurred in countries where the first democratically elected governments were formed by parties of the democratic opposition (Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states). In these

---

[74] "Any change in government can be assumed to create at least a minimum level of distrust between inherited bureaucrats and the members of the incoming government. Moreover, any incoming government may choose or may have to work with inherited bureaucrats even if it perceives a severe problem of political trust simply because it lacks personnel alternatives, or the time and resources to replace existing stuff" (77).

cases, governments were deeply suspicious of ex-Communist top-level officials, and tried to get rid of them as quickly as possible.[75]

The third scenario, described as a process "from pact to de-politicization," occurred in countries where national governments were democratically elected, yet decided to establish working relationships with the old guard of civil servants (Hungary and Poland). The level of trust observed in such cases was greater due to the length and quality of Round Table Talks preceding the process of democratic transition.

Meyer-Sahling asserts that most countries of the former Soviet world adhered to the second scenario of civil service development, finding themselves 'trapped' in a system of politically motivated appointments. This trend, however, was reversed in Estonia by the end of the 1990s, when the attention of the Eastern European governments turned to co-operation between government institutions and the development of a common understanding of administrative reform strategies. The State Chancellery in Estonia was particularly active in this sense; it tried to promote common values across the civil service through different activities, such as: organizing annual conferences for the senior civil servants, gathering key personnel data of the civil service, and giving out an annual 'co-operation award'.

It is also noteworthy that the Estonian government invested a lot of effort into replacing the old guard of civil servants immediately after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Unlike the majority of other Post-Communist states, where a significant number of public servants still carry the legacy of the Soviet Union, a large number of Estonian civil servants entered the service following independence and had never been a part of the Soviet administrative system.[76] According to official statistics, at the beginning of 2004, "there were 18,998 civil servants working in Estonia's ministries and agencies. Estonian civil servants were relatively young (29 per cent younger than 31 and 53 per cent under 41 years old). More than 83% of civil servants employed in the country's ministries and agencies had held posts in the civil service for less than 15 years" (Randma-Liiv and Tõnnisson 2006, 10).

When comparing reforms in Estonia and the other Baltic states, it is obvious that neither Latvia nor Lithuania were as enthusiastic and strict in terms of minimizing government personnel or raising the efficiency and prestige of the civil service (at least during the first transitional

---

[75] The degree of tension between the 'old' and the 'new' visions of post-Communist development was so strong that political leadership *avoided or postponed* the establishment of a politically neutral civil service until it was actually demanded by EU conditionality politics. However, the scope of replacements in this case was limited due to the lack of professional expertise within the 'new guard' of civil servants.

[76] This effort has also been made by Poland, but as we know, with an opposite effect, i.e. The Polish government has remained clientelistic. It has encountered more difficulties instilling the principles of political neutrality in its public administration.

80

decade). For example, Latvia adopted its first Civil Service Law in 1995; however, the reform model chosen relied on a New Zealand model of public administration, which was not entirely suitable to the Latvian case, and it has ultimately led to the break-up of the Latvian central administration into 750 central state bodies, "without clear control or accountability mechanisms" (Verheijen and Dobrolyubova 2007).

One of the most obvious advantages of Latvia's CSR was the centrality of the goal of bureaucratic reorganization, which was the ultimate reason for reform in many areas of the public sector. Another important achievement was the first Civil Service Law (1995), which, among other things, established the principle of a professional civil service, a system of job classification (ranks of civil service), and entry and promotion qualification procedures (examination and certification processes).[77]

The scholarly literature (most of it is developed within the framework of the EU enlargement process) does not acknowledge any significant progress in terms of reform implementation shortly after the first Latvian Civil Service Law. For example, the number of employees in Latvia's central administration institutions increased by 75 per cent during the early years of reform – from 3044 in the1990s to 5316 in 1995 (281). This increase could be explained by the organizational costs of the reform process (the restructuring of individual ministries and creation of new ones). However, similar reforms were undertaken in Hungary and Poland with the opposite effect – these countries managed to considerably downsize their state institutions early on in the reform process (Meyer-Sahling 2004).

A significant breakthrough in terms of CSR progress occurred during the late 1990s, when the influence of the EU in the Baltic states became particularly obvious. Between 2001 and 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a Public Administrative Reform Strategy and a related Program claiming that all reforms should be conducted under the general framework of the EU integration process. The Copenhagen Criteria required the republic to adopt the *acquis communautaire* (code of legislative acts of the EU) by January 2003, with the goal of establishing an effective, stable, and equitable civil service, guided by the rule of law and the acquis (ICPS 2001, 24). The program set out a reform plan, policy processes, and Human Resources Management (HRM) systems; in addition, it established a Strategic Planning Unit within the State Chancellery as a key policy management mechanism.

---

[77] The principles of the public administration reform agenda discussed at the time included: (1) political neutrality, which implied that political developments do not affect civil service personnel; (2) standardization and universality – the principle which emphasized the role of civil servants' qualifications and their utility on a cross-national basis; (3) professionalism, which outlined opportunities for career advancement, and finally, (4) ethical behavior principle, which required that public interests are put before private needs For more information, see Vanags and Balanoff, 1999, 281-282.

It is noteworthy that the Strategy document, adopted in 2001, embarked on a set of measures that were missing in other countries of the former Soviet Union (i.e. improvements of the existing policy-making system). Objectives established by the rules included arrangements such as: moving from reactive policy-making to strategic governance, avoiding unclear decision-making in favor of creating clearly defined coordinating functions, and shifting to a customer-oriented public administration rather than one focused on the requirements of bureaucracy (ICPS 2001). The aforementioned strategic documents indicate that policy-makers considered the starting points of change, which is important for any transitioning society, including Latvia. It is also noteworthy that the new Latvian Civil Service Law was enacted one year prior to the adoption of the EU strategy in 2000.

Lithuania has progressed no faster than Estonia or Latvia, during the first years of independence, and it experienced significant difficulties in achieving substantial reform goals. As in the cases of other nations, major changes in Lithuania have been driven by the prospect of the EU accession. The predominant strategy of reform was one of gradualism and congruence with the ideology of the democratization process. The Law On Public Officials, adopted in 1995, significantly changed the country's public administrative framework by establishing the fundamentals of a civil service, including the distinction between public administration and policy, as well as provisions for the requirements of merit competition and the training of civil servants (2-5). The subsequent Law on Civil Service, adopted in 1999, established principles of a *career-based model*, which resulted in a relatively stable public service system, founded on the ideals of the neo-Weberian bureaucratic state.[78]

Smalskys, Urbanovic and Minkevicius (2013) argue that reforms in Lithuania, as in other CEE countries, were postponed due to the fact that the political leadership underestimated the role of public administration, and also because of the expensive nature of the reform. However, O'Dwyer and Grzymala-Busse assert that the strategy could be predetermined by the preferences and priorities of the new government to maintain control over the state apparatus. It is well known that the corpus of civil servants in Lithuania significantly stagnated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the country's administration did not take much effort to radically change the system of public administration. During the early 1990s, for example, the former Soviet heads had been removed, while the rest of the civil service employees remained in the same positions

---

[78] The foundation for the reform was laid down by the Government between November 1999 and October 2000, with the creation of the so called 'Sunset Commission' and the Strategic Planning Committee to conduct with an in-depth review of the system's functions, strategic priorities and public expenditure (Evans and Evans, 2002) (p.209).

they had held in Soviet times. This stagnation arose from the absence of timely civil service regulations, and as already mentioned, the ambivalence on behalf of the key national players.

Historical legacies have also impeded reforms. One of the problems, for example, was the legacy of the old Soviet practice, including the principles of centralism and party loyalty in a new system of Lithuanian public administration (Jasaitis 300). Another problem was the lack of 'adaptation mechanisms', which made the views on civil service quite stagnant. Smalskys et al (2013) suggest that at the start of the reform, the public bureaucracy was viewed in the same way as during the interwar period (Smalskys et al, 2013): the category of civil servants embraced all persons who were related to the public sector; professional development of civil servants did not happen in a systematic fashion; finally, civil servants were not mobile, and they were not interested in improving their professional qualifications.

When comparing the histories of the Baltic states, it is obvious that Latvia was the most reluctant to rid itself of the old corpus of civil servants following the end of Soviet rule. It has also experienced the most profound influence of the Communist legacy over the development of its civil service. During the inter-war period, independent Latvia went through a process of gradual 'rationalization', which was accompanied by the establishment of a 'protected civil service' (a mixture of German and Russian models characterized by a stable system of salaries, classification, and tenure). However, the advancement of this quasi-rational system was interrupted after World War II, when Latvia became part of the Soviet Union. The USSR introduced the principles of centralized direct planning into the area of public administration, and these principles subordinated public service employees to the Communist party, which valued political loyalty above the principle of merit and the relevant qualifications of individual civil servants.

Vanags and Baloff (1999) observe that, under the Soviet rule, the dominant structure of Latvia's public administration was "linear and functional, where every supervised unit had only one higher-level unit that exercised all administrative functions" (270). This functional structure was borrowed from the theory of Frederick Taylor, and, by the late 1980s, it was considered to be largely outdated. However, the period of post-Communist transformation has somehow perpetuated dysfunctional practices in the form of a rigid administrative structure. Until now, a great number of civil servants did not understand the theory or practice of modern administration (272), and the impact of the old-style organizational culture upon the behavior of civil servants is profound and irresistible.[79]

---

[79] In a Morgan configuration, presented by Vanags and Baloff (1999), the Latvian civil service is described as 'pragmatic and positivist' as opposed to the 'patrimonial and absolutist' civil service systems prevalent

*4.3.3 Reform Laggards and "In Between" Cases: The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia*

The **Czech Republic** may be considered as one of the least successful cases of civil service reform development within the post-Soviet region, lagging behind (in terms of te number of the newly adopted regulations) even Russia and Kazakhstan. There was no civil service law in the Czech Republic until 2002, and when a law was adopted, the actual process of reform implementation was postponed until 2004-2005 (the civil service law was enacted in 2004, one month prior to the country's EU accession) (Kotchegura, 115). The first major legislative initiatives took place between1993 and1995; however, both the Parliament and the Government have effectively put public administrative changes on hold. The reform agenda was narrowly interpreted as a territorial government reform, and, even as such, it did not go through until accession to the EU. Kotchegura (2008) exemplifies the failure of major administrative changes during the early and late 1990s with the following citation from a Czech expert:

When the former administrative regions were abolished, no effective structure to replace them was offered. As a result self-government got frozen at the village level. The state administration was largely politicized. Perhaps paradoxically some parts of government moved to even greater centralization. Procedures became less flexible and at the central level degenerated into mechanical job descriptions (Potucek, 1999:1).[80]

What distinguishes the Czech Republic from the rest of CEE states is the extent of *hidden resistance* to public administrative and civil service reforms. Official proclamations in this country have never translated into any sort of legislative action (as in the case of Russia or some of the Baltic states, where random legislative initiatives took place during the 1990s), and when the Civil Service Draft Law (2002) was submitted for its final reading in Parliament, it passed by just one vote (132). Political forces opposed this reform for multiple reasons. For example, the Civil Democrats were against the special status attributed to civil servants whose relationship with the state was previously regulated by the Labour Code. Former Communists opposed the

---

in some other post-Communist societies (292). This configuration should not be accepted without specific reservations; however, it underscores the fact that Latvia's historical legacy did not 'overwhelm' institutional reform projects advanced in the late 1990s - beginning of 2000s. Therefore the reform, in and of itself, may not be considered a 'failed' project.

[80] By the end of Klaus's give-year term, 'the number of administrators at the top levels has multiplied almost twofold from less than 100,000 to 170,000' (128), whereas whereas the quality of public bureaucracy continuously dropped. One of the Deputy Prime Ministers, cited in Spidla (2001), asserts that "the level of civil service in the Czech Republic since 1989 has dropped considerably"(114).

screening process that would prevent them from entering the civil service. Overall, the process of preparation and adoption of the Civil Service Law was characterized by the spirit of secrecy and a lack of openness to the public.

Some major criticisms concerned the content of the newly adopted law. Kotchegura (2008) asserts that the Czech Civil Service Act did not explicitly define the role and the mission of civil service; it did not establish an effective personnel management system and somehow ignored the duties and responsibilities of civil servants. OECD experts pointed out inconsistencies and gaps associated with the law. For example, one article of the law proclaimed the intention to build an open civil service system with no guarantee of lifetime recruitment. However, experts have pointed out that the actual model of civil service in the Czech Republic combined elements of a career-based tenure system (SIGMA 2003), which could probably suit the Czech Republic more, if conceptual difficulties of the content of the law were overcome. Another problem was a narrow focus on working conditions of public employees, which resulted from the involvement of the Ministry of Labour in formulating and preparing the draft law. [81] One of the basic advantages of the law, however, was that it aimed to depoliticize the civil service and establish a clear line between the functions and positions of political appointees; in addition, the law improved the working conditions and remuneration of civil servants.

The scholarly literature does not fully address the reasons why the Czech Republic appeared to be a laggard of civil service development in CEE region. A preliminary analysis of developments associated with the collapse of Communist rule points to similar factors of administrative reform capacity as in the case of Hungary (i.e. political commitment, party politics and the history of institutional transformation). However, the reasons for the relative success of Hungary as opposed to the Czech Republic are not clear-cut.

One of the most obvious obstacles to the Czech reforms was the bipolar party system, which blocked some of the earliest policy initiatives (Ghindar 2009).[82] Ghindar (1995) argues that the very structure of the two-party system, composed mainly of The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and The Social Democratic Party CSSD, created a ***domestic political deadlock*** over reform within the government and with key stakeholders. EU negotiations have prompted the

---

[81] This approach was taken to the extreme in only one country – Slovakia, where the new State Service Act and Public Service Act were passed along with the new Labor Code in 2001 (Beblavy 61).

[82] For example, during the early 1990s, the leader of the Civil Democrats and the Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, promised to quickly adopt an act on the legal status of civil servants (130). The draft was prepared by the Minister of Labor in 1993. However, the opposition in Parliament blocked it shortly after its approval by the leading party.

85

adoption of a new law; however, the EU's influence over the process of reform implementation was much more muted (Beblavy 2005, Verhejen 2002).

Kotchegura (2008) also draws our attention to the role of policy leadership, which has not been fully committed to the reform agenda over the last several decades. For example, during the 2002 elections, Prime Minister Klaus criticized the EU's persistence regarding the problem of institutional restructuring (and specifically, civil service reform) in the following way:

Individual states have varying civil service rules and regulations and the question whether or not we have a civil service law is entirely inconsequential with respect to our progress and preparedness to join the EU. The insistence of the European Union on this law shows a complete lack of comprehension with regard to the workings of this country (Radio Prague, 12 May 2002) (Kotchegura 130).

President Vaclav Havel, who was an advocate of CSR, expressed the opposite view. In his address to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1995, Havel emphasized that "the backbone of every well functioning state [was] an efficient state administration" (Vidlakova 2000). Following Havel's statement, the Klaus government established a working group within the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which was given the task of preparing a new civil service law. This group produced a draft law, which abandoned some of the elements of the career-based system and the idea of a permanent civil service. However, the draft law did not go through as a result of budgetary constraints in 1997 (Suleiman 2003).

In countries with a long history of overly politicized public bureaucracies (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia), reform efforts fall short of something that could be described as a 'legacy trap', prompting policy-makers to reinforce politically dependent institutions (Beblavy, 62). However, this tendency results in a lack of coherency within the reform management process - policy/execution split and the war of attrition between ministries and agencies. The government and low-capacity ministries do not oversee the process of policy implementation in an efficient and rational manner. Sometimes, they become victims to the conflicting visions of change in public administration.[83]

The role of history seems to be particularly important in the case of the Czech Republic's institutional transformation. First, the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia "was amongst the most strict and conservative, particularly after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968" (Toonen 1993, cited in Kotchegura, 124). The same is true with regard to the legacy left by the

---

[83] For example, during Soviet times, the civil service in Czechoslovakia was characterized by a centralized system, where decision-making was concentrated within the top 6% of civil servants. By contrast, starting from the early 1990s and until 2002, public administration was managed by the leadership of each individual ministry or agency; reform management was dispersed across the board of civil servants, which was difficult to manage in view of the legacy of centralization.

Austro-Hungarian Empire, which "gave rise to the alienation and resentment of citizens towards state officials who represented a foreign power, spoke a foreign language and acted often in an authoritative and arrogant manner" (Kotchegura, 105). Dual legacies produced a system that was prone to excessive rationalization; however, they also fostered an air of distrust between society and the state in the post-Communist Czech Republic.

It is interesting to observe that the worst and the best case scenarios of civil service reform in the CEE region – the Czech Republic and Hungary – share much in common in both the structure of their basic political institutions and the effects of their early institutionalization processes. For example, O'Dwyer (2006) describes the Czech Republic and Hungary as success stories of post-Soviet state-building, based on the idea that these countries managed to escape the pattern of rapid administrative expansion immediately after the collapse of Soviet rule. The other cases of post-Communist transformation (Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia) are described as cases of "runaway state-building" – during the early 1990s, they experienced a lack of political party institutionalization and opted for a dysfunctional politico-administrative nexus.[84]

Party politics works well to explain comparative cases of post-Communist transformation; however, such an explanation does not fully account for the variation in actual public administrative reform progress. How and why did Hungary (having a similar party system to the Czech Republic) avoid political deadlock over the civil service reform process? What forces were interested in promoting the civil service reform agenda and what other features differentiated Hungary from the rest of CEE countries, including the Czech Republic?

While answering these questions, Goetz and Wallman (2001) point to the process of institutionalizing the state's executive system that accompanied state-building efforts in the CEE region shortly after the collapse of the Communist regimes. This process, which is one of the most persuasive, though not a dominant, or fully supported, explanations of regionally uneven reform progress, consists of at least three sub-processes: (1) "establishing the centrality of the executive in the political system by making it the dominant force in policy formation" (865); (2) "remoulding organizational structures and procedures and power relations in such a way as to allow the effective exercise of executive authority" (creation of the core executive around the head of government) (866), and finally, (3) "effective organization of the state personnel" (866).

The most successful 'state-building' cases – Hungary and Poland – advanced significantly in terms of creating capacity of the core executive during the early 1990s. They also

---

[84] Unlike other cases of administrative expansion, which commonly result in the expansion of a state's administrative capacity, "runaway state-building", according to O'Dwyer, "is not driven by interstate competition or bureaucrats seeking legal-rational legitimacy, but by elected politicians seeking patronage resources for the task of party-building" (3).

engaged in what Goetz and Wallman describe as an "emancipation of their governments from the shadow of the presidency", strengthening the role of national legislative institutions.[85] These countries did not achieve the same level of bureaucratic neutrality as a result of CSR. However, what they managed to achieve concerned strengthening capacity of the central state. Some of the major reform dimensions in these countries included (1) reducing the size of the state apparatus, (2) strengthening the formal and informal powers of the prime minister vis-a-vis other members of government, and (3) restructuring the inherited center of government (COG) – The Office of the Council of Ministers – into a Prime Minister's Office (872).

It is important to note that, by the end of the first transitional decade, the constitutional position of the Hungarian Prime Minister closely resembled that of the German Chancellor. The Prime Minister was "elected by parliament, [could] only be dismissed by a constructive vote of no-confidence, and [could] determine the members of his cabinet without seeking parliament's approval" (869). The Prime Minister exercised significant power over the ministers belonging to his political party; however the rest of the government was under the control of his coalition partners.

Several scholars (Agh 2001, Frica 2000) have drawn attention to the growing concentration of power within the hands of the Hungarian Prime Minister. This trend was most apparent under the Orban government, which led to the development of a presidential-style democracy (or the Chancellor democracy, as in Germany). A process towards the 'Prime-Ministerialization' of the state can also be seen in Poland (especially following the adoption of the new Constitution in 1997), whereas in other countries, such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, the congenial nature of the government, as well as frequent changes in the premiership, were not conducive to strengthening the authority of the government leader. Overall, the Hungarian and Polish Prime Ministers appear to be much stronger than their Czech or Bulgarian counterparts, who are, in fact, not chosen by the electorate, but rather appointed by the President, along with other members of the Parliament. The central office of the latter states continues to be dominated by technical and administrative tasks, which limits the capacity of the executive.

Taking this discussion back to an analysis of the Czech case of civil service reform, it is important to note that for much of his time in office, the Czech Prime Minister, Václav Klaus, was the dominant figure inside the government; however, his position was assured by random political constellations (such as his background as a finance minister, which gave him control

---

[85] Nearly all states in the CEE region have witnessed the limitation of the role of the formal and informal executive powers of the presidency during the last several decades. However, it was only in Hungary and Poland that important building blocks were formulated early in the process.

over fiscal policy and the state budget), rather than to constitutional powers (Goetz and Wallman, 871). His speech during the 2002 elections (cited earlier) demonstrates his lack of commitment to the creation of an independent professional civil service, yet it is well known that Klaus nearly always acted in line with official statements made by Czech President, Vaclav Havel (who, probably, believed in the need to reform). The President's recommendation to reform the country's bureaucracy materialized in the form of several working groups dedicated to the development of a professional civil service; however, none of them led to the adoption of a separate Civil Service Act. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic were resourceful enough to overcome this legislative stalemate.[86]

As compared to leaders in other countries, the Prime Minister of Hungary enjoyed more influence over his government – not only because of the changes within the executive, but also due to the stable and sophisticated electoral system, which presents Hungarian leaders with "manufactured majorities" within the national government.[87] For example, in 1994, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) won only 36% of the electoral vote, but still received 54% of the legislative seats (Ghindar, 140).[88] Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Civil Service Law passed in 1992 without any significant obstacles, or that several other reform initiatives were enacted in late 1990s. The Czech electoral system also presents citizens with a manageable number of parties and predictable coalitions (Ghindar, 146); however, this system does not allow the Czech Prime Minister to act decisively in a situation of political stalemate.

Summing up the analysis of major developments in the CEE region, it is important to emphasize that the institutional underpinnings of the reform do not coincide with another policy implementation variable, i.e. *political commitment* to the reform. One of the primary examples of

---

[86] That said, it is necessary to emphasize that the role of political leaders (especially, the role of Prime Ministers in the CEE region) has differed from one historical period to another. Erikson (2007) observes that Vaclav Klaus, Czech Prime Minister from 1992-1997 and President from 2003-2013, represented one of the best examples of a "groundbreaking East European leader", whose dedication served as a reason for extensive market-liberal reforms (346). Indeed, some leaders were the driving force behind their championed reform projects at this time of rapid democratization. However, subsequent developments have either deprived these leaders of extraordinary popularity (and power), or necessitated reforms, which did not seem to be popular. Another example is the Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, who played a key role in both Western oriented market-oriented reforms and in the reform of Serbia's public administration – especially the establishment of agencies by government decrees and not by laws, which was not in line with the country's administrative traditions. "The political opposition accused Djindjic of overstepping the limits of legality, thus modifying the picture of a government solely dedicated to caution and gradualism. His assassination in 2003 brought the reform process to a standstill for a long period of time" (346).

[87] 'Manufactured majority' is descried by Ghindar (2009) as a situation in a which a party that has received only a third of the popular vote can hold what is essentially a majority in parliament (140).

[88] "In addition to having the support of large legislative majorities, Hungarian governments are more stable because of the adoption of the vote of no confidence, which conditions the dismissal of the government on the ability of the parliament to propose a new government" (Ghindar 2009).

*strong leadership heading nowhere* in terms of CSR implementation concerns the case of **Poland**. Due to the presence of what could be described as a 'strong leader' variable, the formal legal framework of CSR has been subject to inconsistent and unpredictable changes. In this respect, the institutionalization of a politically neutral civil service system did not take place in this country.

Poland adopted its Civil Service Act in 1998, establishing an ambitious reform program that formally aimed to create a politically neutral civil service, as well as to enhance the professional qualities of the public administration. However, the civil service remained politicized under nearly all governments. The level of politicization has reached its peak after the enactment of the new civil service law, and especially under the Miller government (2001-2004). Amendment #144a, introduced by the new Government to the Civil Service Law, included exceptions to the rule of competitive recruitment among senior positions in the civil service. At the time, the most significant obstacle hindering the development of the public service was the wide-scale practice of filling senior positions using an 'in proxy status', which opened the civil service to random 'experts' with no real experience in civil service. Another problem, which occurred in parallel to the amendment discussed above, was the massive dismissal of personnel justified as a necessary part of organizational restructuring (7). Majcherkiewicz and Gadowska (2005) argue that these developments led to the overwhelming fragmentation and fluidity of the political scene:

Current politico-administrative relations are a result not only of conducted reforms but even more of radical and unexpected changes, which took place, particularly at the beginning of the 1990s. The consequence of one such unintentional event, which, however, later took the form of a rather permanent tendency, is the strong position of political actors, who officially do not perform any prominent public function and in consequence do not take responsibility for it. Particularly dysfunctional for efficient political performance has been the fact that leaders of parties that have been members of successive government coalitions have stayed outside it (as have parliamentary leaders of political parties forming coalitions). In consequence they distance themselves from the politics of their own government and criticize it, behaving as they do during a political campaign (5).

Majcherkiewicz and Gadowska (2005) mention the development sequence of the system structure (discussed in Grzymala-Busse and O'Dwyer) as another major obstacle to public policy change in Poland. Yet, the ultimate cause of changes discussed by the authors can be attributed to the background and ideational commitments of individual leaders who either maintain or abolish the existing formal legal frameworks in a state that suites those leaders most.

Overall, neither the presence nor the absence of a "strong leader" guarantees reform progress. It is always a combination of state capacity (which results from state-building efforts), political commitment (which is influenced by such factors as party politics and individual values),

90

and the legacies of the past (which are more likely to take precedence when the two preceding variables are insufficient).

One of the most similar cases where no leadership was interested in the reform was the case of Slovakia, where no dedicated advocates of civil service reform emerged during the 1990s. Staronova and Gajduschek (2013?) assert that, after the fall of Communism, "the civil service had not been a major issue on the political agenda" in Slovakia. Significant changes took place with the country's accession to the EU. However, it was just two years after Slovakia's entry into the EU when the Slovak Civil Service Law (2002) was substantially changed and the Civil Service Office (CSO), created with the goal of reform management, was abandoned. These decisions were justified on the grounds that the CSO was "expensive, cumbersome and ineffective". In reality, as Staronova and Gajduschek (2013) observe, "it lacked political support and could not overcome the autonomous tendencies of the ministries. In the absence of the reform management body, it was difficult to overcome resistance and to achieve any substantial change" (2-3).

### 4.3.4 The New Wave of Reform Implementation:  Building on the New Legacies of the Early and Late 1990s

In the previous section of my study, I observed that each country of the former Soviet bloc adhered to the unique logic of post-Communist transformation. It is not coincidental, in this respect, that a great measure of scholarly research on the pace and content of civil service reform rests on the path-dependent explanation of the new institutionalism literature.

My study suggests that some findings from the existing academic literature have been overly generic and do not fully account for the transformational nature of political leadership in individual cases of post-Soviet change. For example, it is well established that Hungary's front-runner position in terms of adopting civil service legislation during the 1990s was underpinned by the seemingly genuine dedication of national political leaders to the creation of a new professional civil service. However, subsequent changes in reform leadership, accompanied by a struggle for power, resulted in the failure of the campaign for depoliticization. The politics surrounding the Czech case underscore the lack of dedication to the idea of CSR progress. When coupled with the weak capacity of the state executive, political leadership may work as an important variable in explaining CSR failure.

Speaking of the current period, civil service scholarship observes the following problems: 1) continued politicization; 2) an ongoing failure to create a professional merit-based system; and

3) a lack of effective measures to improve the quality and stability of the civil service cadre, through appropriate recruitment remuneration, promotion, and career development arrangements (1). Staronova and Gajduschek (2013) observe that "there had been very little change in the period after the accession in 2004 in the overall situation, and even those progressive measures often seem to be short-lived" (Staronova and Gajduschek 2013, 1). Major difficulties occur with respect to reform sustainability rather than implementation.

The current period of reform is somewhat curious as it marks a nearly *universal agreement among national and international discourse communities and interest groups* concerning the goals and the means of reform process. Previously, trajectories of change in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe differed according to the basic prerequisites of the reform characteristic to each individual state. Not only did the content and the driving forces of change differ, but the speed and sequence of reform measures also diverged from one country to another. In recent years, however, trajectories of the reform processes have gravitated toward the principles of New Public Management. Most countries in the region began experimenting with their systems of public administration, ending up with a mixture between the NPM and neo-Weberian models. Major changes were implemented in the area of human resource management (HRM), including pay and promotion systems, which were not covered by reform processes during the early and late 90s.

One of the most vivid examples of such tendencies within the CEE region concerns Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia - countries that initially embarked on diverse trajectories of CSR progress. Hungary introduced radical changes to the previously adopted career-based system on three occasions over the past decade - in 2001, 2006-2008, and 2010 respectively. In 2001, the government introduced a performance appraisal system (NPM mechanism of changing salaries +/-20%), which was taken to the extreme unknown in Western Europe. In 2006, the government increased performance bonuses up to 50% - another NPM-like mechanism aimed at increasing flexibility within the Hungarian public administration. Finally, in 2010, major changes took place with regard to the dismissal of civil servants, whose contracts could now be terminated without giving reasons (the same as was done in the private sector). All measures were accompanied by regulations aimed to increase wage levels, professionalism, and recruitment objectivity in public administration. However, as Staronova and Gajduschek (2013) observe, these measures were highly complex, and they negatively impacted the trajectory of civil service development (4-5).

Slovakia embarked on a fast-track reform process starting in the early 2000s, which included both NPM mechanisms and neo-Weberian principles as a cornerstone of its reform

program. Contradictions between the two models emerged early on in the reform process. For example, in 2002, the Civil Service Office planned to create a centralized recruitment system, based on the criteria of examination, an automatic career path, and limited options for the dismissal of civil servants (elements of a classical career-based system). However, the basic amendment project, which came into force in 2003-2004, introduced innovative elements into the civil service system, such as a "fast-track recruitment process", "nominated civil servants", changes to the grading system, and performance-based appraisal mechanisms. In 2006, nearly all merit-based principles were abolished; however, NPM mechanisms have never taken root in the Slovak civil service system as well.

Staronova and Gajduschek (2013), with regret, observe the following:

In sum, [at this point] there is no clear direction regarding the civil service arrangement…There are no long term visions implemented by concurrent cabinets. It is rare that one cabinet follows a clear direction throughout its term and achieves that by carefully taken steps. Rather, decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, and the direction may change even within the same election period (5).

One of the most obvious obstacles to reform sustainability over the last decade has been the discrepancy between the *laws,* adopted at the start of the reform process (early and late 1990s), and *policies* established by the follow-up reform programs. It is obvious that, in recent years, none of the countries of the CEE region have adopted measures to deal with the process of civil service neutralization. Moreover, since 2006, most governments have abandoned their official dedication to merit-based principles in public administration, trying to innovate rather than develop the existing civil service systems. Contemporary scholarship leaves these developments unexplained, and it goes no further than observing and criticizing recent changes.

It would be reasonable to suggest that state reformers in the CEE region appear to be driven by rational considerations, dealing with the growing disillusionment with the previously established practices of the classical neo-Weberian doctrine. Thus, when trying to improve the existing system of public administration, they blame the very model of public administration, rather than the strategy of policy implementation. In this respect, it appears that the mixture of doctrines present in recently adopted reform programs emerges accidentally, without any clear logic or a sense of direction.

When trying to explain the dynamics of policy implementation in the area of PAR and CSR, it is important to distinguish between the *'old' and the' new' legacies of the post-Soviet state*, which have recently been combined into a highly complex institutional system. The hybrid nature of the reform programs might have emerged as a result of the new legacies of the post-

Communist transition. These legacies also include the new wave of CSR politicization, which is underpinned by the structural processes of post-Communist change (conflict between the goals of democratization and public administrative reform, issues of trust and power dynamics in post-Communist societies).

Scholarly studies concerning the pace and dynamics of civil service reform include multiple explanatory variables for the failure of reform. However, none of these studies clearly elaborates on the *accidental nature* of policy decisions and policy outputs. Evidence suggests that both legislative documents and reform implementation measures in the CEE region appear to be constrained by a variety of environmental conditions. For example, the hybrid nature of reform projects developed as a result of a lack of strategy for CSR development and the structural constraints imposed on the decisions of policy leaders by the transitional process. Staronova and Gajduschek (2013?) explain that the classical career-based civil service model (initially adopted by the majority of CEE states), failed because it turned out to be unworkable within existing policy-making circumstances. Specifically, the two features of this system – seniority and job security – created significant difficulties for policy-makers, and were abandoned at subsequent stages of policy development: "Under these principles, salaries would remain low but compensation comes in the form of gradually increasing wages and tenure. The tenure system has been eroded owing to increasing levels of politicization, while seniority holds little attraction for the young workforce in these countries. Fiscal constraints make an overall increase in wage levels virtually impossible". Meanwhile, if wages remain low, it would be difficult to ensure civil service competitiveness (14).

The current process of CSR implementation may also be described as somewhat accidental. For example, scholars commonly call attention to the *wave of increasing uncertainty* associated with the lack of systematic improvement in the area of politicization. In this respect, success or failure in one area of the civil service profoundly affects developments in other areas of public sector.

An analysis of Poland's recent wave of reforms helps to exemplify the interrelatedness of policy developments in the area of civil service and public administration. Kulesza and Izdebski (1999) (both lawyers who were actively engaged in the Polish reform) argued that the introduction of management principles in administration with recruitment procedures similar to the market sector has commonly (and quite unintentionally) led to the politicization of public administration. Similar conclusions were made by Randama and Viles (Kurdycka 2002), based on the comparative research they conducted in Central and Eastern Europe (Majcherkiewitz and Gadowska 2005). The authors emphasized the dangerous consequences of incompetent

management, such as increased politicization, corruption, and nepotism in public administration (4).

Given the lack of understanding surrounding the origins of policy problems, legislative imperfections in the newly established institutional frameworks [of countries in Central and Eastern Europe] appear to be reproduced in various areas of public administration. Newly adopted programs often repeat the imperfections of old legislative documents. As such, most countries in the CEE region lack an overall vision of the direction of public policy change.[89]

**Table 5: Content of civil service legislation (CEEC)**

| | State | Job duties and responsibilities | Tenure and security | Disciplinary arrangements | Rewards and Wage | Assessment of Civil Servants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hungary | x | x | x | x | x |
| 2 | Lithuania | x | x | x | x | x |
| 3 | Estonia | x | x | x | x | x |
| 4 | Romania | x | x | x | x | x |
| 5 | Bulgaria | x | x | x | x | x |
| 6 | Poland | x | x | x | x | x |
| 7 | Serbia | x | | x | x | x |
| 8 | Republic of Moldova | x | x | x | x | x |
| 9 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | x | x | x | x | x |
| 10 | Republic of Macedonia | x | | x | x | x |
| | Czech Republic | | | | | |
| | Latvia | | | | | |

*Source: Matei and Lazar, 10.*

**Table 6: Characteristic elements of the career system**

| |
|---|
| Public law contracts and the public servants' appointment |
| Exclusively appointed by the debutant positions |
| Specific statutory conditions for education and career |
| Limited recognition of the professional experience obtained in the private sector |
| The remuneration systems established by the statute (promotion on the length of service criterion) |

---

[89] For example, Slovakia's newly adopted Civil Service Law (2009) perpetuates the pre-existing confusion between merit-based and career-based civil service models (this imperfection first appeared in the 2002 Law). The same problem is observed in the legislation of the Czech Republic.

| Lifelong service |
| --- |
| Code of conduct for the public servants (including special disciplinary norms) |
| The work process based on rules more than on results |
| Focus on accuracy, impartiality and the rule of law |
| The subordination of the performance principle |
| Special pension systems |

*Source: Demmke C. (2002), p.99*

**Table 7: Civil service models in CEECs**

| | Country | Career system | Recruitment methods |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Hungary (until 2006) Romania Bulgaria Republic of Moldova | Career-based | -personnel selection through competition/exam -Promotion -Redistribution -Transfer |
| 2 | Lithuania Czech Republic Poland Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia Republic of Macedonia | Hybrid | -Personnel selection with or without organizing a competition/exam |
| 3 | Estonia | Position-based | -Open application procedures are required by the law for recruitment |

*Source: Matei and Lazar, 17.*

**4.4 Central Asian States**

It may seem to be counterintuitive to examine the new wave of reforms in Central Asian states as opposed to (or combined with) the study of the CEE region However, this inquiry is interesting for a number of reasons. These include the need to highlight the speed and tempo of centralization-decentralization process, the pressures for change, and other factors in examining the pace and outcomes of civil service reform development in a controlled environment. Kazakhstan, considered to be the region's front-runner in civil service reform development, offers one of the most interesting cases for analysis. By comparison, the other Central Asian states (most of them autocratic) "either have not been able to reform their respective civil services consistently, due to political instability, or the reform measures they have enacted have been largely conservative in nature" (Emrich-Bakenova 2009, 718).

The development of civil service legislation in Kazakhstan took place over several consecutive stages in 1995, 1999, and 2007. As with other post-Communist states, during the early years of independence, Kazakhstan introduced random administrative innovations to keep up with the ongoing process of economic liberalization. Subsequent stages have witnessed an increased commitment from the country's leadership to the goals of administrative reform; therefore, all reforms were officially endorsed as a way to create a viable up-to-date public administrative system that would effectively advance the goals of both political and economic modernization.

The first Decree on Civil Service, adopted in 1995, created norms with respect to seniority, job classification, performance evaluation, and disciplinary charges, which altogether formed the legal foundations of a career-based civil service reform. One of the basic disadvantages of this legislative document was the absence of *policy implementation mechanisms*. For example, the decree did not outline "the venue through which potential applicants could learn about employment vacancies unless they made a personal request to government or used informal networks and connections to an individual administrative entity" (722). Civil service management and administration were spread among numerous administrative structures that lacked unified human resource management. The decree allowed for a broad range of vacancies to be filled without using a merit-based selection process. Finally, a process for issuing security clearances, as well as the declaration of property assets during the process of recruitment, were practically absent.

Imperfections in the newly adopted legislative framework affected the pace and outcome of civil service development during the mid-1990s. To illustrate the growing levels of patronage (as an indicator of systemic weaknesses) in the Kazakh state administration, Emrich-Bakenova (2009) cites evidence, provided by Schatz (2004), about how "the newly appointed regional akim of the Zhambyl region, from 1995 to 1996, Amalbek Tshanov, removed 140 civil servants in his jurisdiction, replacing 80% of them with members of his clan". Other evidence cited includes the "informal hiring and unjustified mass purges of lower ranking bureaucrats in local state administrations" (722). Emrich-Bakenova (2009) asserts that the lack of merit-based principles in the recruitment process created systemic problems in the performance evaluation of civil servants in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the very process of recruitment involved difficulties due to the low wage levels of civil servants at the time of the reform.

One of the basic threats to security and stability in Kazakhstan's civil service during the mid-1990s was the Decree's Article 29, which formalized a spoils system "by stipulating that resignation of a civil servant of top to second categories leads to the resignation of the entire staff

subordinated to that position, that is, deputies, heads of departments, agencies, committees, divisions, individual departments, assistants, advisers of departments, and staff of territorial administration" (724). An example of the use of this article emerged during the change of governments in 1994-1997 under Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, and in 1997-1999 under Prime Minister Nurlan Balgimbayev. During the same period there were continuous changes among the top-level civil servants– the regional *akims*. In 1995, there were seven regional appointments; in 1996 - 6; in 1997 - 10; in 1998 - 3; and in 1999 - 7 (Igaliev and Igalieva 2005). The resignation of regional akims led to the removal of their deputies, local or lower level akims (district, town, village) and their respective staff (724).

In 1997, President Nazarbayev introduced a state strategy dubbed "Kazakhstan - 2030", which outlined seven major steps for the development of a public administration that was aimed at accelerating Kazakhstan's acceptance into the 50 most competitive countries in the world by 2030. In 1999, within the framework of this program, the Government adopted a new Civil Service Act, with the formal goal of creating an independent and highly professional civil service system. The major achievement of this law was the separation of ***political and administrative*** civil service positions, as well as the establishment of an agency responsible for civil service reform management (*Agentstvo po delam gosudarstvennoi sluzhby*, CSA) The law established a list of positions appointed directly by the President (or by an appropriate individual in the executive), as well as administrative civil service positions.[90] Another advantage of the law was that it outlined competitive and relatively transparent recruitment guidelines, introduced a revised remuneration policy, and created a unified database for civil service personnel management. According to the law, the competitive selection process was supposed to be open to all citizens. Announcements about available vacancies were mandatory and had to be published in official media.[91]

The newly adopted legislative document received consistently positive assessments from the international community. The World Bank (2002, 2005) recognized it as an important pillar of Kazakhstan's efforts to reform its public sector, and used this case as a model of one of the most successful policy developments in the region. Meanwhile, Emrich-Bakenova (2009) doubts that

---

[90] Political appointees include the following categories: A (president's staff), B (government, parliament, judiciary, the prosecutor's office), C (republican-level ministries, departments, agencies and their regional counterparts), D (staff of the regional executive and representative bodies). The law specifies qualification requirements for administrative positions, which include education, work, experience, knowledge of the state language, and an ability to serve citizens (725).

[91] The law also reiterated a number of requirements for civil servants' behaviour and responsibilities (full capacity service, prohibition of enterpreneural activities, declaration of property assets, prohibiting nepotism, etc.).

the adoption of a legal framework founded on a merit-based system reduced politization or led to increased professionalization of civil servants (Gajduscheck 2007):

Regular, persistent deviations from formal requirements in Kazakh civil service shows that the system continues to run, which in turn reinforces reliance on a progression of patchwork measures, each resembling the others instead of fundamental comprehensive reform. The question then is whether Kazakhstan is doomed to the endless repetition of the same type of reforms. What stops them from being finally realized? According to Dery, loose control and discretion, while helping the system to overcome inherent deficiencies of centralization, opens the way to systematic breach of law and functional corruption, which in turn, inspires more of the same. Thus, there is indeed little use for in rules when their enforcement is discretionary and unpredictable (Dery 2002, 214, in Emrich-Bajenova 720).

Emrich-Bakenova further sides with scholars evaluating PAR developments in other post-Communist states, arguing that the official proclamations on the reform success in these countries may not be fully supported. Similar to other cases, the first stage of Kazakhstan's civil service development was characterized by problems that were exacerbated by the struggle among political elites, by citizens' apathy, and by the poor state of economic development. At subsequent stages, however, this new type of post-Communist politicization, coupled with the concentration of power within the hands of top-level public officials, has institutionalized through a range of legal venues and discretionary opportunities stipulated within the recently adopted legislative framework.[92]

The Civil Service Management Agency (CSA), in cooperation with its regional departments and the Eurasian Study Centre (a newly established educational institution), greatly contributed to the progress of PAR and CSR in Kazakhstan over the past 10 years. Meanwhile, official sources (the CSA in conjunction with UNDP) recognize that the Agency faced significant resistance from branch ministries, which opposed restrictions on discretionary practices pertaining to the hiring and firing civil servants (2). Until recently, counter-resistance efforts has presented itself as an obstacle to the universal consensus concerning the means and objectives of reform, although the overarching trajectory of change has been one of continuous progress toward the ultimate goals of PAR and CSR.

The new wave of reform, which started in 2007-2008, switched the emphasis from just recruitment to a comprehensive *personnel management system,* underscoring once again that the development of a professional civil service system is one of the nation's most important priorities (for more information, see The State of the Union Address to the People of Kazakhstan by

---

[92] Emrich-Bakenova argues that quite often, public officials misuse and abuse legislative ambiguity and inconsistencies, at their discretion and to their own advantage, at all the crucial points, such as recruitment and dismissal, promotion and remuneration.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, February 6, 2008). In this project, it is clear that the government has directly linked PAR and CSR with the overall goal of the country's economic advancement, including an improvement in the quality of life for the citizens of Kazakhstan (these goals fit with the country's "Strategy – 2030", adopted in 1997.

By the third wave of reform, Kazakhstan's new legislative framework in the areas of PAR and CSR included some of the following important documents:

- The Law on Civil Service (1999);
- The Law on Anti-Corruption Measures (*Zakon o Bor'be s Korruptsiei*);
- The Law On Administrative Procedures (*Zakon ob administrativnykh protsedurakh*);
- The Code of Ethics in Public Service (*Kodeks Chesti Gosudarstvennykh Sluzhashikh*).
- Administrative standards adopted by presidential decrees (oath of allegiance, qualification regulations, disciplinary measures in public administration, etc.)

The Government of Kazakhstan has been considerably activist in its implementation of administration and civil service reform policy, managing to adopt over 30 supplementary documents to the Law on Civil Service (1999) (not to mention other legislative documents). Some of the most important amendments were enacted in 2003, when the norms on meritocratic recruitment were breached for the purpose of achieving greater effectiveness and efficiency in public administration.[93] At the same time, several new amendments have strengthened the norms of anti-corruption mechanisms by prohibiting persons involved in corruption scandals to be employed in civil service organs during the years, which follow their conviction. Department heads were also to be dismissed in cases where they chose to employ people already fired for alleged corruption. These measures were emphasized and reiterated by the Presidential Decree "On Strengthening the Fight Against Corruption" (2005), the Code of Ethics, and by the Presidential Decree of April 22, 2009, which defined the fight against corruption as an important priority for national politics.

The study suggests that the third wave of reform, starting from 2005-2010 included a new 'corporate agenda', grounded in the ideas of the new public management system prevalent in the majority of post-Communist states. The stated objectives of these measures were "the orientation of public administration toward a final result, efficiency, transparency, and public accountability" (737). The downsizing of government by 30% was geared to restructure and provide better

---

[93] Specifically, the law created an option for non-meritocratic recruitment via inter-departmental exchanges, allowed by the heads of the departments.

financial support to the remaining civil service; civil service remuneration, in turn, was to be evaluated on achieved results, with reference to both the past achievements and 'future potential' of each individual employee (737).

It is important to note that measures associated with a market-based mentality in public administration have produced somewhat contradictory results (as has been the case elsewhere in the world). On the one hand, these measures, coupled with the basic legislation adopted in earlier years, improved the transparency of the hiring and firing process, reduced the turnover of personnel in public administration, and established formal restrictions on the politicization of civil service. On the other hand, measures, such as the introduction of the short-term contract system (which is also a part of NPM), had the opposite effect of encouraging instability and the further politicization of civil service by handing out jobs to outsiders based on friendship, party affiliations, and other criteria.

Beisembayev (2010) identifies several important problems with Kazakhstan's civil service and public administration that have persisted over the last 10 years: (1) the lack of measures ensuring fair conditions for hiring and firing civil servants (it is a widespread practice that heads of national departments force employees to leave their jobs "of their own will", without giving reasons); (2) insufficient pension funding for former civil service employees; (3) the lack of implementation measures associated with the Code of Ethics for civil servants; and finally (4) the lack of stability and continuity in civil service retention.

In Kazakhstan, the process of hiring civil servants involves a great deal of subjectivity on behalf of the heads of civil service departments. These heads often use the existing legal mechanism as a means to expand their personal networks of power and influence, rather than to ensure the quality of the professional civil service. The process of hiring civil servants is focused on testing a candidate's knowledge of law, and does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the skills and practical expertise of civil servants. Similarly, the mechanism for performance appraisal remains underdeveloped, which leads to the reproduction of inefficient practices throughout the civil service.

It is important to note that Kazakhstani officials, similar to their colleagues in the near abroad, face particularly acute problems with respect to the process of *norm internalization*. For example, experts observe that while Kazakhstani officials may express a formal commitment to the goals of PAR and CSR, this is also usually accompanied by a sense of unspoken distrust of new public administration mechanisms, such as competition, formal appraisal, and other aspects of the personnel management system. Much of this attitude is explained by the lack of cultural, social, political, and economic prerequisites for the reform process.

**Table 8: Kazakh civil service: fluctuating numbers**

| 1994 | 2000 | 2003 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 million (total number state budget employees) | 66.603 | 79.000 | 95.369 | 94.508 | 94.148 |

*Source*: CSA (2006-2008); Nazarbayev (2003); World Bank (1996, 2002), Emrich-Bakenova (2010, 729)

**Table 8.1 Turnover among civil servants in Kazakhstan**

| 1998 | 2001-2003 | 2004 | 2007 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22% | 14% | 8.5% | 15.7% | 7.4% |

*Source*: Baimenov (2000); CSA (2006-2008c); World Bank (2005), Emrich-Bakenova (2010, 729)

**Table 8.2 The structure of civil service in Kazakhstan**

| Age | % | Seniority (Years) | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30 years and younger | 30 | 1 | 11 |
| 31-40 | 24 | 1-5 | 33 |
| 41-50 | 27 | 5-10 | 20 |
| 51 and older | 19 | 10-15 | 14 |
| | | 15-20 | 8 |
| | | 20 and over | 14 |

*Source*: CSA (2006-2008c), Emrich-Bakenova (2010, 729)

To understand the reasons why Kazakhstan is a front-runner in CSR development within Central Asian, it is important to take into consideration the influence of foreign actors, as well as the significant political leverage enjoyed by the President of Kazakhstan, over the past several decades. Kazakhstan "is a highly centralized unitary state where the president as head of state coordinates the functioning of all state branches and local governments (executive – *akimat*, and representative - *maslikhat*), which are part of the local public administration" (Emrich-Bakenova, 720). Kazakhstani elites have also been relatively open to the project and advice provided by foreign actors. In fact, the very process of political centralization, which is commonly detrimental to the quality of most reform projects, has been working, in the case of Kazakhstan, as a channel

of leverage, considering the level of engagement of Kazakhstani political leader with foreign ideas and research projects.[94]

In recent years, the Parliament of Kazakhstan (consisting of the Senate and *Majilis)* has steadily yielded its powers to the president, who has been officially granted the authority to dissolve parliament and convene new parliamentary elections (at the moment, the president oversees appointments to government, senate, courts, and local public administration). David Dery argues that this system (due to its over-centralized nature) is "particularly prone to the customarily use of discretions, corruption and nepotism" (720). At the same time, it is susceptible to the visions of national leaders; therefore, in such circumstances, much depends on how individual leaders perceive the reform process.[95]

It is also important to note that the early 1990s were characterized by a struggle for power among various elite groups (nomenclatura of the Soviet times, business entrepreneurs, the financial establishment, and a very small groups of technocrats): "Radical changes were characteristic of that time; however, the existing political opposition was weak and not capable of presenting a viable alternative to the existing power. In addition, there was an overall low level of political activity and inertia among the Kazakh population, evidenced by the decline of voter turnout" (Emrich-Bakenova, 2010). This led to the establishment of a strong personalistic rule.

It is also important to note that the adoption of the Civil Service Law (1999) in Kazakhstan was accompanied by a strengthening of the executive (President) and a commensurate weakening of the Parliament (Masanov 2000, Osipov 2002, Serikbaev 2002). Viewed in this context, the processes of CSR and PAR may be described as being a part of the *state-building project*, which aimed to perpetuate the existing model of power relationships, while steadily progressing toward the goals of economic advancement.

The other Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) did not enjoy the same level of success as Kazakhstan, even though reform of civil service were attempted nearly everywhere. For example, **Kyrgyzstan** launched its public administrative reform (in a narrow

---

[94] I would like to emphasize one again that Kazakhstan's relative success has failed to include the elimination of patronage in public administration. Indeed, the very process of centralization and the establishment of an authoritatian regime in this country have had a far from positive impact on the goal of political neutrality in public administration.

[95] Verhejen (2003) attributes some of the positive developments in the area of CSR in Kazakhstan to a combination of factors such as strong political will and the development of an independent and well-managed civil service agency. In Kazakhstan, officials also point to the successful application of international standards coupled with the ability to develop a unique model of public administration suitable for the conditions of a Central Asian society. Meanwhile, the role of Nazarbayev, as a driving force behind the adoption of some of the most important legislative documents, remains undeniable.

sense) as early as in 1996, when President Akaev issued an address to Parliament on the role of bureaucracy. On July 14, 1996, the President also issued the Decree "On State Service in the Kyrgyz Republic", outlining the goals of the reform. Later, in November 1996, in an address to the joint session of the *Jogorku Kenesh*, the President stated that "the structural improvement of government and the central organs of executive power should give a powerful impulse to better quality and efficiency of the government's performance....Alongside organisational changes to the executive power at the central level, local government also needs to be reorganised" (Dukenbaev 1999).

By the end of 1996, as a result of major administrative efforts, the size of Kyrgyzstan's central government had been trimmed from 21 to 15 ministries, state agencies had been restructured and new ones had been created, and the Cabinet now consisted of just three vice-PMs compared to the previous six. This reorganisation, according to official statements, "provided for a 30% reduction of staff in the President's office, a 20% reduction of staff in Premier-Minister's office, and a 10% reduction at the local administration level" (5).

Unlike some other countries in Central Asia, the objectives of public administration reform in Kyrgyzstan (as stated in the documents) included the promotion of quality governance and democratic principles in public administration, which boiled down to some of the following principles: (1) "increasing quality and efficiency in the state apparatus"; (2) "fostering economic development during the transition period"; and (3) "bringing state government into conformity with economic transformations taking place in the country" (Dukenbaev 1999).

Against this reform-oriented background, it seems unfortunate that Kyrgyzstan's newly adopted Civil Servce Law (1999) was characterized by so many imperfections that the working group started revising the law immediately after its enactment. Some of the major problems included a great number of gaps and ambiguous norms in the legislation, as well as a failure to distinguish between administrative and political employees. Another significant impediment was the absence of a reform coordination mechanism (an organization with functions similar to Kazakhstan's CSA).

In 2004, the Kyrgyz Government, lead by Akaev, adopted a new Civil Service Law, which attempted to address the problems that were not resolved during the first transitional decade. *Vechernii Bishkek (17.06.2004)* observed that discussions about the new law in the Kyrgyz Parliament sparked heated debate about the usefulness and appropriateness of the legislation. Specifically, opponents of the reform criticized the newly created National Commission, which was charged with leading the reform's comprehensive coordination. Significant criticisms were also spurred on by the establishment of a database, which collected

information on the promotions of civil servants, as well as their family members. The final stumbling block concerned the requirement that civil servants declare their own incomes and the incomes of their family members.

In 2012, President Almazbek Atambaev authorized amendments to the 2004 Law. The major thrust of these amendments concerned issues of transparency and accountability in civil service, the protection of civil servants against unlawful practices during recruitment and/or dismissal, and regulations concerning the responsibility of civil servants for the unlawful fulfillment of their obligations (Atambaev 2012).

Dukenbaev (1999) contends that even though reforms in Kyrgyzstan were initiated by the top-level political leadership, problems of implementation arose as a result of a combination of the **extreme centralization of authority** "buttressed by a complex and sometimes contradictory mix of procedures and regulations, somewhat unclear civil service policies and a rather mechanistic monitoring system". These problems were also accompanied by the lack of a genuine political willingness or capacity to reform civil service. The first set of features, which Kyrgyzstan shared with the relatively more successful Kazakhstan, did not represent a major obstacle to civil service reform progress. It was actually the second set of features (genuine motivations of policy leaders as well as state capacity) clearly differentiated Kyrgyzstan from Kazakhstan and contributed to the former's lack of progress in CSR development. In addition to the difficulties of institutional heritage (the old styles of policy making "based on an omnipotent central authority and lack of initiative") the problems mentioned earlier seemed to be too difficult for the country's policy elite to summount.

**In Tajikistan,** the Law on Civil Service was adopted in 1998. However, the Law's implementation stagnated as a result of the major political and economic problems that the country experienced during the early 1990s (e.g. consequences of the civil war, political polarization, economic hardships experienced by the population). Similar to the case of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan's newly adopted civil service law established an agency responsible for reform implementation (*Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby*); however, its functions remained largely formal. Between 2002 and 2003, the President Emomali Rachmon also adopted several decrees under the title "On State Service", which included a list of central and local organs of state power and management, a list of civil servants, regulations for recruitment and dismissal of civil servants, and the process of certification (attestation) of civil servants. Tajikistan's Code of Ethics in Civil Service was also under review, but has never been adopted by the national government. In fact, many of the regulations mentioned above were never fully realized.

**Uzbekistan** is considered as one of the major laggards in PAR and CSR development in Central Asia. No civil service law has ever been adopted in this country, even though random initiatives have been attempted with the help of foreign-based institutions. For example, in the early 2000s, the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan adopted an action program, outlining procedures for the implementation of a merit-based hiring process, certification procedures, and the professional development of civil servants. On July 1, 2013, the national government also launched an e-governance project, which aims to establish a universal Internet portal of state services. This achievement, however, concerned public administrative rather than civil service reform.

In an effort to explain Uzbekistan's lack of progress in CSR development, Pulat Alkhunov points to the extreme centralization of the existing political system, coupled with the double standards shared by the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, and his top-level public officials:

"Why things go this way? First of all, no one in Uzbekistan, including the President, shares interest in reform progress. Second, even if this interest existed, the result would be the same – it is observed that the President does not govern the system any longer; vice versa, the system of corrupt public bureaucracy governs the President. Public officials appear to be corrupt to the extent that if the system changes, they won't be able to stay in power and maintain their influence over the system; therefore public officials sabotage civil service reform progress; they do not want to lose what they have". (Akhunov 2012)

Specific lessons can be infered from each individual case of post-Communist transformation. For example, the laws adopted in Kyrgyzstan were initially oriented toward the development of a functional and efficient policy-making system, and not just the mere adoption of a new classification system, or a set of rules for civil servants. The Kyrgyz Law on Civil Service demanded that policy-makers refuse from spontaneous reorganization measures so as to achieve some level of stability in public administration; therefore, public officials understood the nature of the policy-making process, extending their efforts further than the mere adoption of formal-legal frameworks, as it is commonly assumed. Kazakhstan progressed further than anyone else in enacting legal regulations for PAR and CSR; however, the process has stalled in nearly all aspects of the reform due to increasing centralization dynamics, which have blocked the most important reform area – the issue of the political neutrality of civil servants.

**Table 9 Trajectories of public administrative reform in post-Communist region[96]**

|  | Russia | Kazakhstan | Eastern Europe (Estonia) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Reform Rationale** | Economic efficiency, competitiveness issues, state-building, which was the cornerstone of Putin's speech in 2000 | Economic efficiency, competitiveness issues; reducing administrative barriers to businesses | Economic efficiency, competitiveness issues; pre-accession arrangements |
| **External Pressures/Internal Pressures** | The Russian public service reform arose from domestic pressures, which came as a surprise, in view of the country's deeply rooted traditions of "untamed bureaucracy" | Similar to Russian, civil service reform in Kazakhstan arose from domestic pressures | Accession to the EU The impact of international aid and international donor organizations |
| **Comprehensive versus Incremental approaches** | 1991-2001 –incremental adaptations 2001-2010 – comprehensive modernization strategy | Comprehensive developmental strategy "Kazakhstan 2030" | Incremental |
| **Implementation model** | Bureaucratic/symbolic (high conflict-high ambiguity) | Bureaucratic/administrative (low conflict-low ambiguity) | Political (high conflict-low ambiguity) |
| **Policy instruments** | -Framework legislation and secondary laws at the federal and regional levels; -Reform Programs and Concepts. -Between 2003-2005, adoption lagged behind, preventing regions from moving forward | Framework legislation and secondary laws at the federal and regional levels | Framework legislation and secondary laws at the federal and regional levels (1995, 1996, subsequent amendments) Extensive Methodological Support |
| **Engaging in strategy formulation, communication strategy** | -Input at a high political level through the Federal Council -Advisory Councils for the officers of Presidential Representatives in Federal Districts | Seminars with high-ranking and low-ranking public officials; publishing relevant information, including guidelines to support public administrative and civil service reform | Ppromotion of common values across the civil service through different activities such as organizing annual conferences for senior civil servants, gathering key personnel data of the civil service, and giving out an annual 'co-operation award'. |
| **Approaches** | -Limited application of New Public -Management instruments – contradictory tendencies within the power pyramid (state institutions are weak, public bureaucracies are strong) | New Public Management, combined with some measures to strengthen the power of state apparatus (i.e. expansion of the state powers) | New Public Management – decreasing the role of the state |
| **Reform Management Style** | No single agency responsible for reform Major actors: Commission on Public | State Civil Service Agency under the supervision of the President of Kazakhstan (*Agentstvo po delam* | The step by step development of a national "lead agency" institution; Major reform |

[96] During the 1990s, Russia and Kazakhstan were characterized by similar political regimes and patterns of centralization-decentralization dynamics. The bargaining power of local elites was huge, and reforms were driven internally rather than the EU accession process. It is noteworthy, however, that implementation process was not sustainable in the long run, even though policy agenda remained stable for over decade.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Administrative Reform The Ministry of Economic Development | *gossluzhby*), Ministry of Economy (*Ministerstvo po Ekonomike i biudzhetnomu planirovaniiu*), and an elaborate system of implementation agencies | stakeholders*:* Ministry of Finance, *Ministry* of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, State Chancellery); after 2003 – no reform |
| **Concrete measures to improve bureaucratic performance** | 1. Federal Programs, laws and other official documents, estblishing<br>(a)　　Competitive recruitment<br>(b)　　Pre-qualified pools<br>(c)　　Job descriptions and job regulations<br>(d)　　Contracts for civil servants<br>(e)　　Dispute resolution procedures<br>2.  A set of anti-corruption measures, including anti-corruption law, starting from 2008 | (a)　　Competitive recruitment (2003)<br>(b)　　A set of anti-corruption measures, including Disciplinary Committees in the cities of Astana and Almaty;<br>(c)　　Code of ethics for civil servants (May 3 2005), including a variety of specific measures, such as the control of ethics book-keeping;<br>(d)　　Public service regulations (standards and regulations) | Federal Programs, laws and other official documents; consistent in some cases; inconsistent in others. |
| **Obstacles to effective implementation** | A lack of consensus building; Capacity constraints; Complexity of arrangements | Capacity constraints Genuine political will to reform | Political volatility, i.e. when political changes have happened quickly, sustainable administrative reform policies have been difficult to plan and implement. |
| **Achievements** | Limited – ('partial reform paradox')<br>The rise of clientelism and political discretion (partial reform paradox);<br>Efficiency, effectiveness, and the level of professionalism did not significantly improve;<br>Structural transformations (functional changes) have only partially taken place | Decline in clientelism and political discretion;<br>Overall, civil service reform in Kazakhstan may be described as being more successful than in Russia. | Decline of clientelism and political discretion.<br>Civil service reform may not be described as a success story; however significant results were achieved faster than in other countries. |

Source: Author, based on a variety of sources (World Bank publications, interviews,official policy prgrams )

**4.5 Conclusion**

In summarizing the discussion of this chapter, I observe that all explanations of policy-making process in a transitional context include structural, institutional and voluntaristic components. However, the role of agency is most significant during the early stages of political

transformation, as well as in policy systems, where the burden of legacy, as well as the strength of executive, "allows for affirmative actions on behalf of post-Communist leaders" (Eriksen 2007, 346).[97] It is not coincidental, in this respect, that the first decade of post-Communism provides us with the history of diversification of reform paths, whereas the last decade is that of the 'race to the bottom' in a form of the new public management approach. It is also quite striking that reform efforts have moved beyond formal declarations in only those cases, where the state executive capacity was strengthened with the expansion of the power of Prime Minister (Hungary), or due to the nearly universal consensus over the course of action after the fall of Communism (Estonia).[98] The ideational vacuum, as well as internal resistance to reform, systemically paralyzed the process of policy making in many other, seemingly successful, states (Czech Republic and Poland). This problem intensified in recent years, with the increasing economic pressures upon national governments. However, the general trend of non-implementation prevailed until these days, and it served an important role of accommodating forces with deeply entrenched interests in the old Communist institutions.

Interestingly, it would be quite misleading to judge about reforms by their immediate outputs (major legislative documents) only, as these indicators may not necessarily reflect upon the actual transformation of civil service. More important and useful, in this respect, would be looking behind the scenes of policy-making so as to recognize whether decisions and non-decisions have resulted in any sort of incremental change. Ultimately, not all decisions represent real reform efforts; and the latter is not the only possible precondition for paradigmatic change (if any). One of examples, discussed here, is the case of the Czech Republic, where CSR lagged behind until the early 2000s. This sluggishness however, did not prevent the Czech state from improving its governance quality indicators so as to enter the EU.

This study has elaborated on the historical, agentenial and structural characteristics of individual cases of post-Communist transformation, pointing out features that these countries share in common. Such features include (1) issues of trust, which incentivized policy-makers to adopt various strategies of PAR and CSR; (2) state-building efforts, which created nationally

---

[97] Eriksen (2007), quoted here, argued that "Western democracies have little latitude for transformative leadership…However, the situation is clearly different in non-democratic systems and in systems experiencing rapid and wide ranging transformations where old patterns of decision-making have collapsed and not yet been replaced by new sets of procedures. These rare moments of "extraordinary politics" offer rich opportunities for individual actors" (346).

[98] Overall, most PAR and CSR reforms in post-Communist region appear to be politically bound; thus to arrive at reliable conlcusions about reform progress we have to consider the origins of public officials' commitment to reforms (legitimacy versus performance; symbolic versus real effort), as well as continuous interaction processes between policy choices and bureaucratic interests stemming from the old Soviet institutions.

unique 'development sequence' processes (party system institutionalization, the establishment of public administration, and others), and finally, (3) the institutionalization of the state executive (the establishment of the centrality of the executive and its organizational features), which affected the capacity of policy leaders to launch and implement policy changes.

The last variable has much to do with the 'strength', or capacity of policy leaders to cope with opposition to public administrative and civil service reform. However, when unconstrained by institutionalized features of democratic governance, centralized executive rarely entails quality decision-making process.

Generally, the strength of the executive alone does not explain the diversity of reform outcomes in those countries, where the values of this variable were nearly the same (Hungary and Poland). In this respect, my study suggests disaggregating between the notions of quality decision-making process (characterized by the degree of reform commitment) and strong leadership in a transitional context. Here, strong leadership refers to the ability of national leaders to cope with resistance to proposed policy changes (capacity and insulation from societal pressures), whereas quality decision-making (reform commitment) implies the ability to effectively formulate and implement public sector reforms. In this perspective, neither the presence nor the absence of 'strong leaders' guarantees reform progress. It is always a combination of state capacity (which results from state-building efforts) and political commitment (which is influenced by factors such as party politics and individual values) that influence reform outcomes. In this respect, the legacies of the past are more likely to be of greater significance when the first two variables are not well established).

The fact that institutional legacies take over the 'failed' or 'delayed' policy projects is obvious from many cases of post-Communist transformation, discussed in this chapter. For example, Hungary and Poland experienced significant pressures to reform prior to the collapse of the Communist rule, yet during the 1990s, their PCs strategies considerably diverged. Central Asian societies have also developed similar cultural attributes, which spanned across centuries to result in the expansion of clan politics during these days; however, my study suggests that Kazakhstan, in recent years, has outrun the Czech Republic, and its reform outputs (the new pieces of legislation) appeared to be more prolific. It would be unreasonable to deny the role of history altogether, as there is much evidence in its favour (ultimately, the Czech Republic had one of the most conservative regimes during the Soviet times, whereas Hungary developed rational public administration starting from the 15th century). At the same time, not all historical events matter, and not all things that we observe (for example, patronage in state administration) may be directly attributed to the past. Generally, it would be reasonable to distinguish between the old

110

and the new legacies of post-Communist transformation with problems such as the trend toward overcentralization belonging to the first group, and problems such as the hybrid nature of public policies, the lack of vision regarding the direction of the reform process, and conflict between the goals of administrative reform and the process of democratization belonging to the new generation of post-Communist heritage.

Eriksen (2007) rightly argued that "the dominant pattern of post-socialism has been one of variation, not uniformity, and the ways in which new institutional patterns have been introduced in the East differ(ed) significantly from the processes of modernization in the West" (335). However, as it was mentioned earlier, the role of Communist legacies significantly declined in recent years, giving way to similar trends and features in hybrid policy-making systems. Briefly, these features could be described as follows.

1. First, this study draws attention to the discrepancy between *the alleged intention of civil service reform and the actual legislative documents* that emerged at various stages of the reform process. The World Bank (2002) argues that the only real progress achieved during the early and mid-1990s concerned the adoption of the "basic legal and institutional foundation for a professional, de-politicised civil service" (4). At the same time, it is fair to say that such formal legal frameworks were quite incomplete, and what is worse, they contained, quite often, the contradictory incentives for policy implementers. Thus civil service legislation never reached the level of maturity and institutionalization necessary to provide implementers with unambiguous guidance for policy action.

2. Another characteristic feature of Post-Communist civil service reform includes *discrepancies between the laws, follow-up reform programs, and implementation practices* in various areas of the public sector. One of the most vivid examples concerns the practice of personnel policy, which perpetuated political patronage in the area of politico-administrative relations. "[R]esearch has found that, at the central government level, politico-administrative relations are characterized by 'instability', as incoming governments show little willingness to continue to work with the administrative staff that has served their predecessors in government" (Verheijen 2001). Thus only a few countries have moved close to the development of *public policies* that would follow up systemically on the newly adopted laws.

3. The final peculiarity of civil service and public administrative reforms in CEE and Central Asia concerns the *differential reform implementation process,* which included cases of occasional reform success that were closely intertwined with the cases of reform failure. As was previously discussed, most countries of the former Soviet world experienced significant difficulties with establishing the principles of political neutrality and professionalism in their civil

111

services. By contrast, issues such as the quality of service delivery, e-governance, and other "technical areas" of civil service and public administration reform have significantly improved in recent years, and they have never entailed as many obstacles at the stage of implementation.

Most observations described above have much to do with policy decisions and non-decisions made by the top level public officials, which, in some cases (Hungary and Estonia), were indicative of a firm course of action, whereas in other cases (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic), reminded of a set of quasi-policies aiming to resolve the most urgent problems rather than to create a pro-active strategy of civil service change. It would be reasonable to suggest, in this context, that some national governments have simply lacked vision concerning the direction of change, or could have started reforms from a wrong point, in which the sequence of decisions was meticulously ignored. For example, the very step of establishing the principles of political neutrality was critical in the development of a professional public administration. However, just a few states understood the significance of such principles and could maintain the integrity of a course of action once chosen during the early 1990s.[99]

All in all, evidence suggests that contradictory domestic pressures, coupled with the demands of the EU process have narrowed down the scope of reforms and pushed national leaders to adopt formal and inconsequential policies that were not underpinned by incremental reform prerequisites. The prospect of EU accession, in this respect, affected the new member states superficially, having no significant impact upon reform sustainability, which proves, one more time, that the driving force of change (external versus internal) correlate importantly with various aspects of the reform, such as policy continuity and its real rather than formal achievements. Experts observe that the biggest problem of policy-making in the region was that "politicians were inclined to understand their jobs not as making policies, but as producing symbolic change or mere gestures and distributing patronage" (SIGMA 2003). In this respect, "a great number of cases occurred when policy makers have tried to feign [deny and postpone] rather than implement" new standards (Eriksen, 335). This development follows the pattern of some of the old legacies of the Communist system, and is more pronounced in countries with strong authoritarian traditions.

Summarizing the discussion, I would avoid labeling post-Communist survival strategies as purely 'defective' (the term introduced by Goetz and Wollmann 2001), as they were adopted

---

[99] Estonia and Hungary benefited from the value of bureaucratic neutrality and moral integrity more than anyone else, as the former attempted to create a new generation of civil servants, while the latter proclaimed bureaucratic neutrality as a "central tenet in the democratic transition" (Staronova and Gajduschek 2013, 2). However, all countries considered were characterized by superficial policy-making expertise on the integrity of various reform models, or the necessity to stick with a course of action once chosen at the beginning of the 1990s.

by national governments for various reasons, which include not only unique histories and political constellations, but also the goal of strengthening (or preserving) state capacities after the fall of Communism. It is important therefore to consider that post-Communist states are (still) not as strong as they need to be, and among the sheer amount of problems they have to overcome, are the difficulties pertaining to the integrity, compliance and accountability of public administration. Institutionalized contraints on the executive (legislature, party system, judiciary, etc.) are equally important in taking reforms further than the narrow interest of political leaders, who usually neglect issues of public engagement and research uptake. However, contrary to what Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) suggest in their argument about radical change as the only route toward policy achievements in CEE, I suggest considering advantages of incremental adaptation, and its impact upon the prospect of achieving significant policy outputs. As I have mentioned earlier, previous accounts of CSR in post-Communist societies were limited due to their narrow focus on issues of political neutrality, or party politics, which did not explain the dynamics of CSR as a uniform entity. In this respcet, to understand the trajectory of non-implementation in some states of the former SU, we have to consider the stakes and constraints coming from elsewhere, beyond the process of democratization (particularly, the risks associated with interests entrenched in the old institutions). This approach would help us understand the cases of differentiated reform progress on a cross-national basis.

113

# CHAPTER 5

# CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES: A CASE OF RUSSIA

## 5.1 Introduction

International experience suggests that civil service reforms stagnated in recent years for various reasons, which include problems of ideational crisis, bureaucratic resistance, the unique features of individual political systems, and the unsatisfactory policy-making practicies, which tended to provide common solutions to different problems worldwide. Post-Communist states, in particular, have encountered significant pressures to maintain rather than challenge public officials' status quo. As a result, problems have flourished to the extent that in the early 2000s, the only possible reform option contemplated was radical and profound change. Evidence suggests, however, that post-Communist leaders successfully adjusted their strategies to the unstable political context, in an attempt to delay or escape the reforms altogether with the use of formal quasi-policies, going nowehere in tersms of implementation. Predictably, only a few of these states managed to consistently implement early reform promises, coming up with solutions that were comparatively deliberate and systematic.

The Russian case is representative in a way that it did not escape the fate of a 'runaway' state-building, leading to the disproportionate expansion of its civil service corpus. Russia has also been active in the formal legislative arena, trying to introduce new laws that were not followed through with any sort of policy implementation strategy. One of the most significant features, described by the post-Soviet scholars, was that in Russia, public bureaucracy expanded its power and influence to become the most stubborn and a reactionary force behind the state apparatus (Ledyaev 2009, Oleinik 2009, Gaman-Golutvina 2009). Moreover, institutional constraints remained weak and malleable, which affected the nation's administrative capacity to formulate and implement effective reform strategies.

Generally, evidence suggests that civil service reforms in Russia were continuiosly postponed or recalibrated for the reasons that have not been sufficiently explained. My goal, in this respect, is to examine the relationship between reform progress (timeline of legislation and implementation measures) and major factors related to state implementation capacity in Russia. The unstable political context is an important pre-requisite of the observed relationship. As such,

I devote much attention to the examination of the contextual and structural factors of the Russian policy-making process.

To reveal the impact of key factors and variables on policy implementation, I look at the dialogue between the processes of policy formulation and policy implementation during the years of Putin's presidency. In this respect, I ask questions stemming from the hypotheses advanced in the first half of my dissertation. What is the role of political leadership in the process of reform initiation? How committed is the top-level political elite to the process of CSR implementation in recent years? To what extent does the strategy of reform fit with the pre-existing institutional structure of the Russian state? How path-dependent are the political choices made by Russia's ruling elite? Finally, what are the legacies of the post-Communist transformation and how do they influence reform progress?

Given that the focus of my study is concentrated within an autocratic political context, I aim to develop a more nuanced set of explanations, working my way back to issues of politics, which account for *the location of decision-making power (whose decisions prevail and whether they matter at the stage of policy implementaiton), as well as the peculiar features of the Russian policy-making system, which I expect to share many things in common with the rest of post-Communist world.* That said, I do not suggest that Russia bears identical characteristics with all its neighbours. By contrast, I insist that Russia is wothy of studying on its own, and it may have as many similarities as differences with the rest of post-Communist states, based on the history, culture and structure of its public bureaucracy. Civil service expansion, for example, seems to be inevitable in a globalized world, and it is not something unique. By contrast, the very size of Russia, its federal administrative structure and its super-presidential constitutional design presumably affect the nature of obstacles to the reform in this counry, the operational capacities of the state and the system of public administration. In this context, Russia may be treated as representative in a sense that a great variety of informal institutions in this country shape the inexplicable and largely intractable policy implementation process.

The first half of this chapter reviews the process of civil service reform enactment, based on both interviews and written accounts of public policy change under Putin. The second half draws exclusively upon semi-structured interviews with senior public officials and civil service experts in Russia who were involved in all stages of the reform. The sample of interviewees includes 30 experts who were mentioned in major public policy reform committees, published in academic journals, and recognized as public policy professionals both in Canada and Russia. This study is further complemented by an analysis of relevant federal legislation, as well as by statistical and sociological reports dealing with the views and attitudes of state officials.

This chapter makes several important claims. The first claim is that the process of public administrative and civil service reform is neither successful nor unsuccessful; it is rather differentiated across major sectors of CSR and on a cross-regional basis. The second claim contends that the reason for CSR uneven progress rests in a combination of variables, such as the state of institutional capacity, the level of conflict (consensus) around the prospects of reform and the extent of public official's commitment to the course of action once chosen. Bureaucratic interests prevail in cases that appear to be politically sensitive (such as issues of bureaucratic neutrality, ethics and anti-corruption). Moreover, the engagement of state servants in the processes of policy making considerably increased in recent years, which may indicate the increasing political role of state bureaucrats. All in all, the variety of views on the content and outcomes of CSR is so great that it would be difficult to arrive at anything other than polar opposite explanations. Thus my goal is to analyze the observable implications of CSR implementation in order to improve the state of research on post-Communist change.

## 5.2 Overview of Russia's Civil Service Reform

In Russia, the current wave of public administration reforms have formally started with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the new Constitution in 1993. In 1995, the Federal Government adopted the Federal law 'On the basic principles of the Civil Service in the Russian Federation' (1995, No. 66), trying to redefine the legal basis for the newly independent state's civil service system. However, this law, along with the subsequent relevant legislation, was rarely fulfilled in a systematic fashion due to the lack of policy implementation mechanisms.

In 1997–8, a group of reform-minded political advisors, who worked closely with the presidential administration, introduced the new 'Draft Law on Public Administration Reform' to President Yeltsin (Krasnov and Satarov 2010). This document contained harsh criticisms of the post-Communist state apparatus and promoted the idea of an open, merit-based civil service system. The idea of reform was welcomed by the President and served as an important ideological foundation for developing a new reform agenda during the subsequent stages of political transformation. However, due to the hectic priority-setting process at the time, as well as continuous economic crises and political instability, the document was never officially published.

In 2001, Public Administration Reform became a top priority on the agenda of the newly-elected Russian government. Federal powers launched a set of comprehensive policy measures aimed at adjusting the state machinery to the changing political context. Most of these efforts

116

went in line with President Putin's overall process of political centralization, which included the technocratic model of public administration, hierarchy of bureaucratic organization, and centralized control. Reforms consistently aimed to achieve greater efficiency and responsiveness in the state apparatus via functional and managerial reorganization.

It is important to note that the federal powers initially focused on civil service rather than public administrative reform. However, the Program "On State Building" developed in State Duma prior to Putin's elections in 1999-2000 (soon to be transformed into the Conception of State Service Reform in the Russian Federation #1496), encompassed both dimensions, and recognized the need for structural and functional changes within the post-Soviet state apparatus. The ultimate goal of the conception's civil service reform dimension concerned creating an efficient and effective civil service, based on the principles of legality and professionalism defined as performance achieved through effective personnel policies (see figure 1). Similarly, the reform of public administration has focused on issues of productivity, effectiveness, and efficiency in state institutions.

One of the crucial challenges of the Russian government from the early years of Putin's Presidency was to devise a coherent strategy that would help overcome problems associated with the post-Soviet transformation. Political turmoil during the 1990s created favourable conditions for the growth of informal practices that enabled the former nomenclature to retain much of its power in the state apparatus. Thus when reforms began, policy-makers had to deal with the legacies of the past, along with an overly powerful body of state bureaucrats. The most obvious obstacles of the existing bureaucratic organization were inefficiency and a lack of accountability and control. The system, on paper, was designed to be open and free to all citizens, yet it remained largely inaccessible to the masses, constrained by the lack of competition as well as by its non-transparent pay and promotion systems.

As such, the primary goals of reform were to improve the quality of state organization via the restructuring of hierarchical orders and operational principles within the post-Communist-state apparatus. All of the goals listed above became part of the distinct processes of PAR, CSR, and State Budget reforms, regulated by the relevant legislative documents. In 2004, these reforms were united into a joint project entitled 'The Reform of State Administration.' However, each component continued developing according to its own unique policy implementation timeline. For example the two stages of PAR took place in 2003-2005 and then again from 2006-2008, which partly overlapped with the stages of CSR which ran in 2003-2005 and 2009-2013.

The Conception of the State Service Reform in the Russian Federation #1496 (August, 15, 2001) advanced a set of systemic goals that also helped to identify problems confronting the

public service sector of Russia.  One of the goals was to create a unified system of state service, based on the following principles:

- Professionalism: implementing a merit-based system as an integral principle for recruitment promotion;

- Serving societal needs: ensuring the individual and collective rights and freedoms of citizens, cooperation with civil society, and the overall openness and transparency of the civil service;

- Effectiveness: focusing on improving the ability of the civil service to achieve the government's objectives in a cost effective manner;

- Stability of the civil service:  providing safeguards in terms of employment stability, longevity of service, and remuneration.[100][101]

The most important feature of this first conceptual CSR document of the Putin administration was *the unequivocal acceptance of the formal principles of a liberal democratic society, which included free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights and civil liberties.* The Program of State Service Reform (2001) devoted several lengthy chapters to the quality of state-society relations, as well as to the democratic foundations of the emerging civil service organization. Presumably, the authors of the program wanted to engage civil society in the process of reform, and they identified the conditions of democratization as being indispensable from the process of civil service rationalization (e.g., de-bureaucratization, opening access to information about the civil service; fostering ethical principles in the behaviour of state bureaucrats). The word "democratization" did not appear in the text of the program; however, judging by the list of principles provided in both the 2001 Program, and the 2004 Law, policy-makers agreed that the nation's civil service had to develop in line with the ideals of democratization. In their view, Russia's post-Soviet civil service was to be founded on the principles of transparency, openness, accountability, and human rights.[102]

---

[100]Most of these principles were incorporated into subsequent pieces of legislation on PAR and CSR.

[101] Goals listed in this table are derived from official documents, which replicate each other, with slight variations. At the same time, there is a number of unofficial goals, featuring in a wide range of scholarly documents. The latter cover efforts at (1) minimizing bureaucratic discretion (administrative decision-making power); (2) minimizing bureaucratic control over resource distribution (one of the most notorious legacies of the Soviet past), and finally, (3) cutting down the number of civil servants, and finally, (4) minimizing bureaucratic control over information (with the use of expert analysis of decisions taken at various levels of public bureaucracy).

[102]Words such as *'efficiency' and 'effectiveness'* were not used within the text of the law; therefore, it may be suggested that the initial goal of the reform was to establish a legal and organizational foundation for subsequent reform steps, rather than to reorganize civil service according to specific managerial principles

The process of policy formulation in the area of CSR involved several important actors: (1) representatives of the Presidential Administration, (2) Federal Government, with The Ministry of Labour, The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, The Ministry of Justice and others engaged to varying degrees in various stages of policy formulation and policy, and finally, (3) experts from the research community based out of leading institutions of higher education, (e.g. The Institute of Strategic Research under the President, The Academy of Science under the President, and the Higher School of Economics). Interestingly, at the start of the current wave of reforms, political actors relied on advice from the expert research community, composed of scholars and practitioners specializing in the area of public administration. These actors participated actively in the ongoing debate on PAR in Russia and abroad, and they commonly imported and adapted some of these new ideas to the conditions of Russia's post-Communist transformation.

The Presidential Administration was the key policy coordinator of CSR from 2003-2005, whereas between 2006-2010, the locus of control gradually shifted to the Federal Government with its ministries. For example, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade was actively involved in the process of managerial reform, including pilot reform projects in the areas of performance-based pay, performance indicators, personnel management, results-oriented budgeting system and others. The Ministry of Labour became another active participant in the reform effort, with a focus on promoting the ideas of professionalism and work ethics in the state service. Starting in 2010, each Russian Ministry became responsible for the development of policy implementation mechanisms within their individual areas of expertise outlined by the law. This process marginalized the expert research community from active involvement in the development of relevant regulations.

The federal government prepared and adopted several important laws within the framework of the Federal Program for Reforming the State Service (2003–2005)[103]. The first one

---

and mechanisms. Overall, the trajectories of reform outlined in the program focused on fostering a new type of relationship between the state and society; they also aimed to improve the system of civil service education, recruitment, promotion, rotation, and other aspects of the existing personnel policy.

[103] This Program was adopted prior to the enactment of the key legal documents in the area of civil service. The goals of the Program of Civil Service Reform (2003-2005) were narrowed down, in comparison with the Conception of the Civil Service System Reform (2001), and included the following issues: (1) improvement of the legal bases of civil service; (2) experiments and pilot reform projects testing new approaches to the organization of the federal civil service, (3) improvement of the professional foundations of civil servants; (4) improvement of the material and technical conditions of the Federal civil service. Reform funding occurred via the *Upravlenie Delami Presidenta RF*. As a follow-up, contracts were made with the ministries of the Russian Government (through the state procurement mechanisms); after that, state contracts were actually implemented. Ministry of Finance funded it's program initiatives independently.

was Federal Law No. 55, 'On the System of State Service in the Russian Federation' (2003), which divided federal and regional public service systems into three categories: the civil service, the police service, and the military service. The next law, 'On the State Civil Service in the Russian Federation' (No. 79), emerged in 2004, and its ultimate goal was to profoundly modernize the system of operational principles and rationales of the post-Soviet bureaucracy, including improved systems of remuneration, career promotion, and job conditions. The law has introduced several important policy instruments into the organization of the Russian civil service, namely: appointment based on competition; pre-qualified pools; job descriptions; examination and certification processes, contracts for civil servants; a government bodies' remuneration fund; standards of conduct; conflict of interest regulations; and dispute resolution procedures. Some of the mechanisms discussed here were not entirely new to the post-Soviet state apparatus. However, prior to the current wave of reform (2001-present) they rarely had been implemented (for more information, see Table 13, p. 135).

The main achievement of the newly adopted law was to narrow the definition of who is considered a "civil servant." The law excluded some groups such as teachers, doctors, regional governors, judges, and other top-level political appointees, from the category of civil servants, which in turn reduced the size of civil service. Generally, the norms of the law did not draw a clear line between political appointees and career civil servants. However, by excluding some groups of top-level public officials (e.g., ministers, deputy ministers, governors and others) from the category of civil servants, the law has generally made an important step toward reducing the level of politicization of the Russian state apparatus. In this respect, civil service positions were to be distinguished from "**state positions**" (*gosudarsvennye dolzhnosti*), created for the immediate exercise of state authority with the use of political appointees. State positions were to be regulated either by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, or by other Federal Laws (for more information and examples, see Appendix). Civil service positions, on the other hand, were listed by the newly created civil service register (Article 43, Chapter 7).

Law No. 55 defined work in the state service as a professional occupation, which fulfills the functions of federal and regional state organs, including the functions of persons occupying state positions (*litsa, zameshchaiushie gosudarsvennye dolzhnosti*). Article 3 of the 2nd Chapter of this law identified the major principles of the state service in the Russian Federation, which include: federalism, legality, the priority of human rights, equal access to the civil service, integrity of the legal and organizational bases of the state service, the connection between the state service and municipal services, and openness and professionalism in the state service.

Federal Law No. 79 contained a more detailed description of civil servants' roles, obligations, and responsibilities (Chapter 3), and it also stressed the importance of professionalism in the civil service occupation. The list of legal and organizational principles of civil service (beyond those discussed above) included the stability of the civil service, the accessibility of information about the civil service, cooperation with citizens and civil society organizations, and protection of civil servants in cases of illegal interferences in their professional work. The law introduced an elaborate system of ranks and positions (*chiny i rangi gosudarsvennoi sluzhby*), which regulates the way civil servants are to be hired, promoted, and fired.

The most important, though not entirely new innovations of Law No. 79 concern Article 16 (Restrictions associated with civil service), Article 17 (Prohibitions associated with civil service); Article 18 (Requirements for the professional conduct of civil servants), and Article 19 (Conflict of interest resolution procedures) of Chapter 3. For example, Article 16 established the following criteria excluding some of the candidates from work in the civil service: health problems interfering with implementing civil service functions (including cases established by the court hearing); legal prosecution interfering with the fulfillment of civil service duties; refusal of a candidate to undergo a background clearance procedure in the case of appointment to a position related to state secret information; the absence (or refusal) of Russian citizenship; dual citizenship; an immediate family relationship of a proposed candidate to one of the managers in the department or the subordinate employees; submitting forged deeds to the competition/appointment committee, including fake documentation on a candidate's incomes.

Article 17 (Prohibitions...) did not allow civil servants to occupy posts on the management boards of commercial organizations or to purchase shares or conduct any other entrepreneurial activity; it also prohibited civil servants from simultaneously serving in the state service (in the sense of *gosudarsvennaia dolzhnost'*), as well as from working in the municipal service or professional union organizations. The article banned civil servants from representing the interests of third parties or receiving informal rewards (gifts and payments) from such parties, and also prohibited the use of the official resources for private gain. Item 7 of Article 18 required civil servants to adhere to the principle of political neutrality in civil service. Article 20 obligated civil servants to submit information on their incomes, including annual tax statements. Finally, Article 19 required civil service employer representatives to establish conflict of interest resolution committees, to assist departmental heads in maintaining the integrity of civil service employees. Generally, most articles *required* (rather than recommend) civil servants to obey the norms of the law. However, subsequent regulations (Presidential Decrees, Government

Resolutions and other relevant Federal legislation adopted as a measure of reform implementation) created greater leeway in interpretation of the rule of competitive hiring, conflict of interest resolution, and other areas of reform (to be discussed further).

The final stage of the current wave of reform (2007-present) entailed the adoption of an important follow-up program, called "Reform and Development of the State Service in the Russian Federation" (2009-2013). This document inspired much doubt and criticism within the community of Russian policy-makers due to the fact that it might have simply marked the filure of the previous reform initiatives. However, the program might have also entailed a radical change in the way of thinking about the process of policy-making after the fall of the Soviet Union. One of the reasons to believe so was that it focused on the 'development' rather than reform of the Russian state service, and it was based on the ideas of continuity and evolutionary qualities of state institutions in Russia. Dimensions of the reform program included the development of a civil service management system, anti-corruption mechanisms, mechanisms of cooperation between the state service and the public, raising professionalism in the civil service, regulating the expert community consultation process, providing methodological support to ethics commissions, and establishing control over the civil service in general. It is important to emphasize that this stage was accompanied by a change in the Russian political leadership and a shift of the locus of control over reform from Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Mert) to the Ministry of Labour (Mintrud). The major schism between the two institutions was generally structured along the lines of efficiency-based NPM mechanisms (advocated by Mert) and the Weberian personnel policies (advocated by Mintrud). The first strategy placed emphasis on the restructuring of public administration, which has overshadowed the process of CSR since 2005, while the second approach reasserted the importance of CSR as an independent reform area.

It is important to note that the control over reform coordination in this program has shifted from the Presidential Administration to the Ministry of Labour, which traditionally focused on issues of work ethics, professionalism, and meritocratic recruitment. Other ministries, including the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Communications, and the Ministry of Justice, were dubbed as policy implementers, though they were obliged to develop independent policy regulations (e.g., reform plans, experimental projects, and so forth) and to provide relevant cross-ministerial recommendations. This approach is described by Jakobson (2010) as a *narrow-focused departmental or agency-based approach* toward implementation, in which civil servants are involved in all stages of policy formulation, implementation, and control.

122

It is important to note that the first attempts to involve these ministries in a bottom-up process of policy formulation occurred within the framework of public administrative reform, which has been more dynamic and overalapped with other reform projects. In this respect, it would be useful to outline the stages and outcomes of Russia's public administrative reform, in order to better disaggregate the two processes of PAR and CSR.

### 5.3 Overview of Public Administration Reform

Public Administrative Reform officially started in 2003, at the same time as Civil Service Reform, with the enactment of the Presidential Decree "On implementation measures of administrative reform in 2003-2004." However, PAR progressed faster than CSR, which resulted in a shorter follow-up reform program in 2006-2008. The Commission on Administrative Reform, using a managerial perspective for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of state institutions, set the goal of clarifying the functions and responsibilities of various state organs. As a result, a significant number of functions (5634 in total) were reviewed; 1468 of them were found to be "redundant", 263 – "duplicative", 868 – "subject to reformulation" (Konov, 4).

The Presidential Decree "On the System and Structure of Federal Executive Organs," adopted in March 2004 within the framework of PAR, established three categories of state institutions: Ministries, Agencies, and Services. Ministries were deemed responsible for the function of policy formulation; Services were invested with the powers of control and supervision; and finally, Agencies were held responsible for the implementation of laws, which included the provision of services, keeping records, the management of state property, and other functions.

According to the Decree, Ministries became the key actors of policy development in all areas of the Russian public sector. For example, ministers have to approve framework documents (e.g., annual plan and performance indicators) for the Services and Agencies under their supervision every year. Ministers also have to submit draft regulations on the maximum staffing and payroll requirements for the federal service under their supervision to the Government of the RF; and proposals on the federal budget and financing of the federal services and federal agencies to the Ministry of Finance (Konov 4).

Overall, public administrative reform envisages three types of administrative regulations: (1) regulations dealing with the interaction between federal bodies of executive power; (2) regulations dealing with the internal organization of federal powers; and (3) regulations, focused

on the implementation of state functions. The last group of regulations include administrative standards (*administrativnye reglamenty*) and public service standards (*standarty gosudarstvennykh uslug*), which clarify the way in which state services are to be delivered to the public. Essentially, there are at least three purposes of administrative regulations: rationalizing the work of the civil service; opening access to the civil service, and enacting anti-corruption mechanisms. The same goals are pursued with the use of instrument of *job descriptions (dolzhnostnye reglamenty)*, which were also developed within the framework of civil service reform. These instruments are used under the contract system, whereas civil service standards apply not to specific positions, but to the actual services in public administration.

It is interesting to observe that between 2001-2005, the goals of PAR and CSR did not change significantly, and they were similar to those outlined during the earlier stages of the post-Communist transformation. However, the obstacles to the reform process diverged greatly from one historical period to another. In 1992-1993, the goals and strategy of reform efforts suffered from a lack of clarity, combined with conflict over the direction of change and a severe resistance to reform on behalf of public officials. In the mid-1990s, the volatile political process, coupled with the lack of political will to reform, paralyzed the system and led to a state of institutional inertia. Finally, starting in 1999-2000, policy-makers attempted to work out a strategy that would resolve nearly all problems accumulated during the years of transformation. However, their strategy of reform turned out to be unfeasible, and incorporated multiple technical difficulties.

During the current wave of reform, which started in 2004-2005, state officials focused more heavily on the goal of *rationalization* rather than modernizing civil service in line with NPM. This sign of content recalibration underscored that it was impossible to jump over the stages of reform development (Kudiukin, Interview 2010), and that a more systematic approach was needed to deal with the quality of public governance. One of the interviewees in my research describes this process as a 'regression to Weberianism.' It proved that reformers had to rationalize the inherited model of PAR and CSR at first place, before they could start thinking of alternative projects of state organization.

The reason for the adjustments of the reform goals and instruments was definitely rooted in the overwhelming nature of the required changes, as well as in the conditions of path dependency that had to be overcome in order to fulfill some of the preliminary objectives. Quite soon it became obvious that it was simply impossible to achieve all of the reform's initially stated goals. Thus the logic of reform dictated the need to develop rather than reform the system of civil service.

What is also obvious from the preliminary analysis presented here is that the final stage of public sector reforms (2007-present) reveals a universal acceptance of the need to reform.[104] For example, Barabashev (2005) argues that nearly all experts working on this project from 2001-2005 agreed on its **core principle**s. At the same time, it would be fair to say that consensus was reached on the goals, but not the means of reform. Research held by the Higher School of Economics in the early 2000s indicated that representatives of at least 6 regions considered opening access to information about civil service (transparency) as unimportant. This finding was quite remarkable, considering that all parties have seemingly reached agreement over reforms (Arkhangelskaya 2003). Generally, the views of experts significantly diverged from the views of civil servants, including both top-level and lower-level public officials. As a result, the goals of the reform were not properly coordinated, and, as such, civil servants at various levels of public administration took this as an opportunity to allocate their personal and organizational resources to one goal of reform over the other (*unequal treatment of reform priorities*). The area where consensus was most obviously problematic was the process of policy implementation, specifically, regarding the organizational prerequisites and means of civil service reform.[105] For example, commissions on competitive recruitment were not created in all state organs until the end of the decade (interestingly, Ministry of Labor lagged behind in the adoption of relevant regulations even though it promoted the idea of merit-based recruitment and ethical standards at first place), while commissions on professional conduct, which formally existed, failed to have any real impact on the process of reform implementation.

The difficulty of studying implementation process concerns the fact that disagreement is not as open as to observe its obvious implications. As such, our means of research are limited to the study of scarce information collected with the use of in-depth interviews. In what follows I describe and summarize these interview findings to assist the main goal, i.e. using this data to evaluate the key explanatory variables of my research.

**Table 10 Major CSR Developments in Russia (1990-2010)**

| Major Developments Associated with the Progress of CSR in Russia (1990-2010) *Ideas, Interests and Institutions* |
| --- |
| - Initial Ideas (1997-1998) – merit based system of civil service (democratic principles of openness, accountability, transparency). |

---

[104] For more information on the stages of the CSR process, please see Kotchegura (2009), Barabashev et al. (2011), Analyticheskiy Vestnik Soveta Federatsii RF no. 14 (400), 2010, and other sources.

[105] Foreign experience was not useful in answering all of the strategic and tactical decisions associated with the post-Communist transformation. Beyond that, there was a set of problematic socio-economic issues, which made finding the right answers even more difficult.

- Political Obstacles to Reform Initiation Process (the Concept of Reform has been officially endorsed, but never published, due to the difficulties in policy initiation process).
- 2003-2004 - Ideas Revisited – "Modernization Project", the Program of Comprehensive Public Policy Change (Budget, Taxation, Public Administrative reforms, etc.).
- Institutional Innovation – massive political support at the stage of policy initiation; success in adopting the formal rules of CSR.
- Implementation Difficulties (the strategy of reform; the choice of policy tools; mobilization of interest groups; commitment toward reform process).
- 2009-2013: The Program on *Reform and Development* of Civil Service marked the change of approach toward the process of civil service reform: greater level of policy continuity; not clear, if it marks a failure at the previous stage.

<div align="right">Source: Author</div>

**Figure 1 Hierarchy of CSR and PAR Goals (current stage)**

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
1. Integrity of civil service legal and organizational bases
2. Effectiveness and efficiency
2.1. Rationalization
2.1.1 Reorganization
2.1.2 Integrity of civil service legal bases
2.2 Professionalism defined as performance achieved through personnel policies
2.3 Material and technical conditions
3. The system of civil service administration (not implemented)

Instruments: Competition, pre-qualified pools, job descriptions (intertwined with administrative regulations and service standards), contracts, remuneration fund, standards of conduct, dispute resolution procedures

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
1. Executive reorganization
2. Effectiveness and Efficiency
2.1 Rationalization (standardization and regulation)
2.2 Performance management ('upravlenie po resultatam'), including administrative regulations (interaction, internal organization, public service standards)
2.3 Anti-Corruption
3. Improving State-Society realtions through quality service

<div align="right">Source: Author</div>

**5.4 Findings from an Expert Interview Study**

Success of the policy implementation process is usually identified by the outcomes that a reform yields at the end of the implementation stage, as well as by the ability of national governments to achieve the policy goals formulated at the initial stage of political transformation. Polidano (2001) argues that tactical choices in both the design and implementation of civil service reform can determine the ultimate outcomes of the reform process. However, researchers pay

little attention to the interaction between tactical and strategic choices, and, as such, their explanations for why a particular reform failed or succeeded turn out to be rather unhelpful (1).

In the case of Russia, there is a large area of uncertainty associated with the CSR implementation process. First of all, it is difficult to identify cases of unequivocal success or failure, because some elements of the reforms seem to have been formally implemented in nearly all areas of public service. Secondly, various reform initiatives (e.g., anti-corruption, performance management system, merit-based recruitment and others) were launched interdependently as a way to improve the existing institutional framework. These measures were difficult to implement simultaneously, and they have not yet produced any significant changes.

In what follows, I will focus on the empirical findings of my research and prepare room for the discussion of the key explanatory variables in Chapter 6 to follow. The first step of this study will be gathering information on the opinions of various participants of the reform; the second step will be analyzing those opinions and filling gaps in the existing written sources on public policy change in Russia.

First, in order to arrive at a coherent explanatory model of the reform, it is important to figure out what were the major problems and whether they could be avoided by targeted analysis and action. My study, in this respect, identifies a confluence of factors (and problems) emanating from the history of the current wave of bureaucratic reform, which is based on personal reflections of interviewees. One major theme summarizing problems and obstacles to CSR process, described by the respondents, concerns the quality of the newly emerged legislation, which has allegedly included a number of regulatory loopholes and reference norms (otsylochnye normy) significant enough to delay the process of policy implementation up to 5-7 years. The second most important problem concerns the quality and nature of the decision-making style itself, which, according to the predominant number of experts, consistently produced unintended policy outcomes. Experts point out, for example that, beginning in 2005, the sequence of events in the area of CSR was unpredictable, both due to the presence of conflict over the direction of change and the overwhelming nature of the transformation that was expected to happen. The pace of change invoked by the civil service reform was not as dynamic as reformers would have predicted. Sometimes, change did not happen at all, which was difficult to cope with in view of the fact that the reasons for the lack of progress remained unclear. [106]

---

[106]The findings of my study partially coincide with a survey conducted by the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law (HR specialists in the Federal Ministries, Services, and Agencies). In this study, experts mentioned the following problems associated with the federal law: (1) the lack of implementation measures and regulations – 75% of the respondents; (2) the lack of clarity in some of the provisions of the federal law (50% of the respondents); (3) gaps and contradictions associated with the content of the law (less than 25%

One of the most obvious stumbling blocks in implementation process was, as I have mentioned earlier, the delay in the adoption of implementation norms. This problem emerged due to the fact that the old Law 'On the Fundamentals of the State Service System in the Russia Federation' (1995) was abolished in 2002-2003, while implementation measures of the new Federal Law No. 79 have not emerged within the reasonable period of time.[107] According to the official sources, the president enacted over 30 decrees over the period of five years since the start of CSR; however, not all of them were implemented due to the **lack of instruments, incentives**, and most importantly, insufficient **control mechanisms** developed within the framework of policy implementation process. The latter problems have stalled reform progress on a number of its important dimensions. Other problems, such as the lack of funding, ambiguous policy goals and a limited amount of policy expertise in the area of civil service and public administration have also aggravated the process of policy implementation.

Accounts of the dynamics of CSR diverge across the line of whether and to what extent the process of bureaucratic reform has been politicized (and therefore, whether the role of policy leadership coincided with its political component). One of the views, for example, holds that Russian leadership has paid insufficient attention to the goal of bureaucratic reorganization (particularly, when compared to the functional reorganization under PAR), and therefore the project may be described as comparatively underfunded (hence unsuccessful). The opposite view is that the role of the central state considerably increased in recent years and so did its funding for policy projects. Thus to understand the reasons for the lack of CSR progress we have to take into account disagreements concerning the role of the state in policy implementation, as well as issues, which go beyond the sheer amount of funding (not how much, but how effectively resources were spent, and whether all paritcipants of the reform process have had an equal chance to utilize the structure of opportunity created by the federal government in the early 2000s).

Some interviewees have placed greater explanatory emphasis on the decision-making style of the Russian leadership and described it as overly inconsistent in the way it dealt with the key priorities of domestic politics. This account is quite persuasive in view of the sheer amount of

---

of interviewees); (4) the lack of funding allocated by federal organs of power. Only 18.7% of the respondents believed that the newly created Civil Service Law No. 79 was implemented effectively, whereas 2/3 of interviewees believed it did not function properly and the process of policy implementation was lagging behind (for more information, please see Tikhomirov&Gorokhov 2008).

[107]For example, some of the earlier Presidential Decrees made exemptions to the rule of the competitive recruitment process established by Law No. 79. Therefore, before the start of the new wave of recruitment, it was necessary to remove all possible contradictions associated with previous legislation. The same occurred with regard to the provision of the recruitment of civil servants older than the pension age.

salient policy issues, which have sporadically emerged on public policy agenda over the last decade to steal the resources and attention needed for civil service reorganization.

Interestingly, all accounts of CSR process appear to be quite unique, and they do not fit into a single explanatory framework of policy change under the leadership of Putin and Medvedev (policy streams approach, historical institutionalism, rational choice, etc.). The constraining role of institutions is commonly cited as a major reason for the so called 'narrow-minded' approach to the design and formulation of the new legislation, including the lack of consultation and feedback mechanisms in the Russian decision-making process. However, the same problems could emanate from alternative reasons, such as the decision-making style of the Russian executive leadership, or the lack of policy implementation expertise (and accordingly, comprehensive approach toward the reform).

It is important to bear in mind that CSR legislation emerged as a result of a 'rushed' consensus among various participants of the reform, and regardless of how little attention it has received, agreement on the ultimate goals and means of the reform has not been reached. Hidden tensions over the nature and content of the newly emerged norms became obvious during the early stages of policy formulation, which included the so called 'consultaiton' mechanisms with civil servants responsible for the juridical assessment of draft legislation. Interestingly, tensions and disagreements between experts and bureaucrats have never took form of an open conflict. By contrast, the ultimate policy outputs (norms) have simply emerged in a form of law to reflect the aforementioned consensus, where minor changes and modifications led to a completely new policy project.

The Law No. 79, for example, has passed after a few stages of reading in the state legislature, which has alledgely, undermined the goal of meritocratic recruitment in the Russian civil service. The final version of the law contained exemptions to the competitive recruitment rules and provided just a few necessary but insufficient references to policy implementation provisions. State Duma Deputy, Vladimir Yuzhakov, in this respect, argues that Law No. 79 effectively undermined the principles of a merit-based system in Russia by incorporating unreasonable exceptions to the norms of a competitive hiring process (see Table 11). In explaining the lack of policy implementation progress, Yuzhakov invokes the long lasting conflict over the future developmental trajectory of the Russian state:

"Speaking about Russia and its bureaucratic reform, we have to understand that the conflict over the future developmental trajectory of this country is not over. There are numerous forces within the Russian political system, which oppose the new transparent rules of the game. Thus it would be unreasonable to expect anything but a continuous struggle over the content and implementation of such an important political project as civil service reform" (Interview, 2010, translated).

129

One of the most obvious consequences of the new law was that it has reinforced some of the existing divisions between higher and lower-level bureaucrats, while lowering the level of transparency in selected areas of the Russian personnel system. For example, building on the new public management instruments, some norms of the law expanded the amount of discretionary powers of civil service departmental heads (directora) in the hiring, payment, and conflict of interest resolution processes. In line with the newly adopted managerial principles, departmental heads were given extensive decision-making responsibilities on the amount of remuneration for civil servants, based on their performance excellence. Heads of the departments were also entrusted with making decisions about the termination of contracts (without being held accountable for explaining the reasons for making such choices) and deciding the fate of employees found to be involved in a conflict of interest. While most of these exceptions to the overarching goals of the reform process were intentional, the 'unintended' consequences of such rules were that it became more difficult to understand why people were hired or fired, and moved or replaced within lower level departments.[108]

**Table 11 Exemptions from the rule of competitive recruitment**

1. Contract appointment to the position of director (rukovoditel') or assistant (advisor) of director;
2. Appointment by the President of the RF to the position of director (rukovoditel') or assistant (advisor) of director;
3. Terminal contract appointment;
4. Cases outlined by the article 28 (part 2). And article 31 (part 31) of the Federal law no. 79 (2004) "On the state civil service in the Russian Federation";
5. Appointment of a person from the pool of civil servants, which is formed on a competitive basis;
6. Appointment to the position which involves in it's duties the use of state secret information;
7. Appointment to the junior position, on the decision made by Employer's representative.
    Competition is announced by Employer's representative, and it is held in two stages 1) making an advertisement about a job vacancy in civil service; and 2) managing the

---

[108] Yuzhakov (2003) observes that forces, which blocked some of the most innovative ideas in the State Duma, were most commonly represented by the centralist political parties, including the 'party of power' (United Russia). For example, the Law On the System of State Service (2003), with all its imperfections, has been approved by the following major actors:  Unity (Edinstvo) (98,8% deputees), OVR (Otechstvo Vsya Rossiya) (100%), Liberal Democratic Party (100%), Group of Deputies "Narodny Deputat" (100%), "Regions of Russia " (57,4%) and "Yabloko" (29,4%). Most of these forces represented *the core of the Russian power structure*. Out of over 200 amendments introduced during hearings, on the clarification of the principles of meritocratic recruitment and others, only 40 were actually accepted.

actual competition.

Another area, where the discretionary power of departmental heads significantly expanded, concerned anti-corruption measures, and more specifically, conflict of interest regulations, including application of those norms by various state departments. Framework legislation (Article 19 of Law No. 79) defined conflict of interest as a situation wherein a civil servant's interests interfered with the impartial fulfillment of his/her professional obligations and responsibilities; this article has also placed some level of decision-making power within the hands of departmental heads (directors), thus making them [directors] responsible for individual cases detected within their relevant departments. Interestingly, Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 269 "On Commissions Observing Requirements on the Professional Behaviour of Civil Servants" (March 2007) (**major implementation document**) did not establish procedures departmental heads could follow to deal with individual cases among their subordinate employees. Instead, Decree **recommended** that the head of the commission undertake outreach activities, by explaining the undesirability of conflicts of interest to subordinate stuff. Thus, the norm did not include incentives for policy implementation, and it reinforced formalism in the process of policy implementation.

It is important to mention that ideas advanced by policy experts have not been necessarily rejected or undermined from the very start, but instead experienced a long history of struggle with the existing decision-making machine. One example of this kind could be derived from the history of a longterm project described as 'upravlenie po resul'tatam' (comprehensive performance management initiative, which has aimed to establish the level of correspondence between the salary and performance of civil servants. By design, this system, which was essential to both PAR and CSR, developed principles of performance-based pay in order to incentivize public officials to work more effectively. However, in practice, its application appeared to be unfeasible and required considerable changes within the operation of the Russian budget, as well as the work of civil service organizations. The system has also been met with criticism on behalf of civil servants, who did not understand how and why they should 'serve' the public. State servants in Russia have always perceived themselves as representatives of state power, so

---

[109] 1) Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 112 "On competitive recruitment in civil service of the Russian Federation" ("O konkurse na zameshchenie vakantnoi dolzhnosti gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhny Rossiiskoi Federatsii"), adopted on 1 February 2005, by the article 22 of the Law no. 79, 2004. 2) Decree of the President no. 82 "On amendments to the Decree no 112" (January 22, 2011).

changes proposed by some components of the reform required significant cognitive and behavioural adjustments (Interviewee, 2010).

Experts point out that the process of developing the necessary performance management (in Russian, UPR) regulatory framework has been lengthy and labour intensive, yet by the time the system was completed, the idea of performance-based pay was unexpectedly blocked and rejected by the Ministry of Finance. Interestingly, the reasons for the difficulties with performance management extended further than bureaucratic resistance. As I have said earlier, the nature of change involving NPM mechanisms has been quite overwhelming from the very start, and it has been even more difficult to implement UPR programs, considering that the appropriate prereqsites of rational bureaucratic organization, by the start of reforms, have not been met. One of interviewees in my research suggested that NPM was easier in Russia, as it allowed to build market based principles without any significant obstacles. Evidence suggests, however, that neither the mindset of state bureaucrats, nor state capacity was enough in recent years to achieve any substantial results in the area of performance management system.[110]

These widely cited examples of seemingly inexplicable changes in the course of policy enactment and implementation reveal two things. One of them is that control over implementation has not been the prerogative of policy experts. The second observation concerns the level of cognitive discontinuity among participants of the reform, where political willingness to reform (or a structure of opportunity created by the federal government) has stumbled over a multitude of tactical decisions policy implementers have had to take in view of competing ideas, interests and resources, and what's mostly important, in view of the existing level of state capacity and policy-making expertise.

**Table 12 Major steps in the development of performance management system**

| |
|---|
| 2003 – The start of administrative reform;<br>2004-2005 – The concept of performance management (*upravlenie po resultatam, UPR*) introduced as a component of PAR;<br>2004 – Federal Law no. 79 includes the following features interconnected with UPR, e.g. contract requirements, service standard (dolzhnostnoi reglament); performance based pay.<br>2005 – the start of budget reform; changes to the budget classification system, spending accounts and other features interconnected with UPR; instruments of administrative management: reports on the goals and achieved outputs (DRONDy), financial plan, djudzhetnoe assignivanie, gosudarstvennoe (munitsipalnoe) zadanie; |

---

[110] Russian literature has only recently discovered that the usefulness of NPM reforms has been heavily criticized by Western scholarship, including Hood and Kackson (1994), Kelly (2002), Dubnick (2005); Hood and Dixon (2010), etc. These criticisms, however, did not affect UPR programs, which continue running in Russia in a hope to bring more order to the Russian civil service.

2005 – Targeted Program «Electronic Russia», automatic follow through on effectiveness and efficiency indicators of state administration;

2005-2008 - Major difficulties entailed the disjuncture of performance indicators used at the federal and regional level; the lack of consistency between objectives and performance indicators in various performance reports

2008-2012 – Declining interest in UPR; yet the programs are running in a hope to bring more order to the Russian civil service system

Source: Author, based on a variety of sources

The most significant drawback of the newly created law was the expansion of the system of ranks that re-distributes privileges among civil servants. While the intention of state reformers was to simplify the existing system of civil service by disaggregating several groups and categories within the civil service, the outcomes of the reform have turned out to be quite the opposite. Moreover, this law has led to the expansion of the number of state bureaucrats rather than to the reduction in their cize, as it was planned by the reformers. Obolonsky (2011), in this respect, observes the following:

The number of bureaucrats in most countries of the world has decreased quite drastically in recent years. However, this number tends to have shrunk more significantly as we move from the East to the West of Europe. Historically, England has had the lowest number of state bureaucrats, whereas the maximum number could be found in the Habsburg Empire, as well as in Prussia. In Central Europe, the autonomy of the individual from the state has always been stronger than in the East. It is not coincidental that the greatest wave of alarmism concerning the role of public bureaucracy in private life originated among Central European scholars (Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ludvig fon Mizes, Erich Fromm, and others)…The extent of influence that state bureaucrats have enjoyed has always been lower in the West. The nature of the relationship between a state's bureaucracy and its citizens has also been different (Oblonsky 2011, 14). [111]

This study clearly demonstrates that norms contained in Law No. 79 (2004), such as in Article No. 11 ('The System of Ranks'), Article No. 31 ('Organizational Restructuring of Civil Service Institutions'), Article No. 33 ('Termination of Employment Regulations'), and Article No. 50 ('The System of Pay and Reimbursement') have all encountered multiple difficulties throughout the implementation process (Tikhomirov and Gorokhov 2009). Other norms, which covered the standards of conduct and conflict of interest regulations, required major systematic improvements, and were, by and large, not implemented over the five to seven year period since the start of the reform.

The most important intervening variable in explaining the unintended reform outcomes was a lack of policy aprisal and feedback mechanisms, as well as a limited practice of

---

[111]Barabashev (2007) agrees with Obolonsky, saying that the introduction of ranks, as opposed to the previously adopted 'categories' (*razryady*) of civil service, promised to reinforce the pre-existing rigid stratification system. The system of ranks, inherited from the time of Peter the Great, are quite outdated, and do not suit the contemporary civil service in Russia (101).

intermediate policy planning (in other words, flaws within the existing policy-making system), which significantly aggravated conditions in which reforms unfolded. In this context, it has always been difficult to decide where, exactly, obstacles to civil service reform originate. Generally, the poor state of contextually appropriate implementation research is one of the most commonly cited reasons for the difficulties in **monitoring organizational performance**, which requires "evaluation and measurement (rather than subjective appraisal) - both quantitative and qualitative, using performance indicators and occasionally borrowing these from the private sector to provide feedback to administrators" (Barabashev 2005). These measures are not readily available, and as I have said earlier, they require some time to develop. Moreover, none of these instruments may be usefully applied when the key framework documents lack **definite criteria of the reform goal attainment**.

Barabashev (expert and an interviewee in 2010), in this respect, observes the following.

It is almost impossible to predict the outcome of the reform in terms of the ideals of a democratic society, as the Program *lacks definite criteria* [for defining what entails reaching its goals]. It is envisaged that only in the process of the Program implementation such criteria could be identified. However, the permanent social and expert monitoring of the process is crucial to achieve [the goals of the reform]. Evidently, there is a high risk that public service reform could be turned into a technocratic project. In order to avoid such a negative turn, it is essential to implement the following: 1) apply positive foreign experience by introducing a kind of political patronage over public service reform; 2) ensure openness (publicity) of the reform process which is imperative for the positive outcome of public service reform (Barabashev et al. 2007, 91–124).

In a similar vein, Barabashev points at the difficulty in evaluating the initial prerequisites of the reform, or, to be more specific, neglect with which some of the major **reform prerequisites**, such as the structure and composition of civil service, have been treated:

Neither "lessons of the past", nor modern negative trends, changes in the structural and functional profiles of public service (e.g., ageing staff, gender discrimination, low payment, lack of continuity and etc.) receive adequate consideration in the course of reform. Inattention to the risks of public service reform along with the existent political, social and economic, organizational and legal risks is likely to set back a reforming process (Barabashev 2007).[112]

Russian experts commonly use quantitative measures of reform progress, such as the number of job descriptions issued within a certain time span of the reform process or the number of requests sent out to federal departments to clarify the norms of the newly adopted Civil Service Law. These variables assess the process of policy implementation in a dynamic perspective; however, they are not comprehensive enough to let us arrive at any reliable conclusions regarding the outcomes of CSR. At the international level, policy-makers commonly use the WGI

---

[112] For more information on the risks associated with various stages of CSR, as well as the state of implementation research, please see APPENDIX.

Government Effectiveness rating (Kaufmann et al., 2003), the PRS' ICRG Bureaucratic Quality rating and others.[113] These measures, as well, do not indicate a correlation between administrative reform and good governance (which are not policy implementation variables). Therefore, they cannot be used to comprehensively explain stories of success or failure of the reform implementation processes.

Taking into consideration the state of implementation research, described above, it appears to be quite difficult to accurately evaluate the degree of CSR progress until this day. Table of ranks remains the only piece of law that has been fully implemented, and therefore it features in all stories as a single case of 'success' (presented with a grain of salt, considering that experts' aspirations have not included the table of ranks). Moreover, interviewees' answers reveal a contested vision of CSR goals, where initiatives taken to increase the level of bureaucratic efficiency, effectiveness and professionalism correlate with expectations that the number of civil servants is going to decrease, while the nature of civil service is going to become more rational. These optimistic expectations, quite obviously, do not stand the reality, where scarce resources, institutional constraints and other factors create room for selective interpretation and enforcement of the newly emerged norms. Ultimately, PAR and CSR work together, and flaws within a single dimention of the reform (such as NPM) significantly affect the quality of implementation process in other policy areas (such as the goals of meritocratic and transparent recruitment, propmotion and conflict of interest regulations).

It is also important to mention that the lack of regulation in some areas of CSR has been fully compensated by an equally disturbing process of excessive formalism (overregulation) on a number of alternative dimensions. This process has served to reinforce the old-style mentality of the post-Soviet bureaucrats, where a single piece of regulation could be used to either improve or impede quality bureaucratic service. For example, job descriptions tended to 'over-regulate' civil servants' obligations and responsibilities. Not only did they outline civil servants' rules of conduct, but they also have put restrictions on the information they could share with their 'clients' (Federal Law No. 79, Article 17). Experts observe that this type of 'formalism' (i.e.rigidity and overregulation) that has emerged in Russia in recent years has stifled the necessary level of self-regulation and behavioral autonomy critical to bureaucratic service. As a result, experts observe

---

[113]Some of the most commonly cited measures related to the capacity to provide public goods and services also include the "Weberianness" index from Rauch and Evans (1999), Measures of corruption from the WGI, The ICRG Corruption, Transparency International, and Freedom House, measures of Road Density (WDI), and others. The WGI Report issued in 2012, suggests that Government Effectiveness in Russia, as well as its Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law did not change significantly over the past several years, staying at the low end of 30-40%; whereas 'control over corruption' fell to a low of 10% in 2009-2010 [APPENDIX].

some of the following trends on the output side of the reform process: a disproportionate allocation of power between the state, society, and the central executive; an imbalance between the center and local authorities; and a rigid formalization structure.

Overall, competing explanations of policy implementation progress make it difficult to combine them in a coherent and universally applicable explanatory framework. The interviewees I surveyed during the Fall of 2010 revealed a number of interrelated problems that have played an important role at various points of policy-making process. In this respect, insufficient funding (Kudiukin and others, Interview 2010) has had an equal chance to explain the stalled implementation process, as the poor strategy of CSR (Interview 2010), or the post-Soviet legacy and the overwhelming nature of work entailed by the enactment of new regulations (Obolonsky, Kudiuking, others; Interviews 2010).[114] Most of these obstacles could be traced back to the quality of the decision-making process, which has allegedly produced such unintended effects as encroaching formalism or the lack of regulation. Problems identified by interviewees at the stage of reform implementation did not only affect the reform selectively, but they were also closely intertwined and influenced one another.

To distinguish between cause and effect relationships in the process of policy implementation, the obstacles to the successful reform implementation process may be split according to the groups of variables identified by the summary of policy implementation research in Chapter 3. For example, the eclectic nature of the reform, as well as the lack of methodological support, fall into the category of material variables of the policy implementation, whereas the absence of clear and consistent objectives, the hectic style of policy-making, and insufficient funding, constitute structural variables of public policy change. All in all, Russian experts have not yet managed to describe the obstacles to CSR in a systemic fashion. Thus my research takes one of the many necessary steps to improve our knowledge of policy-making process in a transitional context.

---

[114] Interviews point out that the lack of funds impeded the process of policy implementation in the area of merit-based pay (particularly, at the regional level). Excessive formalization (rigidity and the lack of policy implementation mechanisms) characterized the process of policy implementation in the sphere of anti-corruption. Finally, the lack of reform expertise impeded progress in the creation of a performance-based management system, formal legal organization, and in anti-corruption measures. Overall, the reforms that lagged behind throughout the course of CSR implementation included: the CSR management system, performance-based management, and personnel policies (specifically, the principles of meritocratic recruitment, promotion, and pay systems), i.e. the most crucial aspects of CSR.

**Table 13 Summary of Implementation Obstacles**

| Implementation obstacles (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983) | Problems observed in the Russian case of CSR |
|---|---|
| Material variables (technical, target group behaviour, amount of behaviour required) | -         Eclectic nature of reform legislation<br>-         The lack of methodological support |
| Structural variables (clear and consistent objectives, adequate causal theory, hierarchical integration within implementing institutions, financial resources, implementing officials, initial allocation of resources, formal access by outsiders) | - The absence of clear and consistent objectives<br>-The hectic style of policy-making process<br>- Insufficient funding<br>- The slow pace of implementation process |
| Contextual variables (public support, socioeconomic variables, support from legislators, commitment from implementing officials) | - The lack of commitment on behalf of civil servants and public officials<br>- The lack of civic engagement |

Source: Author[115][116]

**5.5 Conclusion**

This brief chapter opened up with a puzzle of inconsistent reform progress, which reduced the scope and ambition of CSR to the narrow goal of marginal legislative adjustments. The chapter observed that the nature and driving forces of bureaucratic restructuring considerably changed during the last several years. However, initiatives taken were unprecedented, and they certainly influenced the body of civil service in various areas of public sector.

The study highligts several important framework documents, which include programs, laws and decerees enacted by the Russian executive branch in response to expert pressures and concerns. This prolific body of policy outputs is an achievement on its own, and it exhibits a great degree of policy continuity, which covers a period of more than 10 years. On the other hand, there is a lot of evidence suggesting that the internal coherency of the newly adopted laws has been significantly compromised by various actors interfereing in the reform process. Legislative loopholes in some areas and excessive formalism in others, as well as reference rules (otsylochnye normy) of the Law no. 79 replicated and even outnumbered deficiencies of the legal documents adopted in Yeltsin period. Moreover, the process of reform implementation remained quite intractable, which was due to the lack of feedback and control mechanisms.

The preliminary research suggests that reforms in such areas as anti-corruption, meritocratic recruitment, performance-based pay and others were stuck for various intentional

---

[115] Based on interviews with experts and public officials; involves the study of primary and secondary sources.

[116] This table is used as an instrument to categorize the variables of the policy-implementation process. However, it is not a part of my analytical framework, due to the fact that it does not fully account for the role of institutions.

and unintentional reasons, which include the lack of political support, manifested in attention shifts and a limited practice of intermediate policy planning; a sense of deep ideational crisis, translating into conflicting reform projects; competing interests involved in various stages of policy-making process; and, finally, the lack of policy-making expertise. All accounts mentioned appear quite often in participants' explanations of the reform inconsistent progress. None of these explanations, however, dominate in the body of primary and secondary material I researched. Competing visions belong to the whole range of policy actors, involved in different stages of CSR, and each of these groups may provide us with their unique take on the transformation of post-Communist administration.

While it is too early to conclude whose decisions prevail in CSR decision-making process, it is crucial to point out that tensions and competeing visions have never took form of an open conflict (consensus emerged right away in a form of law or it was significantly delayed), while a single successful dimension concerned the table of ranks and the redistribution of privileges. Observations of this kind clearly point out that bureaucrats may be treated as active yet clandestine participants of the reform. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the level of bureaucratic involvement is more pronounced in sensitive policy areas such as the process of hiring and performance management, whereas the change of leadership in 2008 affects the 'neoconservative' (in a Russian sense) turn in policy rather than methods. The conflict among various ministries emerged in the early 2000s as a result of significant tensions between the New Public Management and the neo-Weberian paradigm; both approaches developed intensively within the distinct yet intertwined streams of of PAR and CSR. However, the aforementioned change of leadership has empowered the Ministry of Labour to the detriment of neoliberal policy agenda, even though this move did not change much to reduce the unfeasible scope of the ongoing reforms.

Genereally, as I have said earlier, the number of explanatory variables identified in my research is immense, and it does not clearly fit into the framework, which omits the interplay policy-makers capacity and willingness to foster substantial rather than superficial change. Remarkably, nearly all accounts mentioned earlier include structural and voluntaristic components, and only those belonging to the group of agentenial forces may be found among the causal candidates. For example, issues, such as public funding or legislative support depend the decisions of the top-level political leadership, whereas clear and consistent objectives, including the ability of national government to follow through the process of policy implementation stem from limited resources, which include the state of policy implmentaiton expertise. What is also obvious is that the differential implementation progress originates in a 'vicious' circle, where the

138

problems of funding, legal support, conflict, or the lack of expertise belong. The rest of these features, such as the inconsistent nature of policy-making, or the lack of commitment on behalf of public officials, appear to be the intermediate casal candidates. All in all, the study suggests that reform progress may be defined by a wide range of factors that vary, from the model of public administration state reformers are trying to build, to the process of micro-implementation, which includes setting up the goals, strategies, activities, and contacts of the actors involved. In the following chapter, I disaggregate among these variables further.

**Table 13 Mapping the range of factors**

| | |
|---|---|
| Contextual Variables | Political Dynamics – a set of contextual variables (political will, public support, state-society relationships; socio-economic variables – hectic style of policy making process; commitment on behalf of state officials; the climate of rationality); political dynamics is only one out of many contextual variables that could influence the reform process. |
| Material Variables | Bureaucracy (material variable dealing with the target group behavior, amount of behavior and change required; technical difficulties; implementation process legally structured to enhance the compliance of implementation officials); |
| Structural Variables | Strategy: clear and consistent objectives, incorporation of adequate theory, hierarchical integration, recruitment of implementing officials – actors, implementation structures) (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983 |

Source: Author, based on the existing typology of policy implementation variables [117]

---

[117] Based on interviews with experts and public officials.

# CHAPTER 6

## LEADERSHIP, STRATEGY AND THE LEGACIES OF POST-COMMUNISM: WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR INTRACTABLE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS?

### 6.1 Introduction

The first chapter of my study advanced several major hypotheses concerning the progress of civil service reform in Russia. One explanation addressed the lack of political will to reform. A second (alternative) hypothesis suggested that the outcomes of civil service reform depend on the nature of formal and informal institutions developed in Russia over the last several years. Finally, the last hypothesis proposed that reform success is influenced by interactions among reform components and that these interactions occur in line with an adopted reform strategy.

In what follows, I expand upon the set of hypotheses suggested above and evaluate the key explanatory variables discussed earlier. I demonstrate that, while it may seem to be the role of multiple highly polarized factors to shape the content and outcomes of the reform, in reality, much depends on our ability to see these variables as a part of a broader explanatory framework, which includes (but not limited to) the decision-making and institutional capacities of the Russian state. Political leadership is an important prerequisite of the reform progress, which is to be measured with the use of reform strategy. However, the two concepts of leadership and strategy do not completely coincide as the former entails the study of implicit, rather than explicit choices policy makers take at every stage of reform development. Overall, the distinction between the strategy, leadership and institutional legacies is very schematic, and it is made here to delineate between the *structural and voluntaristic components* of public policy change.

The chapter finds that recent policy measures in Russia have unintentionally worked to reinforce some of the dysfunctional practices of the post-Soviet state apparatus. The major puzzle, in this respect, is how and why the reform, which ostensibly aimed at establishing greater control over bureaucracy resulted in expanding its power and influence. Evidence suggests that the range of 'implicit choices' made by the Russian government in the course of its state-building project affect the quality of legislation and the flow of agenda-setting process. In this context, institutional legacies 'take over' the 'failed' design of the reform as a consequence of both unintentional miscalculations, and as a result of deliberate choices made by the top-level officials to maintain their status quo.

## 6.2 An Evaluation of the Key Explanatory Variables

### *6.2.1 Political Leadership and Priorities of the Russian Government*

To understand the role of political leadership in the process of Civil Service Reform in Russia, I suggest examining the level of political commitment to reform rather than peculiar characteristics of its collective reform strategy to be discussed later. In this respect, I suggest considering some of the following important variables of the policy making process, namely: (a) the government's priority-setting process (including its basic characteristics such as, consistency, comprehensiveness, research uptake, interaction with parallel reforms and others), (b) legislative follow-up, and (c) the allocation of funds over the time span of the reform. The first measure entails <u>attention shifts</u> to such features as the process of political recentralization. The second and third measures indicate <u>the level of support</u> provided by the federal leaders to PAR and CSR in a form of specific reform strategies and resources.[118] The existing scholarship emphasizes the importance of all of these factors in policy-making process. Therefore, in what follows, I explain how they influence the course and outcomes of the reform during the years of Putin's Presidency.

First, to understand the goals and trajectories of public policy change one has to consider both explicit and implicit choices made by the federal powers on a particular state administration reform model during the early 2000s. In this respect, it is noteworthy that since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia, along with the rest of the former Soviet republics, has experienced a process of a prolonged disintegration, leading to the collapse of the central state institutions that were in charge of major policy-making functions. During the second transitional decade, however, the new leadership has struggled to reinvent its administrative system and to place it in a context of a bigger state-building project. Thus while the first generation of reforms in this country included rapid systemic changes, such as decentralization, privatization, macroeconomic stabilization, and the liberalization of prices and trade, the second generation of reforms encompassed a variety of administrative measures aimed at reinforcing the state's capacity and ability to govern.

Scholarly studies (Cameron 2007, Way and Levitsky 2010, and others) suggest that Russia, along with other post-Communist states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Slovakia (until 1998), Bosnia, and others, was unable to maintain stable democratic institutions. Given the

---

[118] In my dissertation, I use the cocept of reform strategy twice as an IV and DV (dependent and independent variables). In this chapter, I use reform strategy as a dependent variable (DV), and I see it as a result of deliberate policy choices (funding and legislative support). This is to be distinguished from the view of reform strategy as an IV (to be discussed later in section 6.2.3), which is viewed as being subjected to miscalculations and unintentional mistakes made under condition political will was present.

enormous difficulties associated with the country's political and economic transformation, Putin's predecessor had tried, quite unsuccessfully, to bargain for power with the regional authorities during the early and mid-1990s. This period resulted in a loss of control over the centrifugal tendencies at the regional level, and it was followed by attempts to centralize power at the cost of democracy. Political decisions of the early 2000s have abruptly reversed the process of the informal decentralization witnessed by the Yeltsin era, and these events informed the majority of reforms in Putin's Russia, including PAR and CSR. More than anything else, they affected the structure of the government's priority-setting process, as well as the style of the policy-making process and its outcomes.

It was mentioned earlier that during the start of Putin's Presidency, the Russian Government has initiated several parallel reform projects dealing with the effectiveness and capacity of the state apparatus (taxation, administrative, state budget, pension, civil service, military, police reforms, and others). However, the scope of institutional change was so great that the government did not manage to fulfill all its promises in a short period of time. At the same time, evidence suggests that public policy agenda in Russia during the early 2000s has been hectic, and it was systemically skewed toward reforms promising to bring about greater centralization and control at the federal level. For example, PAR, with its emphasis on organizational capacity and effectiveness enjoyed greater funding and legislative support than CSR. The latter, in fact, was narrowed down to the description of obligations and responsibilities of civil servants.

The structure of the government's priority-setting process, discerned from official documents, demonstrates that the central government (specifically, Presidential Administration) provided the unequivocal political support to CSR during the early stages of Putin's Presidency. For example, Law No. 55, 'On the Public Service System' (2003), and Law No. 79, 'On the Civil Service in the Russian Federation' (2004) were both initiated by the Presidential Administration, and they became part of a single strategy of comprehensive institutional transformation. The executive branch of power participated actively in the design of the newly adopted legislative framework, whereas the body of civil service have carried out major implementation functions.[119] However, the subsequent developments (starting from 2005 until 2009) point out at the lack of consistency in implementing civil service laws. For example, out of 30 normative acts adopted by

---

[119]In 2003-2007, there were four directors of administrative reform – Boris Aleshin, Dmitry Kozak, Aleksandr Zhukov, and Sergei Naryshkin. One of them, Deputy Head of Presidential Administration, Dimitri Kozak, acted as the main figurehead for the centralization of power project in the federal government, which, in effect, made regional heads subordinate to the Russian president. (Gaman-Golutvina 2007)

the State Duma in a period of 2005-2010, only a few (to be more specific, Presidential Decree no 885 (2002) and Presidential Decree no. 269 (2007)) emerged under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin to deal with the goal of building an ethical and transparent civil service. The remaining normative documents, which regulated the standards of bureaucratic conduct and conflict of interest controversies, transpired between 2008-2010, under the Presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. Most of state initiatives at the time have focused on the status and career opportunities of civil servants; these measures did not significantly challenge any of the existing interests entrenched in institutional legacies of post-Communism, and they have made an impression of a regular legislative upgrade.

The lack of consensus was particularly obvious on issues, related to ethical conduct of civil servants and anti-corruption measures.[120] In this sense, we could observe not so much the lack of political willingness to reform, but rather the lack of *a common understanding, or an agreement on the goals and rationales of the proposed public policy changes* (initiatives in area of civil service professional conduct were consistently blocked by the state legislature, whereas political leadership did not push those reforms any further). For example, in 2002, President Putin issued the Decree on the Code of Ethics for civil servants. Following up on this step, the Union of Right Forces (Soiuz Pravykh Sil) initiated hearings in the State Duma on the adoption of this code as a separate legislative document. However, the Draft Law did not pass the second reading, and it was blocked by the centrist political parties, including the party of power United Russia.[121] The Decree on Commissions dealing with the standards of conduct and conflict of interest regulations was a similar case. It was passed in 2010 only, during the relatively reformist years of the Medvedev Presidency.

At this moment, it is difficult to say whether political leadership was the decisive factor in cases as the one discussed above. In fact, such variables as the lack of administrative capacity, or interest-based obstacles to reform have always been closely intertwined with the reluctance of policy leaders to oppose forces, which might have blocked the most important reform initiatives. For example, in March 2013, the Ministry of Labour developed rules on *Declarations of Incomes* for departmental head candidates at the federal level. This initiative was thwarted by the Russian policy-making system's lack of *implementation capacity*, which was unable to analyze information from all state employees.[122] At the same time, most obstacles could have been avoided in case policy leaders provided the unequivocal support to civil service reform. Innocente

---

[120] It is not coincidental that the UN convention against corruption that was signed in 2003, has never been ratified by the State Duma.

[121] However, some of the provisions were hastily incorporated into Law No. 79. In 2003.

[122] For more information please see Kommersant No. 45, 16.03.2013.

(2012) gives the following example of an attempted initiative in the area of anti-corruption legislation:

When Dmitry Medvedev announced that the war on corruption was his top priority and initiated the passage of an entire complex of anti-corruption legislation, it's unlikely that Medvedev knew that he would meet with such strong resistance from basically the entire civil and Duma corps, and that his fight *would not have the support of his patron, Vladimir Putin*. Medvedev ought to be given his due: his idea for the law on declaration of state incomes was progressive. However, in the end, this initiative, like so many of his initiatives, turned out toothless and ineffective. *The Duma, which is controlled by the party in power, simply redrew the law and swept aside Medvedev's insistent demands that the legislation be passed in its original form...* At first, Medvedev had demanded that declarations of income also be provided by officials' "family members"—this was how it was stated in the draft of the law that was introduced to the Duma at the end of 2008...In response to the draft law, the United Russia Party decided to limit the definition of "family member" to spouses and minor children. Officials agreed to this compromise. The majority of them had adult children, and thus, this definition suited them. As a result, the Russian public was given the opportunity to learn about the income and property of officials and their spouses only. But even these limited data proved amusing reading (Innocente, 2012).[123]

In this particular example, we see how the state bureaucracy engages in the process of negotiation over the content of the law. Interestingly, political leadership avoids confrontation to the demands of actors, which include both party members and civil servants.

Innocete argues that *Declarations of Incomes* may still have a positive effect on the progress of CSR. However, critical voices raise questions about the level of political will and resources needed to oppose hidden resistance and adopt policy measures that would make such progressive ideas in the area of anti-corruption and civil service feasible.[124] Overall, the problem of political leadership and policy leaders' consensus over reform appears to be particularly important in a system so complex and incoherent as the Russian bureaucracy.

It is noteworthy that the design and implementation of CSR in recent years have been concentrated within the top-level public bureaucracy. In this respect, while the driving force of major policy changes originated within the community of experts working closely with the Presidential administration, the subsequent stages (2005-2009; 2009-2013) have witnessed a considerable *turnover of policy actors involved in the process of policy formulation*. The influence of the expert research community has declined significantly in recent years. At the same time, the role of Russia's public bureaucracy in the process of policy implementation has significantly increased.

---

[123]Overall, to understand the role of political will in the process of CSR, it is important to consider not only the decisions of the top-level political elite (Presidential Administration), but also the ongoing conflict within *the Russian Parliament* (State Duma).

[124] Declarations of incomes were used in Russia for over 4 years. However, the Russian state lacked the implementation capacity to check them all.

One of the steps, taken recently by the Russian government (as a sign of delayed implementation) was to entrust central Ministries with the role of implementing the Program on State Civil Service Reform and Development (2009-2013). Starting from December 2010, each individual ministry and agency had to elaborate on the relevant policy implementation tools and mechanisms, which led to the eruption of useful, yet uncoordinated efforts (usually taking form of pieces of advice for other departments). For example, the Ministry of Economic Development adopted the Code of Ethics (2010), which included *recommendations* for civil servants to abstain from activity that could possibly corrupt their behavior and motivation. Civil servants were advised against negotiating with future employees from private business organizations before the end of their state service; they were also prohibited from accepting gifts in any form from subordinate employees or partners in private companies.[125] Most of these initiatives were effective yet uncoordinated, and as just said, they lack focus on any specific policy issue.

It is important to remind that implementation, in my perspective, includes at least two sets of overlapping developments, such as legislation adopted after the first conceptual framework document on State Development (2001); as well as administrative decision-making, which follows through individual pieces of legislation in individual departments of state administration. This table accounts for only one type of implementation, which is implementation by the federal organs of power.

**Table 14 The dynamics of the implementation process in various sectors of CSR**

| Goals of Civil Service Reform Strategy[126] | Strategy |
|---|---|
| | **Normative implementation** |
| **1.Integrity of civil service legal and organizational bases; reorganization**<br><br>-Creating a coherent civil service management system<br>-Introducing categories, groups, ranks and types of cvil servants) | **Federal Law** (FL) no.79 of 2004 "On the Civil Service in the Russian Federation";  PD - Presidential Decree no. 1336 On Civil Service Reform (2003-2005); PD no.1496 - The Program on Civil Service Reform and Development (2009-2013)<br><br>**Other Presidential Decrees** (PD)<br>PD no. 113 (2005)  "O poeriadke prisvoeniia klassnykh chinov", "<br>PD no.1574 (2006) "O Reestre Dolzhnostei Federal'noi Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby" (2006)[127];<br>PD no. 18 (2008) "Nekotorye voprosy federalnoi Gosudarstvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby |

---

[125] For more information, see Barsukov and Buturin (2012).

[126] These dimensions of CSR do not coincide completely with the goals of the reform process. Goals represent the overarching principles or values of the reform process - something that went missing in the most recent legislative documents. Taking into consideration the state of the primary documents at hand, in this table, I am trying to match the overarching goals of reform with the design strategy and actual implementation procedures. This process requires summarizing the findings of the original research conducted in the Fall of 2010 and mapping interviewees' responses into the study of CSR progress.

[127] In all cases, the list is not full; however, I point out the most important regulations.

| | PD (2010) "O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Reestr Dolzhnostei Federal'noi Gosudarsvennoi Slyzhby". |
|---|---|
| **2.1 Reorganization and Rationalization** (improving organizational bases of civil service to increase effectiveness and efficiency)<br><br>Instruments:<br>   1. Merit based competitive recruitment;<br>   2. Job contracts and descriptions (closely intertwined with PAR Administrative regulations and public service standards),<br>   3. Job descriptions;<br>   4. Pre-qualified pools,<br>   5. Remuneration fund,<br>   6. Standards of conduct,<br>   7. Dispute resolution procedures<br><br>**2.2 Professionalism defined as performance through personnel policies**<br>-Raising the level of professional skills and expertise of civil servants<br>-Meritocratic recruitment process<br>-Performance-based budgeting and management; skill-based pay system (NPM mechanisms)<br><br>**2.3 Improving the overall quality of institutions**[128]:<br><br>-Minimizing the discretionary powers of civil servants;<br>-Raising prestige of civil servants | **Recruitment and training (2005-2009) (personnel management)**<br><br>**Federal Law** (FL) no.79; The Concept of State Service no.1496 (2001); Presidential Decree no. 1336 On Civil Service Reform (2003-2005))<br><br>   1. PD (**Decree of the President**) "O primernoi forme sluzhebnogo kontrakta" no 159, 2005;<br>   2. PD on attestation procedures (ob attestatsii grazhdanskikh sluzhashikh), no 110, 2005;<br>   3. PD on qualification examination procedures (poriadok sdachi kvalifikatsionnogo ekzamena),<br>   4. PD no. 111, 2005, "O konkurse na zameshenie vakantnoi dolzhnosti"<br>   5. PD no. 112, 2005; "Qualifying requirements on the length of service"<br>   6. PD no. 609, 2005; personal information regulations "Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniia o personal'nykh dannykh i vedenii ego lichnogo dela";<br>   7. PD no. 763, 2006 - "O denezhnom soderzhanii federal'nykh gosudarsvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashikh" (v redaktsii Ukaza Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii)<br>   8. PD no. 1532, 2007 "Ob ischislenii stazha...",;<br>   9. PD no. 722, 2007 "O provedenii eksperimentov"[129]<br>  10. PD no. 1808, 2008 "O Denezhnom soderzhanii federalnykh sluzhashikh";<br>  11. PD no. 1456, 2009 "On a contract-based professional education".<br><br>Implementation in the area of <u>results-oriented pay</u> system has been postponed due to the technical difficulties, pointing out at the fact that neither preliminary nor final results of the work of public bureaucrats could be easily measured. In 2011-2013, the Draft Law has been discussed in State Duma establishing the results-oriented pay system for the high-ranking public officials (Ministers, Governors, etc.)[130]<br><br>**Professional Conduct (2007-2013)**<br><br>**Federal Law (FL) no.79:** provisions concerning gifts, outside employment, use of official information, political activities of civil |

---

[128] To remind, PAR and CSR, were closely intertwined: within the period of 2005 and 2008, policy-makers adopted more than 400 administrative schedules (administrativnye reglamenty) describing responsibilities of civil servants in various areas of public policy; half of them were approved by the Ministry of Justice in the Russian Federation, and 90% of public service employees argued that they were satisfied with the results and found these regulations to be useful (Barabashev & Klymenko 2010, p. 47-49).

[129] In 2008, the amount of pay doubled in comparison with the level of pay in 2005 (17 thousand roubles for central ministries) (Barabashev 2010). In general, however, the idea of performance-based pay did not go through.

[130] The Draf Law determines departmental heads to establish the amount of pay for their employees; deputy ministers are supposed to be subjected to the same remuneration system in 2015.

146

| | |
|---|---|
| - Restrictions associated with the status of civil servant;<br>-Standards of conduct<br>-Conflict of Interest Regulations;<br>-Rules of Professional Conduct;<br>-Dispute resolution procedures<br>- Personnel policies (meritocratic recruitment, promotion, skill-based and merit-based pay)<br><br>**2.4 Improvements of the Material and technical conditions** | servants and other issues usually regulated by codes of conduct<br>**Federal Law (FL) no.273** 'Anti-Corruption Measures' (19.12.2008), preceeded PD «Anti-Corruption Measures» (#815 ), as of 2008[131].<br><br>1. Presidential decree (PD) no 885 (2002), (16.07.2009 № 814) «On major principles of civil servants' conduct"; PD no. 269 (2007);<br>2. PD no 159. 16 February 2005 "O primernoi forme sluzhebnogo kontrakta"<br>3. PD no. 609, 30  May 2005, O personal'nykh dannykh gosudarstvennogo grazhdanskogo sluzhashego;<br>4. PD no. 269, 2007 Conflict of interest regulations "O komissiakh..";<br>5. "Voprosy Federalnoi Gosudarsvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby", 30 April, 2008, no.18;<br>6. PD no. 557, 2009 The list of positions of the Federal Service, which require submitting income information prior to the appointment procedure;<br>7. PD No. 561, 2009 "On the placement of income information submitted by civil servants"<br>8. PD no. 559, 2009 "Rules on filing income information";<br>9. PD no. 814 of 16 July 2009 "On the placement of income information submitted by civil servants", no 561, 2009;<br>10. PD no. 1065, 2009 Validation of income information submitted by civil service candidates;<br>11. Decree no. 814 of 16 July 2009 "On Amendments to the Decree of 12 August 2002, no. 885;<br>12. PD no 1065, 2009«On Commissions Dealing with the Standards of Conduct and Conflict of Interest Regulations».<br>13. PD no. 821 (2010) "On the procedure of validation of income information submitted by civil service candidates" |
| 2.4 Decreasing the number of bureaucrats (popular yet unsubstantial goal)[132] | All of the above;<br>Negative developments; 1) it was expected that the size of the state apparatus will shrink permanently; however, the dynamics of change was not stable; the number of state bureaucrats shrinked in 2004, however, it significantly increased, exceeding the initial conditions of the reform process (Barabashev 2005). 2) the quality and professionalism deteriorated at the federal level (lack of competitiveness, poor remuneration) |
| The system of civil service administration (state departments entitled with | Not implemented due to the ideational conflict (replicating the past, where the party system was in control of state administration inspired objections); |

---

[131] FL no.273 (a) created civil service job listings; (b) imposed requirements upon civil servants to file annual income statement; (c) regulated access to information concerning income statements filed on behalf of public officials.

[132]It is important to note that the size of the state executive does not fully coincide with the size of the state civil service. For example, in 1994, nearly 90 percent of all employees in public administration in Russia belonged to the executive branch. In the seven-year period from 1 January 1994 to 1 January 2001, this number increased from 894,400 to 983,700, or to just under 10 percent. However, the number of civil servants was considerably smaller than that, because many state employees are secretaries, drivers, janitors, and technical personnel. The number of civil servants in January 2001 was about 725,700, but over a quarter of all employees in the state executive were not considered as civil servants in the traditional sense (Brym 2004, 96)

| administering civil service system in Russia) (Presidential Decree no. 1336 On Civil Service Reform (2003-2005) | Random initiatives on CSR administration: Presidential Decree "On State Service Reform Commission" under the President of the Russian Federation (O komissii po reforme gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby RF), no. 1775, December 12, 2008. |
| --- | --- |

Source: Author[133]

One of the most important issues to consider in explaining the role of political leadership in Russia's CSR implementation concerns the existing *budget allocation process*, and the way it has changed during the last several years. Evidence suggests that since 2003-2005, each annual budget contained expenses provided to foster the process of state building. However, CSR finance has not been as profound as it used to be in other policy areas. For example, in two consequtive years of 2008 and 2009, the Federal powers have spent around $32 mln (960 million roubles) and $16 mln (481,600 thoustand roubles) on PAR and CSR implementation accordingly. The Program of Civil Service Reform, in turn, was funded in the amount of 539,100,000 roubles ($18 million) from 2003-2005 (2 years); and in the amount of 691,000,000 roubles ($23 million) in 2009-2013 (4 yeaars).[134] [135]

It is important to mention, however, that the amount of resources allocated for CSR purposes was important so far as it has been effectively spent and distributed. In this respect, it is noteworthy that at least half of these funds went to a variety of research projects, with the other half contributed to the actual process of policy formulation and policy implementation. Unfortunately, a large amount of the resources discussed above has been 'wasted' at the stage of policy research uptake - not because this research was useless, but rather because it became irrelevant during subsequent stages of the policy-making cycle. Interviewees assert that scholarly findings and suggestions were duly ignored as soon as they reached the doors of some conservative legislative state committees. Draft laws changed multiple times, depending on the group of interested actors who gained access to the system of policy-making, thus changing the

---

[133] Based on interviews with experts and public officials; involves the study of primary and secondary sources.

[134] "Federalnaya Programma Reformrovania i Razvitia sistemy gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (2009-2013)," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* Federalny Vypusk, No. 4867, 13 March 2009.

[135] Comparatively speaking, in 2008 (one year only), PAR was financed in amount of $32 mln (960 million roubles), plus 132,637 mln roubles ($4,421 mln), allocated for the purposes of regulatory monitoring (control) over implementation of administrative schedules (vnedrenie administrativnykh reglamentov), normative and methodological support of multifunctional centres (mnogofunktsionalnye tsentry). http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.134583.html In 2009, the Federal government allocated 481,600,000 roubles ($16,053,000) for the same purposes. All in all, comparatively speaking CSR funding was not as profound as reform finance in other policy areas. http://www.rg.ru/2009/07/24/reforma-dok.html

structure and content of ideas developed by the expert research community.[136] In addition, some problems emerged with regard to the distribution of reform funding on a cross-regional basis. Article 18 of the 2003 Law on State Civil Service divided the spheres of fiscal responsibility between the federal and regional budgets, stipulating that regional CSR programs were to be financed by the budgets of often fiscally constrained regions. Within this context, it is predictable that only a few regions were motivated to take decisions leading to the adoption of comprehensive CSR programs.

The question that logically follows is: why would officials spend so much money on research in advance of the enactment of any significant law in the area of public administration only to ignore the findings and recommendations of the research community? In answering this question, *I suggest that the reason lies in policy-makers' undervaluation of a pre-existing split between the bodies of Russian experts, top-level decision-makers, as well as the higher- and lower-ranking public officials*. Even though agreement exists concerning the poor state of Russia's civil service, there is no consensus on the ways and the means of reforming it. Multiple conservative interests struggling to maintain the status quo interfere in the policy-making process. Another problem concerns the fragmented nature of the decision-making system in Russia itself, which inherited some features of the Soviet-style bureaucratic organization. This system has partially relied on consultations; however, it was not flexible enough to include and analyze all recommendations or to provide consistency of implementation and feedback mechanisms. In this system, some of the most important recommendations were doomed to be thwarted either intentionally or unintentionally by the reactionary bureaucratic force.[137]

Judging by the scope of the reform, as well as by the amount of the follow-up legislative support, political leadership contributed greatly to the process of CSR implementation. The Presidential Administration was the main actor instigating public policy changes in 2004-2005; it has also created policy instruments and funded reform progress in a consistent and systematic manner. However, evidence suggests that a variety of factors, such as the hectic shifts of public policy agenda and the lack of political support of some of the most important policy initiatives have made CSR somewhat irrelevant in the eyes of the top-level public officials. Formally, policy-makers have remained committed to the goals of the reform; in practice, however, they

---

[136] Experts observe that due to the reform's very slow pace, some of the funds allocated to the reform progress were not properly utilized. Over 30% of the funds were returned to the Government, at the end of the first stage of the current wave of reform (Federal Program 2003-2005).

[137] The question of public funding seems to be controversial, due to the common assumption that CSR is consistently deprived of financial support. However, evidence suggests that the problem originates in *the efficiency and effectiveness of resource allocation rather than the actual availability of funds.*

were unable to reach multiple goals in a short period of time, and they only focused on the reforms that were most easily attainable within the existing political context (such as the PA rationalization process).[138] Overall, CSR has never been treated as a matter of top priority (in fact, it has been 'overshadowed' by other reform projects). In addition, there was a lack of agreement *on the goals and rationales of the proposed public policy changes.*

To conclude, the findings of my study confirm the initial premise of my work, which suggested that both CSR and PAR have to be evaluated within the broader context of recent political transformations. The process of political centralization that started in the early 2000s created a structure of opportunity for CSR and other public sector initiatives; however, the same process constrained this reform by dictating the structure and content of public policy agenda. According to this explanation, the goal of Yeltsin's successor during his first term in office was to create an efficient, centralized, and responsive administrative machine that would effectively support his initiatives, whereas the goals of the newly adopted Civil Service Law extended further into the area of rational organization of the post-Communist state apparatus, with a focus on improving professionalism, ethics, transparency, and accountability. Overall, evidence demonstrates that experts and policy-makers have probably underestimated the risks associated with entrenched interests and institutional legacies, which informed them. Consequently, the process of administrative restructuring took place in a more dynamic fashion, than the development of ethical standards dealing with issues of behavior, transparency, and accountability in civil service organization. In general, the new Civil Service Law introduced some minor adjustments to the existing 'rules of the game'; however, it did not change much in the existing system of goals and rationales of civil service and public administration (the initial goals were not reached).

*6.2.2 Institutional System and Style of the Policy-Making Process*

It is widely recognized that institutional legacies take over the 'failed' reform projects, and reforms, which are poorly designed (or lack political support) do not sustain the pressure of habitual rules and practices. In this section of my study, I focus on institutional obstacles to the reform, such as the legacy of post-Soviet bureaucratic organization, the amount of change

---

[138]Both experts and policy makers observe that, starting in 2005, interest in both PAR and CSR steadily declined. Rubtsov (2011) argues that political leadership in Russia lacked control over the reform progress; it also got easily persuaded about priorities of the reform process, as well as organizational pre-requisites of the reform.

required by the reform, the behavior and mindsets of interested (or affected) policy actors, and constraints of the existing policy-making system. *I assume that the initial decisions on civil service reform in Russia did not sustain the pressure of institutional legacies, which included* horizontal government functions, such as the law-drafting process, the staffing and management of personnel in the administration, the budget process, financial control and policy-making process in general. These developments have not only transformed the meaning of reforms, but also perpetuated the gap between the decision-makers and all those who were marginalized by the political transition of the early 1990s.[139]

One of the most important issues to remember when dealing with the current stage of reform is that the composition and the structure of the Russian state bureaucracy has profoundly changed over the last several decades, whereas its system and organization, remained quite stagnant. Some experts (Kryshtanovskaya 2011) describe the organizational prerequisites of the Russian civil service as a network of politically loyal appointees, recruited on a regular basis to avoid "degeneration that often results from political monopoly" (22-23). Others (Huskey 2001, 2009) point out at such features as the disorganization, the lack of regulation and order in a Weberian sense of this word. Huskey (2009), in particular, argues that the collapse of the SU has "weakened the state and unleashed a protracted political struggle that reshaped the institutional landscape in which Russian officialdom functioned" (215). This struggle, which involved the President, Parliament and governors of Russia's 89 regions, resulted in establishing a super-Presidential political system, with loyalty and patronage as a backbone of the newly developed bureaucratic machine.[140]

In terms of the composition and the structure of civil service in the early 2000s, the body of state bureaucrats was no longer a uniform entity; by contrast, it was split into various groups with diverse interests. A growing number of polical appointees (ministers and deputy ministers) were recruited from the ranks of civil servants (neither professionals, nor politicians), which perpetuated the trend of bureaucratic politicization. Moreover, the split within the ranks of civil servants could be traced along the lines of gender, education, pay, and physical location. For example, Brym (2004) points out at the 'stagnant' nature of the Russian bureaucracy, gender segregation and a lack of qualified personnel, including a mismatch between the expertise of civil

---

[139] Transitions produce their own 'legacies'; thus the dysfunctional features of the newly emerged system are difficult to cope with due to the complexity and risks associated with the ongoing state-building project. In this context, the process of reform implementation unfolds inconsistently, and it is influenced by the dynamic interaction between policy actions, structural and institutional constraints.

[140] The two contradictory legacies of the Russian officialdom at the moment were the lack of control in some areas with over-centralization in others.

151

servants and the most pressing needs faced by the Russian government. [141] Barabashev (2005) observes an 'imbalance between the center and the local level' in the number of public officials, as well as the discrepancies in the levels of pay of the federal and regional bureaucrats. Finally, Jakobson (2002) points out at the gap in expertise between the two groups of state bureaucracy: cadre bureaucracy (policy implementers) and the decision-makers.

The outline of the shortcomings and cleavages in the structure of public bureaucracy described above is not limited. However, *not all of these features are equally important* in terms of their influence on the reform progress and outcomes. For example, the size of public bureaucracy affected state administrative capacity in a less obvious manner than its composition and structural cleavages. Official data suggests that, during the 1990s, the rise in the number of state bureaucrats had not been as radical as it would have been predicted.[142] The discrepnacies along the lines of ascriptive characteristics, such as physical location, education and expertise, by contrast, proved to be decisive in terms of CSR implementaiton. One of the reasons concerns the transformation, which brought less experienced employees to the top level of public administration. For example, Jakobson (2002) observes that in the first transitional decade, only 35 % of the higher-ranking public officials ('group A') came to the civil service before the years of Perestroika. The remaining group consisted of people who built their careers in the 1990s. The group of policy implementers included a great number of experienced public officials (around 60.5%).[143] Moreover, the age difference between higher and lower level state employees was so obvious (about 10-15 years) that it resulted in a great level of *cognitive discontinuity* between the designers and implementers of the reform.

Inconsistencies within the demographic and professional composition of higher and lower ranking officials made it difficult to ensure consensus at various stages of the reform process. The political process of bureaucratic appointments has continuously upset and threatened the lower-ranking bureaucrats, who were critical of some reformist ideas, such as the NPM ideology.[144] As a result, these groups of civil servants have gradually consolidated and formed the so called

---

[141]Brym (2004) notes that between 1994 and 2001 only 7 percent of public service employees had less than one year of experience; much so-called staff 'renewal' actually involved the reshuffling of the existing personnel (Brym 2004). According to 2002 data, 70 percent of the civil servants at the federal level were older than 40 years. At senior levels, more than half of the staff was older than 50 years (Barabashev 2005).

[142] Brym (2004) outlines that, in the period between 1994 and 2001, the number of federal employees actually decreased by 10 percent, and amounted to fewer than 40,000 people. Overall, it would be fair to conclude that the size of public bureaucracy has changed in line with the goals and rationales of institutional transformation.

[143] More than 48% started their service during the last 10 years, and their experience reached less than 15 years

[144] For more information, please see Arkhangelskaya 2003.

'reactionary force' behind the state apparatus. In this respect, Jakobson (2002) comments that the core of Russia's civil service could be described as a "corporation" that was exclusive and preoccupied with the necessity of preserving its own interests.

One of the dimensions of this 'consolidated force' has been the discrepancy in the size and capacities of the federal and regional employees. For example, in the beginning of 2001, "the number of state officials ranged from 4 per 1,000 population in Ingushetia (Caucasus region) to 58 per 1,000 population in the Evenki Autonomous region in the Far North, with the national average standing at 8 per 1,000" (Brym 2004, 96). The "density" of state officials in a region was sensitive to budget constraints, and it has resulted in a cross-regional variation of reform processes (to be discussed in the next chapter).

It is interesting that the difference in attitudes of civil servants toward CSR has emerged in the early 2000s along the same lines as outlined above, i.e. age, the level of expertise, physical location and other important characteristics discussed earlier. Obolonsky (2006), for example, suggests that at the start of CSR, the body of civil servants was split into the groups of 'reform allies' and of 'reform opponents'. The second group was better organized than the first one, because it consisted of the older generation of state employees, located at the lower level. By contrast, reform allies were scattered unevenly across the state apparatus. Except for in the case of a few high-ranking public officials, this group did not possess any real power to control the process of reform implementation.

The location and organizational capacities of state bureaucrats significantly influenced their role in CSR. For example, the top-level bureaucrats heavily engaged in the decision-making process, shaping the original policy design provided by the Russian experts. By contrast, the lower-level civil servants lacked knowledge on the ongoing reforms and behaved on assumptions derived from previous experience with federal initiatives (these patterns included a mixture of compliance and self-interest). In this context, opposition to the reform was hidden, and it emerged only when the risk of the re-allocation of power and resources was at stake. (Rubtsov 2011) It is also quite obvious that selective interests 'took over' some strands of the reform at the very stage of policy formulation, as they managed to transform the content of the Draft Law on Civil Service System, and limited the discussion over the future prospects of CSR to the process of juridical consultations.

To understand why the seemingly neutral cleavages of the Russian bureaucracy took over the 'failed' CSR project it is important to consider the general institutional context in which reforms have recently unfolded and the impact they made upon the Russian decision-making process. In this respect, it is important to remind that the set of political reforms initiated by the

Russian President during the last decade were motivated by his fear of the collapse of the Russian state (Taylor 2011) and the related goal of regaining control over the federal and regional bureaucracy. One of the negative effects of these recentralization efforts has been a significant alteration of the decision-making practices, including the violation of the division of power principle. Specifically, experts observe that the system of public choice institutions in Russia has been consistently skewed toward the executive during the last 20 years. Some groups of public officials acquired so much power and influence that they were in a position to easily dominate both the process of policy formulation and implementation. This situation has narrowed the circle of people who participated in the decision-making process and made the decision-making largely non-transparent.

The features of the newly emerged institutional framework included the domination of the executive branch of power over the processes of policy formulation and policy implementation; the diminishing accountability of political parties, represented in the Russian Parliament, to the public; and finally, a lack of transparency combined with a growing insularity of the decision-makers. Lev Jacobson, the vice rector of the Higher School of Economics in Russia, argues that due to the concentration of power in the executive, the Russian authorities have adopted a so-called "departmental" or "agency based" approach to public administrative reforms. This choice has profoundly affected the content of the new laws, as well as the pace and outcomes of the reforms:

Given our relatively weak civil society and political parties, the main forum for representation and reconciliation of interests is provided by the executive authorities. Accordingly, government agencies and departments are the main actors involved in shaping the political agenda, as well as in its implementation. But the *departmental (agency) approach to reforms* is limited by definition. A radical agency project is a breakthrough in one relatively narrow area and is out of line with the general state of the public sector and public management. Such a breakthrough, first, is rarely successful on its own; second, it tends to produce *unexpected effects* in related areas; and third, it implies "bridge building" between the sector under reform and its environment. Such "bridges" include the numerous amendments to laws, which make them internally inconsistent. In addition, any agency, whether reform-oriented or conservative, tends to try to increase its influence and facilitate the performance of its functions (Jacobson, 6).

All in all, the structure of basic political institutions in Russia underscores the overly powerful role of the executive branch of power. One reason for this is the existing constitutional design, which crystallized prior to Putin's time in office (a super-presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system). Another one is the dynamics of recent political reforms, which affected formal and informal policy-making institutions. Given the overarching goals of political recentralization, the process of policy-making in recent years has suffered from conflict and unexpected shifts, so that some laws and programs (Law No.79 On Civil Service Reform being one of them) emerged as a result of rushed consensus among various policy actors, who often had

154

very diverse interests and ideas regarding the future of public service in Russia. In this respect, the style of the policy-making process, and content of the law were largely compromised.

The existing institutional problems are exacerbated by the fact that there are a number of overlapping competitive structures within the Russian government. Until 2010, Apparatus of the government dominated the process of policy implementation, and therefore it deprived other ministries and agencies of any significant influence over the policy-making process. The role of the State Duma in the development of new legislation has always been minimal. In this respect, the *model of policy-making* has undermined effective co-ordination between the ministries and agencies and has led to an overall discontinuity of the process of policy formulation.

Vladimir Yuzhakov (Interviews 2010) argues that the quality of legislative documents issued over the past few years has significantly declined – mostly due to the interference of state officials in the process of policy formulation. In this respect, the power and influence of the Russian officials expanded accidentally, as a result of parallel contested developments, if not as a consequence of the newly adopted law. It is particularly interesting that Putin, who deeply distrusts civil servants and publicly asserts that these actors need to be controlled, actually empowers them by granting them with the decision-making powers in the area of PCS. Civil servants, in turn, behave on the assumptions derived from their previous experience with the Federal powers, turning out to be overly protective of their own interests.

To conclude, this section of my study demonstrates that the legacies of the Russian institutional structure and public bureaucracy significantly influenced the distribution of power within the body of Russian officialdom. In this context, reforms have faced significant problems not only because of the lack of consensus among the top-level political leadership, but also because they came from a point where the interests of various players collided, and the process of building consensus among the reactionary and progressive forces turned out to be difficult. The conflict over the future trajectory of the Russian state largely explains the existing political stalemate. However, this discussion also demonstrates that none of the significant policy actors were particularly active in overcoming obstacles to CSR. One reason is the complexity and amount of change required by the reform. Another is the importance of the existing institutional framework for the survival of the regime and parallel reform projects.

It is obvious that the newly emerged policy-making system in Russia includes elements of both *old and new institutions*, where the traditions of secrecy, the domination of the executive branch, and other legacies of the past are closely intertwined with an intention to create a viable, modern, and highly effective civil service system. This model perpetuates cleavages among civil servants, and it largely affects the flow of information, knowledge, and practices concerning the

goals and outcomes of the reform process. All in all, evidence suggests that both the reform design and the reform implementation processes involve long-lasting political conflict over the trajectory of change in Russia. The latter includes the dilemmas of unity versus diversity, obedience versus delegated authority, and efficiency versus democratic control. These issues appear to be common for many other transitioning states, and quite predictably, they create obstacles to achieving the goals of the reform process.

### 6.2.3 Reform Strategy

Research to date has paid insufficient attention to the model of public service that policy-makers were trying to build. Meanwhile, conflict over the future of public choice institutions in Russia has been a recurring theme in the nation's history, and it has influenced the choice of reform model and direction of reform several times throughout the course of institutional change. First of all, conflicting ideas about the ultimate goals of reform (i.e., a lack of vision of a new model of public service), increased the likelihood of self-defeating reform projects. Secondly, contradictory views regarding the means of reform have made Russia's CSR strategy highly inconsistent. Both the goals and the means of public sector reform have been complicated by a variety of political and societal tensions, and therefore, they should not be taken at their face value.

In this section, I suggest viewing reform strategy as a result of policy choices, made by the leaders under assumption they were committed to the idea of CSR. In this respect, I use the concept of reform strategy as a measure of reform capacity rather than commitment the way I did it in section 6.2.1. I suggest that the choice of policy objectives and instruments emerged as a result of deliberate policy choices, which could be misguided or unintentionally disrupted. Thus the primary concern of this section is to identify the goals and peculiar features of the Russian CSR model.

Konov (2006) observes that in the early 2000s, "a strange mix of NPM and neo-Weberian principles" characterised the reform process in Russia. On the one hand, reformers attempted to modify the post-Soviet state apparatus to fit with Weberian principles; on the other hand, they were trying to build a new system based on the ideas of New Public Management. The first goal was associated with an attempt to limit the discretionary powers of public officials with detailed and narrow regulations. By contrast, the NPM strategy involved the use of market-type devices to manage the public sector. In this model, top-level public managers were central to making

156

government more efficient, and citizens were conceptualized as consumers rather than as independent policy actors.

It is noteworthy that while in the rest of the world "NPM has started to be seen as a transitory stage between the traditional model of Public Administration and new, more integrated forms of governance", in Russia, it was perceived as the ultimate goal of the reform process, and as a convenient way of adjusting to the post-Communist reality. To understand the source of this 'strange mix' of ideas penetrating the Russian reform process, it is important to consider that the end of the Soviet era coincided with a so-called 'ideational vacuum' among policy-makers.[145] Some of the old Soviet institutions quickly disappeared during the early 1990s, whereas other formal arrangements remained in place. In this situation, policy-making system in Russia became subjected to *policy diffusion* – a phenomenon that arose as a result of economic globalization, which pressured nations to secure an appropriate level of international competition. In Russia, this process has never been conceived of as problematic, and it influenced CSR indirectly. Overall, it may be observed that even though reforms in Russia were driven from *within the social system, the national government quite rationally engaged in lesson drawing, and as a result, it adopted an "outward-looking" approach to tackle the problem of institutional change.*[146]

One of the channels of policy diffusion in PCS was the World Bank analysis and support of the framework 'Action Plan for State Service Reform in the Russian Federation' (2002). To remind, the aim of the program was to rebuild the state service system in Russia by taking some of the following steps: (i) create a culture focused on performance and outcomes, as well as on service to citizens and service users; (ii) introduce competitive employment practices, including pay reform; and (iii) strengthen external accountability and transparency, and others. The World Bank contributed to the program not only financially, but also technically and ideationally with the use of "targeted analyses of international approaches in similar reform areas" (Ibid.). It also undertook a lot of analytical work at the request of the Russian government, and completed

---

[145]The 'disorientation' of the yearly years of post-Communist transformation included both an ideational and institutional vacuum. Another concept that could be used to describe this phenomenon is **'anomie'**, a term popularized by the French philosopher Emile Durkheim in his book "Suicide" (1897). The latter describes the state "without Law", or the lack of social norms and orientations ('normlessness'). Alternative meanings of this word are "a rule that is a lack of rule," "derangement," and "an insatiable will." It would be fair to say that the *outward-looking model of policy-making process* emerged in Russia as an attempt to overcome the ideational crisis of the late 1990s.

[146]It is important to note that the current wave of administrative reform began in 2003-2004 with an 'ideational shift' in the perceptions of expert community and policy-making practitioners. Policy-makers in Russia were not pressured or forced to rebuild the existing system of public administration. By contrast, they were inspired by foreign-born practice, and therefore they heavily engaged in the process of lesson-drawing rather than policy trasnfer.

knowledge management activities such as the creation of a Russian-language public administration reform website (Ibid.). [147]

It is well known that the New Public Management has traditionally, focused on administrative modernization, including performance-motivated public management and the use of integrated economic, sociological and other advanced conceptual models (Lynn 1998, Drechsler, 2005). These ideas have evidently provided a good starting point for designing and rationalizing the public administration; however, contradictions, which emerged from the strategy of mixing the NPM and Weberian models in Russia have overshadowed achievements of this policy. First of all, the type of formalization that emerged during the process of civil service reform has turned out to be antithetical to the goals of NPM. In the words of one of my interviewees, public policy measures have stifled the creativity necessary to achieving the desired goals of reform. Another problem was that the mentality of post-Soviet bureaucrats provided rather infertile ground for the ideology of New Public Management to flourish. Civil servants in Russia have commonly perceived themselves as representatives of "state power", rather than the servants of society (i.e., cultural and psychological barriers to NPM).[148] These were the old traditions and stereotypes of state-society relations, which impeded the process of effective decentralization.

To elaborate on the Russian CSR model, I suggest paying attention not only to the overarching ideological framework of this reform, but also to the scope and peculiar features of CSR implementation strategy. The latter emerged as a result of the decision-making processes described earlier, and it has influenced policy outcomes independently with the use of framing and interaction effects.

As I previously noted, the approach taken by the Russian authorities toward PCS has been comprehensive by design, covering such diverse areas as Civil Service, Public Administration, Budget, Taxation and others. A comprehensive approach was necessary and

---

[147] One of the most important recommendations of the program was the adoption of the Law on the State Service System, the Code of Conduct and Conflict of Interest Regulations. It has also required each of Russia's 89 subjects to come up with its own Civil Service Reform Program, allocated resources for the purposes of state service reform in the Federal Budget for 2013, and envisaged January 1, 2003 as the start date for reforms (World Bank 2013).

[148] One of interviewees in my study mentioned that a great controversy emerged from the process of managerial reorganization, since public servants resisted the newly introduced ideas of service delivery, transparency, and accountability. Prior to the enactment of Law No. 79, public officials used to think of themselves as actors vested with state powers. Therefore even semantic changes in legal documents could be perceived as unacceptable.[148] However, the Law no 79. (2004) did not initially attempt at managerial reorganization; neither did it identify civil servants as managers of public administration machine. On the contrary, the law described civil servants as representatives of the state apparatus (executive organs of power), whose aim was to fulfill the responsibilities of the state.

desirable in the context of political transformation. However, in Russia, as in many other transitioning states, this project turned out to be self-defeating, and has led to the incomplete implementation of nearly all of the recently adopted laws relating to the reforms.[149] Firstly, evidence suggests that policy elites have initially approached comprehensive public administrative reform without considering the *sequence of steps* or the existing *temporal constraints* of public policy change in a transitional context (e.g., the Program of Reform in 2001 outlined mostly generic policy objectives). Secondly, the *policy instruments* necessary for reform progress were not clearly elaborated. The Law on Civil Service Reform (2004), in particular, contained important references to such tools as "conflict of interest," "job pool," "administrative standing order" (*administrativny reglamnet*) and so on. Not all of them were new in a Russian transitional context, yet they required additional paper work.

The greatest shortcoming of CSR implementation strategy was the inefficient policy communication employed by the Federal government, which relied on the old patterns of policy-making, proposing that laws were self-executing documents. In this respect, Yuzhakov (Interviews 2010) observed that the strategy of CSR was flawed because it did not pursue the goal of _building alliances_ between top-ranking and lower-ranking public officials. Instead, it treated civil servants as inconsequential participants of a reform that they had to comply with, thus disengaging civil servants from the process of actual participation.

A study conducted by the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law Under the Russian Government (Tikhomirov and  Gorokhov 2009) vividly demonstrates some of the preliminary outcomes of this strategy, suggesting that in 2008, only 50 per cent of civil servants were aware of the new legislation, whereas another 40 % had not heard anything about the Federal methodological guidelines (*kommentarii*) (297-298).[150] About 33.3% of respondents reported activity that did not go in line with the existing legislative norms, which was most

---

[149] To remind, civil service reform has aimed to profoundly change the goals, rationale, and operational principles of the post-Soviet bureaucracy by introducing improved systems of remuneration, career promotion, and job descriptions. Objectives of the reform were as follows: optimizing the federal public servant headcount; defining powers and responsibilities of public servants; creating conditions for openness and accountability of state bodies' administrations and public servants to civil society; developing public service resources; improving the efficiency of personnel policy and the quality of employee structure of the federal public service; implementing mechanisms for identifying and solving public service related conflicts of interests, introducing legal regulations for the professional ethics of public servants; and developing a public service management system. *Overall, the number of goals was overwhelming, and not all of them were properly coordinated.*

[150]The study conducted by the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law included expert interviews with HR specialists in civil service agencies and departments at the federal level. It also included a public opinion survey, which aimed to identify society's changing attitudes toward the existing public service system. The main goal of the legal monitoring was to evaluate the state of legal consciousness of civil servants.

commonly rationalized by specific circumstances or the inefficiency of the norms of the newly adopted legislation.[151] All in all, contrary to the expectations of the research community, by 2010, there was a large pool of civil servants in Russia who did not understand or share the goals of CSR. Civil servants' lack of knowledge about the new norms adopted at the federal level, as well as their interest in preserving the status quo diminished their role in the process of policy implementation. Thus it was commonplace for public officials to act as total bystanders of the CSR process.

Barabashev (2007) supports the idea of poor communication strategy at the Federal level, pointing out at another relevant problem, i.e. the discrepancy of communication methods policy leaders used when dealing with the group of civil servants and the rest of the Russian population. The author suggests that most problems of CSR stemmed from the conflict of bureaucratic interests with the goals of the reform process proclaimed in mass media, rather than from the conflict of ideas, or the conflict of departmental committees. *In this respect, the sources of civil servants' disengagement from the reform was that, initially, reforms were presented to the public as an attempt to fight or curtail bureaucracy, whereas civil servants were approached with the use of technocratic jargon*. As a result, when reforms started "bureaucracy [was] willing to defend itself in view of the public policy changes, and it threatened to undermine the process of CSR" (106). In this process, both the content and outcomes of CSR were largely compromised (Barabashev 2007, 111).

It is important to note that technocratic language of the reform process (i.e., the focus on efficiency and effectiveness of the reform process) emerged as an attempt to maintain consensus around the principles of the reform. However, this language was hardly effective, due to the emphasis on the ideas of NPM. Barabashev (2007) criticizes the approach taken by the government, saying that the latter should not have been presented as a merely technocratic project, nor should it have been presented as a strategy to curtail state bureaucrats.

It is also important to remind that, in Russia, the level of influence within the executive branch of power varies immensely. Top-level bureaucrats exercise a great amount of influence over the decision-making process, whereas the mid and low-level bureaucrats are hampered by a lack of knowledge and information concerning the goals, strategies, and outcomes of the reform. These actors appear to be more vulnerable to the potential consequences of unexpected policy

---

[151]Obolonsky argues that the main reason for the slow pace of reforms was *the lack of understanding of the importance of civil service reform among state bureaucrats*. "A paradigmatic shift in attitudes toward the reform on behalf of state bureaucrats did not happen, and it created a real danger for the stability of the state, civil society, and economic development (Obolonsky 2011, 14). [translated by author]

changes, as they do not have access to restricted flows of information, and they turn out to be overly cautious and protective of their own interests.

According to public opinion survey discussed earlier (Tikhomirov and Gorokhov 2009), civil servants negatively assessed the style of policy-making process in Russia, pointing out at the hectic style of decisions, which tend to prioritize certain laws over others, and on a seemingly ad-hoc basis. This process, in their opinion, has led to the deteriorating quality of the laws. At the same time, this was not the main reason for the failure of CSR. Both experts and civil servants point out at obstacles at implementation stage.

Interestingly, the views of the the lower-level state bureaucrats coincide greatly with the views of Russian public. According to the data collected by the Academy of Science under the President, in 2005, only 50% of the Russian public was aware of CSR (these figures could be only compared to the awareness of the judicial reform). Almost half of respondents assumed that the reform pursued the interests of public bureaucrats (44.2%), and 30.2% suggested that the reforms were aimed at satisfying the interests of the industrial lobby. Furthermore, people surveyed exemplified a noticeable lack of interest in the issues of civil service and public administration, assuming that it was a mere technocratic project that had nothing to do with the public interest. Lay people surveyed didn't understand clearly the relationship between public administrative reform and the prospects of economic modernization (i.e., a clear public interest). In addition, they were unaware of the implications that the structure or principles of the state apparatus might exercise upon their daily lives.

**Table 15 Public Awareness about the goals of public sector reforms in Russia**

*Do you understand the purposes of the ongoing reform projects? (2004)*

| Reforms | Population (%) yes-answer | Experts (%) yes answer |
|---------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Housing | 22.3 | 58.0 |
| Education | 20.3 | 39.5 |
| Pension | 22.1 | 55.0 |
| Military | 17.5 | 37.0 |
| Judicial | 14.1 | 43.5 |
| Taxation | 13.7 | 31.5 |
| Land | 13.4 | 32.5 |
| Civil Service Reform | 11.7 | 76.0 |

Source: Chesnokov M.D. 2005. *Administrativnaya Reforma v Rossii*. Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law Under the Government of the Russian Federation, ed. By Naryshkin and Khabrieva, Moscow, p. 325.

To sum up the discussion of this chapter, all of the problems associated with the strategy of civil service reform in Russia could be divided into two main categories. (1) Problems originating within the design strategy – this group includes the lack of clear and consistent objectives; the conflict between an outward-looking reform model and the pre-existing conditions of CSR (e.g., the organizational characteristics of the Russian civil service system); the lack of a causal theory concerning the success or failure of civil service reform, and problems with the design of the reform implementation strategy (e.g., the lack of engagement and poor communication strategy). (2) The second group includes problems originating in the actual reform implementation, i.e. the slow pace of the reforms, the selective policy implementation process, public officials' disengagement from the reform process, the behaviour of state bureaucrats, and so on.

At least half of the problems mentioned above originate in the nature of policy-making system that crystallized over the years of Russia's transformation. Therefore, the origin of policy implementation problems could be traced back to the broader political context, as well as the newly rediscovered legacies of post-communism. In the table provided below, I demonstrate that certain implementation problems stem from the design of the reforms. These characteristics include issues such as the slow and selective process of implementation, as well as public officials' disengagement from the reform. The table does not focus on variables derived from the hypotheses of my research. Instead, it considers observable implications of those variables, outlining the linkages between the stages of policy formulation and policy implementation.

**Table 16 Summary of CSR problems (Russia)**

| Problems originating within the Design Strategy | Problems originating in Actual Reform Implementation Process (arising in conjunction with problems originating in the design) |
|---|---|
| Comprehensive Design of the Reform | Selective Policy Implementation Process |
| Unclear policy Objectives | Disengagement from the Reform Process on behalf of civil servants |
| Choice of Policy Instruments (communication, mobilization strategy) | Bureaucratic Resistance, The Lack of Civil Engagement |
| The underdevelopment of implementation mechanisms | The slow pace of implementation process, cases of non-implementation, |
| The lack of policy appraisal tools | The lack of continuity in some areas of CSR |
| Allocation of Funds | The slow pace of implementation process, cases of non-implementation, selective policy implementation process |
| Legal Gaps | The slow pace of implementation process, cases of non-implementation, selective policy implementation process |

Source: Author, based on Interviews conducted with experts and public officials in the fall of 2010

In view of the number of policy-implementation obstacles discussed above, in what follows, I split them into a few observable implications and develop criteria that help to identify them. The latter include indicators such as the lack of continuity in the policy making process, the uneven allocation of funds, the lack of regulations, the eclectic nature of reform legislation, and so on.

**Table 17 (1) Summary of CSR problems**

| Characteristics of Policy Implementation Stage | Factors blocking the progress of reform | Indicators (easily observed features of the reform process) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. The slow pace of implementation process<br><br>2. Selective Implementation (success in some areas, and failure in other areas)<br><br>3. Unintended outcomes[152] | Hectic style of policy-making process;<br>Eclectic Nature of Reform Legislation | (1) The lack of continuity in policy making process;<br>(2) The uneven allocation of funds<br>(3) The lack of regulations<br>(4) Eclectic nature of reform legislation |
| | Lack of commitment (political will) | Insufficient funding |
| | The lack of consensus (the split within the 'ideational' community of policy-makers) [the system is not ready for any sort of paradigmatic shift] | The inconsistency of the proposals advanced by policy makers and actual reform strategies; points of leverage |
| | The lack of expertise | The lack of accountability mechanisms |
| | The split within the state bureaucracy | Losers and winners of the reform process |
| | Bureaucratic Resistance | The split within the state bureaucracy<br>Cases of non-implementation;<br>Selective Implementation Process |
| | Insufficient funding (political will) | Economic scarcity, competition |
| | The underdevelopment of implementation structures (Gaman-Golutvina) (Strategy) | The absence of a single team for its implementation |
| | The lack of Civic engagement; (heritage, strategy) | The lack of control and accountability mechanisms; state-society dialogue |
| | Eclectic nature of reform legislation (reform design | The lack of incentives, or inappropriate incentives of the reform |

---

[152]The two most important features of implementation process in this list are *the slow pace of implementation* process and *the differential implementation* thatcould result from a number ofother implementation obstacles, such as the lack of funds, or the lack of commitment toward the goals of the reform process.

163

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| strategy) | | process; points of access and the lack of consensus |
| Reform communication strategy | | The lack of understanding of the goals and the purposes of reform<br>The lack of commitment (political will)<br>Bureaucratic Resistance |

<div align="right">Source: Author, based on Interviews (2010)</div>

**6.3 Conclusion**

In conclusion of this Chapter, it is important to reassert that CSR in Russia, regardless of how little attention and coverage it received, is a deeply conflicted political project, which is not easy to grasp with the use of the existing research methods. The type of the reform we are dealing with, as well as the time frame of the reform prevent us from easily identifying the key observable implications of recent policies. Moreover, expert interviews collected in the fall of 2010 provide us with limited data, which tells only one side of the story, excluding the views and perspectives of other participants of CSR.

The assessment conducted by this chapter confirms my previous findings, suggesting that a single explanatory framework, which accounts for agentenial and structural components of post-Communist change, might be quite effective. First, the two variables of leadership and strategy coincide partly when we use them to evaluate each other (even though they do not fully coincide when we think of the discrepancy between strategic and tactical choices policy makers need to take). Second, the concept of institutional legacies makes sense when we take into consideration the lack of political willingness or capacity to change the dysfunctional institutions and practices. All in all, both leadership and the reform strategy may be subjected to the legacies of the past, which shape the ways of thinking and doing things. Thus the goal of overcoming historical legacies may be difficult if not impossible to attain.

The study poses several important questions concerning the key explanatory variables of my research: how do we evaluate political commitment in view of contradictory evidence? And what is the best way to grasp the complexity of bureaucratic engagement in CSR? First, evidence suggests that policy leaders have greatly contributed to the initiation of civil service reform in Russia. However, the actual characteristics of the existing political leadership have played in favor of those who opposed the reform. According to my observations, the priorities of the Federal government have fluctuated quite radically over the past 10 years. The process of policy

164

formulation and implementation has been troubled by the lack of consensus (e.g., conflict over the direction of change). Finally, beginning in 2005, political engagement with CSR began to steadily decline. In this respect, the Program "On Civil Service Reform and Development" (2009-2013) marked **an ideational, rather than strategic commitment** to the goals of the reform process, and improvements were only achieved in those areas that were most closely intertwined with public administrative reform - functional restructuring; clarification of duties and responsibilities, developing administrative schedules and job descriptions, and so on.

The problem of reform leadership concerns not so much the lack of reform funding or legislative support, but rather the lack of concensus on the goals and the means of reform, as well as on who was supposed to be in charge of implementation (in other words, the question may not be only about resources). On the one hand, the strategy of the reform attempted to radically break with the past of post-Communist inertia. On the other hand, both the goals and the strategy of CSR came to Russia as a result of policy diffusion, which did not help much in view of the old patterns of policy-making. It was observed previously that neither the goals nor the strategy of civil service reform were clearly elaborated at the very start, whereas reform communication strategy treated civil servants (major participants of the reform) as total bystanders. One of the reasons for the lack of CSR progress was that it emerged as a collective product of actors with diverse interests. In this respect, the role of reform leadership was limited in view of the long-lasting conflict over the future trajectory of the Russian state, which troubled the top-level political elite (Presidential Administration, ministers and other top-level officials), as well as members of the Russian Parliament (policy elites from the State Duma). This conflict affected the quality of CSR legislation and policy-making system in general, which resulted in a fragmented decision-making process. In recent years, a great number of documents related to CSR have been significantly rewritten or modified. Some of these initiatives, such as the Code of Ethics, have never even reached the stage of policy implementation.

When thinking about the reasons of conflict and policy ambiguity, it is important to consider the complexity of the Russian policy-making system, and a special relationship between the top-level policy leaders and public bureaucracy, which crystallized over the years of political transformation. In this respect, President Putin should not be viewed as an actor, who is completely insulated from various power groups in the Russian society. Instead he is an inheritor of the post-Soviet system, which brought him to power amidst the process of political disintegration. Experts observe that currently Putin acts as a mediator of various interest groups, and he is capable of shaping rather than creating a new system of public administration. In this respect, it is difficult to evaluate the extent of his influence over bureaucracy, and it is quite

predictable that his role is closely intertwined with bureaucratic interests who engage in all stages of policy making. In terms of implementation, CSR progress may be viewed as a result of a dynamic relationship between institutions and policy strategies. However, as I said earlier, policy outcomes, as well as the level of bureaucratic engagement is difficult to assess, taking into consideration the fact that it does not easily open up to the public. Thus the study would benefit from additional interviews and other interpretive methods of analyzing the system of public administration.

One of the most important questions [for the future research] concerns the discrepancies of the mind frames, resources and capacities of various groups of state bureaucrats, along with the overly-exclusive policy-making circle, which greatly affected the dynamic of policy implementation. The study suggests that the heritage of the Soviet and post-Soviet transformation divided the body of state bureaucrats into the groups with diverse interests. As a result, these groups engaged in hidden tensions, which made them either supportive or critical of the reforms. Policy-makers have duly ignored the pre-existing split within the body of public officials, coming up with the unfeasible and unrealistic reform projects. In addition, one would argue that experts have probably overestimated the role of political leadership and the capacity of the Russian state to reform itself within such a short period of time.[153]

In the end, my intention is not to belittle some of the most positive achievements of PCS, but rather to convey that a great number of problems in the Russian case stem from the contextual factors of the policy-making environment, such as the institutional and ideational vacuum of the 1990s, problems of path-dependency, conflict over the direction of change, and the lack of civic engagement. One of the most fundamental peculiarities of Russia's civil service reform is the involvement of a variety of non-state actors at the stage of policy formulation. However, this involvement is insufficient, and it comes at a price of cognitive discontinuity between the designers and implementers of the reform. The decision recently made to entrust civil servants with policy advisory functions alienates policy experts further, making them doubt the intentions of policy leadership. Overall, evidence suggests that the number of reform opponents to CSR is higher than the number of reform supporters. Various policy actors are not equally resourceful, and policy results in general appear to be highly fragmented across various sectors and on a cross-regional basis.

---

[153] Thus it is reasonable to conclude that reforms would have stagnated regardless of policy-makers' efforts.

**Table 17 Arguments of structure and agency (summary)**

| Arguments of the will, strategy and institutional design | | |
|---|---|---|
| Political Leadership | Institutional Design | The Strategy of Reform |
| **The type of reasoning involved:** Political Will to Reform→ Commitment in a form of legislative support and financial support to the reform → Policy Outcomes | **The type of reasoning involved:** Institutional design →The style of Policy-Making Process→Policy Outcomes | **The type of reasoning involved:** Design Strategy → Actual Implementation → Outcomes |
| Political will to reform in Russia contributed significantly to the process of civil service reform initiation. However, political priorities have changed over time; and civil service enactment has not ensured the integrity of civil service reform process (effect upon the design and implementation; implementation is the stage where commitment to reform is tested) | The type of Institutional Design developed in Russia skewed the process of policy-making toward the executive, leading to the expansion of the power of state bureaucrats, narrowing down the circle of people involved in policy-making process (effect upon the design of reforms); | The scope of reform, the choice of policy instruments, as well as reform communication strategy have influenced the outcomes of civil service reform process. The overly **comprehensive approach** toward CSR, along with the choice of policy instruments were **not appropriate** within the existing policy-making process in Russia, and they have both relied on a path-dependent way of thinking about public policy change. |
| For | For | For |
| - CSR attracted a great amount of political support within the top political elite;<br>- Policy continuity; abundant legislation | - the domination of the executive (expansion of the bureaucracy);<br>- standard, path-dependent approach toward the enactment of new legislation (all legal documents need to pass via the informal stage called 'soglasovanie')<br>- traditions of secrecy (the flow of information) | - A strange mix of NPM and neo-Weberian principles resulted in the lack clarity regarding the goals of the reform;<br>-Comprehensive approach toward CSR was not appropriate within the existing policy-making process; |
| Against | Against | Against |
| - The interest to CSR declined as early as in 2005;<br>- Resources were not allocated efficiently; less resources were allocated for implementation stage than for analytical assessment and research;<br>-Selective treatment of reform priorities | -Comparatively speaking, reform attracted more attention on behalf of civil servants than before (engagement aspect was stronger if compared to the preceding historical periods);<br>- 'New legacies' included the involvement of research expert community; again, greater inclusiveness of the process of policy formulation<br>- Delay in implementation process; bargaining over the content of new legislation and the lack of control mechanisms were major obstacles; nearly all of them result from the history of radical and profound change and account for the quality of formal and informal institutions in policy-making process | The Federal Program on Reform and Development of Civil Service System, adopted in 2009, represented a sign of the increased level of policy continuity and responsiveness within the existing policy-making system;<br>Intensive research has accompanied the initial stages of policy-making in Russia |

Source: Author

# CHAPTER 7

# EXPLAINING CROSS-REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN RUSSIA'S PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the development and outcomes of public administrative and civil service reforms across Russia's various regions, while building on concepts already discussed in my study (e.g., political leadership, state-building efforts, and the legacies of the post-Communist transformation). I begin with a brief discussion of CSR implementation processes in various regions to determine if federal-level initiatives were effectively followed-through on by regional-level governments. Next, I turn to the analysis of some outstanding cases, including explanations, such as regional leadership, reform funding, legislative support and a broader dynamic of Russian federalism. The study questions the willingness and capacity of regional policy leaders to foster the process of CSR implementation, arguing that public sector reforms should be viewed as issues of power in a context of centre-periphery relations. I suggest that federal influence over the nationwide policy-making processes significantly increased in recent years; however, this influence does not extend further than control over regional heads. Overall, federal powers are capable of selectively enforcing priority projects, and they devise strategies, which affect implementation processes on a cross-regional basis. At the same time, regional heads enjoy significant leeway in terms of organizing their administrations and civil service networks. The federal powers abstain from interfering in CSR in places other than the fedarl organs of power, thus leaving provinces with an option, where they could take initiative, but at their own expense. In this context, much depends on the 'survival' strategies regional heads adopt, as well as on their individual willingness and capacity to coordinate and effectively communicate reforms to civil servants.

The propositions to be examined in this chapter are as follows:

1) Economic scarcity, although cited by my interviewees as the most popular explanation for reform failure, is not the best predictor of the pace, content, and outcomes of civil service reforms at the regional level. Political leadership, as well as some of the basic characteristics of Russian bureaucracy, affect regional policy choices on a greater scale, and these decisions may tell us a lot about the transformation of Russian federalism during the years of Putin's Presidency.

2) Some of the old patterns of the Soviet policy-making system, which remained intact following the collapse of the Soviet Union, continue to impose significant obstacles to policy

implementation in Russia at both the federal and regional levels. Contradictory tendencies within the Russian policy-making system can be seen through an examination of the content of various reform projects, as well in such aspects as a reform's communication strategy.

3) The strategy of reform at the federal level (the sequence of reform initiatives, content, and timing of the reform) often impedes the process of reform implementation at the level of individual regions. In this respect, the growing political recentralization does not necessarily translate into effective implementation of all reform projects, while effective implementation does not necessarily originate in control mechanisms. In these circumstances, much depends on the regional political leadership and the way it deals with the federal strategy of PAR and CSR.

In addition to studying explanations listed above, I test assumptions made at the intermediate stages of my research. For example, in earlier chapters, I suggested that the process of reform implementation could have failed due to the sense of insecurity such reforms induced among civil servants. In this chapter, I will examine just how plausible this explanation really is. I will also focus on a reform's sequencing impacts, as well as the role of institutional and ideational bases of the reform.

To address all questions listed above, I identify and examine several cases of the reform progress (Chuvashia, Samara and Krasnoyarsk located in the Volga Federal District) going into as much detail as it is possible given my scarce sources. I compare and contrast these cases to other regional examples, trying to establish the interrelatedness of such factors as the scope of freedom regional heads enjoy, reform funding and approaches taken by the regional governments toward the process of policy coordination and regional policy communication mechanisms (all these variables boil down to the relationship between the federal and regional strategies of CSR).

The study of Civil Service Reform *at the regional level* is critically important because a growing number of civil servants are located at the regional level. According to the Federal Program "On the Reform of Public Service in Russia (2003-2005)", the overall number of civil servants, municipal servants, and other employees of federal and regional state institutions at the beginning of 2002 stood at 1 million employees. Eighty-nine percent of this number consisted of employees working in the *executive* branch of power; 30% out of this 89% worked in federal state institutions, whereas 28% out of this 30% worked in the regional departments of federal state institutions (the remaining 50% belonged to the regional administrations).[154]

---

[154] To describe these figures more accurately, in 2002, the number of federal civil servants working in *executive institutions* at the central level was 24,900, whereas over 290,000 worked in the regional departments of central federal institutions. In regional executive institutions (i.e., regional ministries and departments belonging to the regional powers), there were 153,300 civil servants and 283,700 people worked in municipal regional organs. These statistics consider the overall number of state employees

It is important to observe that the number of civil servants and state employees working in the executive organs of the Russian Federation has almost doubled between 1992 and 2002. This increase could be explained by the expansion of the state apparatus after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The same trend continued under Putin's leadership. However, although the overall number of civil servants has steadily increased, the trajectory of this growth has fluctuated like a pendulum over the past decade (which is mostly due to methods employed by the federal and regional agencies in counting the numbers of state employees and civil servants).

In 2014, the group of civil servants who work in regions in both the federal and regional organs of power at the level of Russian regions constituted 715,9 thousand, or 43% out of the total number of state employees employed by the state; there were also 326.6 thousand municipal workers, or 66.6% out of the total number employed by municipal organs and electoral commissions (Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarsvennoi Statistiki 2014). The share of regional bureaucrats working in regional organs of power increased 2.25 times over the period of Putin's presidency. The total number of municipal servants increased 2.07 times over the same period, while the figure for federal civil servants increased by just 1.6 times. The number of civil servants has been growing despite the rise in unemployment levels – for example, in 2009, the level of unemployment in Russia increased from 6.3% to 8.4%, whereas the total amount of civil servants in Russia increased by 1% (from 1,102,000 to 1,114,000 people) (Levchenko 2009).

One of the most popular explanations for the growing number of civil servants in Russia at the regional level concerns the increased prestige of civil service careers in the eyes of certain segments of the population. Experts observe that the government's agenda of strengthening the hierarchy of laws in the early 2000s appealed to the younger generation of Russian citizens who were looking for a stable job with a fixed salary and career opportunities. Meanwhile, scholarly research suggests that the increase in the number of state employees did not correlate with an *improvement in the quality of the civil service*. The most obvious trend, for example, is the exodus of qualified personnel from the civil service. In addition, there is a gap between the groups of experienced and inexperienced civil servants, including specialists with less then 5 or more than 10 years of experience.

---

working in the state executive. Other sources, which consider statistics on civil servants only (in all branches), provide somewhat different numbers. For example, Zaitseva (233) asserts that at the beginning of 2001, the number of civil servants in the federal organs of power was 404.700 people (3% less than during the period of 1995), while the number of civil servants at the regional level was 141.700 (plus 280.3 municipal servants). The overall number of civil servants at that time was 1163.300 - 38.800 were located at the federal level and 1124.500 were located at the regional level. These numbers exclude state employees (drivers, doctors, technical staff) and those occupying 'state' rather than civil service positions.

Post-Soviet scholarship knows little about the origins of the observed trends in civil service. It is also unclear why the federal strategies work well in some regions as opposed to others. The goal of this chapter, in this respect, is to elaborate on CSR at the regional level and clarify whether the causal factors advanced earlier could be utilized effectively in explaining the regional implementation stalemate.

**Table 18 Changers in the number of state employees (2000-2013)**

|  | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2013** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | **1161.5** | **1462.0** | **1648.4** | **1548.1** |
| Legislative | 15.4 | 24.4 | 32.8 | 33.2 |
| Executive | 1027.3 | 1234.4 | 1385.3 | 1264.8 |
| Judiciary | 113.7 | 192.8 | 214.6 | 230.2 |
| Other | 3.1 | 8.3 | 13.5 | 17.5 |
| **Regional level – total number** | **1122.7** | **1420.9** | **1600.9** | **1499.5** |
| Legislative | 11.2 | 20.2 | 28.7 | 29.4 |
| Executive | 999.1 | 1204.2 | 1349.5 | 1228.2 |
| Judiciary | 110.5 | 189.1 | 210.2 | 225.4 |
| Other | 2.0 | 6.8 | 11.9 | 15.9 |

**Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarsvennoi Statistiki,**
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/#

**Table 19 Changes in the number of civil servants (2000-2013)**

|  | **2001** | **2005** | **2009** | **2011** | **2013** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total number** | **548,728** | **684,202** | **827,503** | **827,503** | **786,400** |
| Legislative | 10,511 | 11,989 | 13,099 | 12,857 | 12,427 |
| Executive | 443,376 | 556,760 | 710,949 | 667,142 | 624,035 |
| Judicial | 89,923 | 105,672 | 131,966 | 135,055 | 136,165 |
| Other | 2918 | 7610 | 9900 | 10365 | 11479 |
| Federal civil servants | 407,047 | 498,853 | 634,814 | 634,814 | 564,490 |
| Regional civil servants | 141,681 | 185,349 | 233,337 | 221,645 | 221,910 |

**Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarsvennoi Statistiki,**
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/#

171

## 7.2 Cross-Regional Variations of Public Administrative and Civil Service Reform Implementation Processes

The previous chapter observed that the major achievement of the early and mid-1990s was the adoption of the fist post-Soviet Civil Service Law (1995), which created the legal basis for the development of a professional, merit-based civil service system. However, one of the major shortfalls of this law was that it did not create policy implementation instruments that would bring about systemic changes in policy outputs. During the 1990s, public bureaucracy developed on an ad-hoc basis at both the federal and regional levels, and, over time, it transformed into a *reactionary force* behind the weakening state apparatus.

Starting from the first years of Putin's presidency, with the introduction of pilot reform projects and other policy implementation mechanisms created by the federal powers (e.g., The Presidential Decree 'On the Reform of State Service,' 2002), the process of reform implementation at the regional level became more dynamic. The framework legislation and accompanying reform program introduced new policy instruments, such as administrative standing orders, schedules, and regulations, many of which were adopted on a cross-regional basis. However, while there was considerable variation in policy measures across the Russian regions, almost every region faced the same overarching problem: the so-called "partial reform paradox," or a situation characterized by inconsistent policy implementation processes, normative gaps, and the lack of political will to fully participate in public administrative reform. For example, by the end of 2007, only 20 out of Russia's 89 regions had managed to create regional Commissions of Administrative Reform, even though there were regional programs at place, and the Federal Targeted Program "Administrative Reform in 2005-2010" aimed to bring public administrative and civil service reform to all of Russia's regions.

It is noteworthy that the level of formal compliance with the federal guidelines at the moment has been unprecedented in Russia's post-Soviet history. By the time the Program "On the Reform and Development of the Russian State Service" (2009-2013) was enacted, nearly all regions of the Russian Federation had adopted regional programs in the area of PAR or CSR. This process did not mean that CSR became the top priority of all regional governments; in fact, some of the regional administrations did not even mention CSR as a priority in their regional developmental programs (for more information, see table 26).

The diversity of responses to the new legislation was so great that it would be difficult to come up with a universal explanatory model. Evidence suggests that some of the provinces, such

172

as Leningrad Oblast, Karelia, Smolensk Oblast, and Novgorod Oblast, came up with a number of incremental adaptations, which promoted the principles of openness, accountability, anticorruption, and a results-based evaluation system. Others, like Murmansk, approached administrative and civil service reforms comprehensively, by trying to develop linkages between the goals of the countrywide reform and their own unique developmental strategies. The Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (MERT) featured prominently in this process of creative policy-making. By using competitive funding schemes, it attempted to develop an incentive structure to further entice regional governments to fully participate in the ongoing reform. It is unfortunate, however, that the majority of sub-national territorial units limited their efforts to merely replicating the norms of the federal legislation. The most commonly cited reason for this minimal application was *the lack of funding*, accompanied by the *poor implementation capacity* of Russian regions (i.e., insufficient financial resources and/or the lack of experience and expertise of regional officials). Interviewees also refer to the *vague strategy* formulated by the federal powers. These and other problems of regional policy-making will be discussed more in-depth further.

Any attempt to explain the progress of reform in the Russian regions should start with the discussion of the policy implementation measures adopted by the Russian government in the aftermath of its decision to reform the civil service. As was previously mentioned, federal legislation contains at least three fundamental documents in the area of CSR:

1) The Federal Plan, which includes priority implementation measures with regard to the concept of state service reform (adopted by Presidential Decree No. 1496 on August 15, 2001);

2) The Federal Program "On the Reform of the State Service in the Russian Federation (2003-2005)," (adopted by Presidential Decree No. 1336 on November 19, 2002); and finally,

3) The Federal Program "Reform and Development of the System of State Service in the Russian Federation (2009-2013)," (adopted by Presidential Decree No. 261 in 2009).

Not all of these documents contain implementation measures relevant at the regional level. The key document is the Law on the System of Public Service in Russia (No. 58, 2003), which divides the public service into federal and regional branches, and the Federal Program (2003-2005), which includes a few paragraphs on the reform in Russian regions.

There is also a range of follow-up Presidential Decrees and Government Resolutions relevent to reform at the regional level, such as: Decree No. 722 "On the Pilot Reform Projects in the Regional Departments of the Federal Organs of Power" (2007); Presidential Decree "On Measures of Productivity and Effectiveness in the State Civil Service;" Government Resolution No. 281 "On the Financial Assistance of Administrative Reform in the Russian Regions (2010);

and Government Standing Order "On Productivity and Effectiveness in Public Administration," in addition to others. [155]

The Federal Program adopted in 2003-2005 has focused on the federal organs of power, including the regional departments of those organs. This document aimed to accumulate the preliminary expertise in the area of civil service modernization, and it covered such dimentions as testing new methods of management, planning and finance mechanisms, including civil service contracts, conflict of interest regulations, and other policy instruments. The basic achievements of the Program was the launchng of its pilot reform projects in such regions as **Krasnoyarsk, Perm, Samara, Sankt-Peterburg, Saratov, Taimyr, and Chuvashia.** However, it is noteworthy that due to the principles of fiscal federalism, the norms of the framework legislation did not fully extend to the regional bodies of public administration. One of the most important features of the Program was its **advisory funciton**, which relied on recommentations rather than the law enforcement mechanisms. In this respect, the federal guidelines emphasized that CSR at the regional level was to be financed by regional budgets, with resource inputs, allocated on a competitive basis by the federal government and international donor organizations (such as the World Bank). [156]

It is important to note that between 2003 and 2005, each individual pilot region recieved expert support in the form of draft legislation adjusted specifically to the needs of their respective region. Draft legislation was not imposed from above by the federal powers, but was rather developed and offered to regional governments, with the option of choosing amoung various reform strategies that focused on those problems that each region deemed to be most important. The dimensions of the reform were as follows: (1) the adoption of regional subsequent legislation on civil service reform; (2) the development of merit-based recruitment procedures; (3) the linking of salaries to productivity and other measures to create a more effective and accountable civil service. The federal government encouraged a comprehensive approach to the development of policy-making mechanisms; however, it never insisted on any specific strategy for reform, which gave regional authorities some freedom in terms of targeting reform programs to the specific needs of their regions.

The Program "On the Reform and Development of State Service" (2009-2013) built on experimental work conducted in 2003-2005; however, this last program did not specifically

---

[155] Reform programs, as well as the presidential decrees, were policy implementation mechanisms at both the federal and regional levels (Article 18 of Law No. 58).

[156] The total amount of funding allocated at the federal level in support of the Federal Program (2003-2005) was 539,100,000 roubles, which included 296,100,000 roubles for scholarly research and innovation, and another 243,000,000 roubles for other needs. The scope of the program was comprehensive; its ultimate goal was to assist Russia's economic development.

pursue the goal of introducing new public management principles and mechanisms into civil service (as the previous CSR program did). Rather, the document focused on developing a coherent state service system, improving state service management, professionalism and other dimensions including the development of work ethics, anti-corruption mechanisms, a system of public control over the process of reform implementation, cooperation mechanisms between the branches of public service, and other such improvements to the civil service.[157]

Similar to the 2003-2005 Program, the 2009-2013 Program did not enforce policy decisions at the regional level, but recommended the heads of Russian subjects to adopt relevant CSR documents. The program encouraged regions to participate actively in the reform, but left the final decision on policy implementation mechanisms up to the discretion of regional authorities. Overall, the basic features of the first reform program, which gave regions significant leeway in terms of choosing the dimensions and instruments of policy development in the area of PAR and CSR, have been preserved, and the '**selectivity' of implementation processes** became the main feature of the observed policy at the regional level.

It is important to note that the decision to let regions decide on the scope and the type of their CSR projects was in line with the newly developed constitutional principles of fiscal federalism, which divided authority over the state service between the federal and regional organs of power.[158] These regulations did not allow federal powers to shape regional bureaucratic networks unilaterally. Thus the fate of regional officialdom lay in the hands of both the federal and regional policy-makers. Interestingly, experts and policy-makers interviewed systemically criticized this approach. On the one hand, it was observed that the Federal powers created room for the diversity of reform paths and innovation; on the other hand, by leaving nearly all aspects of relevant policy-making in the hands of regional bureaucracy, this approach has helped it preserve the status quo. What is puzzling, in this respect is whether the application of the principles of federalism in case of CSR was more formal than in other areas of reform, such as the

---

[157] It is important to note that there were at least two major participants of policy formulation process during the last decade, i.e. the Ministry of Economic Development (in 2003-2005) and the Ministry of Labour and (in 2009-2013). The Ministry of Labour traditionally has advocated for the need to develop a qualified personnel system, anti-corruption mechanisms, and work ethics in public service, whereas MERT promoted ideas of NPM. Thus the decision to hand-over the title of reform coordinator to the Ministry of Labour in 2010 signalled a shift in emphasis from the new public management ideology to a more traditional view of public sector reforms.[157] Other ministries, such as The Ministry of Defense, The Ministry of Justice, The Ministry of Education and Science, The Ministry of Mass Communications, The Ministry of Finance, The Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as several Russian scholarly and educational institutions, which were selected on a competitive basis, were dubbed as *policy implementers*. They were obliged to follow through on the main directions of the federal programs by adopting decrees and orders in areas relevant to the reform process.

[158] Constitution of the Russian Federation, Part IV, Article 32; Paragraph 2, Article 71; Article 97.

reform of public administration. It is also interesting why regional powers quite often ignored CSR.

**Table 20 List of regions participating in experimental work (2003-2005)**

**Chuvash Republic  (2003-2005)**

Pilot Reform Organs (overall number 16): Regional Department of the Federal Employment Service, Ministry of Culture and Nationalities, Ministry of Health, etc.

**Binding norms, procedures and regulations**
> Regional-level program "On the Implementation of Administrative Reform in the Republic of Chuvashia (2003-2005)";
> Strategic Plan of Action by the Cabinet of Ministers of Chuvash Republic for the executive organs of power (productivity and effectiveness indicators)
> Schedule regulating productivity and effectiveness-based payment supplement procedures.
> Policy implementation and policy <u>enforcement procedures</u>, regulating disciplinary measures in cases of non-compliance with the standards of the program.

<u>Reform outputs:</u>
> Restructuring of the regional organs of power;
> Introduction of quality standards in the area of state service delivery;
> Electronic and administrative regulations (reglamenty);
> Strict budgeting procedures (fiscal procedures);
> Control over policy implementation in all areas of the reform.

**St. Petersburg (2003-2005)**

Pilot organs and departments: Committee of Economic Development, Industry and Trade of St. Petersburg (KERPPiT), including some of the departments of this directorate (e.g., The Department of Small and Medium-size Business Development); The Consumers' market development; the Department of Economy, etc.)

**Procedures and expertise (no binding programs/norms)**
> Analysis of the regional legislative framework in terms of its compliance with federal-level legislation;
> Analysis of the functions and responsibilities of each department;
> Development of a list of state services;
> Measuring the activities of the departments (indicators of productivity and effectiveness; delineation of functions and responsibilities, etc.);

<u>Reform outputs:</u>
> Deliberate analysis of the functions of the Committee has led to the detailed description of at least 23 state services; each of them was underpinned by at least 4 normative documents per service. Results-oriented contracts were developed for testing in each individual department (Volkov 171-176).

**Perm Oblast (2003-2005)**

Pilot organs and departments: The Department of Social Development; The Department of

Finance and Social Policy of the Chief Department of Finance and Tax Policy for Perm Region.

**Procedures, regulations and expertise (some binding norms)**

Defining the functions of each department in line with the goals of regional development;

Developing strategic planning mechanisms (planirovanie i tselepolaganie)

Developing administrative regulations (admnistrativnye reglamenty);

Creating a results-oriented contract system;

One of the obstacles to policy implementation concerned the existing regional normative framework on economic and social development (i.e., the lack of the clarity of the goals and mechanisms which impeded identifying the goals of individual departments).

## Krasnoyark Region (2003-2005)

Pilot organs/ departments: Regional Department of the Federal Employment Service (focus on a single department)

**Procedures and expertise**

Reconstruction of administrative processes; bringing regional legislation in line with the federal-level framework; functional analysis; introduction of the new management mechanisms into the regional civil service.

Reform coordination: The Centre for Strategic Analysis of Krasnoyarsk Region (**Regional Think Tank**)

Reform outputs: building a coherent list of state services; developing guidelines for strategic planning within the regional department; developing administrative orders (administrativnye reglamenty, etc.) and typical short-term contracts to be tested within the department.

Obstacles to the reform: the absence of a regional legislative framework; political leadership of the reform is concentrated at the federal level

## Taimyr Autonomous Okrug (2003-2005)

Pilot organs: Okrug Housing Service, the Service of Social Protection
Procedures, regulations and expertise

The main focus: budget planning; effective use of monetary resources;

Major goals of the experiment:

(a) development of new methodological guidelines containing planning mechanisms conductive to the creation of an Okrug budget, based on criteria of effectiveness and productivity.

(b) development of new methodological guidelines for the pilot reform departments that contain effectiveness and productivity-based budget planning mechanisms.

The structure of the plan for one year developed during the time of the experiment contains the following sections: (1) strategic goals of the pilot reform department; (2) major activities; (3) the structure of budget expenditures; (4) results achieved; (5) effectieveness of budget expenditures; (6) actions taken to improve the effectiveness of budegt expenditures.

Okrug Law No. 19 "On the Budget Process in Taimyr Autonomous Okrug"

Source: Author, based on Smorgunov 2008; Morozova 2004; "Strategiia Reformy Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia v Rossii i ee Realizatsiia na Regional'nom Urovne". Proceedings of the Conference, September 28–29 сентября 2004 (182-191).

Russian scholars haven't come to a consensus on whether or not the selectivity of the policy implementation process, conditioned by Russia's multi-level governance system, has been a positive or a negative for CSR. For example, Barabashev (2007) asserts that the reform implementation process at the regional level can serve as an example of risks associated with the Russian policy-making system:

Spontaneous uncoordinated reforms being carried out under the existing circumstances with simultaneous federal initiatives…[mean] that a number of local or even municipal bodies set up working groups to launch their own programs on modernization of the state apparatus without federal center coordination and timely and systematic control by the expert community preparing reforming initiatives at the federal level. These facts signify a lot. The positive side includes the emergence of civil society and social responsibility, with grass-root pressure making the government improve itself, but on the other hand, it may result in the loss of control, the disintegrated and fragmented public service, including legislation (91–124).

Indeed, some experts interviewed in my study argue that the lessons drawn from regional experimental practices of the early 2000s have not been utilized to their fullest potential due to diverse conditions prevailing in various regions. The discrepancies between regions in terms of the way they implemented policies were so huge that they resulted in an *increasingly growing policy-making gap on a cross-regional basis at the subsequent stages of the reform*.

During the early (experimental) period of the pilot reform projects (from 2003-2005), the most successful progress was made in a few regions only, such as Chuvashia and Krasnoyarsk. In subsequent years (from 2005-2010), the number of success stories increased to include regions such as St. Petersburg, Murmansk oblast, Zabaykalsk Krai, Buryat Republic, Novosibirsk Oblast, and Irkustsk Oblast. However, the experiences of these regions have also demonstrated the lack of capacity of regional political elites to go beyond the federal-level guidelines on policy implementation practices in the area of CSR. Success stories were heavily concentrated within the ***Volga Federal District***, where the pilot reform projects took place in 2003-2005; other districts provided just a few examples of dynamic reform progress.

The main reason for the exceptional performance of the Volga Federal District is most probably related to its early engagement with regional pilot reform experiments. Alternative explanations concern the fact that the Volga District enjoys economic advantages when compared to other regions.[159] However, this explanation does not stand up to the test of inter-regional variation, in which comparatively poor Chuvash Republic is doing better than its prosperous neighbors.

---

[159] In 2003, Chuvash GDP was 6 times lower than in its neighboring Krasnoyarsk. For more information, see Zubarevich 2005, 2010.

One of the most important causal candidates in explaining the stories of success and failure of the reform concerns the sequence and the scope of implementation measures at the regional level. In this respect, CSR should not be confused with the distinct process of administration reform, which proved to be more **successful.** To reiterate, public administrative reform took place in two stages (2003-2005 and 2006-2008), and overlapped with the process of civil service reform (2003-2005 and 2009-2013). However, the focus of the two processes did not coincide, and the reforms observed have brought completely different outcome s.

Regional legislation in the area of CSR regulated a series of issues, including: employment procedures (filling vacancies in the regional civil service); the organization of the regional civil service (structure and processes); the legal status of civil servants; regional state register (list of civil service positions); the formation of the Regional Civil Service Payroll Fund; the order of issuing payment rewards; the definition of qualification requirements for the length of service in the regional organs of power; and restrictions related to civil service (work ethics). [160] By contrast, regional legislation in the area of PAR focused on: the structure of regional state institutions; the quality of state services; the openness and transparency of the executive system; the effectiveness and efficiency of the state; and anti-corruption legislation.

Given the fact that the project of PAR was launched at an earlier date, and that it was prioritized by the federal government, it is understandable that the process of PAR implementation at the regional level developed in a more dynamic fashion. Aspects of the reform, such as: the functional analysis of regional state institutions; the elimination of duplicate functions; rationalizing the delivery of state services, and others, became the building blocks of various regional reform programs. These reform directions were easy to follow and control, and they did not fundamentally jeopardize the usual state of affairs in the regional administrative network. [161]

Regional programs in the area of CSR were adopted closer to the end of the first decade in 2000s (2009-2013). However, most regions continued to view CSR as just a minor component of the broader public administrative reform. Regions such as Stavropol Krai, Belgorod Oblast', Vladimir, Ivanov, Magadan, Nizhny Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, Novgorod, Smolensk, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrugs adopted specific targeted CSR programs between 2009 and 2011. Most other regions, such as Republic of Dagestan, Mari

---

[160] Major implementation activities at the regional level included amendments to the republican constitutions, regional laws, and city charters.
[161] Smorgunov argues that between 2006 and 2008, only a few Russian regions developed programs in the area of performance management and transparency mechanisms (Leningrad, Kareliia, Smolenskaia, and Novgorodskaia Oblasts). However, even this small group of regions focused on the formal legal dimension of the reform rather than on its active implementation process (188).

El, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chuvashia, as well as Udmurt Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Astrakhan, Belgorod, Volgograd, Leningrad, Kemerovo, Kirov, Penza, Rostov and Chelyabinsk Oblasts simply included various dimensions of CSR into their Public Administrative Reform programs (most of these programs were adopted earlier, between 2006 and 2008). Quite predictably, reforms, which targeted civil service only, have been more successful than alternative comprehensive projects (Nechaeva and Kirilin 2013).[162]

It is important to emphasize that Russia's various regions diverged in *the ways they handled* the reform process, as well as in *the amount of attention* they dedicated to PCS reforms. For example, in Saratov and Moscow Oblast', public sector reforms were coordinated by the special ad-hoc organs, which were created early on in the reform process (2004). In Penza Oblast' and the Republic of Mordovia, the reform was coordinated by the regional legislative body, whereas in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Magadan Oblast, it was led by the regional governor. Finally, in Omsk Oblast', the process was coordinated by a special committee for state service reform, while Novosibirsk Oblast saw its regional administration (executive) at the helm (Korshunov 2004).

Beginning in the early 2000s, some regions of the Russian Federation developed cross-regional cooperation mechanisms in the area of PCS. Some of these organizations included a special coordination committee 'On Issues Related to Personnel Management' established by the Northern Federal District in 2004, and the Coordination Committee established by the Volga District in 2009. Generally, most of these efforts have been ineffective due to discrepancies in the policy implementation processes. For example, the Volga cooperation initiative established that each region had to develop at least one pilot reform project to address at least one direction of the reform. This experience was to be shared with neighboring regions at subsequent stages of the reform.[163] However, by the very end there might be very little to share in view of the discrepancies of the initial conditions and problems each of the regions has faced.

To reiterate, the federal program adopted in 2002 by Decree No. 1336 "On the Reform of State Service in the Russian Federation (2003-2005)," did not enforce regional level civil service programs funded by the regional, rather than federal or shared, budgets. Policy implementation mechanisms at the regional level have not been uniform. Moreover, federal law did not clarify whether it expected the regions to simply copy the federal guidelines or be innovative within specific areas of public sector reform (one such example concerned the issue of titles of ranks of

---

[162] To be more specific, both PAR and CSR were more successful if they were clearly separated, yet approached comprehensively at the regional level.
[163] Most of these mechanisms were developed under surveillance of Presidential representatives in the newly developed Federal Districts.

civil servants at the regional level). This all created difficulties in terms of inter-regional comparisons and cooperation, most noticeably in developing a reserve of civil servants and anti-corruption initiatives). Most of the regions simply waited for directions from the federal centre, which was also a safe fit with the federal policy of increasing *political recentralization*.

In December 2010, the federal government began to exclude the expert research community from the process of CSR formulation and implementation. According to this decision, all initiatives had to be led by the federal ministries (as it was mentioned earlier), with implementation responsibilities allocated to state agencies and services at the federal and regional levels. This move limited the involvement of non-bureaucratic actors in the reform process. Thus, the federal government has strengthened the role of the central state executive in all stages of the reform, including the processes of policy formulation, implementation, and control.

One of the outcomes of this decision made at the federal level was that multiple narrowly focused reform projects have emerged with the goal of devising lessons applicable on cross-ministerial and cross-departmental bases. For example, in 2013, the Ministry of Labour of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On the Main Directions…" no. 601 (May 7, 2012) that focused on personnel management reform in federal organs of power. This program has launched three pilot reform projects aiming to develop an electronic application process for the competitive recruitment of civil service personnel, a set of criteria to be used in the recruitment of new personnel, an integrated system for the assessment of state civil servants' performance, and finally, a mentorship programme for new recruits and junior level civil servants conducive to the career progress of civil servants. The reform projects only took place within the Ministry of Labour (and specifically, within the human resources department); however, policy outputs have been expected to take the form of recommendations and legislative amendments relevant to various organs of the state apparatus at both the federal and regional level.[164]

The Ministry of Education (another policy implementation actor) approved a similar Plan of Implementation of the Federal Program (2009-2013), which included measures to improve the professional competencies of civil servants, through the use of individualized programs and development of a qualified reserve of civil servants (December 30, 2011, No. A4 - 16892). Participation in this program enabled the Ministry to develop analytical reports and methodological guidelines on the improvement of professional competencies of civil servants. The Ministry also created and tested a program of professional development for civil servants, issued a list of books and teaching materials, offered recommendations on the pool of civil servants in various state institutions. One of the basic achievements of this work was the adoption

---

[164] For more information, see http://rezerv.gov.ru/GovService.aspx?t=79

of a new Program "On the Professional Development of Civil Servants" for the period of 2013-2015, which created additional civil service and anti-corruption mechanisms.[165]

The Ministry of Communications also developed projects related to PAR and CSR at the regional level. For example, Law No. 210 "On the Delivery of State and Municipal Services" (July 27, 2010), established a system of interagency cooperation (on a cross-regional and cross-departmental basis), with the goal of developing an Internet Portal of State Services. By 2012, the system covered every region, which contributed greatly to the efficiency of work within and between various civil service institutions. Civil servants were no longer required to collect documents from citizens if those documents were already at the disposal of other state institutions.[166]

Finally, the Ministry of Justice contributed to the development of the legal monitoring system in various areas of the public sector at both the federal and regional levels.[167] One of the Ministry's critical contributions to PAR and CSR has been its expertise in the area of anti-corruption legislation. For example, in 2012, the Ministry analyzed over 3,300 normative projects (including 1271 draft laws,168 draft presidential decrees, and 1,828 draft decrees of the Russian Government). The Ministry found that 141 of the legal documents contained so-called 'risks of corruption' (68 – in the draft laws, and 73 – in the decrees of the Russian Government).[168]

The Ministry of Justice also actively participated in projects pertaining to the electronic governance system and anti-corruption measures.[169] In terms of CSR, it has been less active than other Ministries. For example, there was no specific plan adopted on implementation strategy, even though the Ministry developed random provisions for the pool of civil servants and the meritocratic recruitment process. None of the latter was quite successful. For example, in 2012, federal institutions related to the Ministry of Justice held only 80 competitions, whereas the overall number of appointments stood at 908 people (853 out of 908 people were added to the pool of civil servants, also known as the ministerial reserve system). Interestingly enough, these same figures are actually used by the Ministry of Justice as proof of success in the development of its CSR program.

---

[165] Each program had to be approved by the Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Ivanov.

[166] This document was part of the Federal "Electronic Government Project" (PAR), launched on May 6, 2008. The peak of implementation efforts in this area occurred in 2009-2010. In 2012, the regional electronic government project was subsidized by federal funds in the amount of 670 mln roubles.

[167] In 2012, the Ministry of Justice established an expert committee on law enforcement monitoring, which covered PAR and CSR. (*Rasporiazhenie,* April 04, 2012, No. 674).

[168] For more information, please see the Ministry of Justice Federal Internet web-page.

[169] For example, in 2012, the Ministry adopted the Decree (*Rasporiazhenie*) "On Anti-Corruption Measures" (June 28, 2012, No. 121).

Regional departments of the federal services and agencies have also participated actively in all stages of the reform process. Given the design of Russia's public administrative reform, they should have acted solely as policy implementers; in actual practice, however, they often developed and offered implementation projects to the Russian ministries, which either approved or rejected their policy offers.

Regional implementation agencies have also assisted in the development of regional legislation related to PAR and CSR. For example, in the framework of the regional experimental program in Chuvashia's regional administration (2003-2005), the regional Ministry of Health conducted a preliminary functional analysis of the regional ministries. The results of this work created the necessary foundation for subsequent reorganization measures.

Most regional efforts were coordinated or integrated with a variety of other initiatives led by the federal level ministries, depending on the extent of involvement of those ministries in the relevant policy fields. For example, according to the Decree of the State Employment Service of the Republic of Chuvashia (No. 47), issued on March 19, 2007 "On the Implementation of Public Administrative Reform…" the regional employment service now functions in line with its own administrative orders (*reglamenty*) and orders approved by the regional-level Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, and others. To reiterate, *reglamenty* were established by federal legislation and contain self-reinforcing implementation mechanisms, such as a system for monitoring the compliance of regional organs with federal level guidelines. Thus, the Program was enacted by the regional administrative department, even though it contained references to federal norms, which established accountability mechanisms across various levels of public administration.[170] It may come as little surprise that not all regional organs adopted similar policy implementation initiatives.

These regional targeted programs served as critical instruments at the stage of reform implementation, accumulating resource inputs from the federal level, especially when they were linked with regional PAR and CSR. For example, in 2011, the Chuvash employment service received 7,027,359 roubles and deployed 6,120,550 roubles (87.1%) into the framework of the regional program, which aimed to increase the employment opportunities of Chuvash citizens. Additional measures, which were directed at decreasing tensions within the Chuvash employment market, attracted another 2,694,885 roubles (with the federal portion amounting to 2,563,517), which were utilized in the amount of 98.1%. Reports on the allocation of these funds were

---

[170] The Decree of the State Employment Service discussed here was adopted within the framework of another presidential decree, namely, No. 601 (May 7, 2012), "On the Main Directions of Improvement of the System of Public Administration." Each decree, in this respect, may be viewed as a part of the decision-making process, which involves both the process of policy formulation and policy implementation.

submitted to the Chuvash Ministries of Social Development, Labour, and Finance on a monthly basis. This was another important mechanism of self-reinforcing control established by the federal level guidelines and regulations.[171]

Generally, it is important to observe that various organs of the civil service at the regional level are characterised by significant discrepancies in terms of *their levels of responsibility, accountability mechanisms, corporate culture, structure, planning, and coordination mechanisms* (Morozova 2004). As such, regional state institutions developed according to a varying logic, influenced by a variety of external factors. The regional departments of federal institutions were not managed the same way as those institutions under the direction of the regional organs of power. At the same time, there were also significant discrepancies between federally appointed ministries working in diverse policy fields (such as health and education).

Some experts have raised concerns about the process of concentrating the decision-making power in the hands of Russia's executive branch. How can we trust a process where reform policy formulation, implementation, and control are being led by the very same institution undergoing this reform? In 2006, an investigation headed by the General Prosecutor's office, in cooperation with prosecutors from the Russian regions, revealed over 47 thousand cases where law was breached by federal, regional, and municipal civil servants. Around 600 criminal cases of corruption were initiated on the basis of this investigation, which underscored the utter lack of effective control measures to ensure civil servants' compliance with the federal law. Korshunov (2004) argues that these findings accurately represent the extent of corruption within federal and regional state institutions. In this respect, the decision to empower the Russian civil service with the right to reform itself is antithetical to the public interest.

---

[171] Informatsia o realizatsii meropriiatii po provedeniiu administrativnoi reform v gosudarsvennoi sluzhbe zaniatosti naseleniia Chuvashskoi Respubliki i tsentrakh zaniatosti naseleniia za 2011 god. Accessed August 26, 2013. HTTP://CAP.RU/SITEMAP.ASPX?GOV_ID=31&ID=1157321

**Table 21 Reform implementation in Volga Federal District (2005-2010)**

> ***Reforms conducted in the framework of CSR:***
> ***2005 - Saratov oblast'*** – Regional Program "On the Development of Civil Service of Saratov oblast (2007-2009)," adopted by the Government Decree No. 83 (March 14, 2005).
> ***2006 – Nizhniy Novgorod oblast'*** - Regional Program "On the Development of Civil Service of Nizhniy Novgorod (2006-2010)," adopted by the Government Decree No. 122 (April 11, 2006).
> ***2008 - Kirov oblast'*** – Targeted Regional Program "On the Development of Civil Service and Professional Development of Civil Service Personnel (2009-2010)," adopted on July 31, 2008, by Government Decree No. 129.
> ***2008 - Penza oblast'-*** Regional Program "On the Development of Civil Service of Saratov Oblast (2009-2011)," adopted by Government Decree No.613 on September 26, 2008.
> ***2009- Ulyanovsk oblast'*** – Regional Program "On the Development of Civil Service," adopted by Ulyanovsk Governor Decree No. 100, on March 31, 2009.
>
> ***Reforms conducted in the framework of PAR:***
> ***2006 – Republic of Mariy El*** – Regional Program "Administrative Reform Implementation for the Republic of Marii El in 2006-2010," adopted by Government Decree No.151 on July 5, 2006. (Part of the broader legislative framework "On the Effectiveness of State Civil Service in the Republic of Marii El").
> ***2006 - Republic of Chuvashia*** - Republican Program "Administrative Reform Implementation for the Republic of Chuvashia in 2006-2010", adopted by Government Decree No. 98 on April 14, 2006.
>
> ***Major Amendments***
> ***2009 – Republic of Chuvashia,*** amendments to the Federal Targeted Program adopted by Government Decree No. 100 on March 31, 2009.
>
> In other regions, i.e. Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Perm Krai, Orenburg Oblast', Samara Oblast' – there was no follow-up to the legislative framework adopted by the federal government.

Source: Author, *Dnevnik Reformirovania Gossluzhby Chuvashii*,
http://rudocs.exdat.com/docs/index-239543.html


**Table 23.1 Joint Framework on the Implementation of the Federal Program "Reform and Development of the Civil Service in the Russian Federation" for the Volga Federal District, 2009**

> The Joint Coordination Committee, formed by the regional powers identified several major directions of civil service reform and development. Each region had to develop at least one pilot reform project; i.e. it had to deal with at least one direction of the reform. This experience was supposed to be shared and disseminated on a cross-regional basis at subsequent stages of development.
> Reform directions:

| - The creation of a professional civil service system – an overarching goal, partly realized by the following reform project: 'Indicators of Effectiveness of Civil Servants' (Republic of Mordovia); |
| - The prevention of corruption in civil service (Republic of Mariy El, Udmurt oblast); Mechanisms: ethics commissions conflict of interest regulations, suggestions in the area of 'code of ethics' development; |
| - The development of a cadre of civil servants ("innovative technologies in the development of a cadre of civil servants (Kirov, Saratov regions) (development of qualification, test, and assessment procedures); |
| - The development of personnel policies - partly realized by the pilot reform project 'Raising the Prestige of Civil Servants among the Young Generation' (Republic of Tatarstan, Perm Krai); |
| - Improving the openness of civil service, issues of trust (Republic of Bashkortostan, Samara oblast'); Mechanisms: competitive recruitment, working with the pool of civil servants; program development in the area of public control over the civil service. |

Source: Author, based on Antoshina N. "Ob Opyte Reformirovania" (2007-2014)[172]

## Table 22 Reform implementation in the Siberian Federal District (2009-2013)

By May 23, 2013, the regions of the Siberian Federal District had adopted and enacted 1387 normative documents in the area of civil service reform and public administration.

| *Overall Number of Legislative Documents:* | *Amendments in 2012-2013 (258):* |
|---|---|
| Republic of Altai – 67; | Republic of Altai – 6; |
| Republic of Buriatia – 81; | Republic of Buriatiia – 3; |
| Republic of Tyva – 72; | Republic of Tyva – 7; |
| Republic of Khakassia – 119; | Republic of Khakassiia – 61; |
| Altay Krai – 133; | Altai Krai – 35; |
| Zabaikalsk Region – 45; | Zabaikalsk Region – 15; |
| Krasnoyarsk Region – 138; | Krasnoyarsk Region – 46; |
| Irkutsk oblast - 164 | Irkutsk oblast - 19 |
| Kemerovo oblast – 50; | Kemerovo oblast – 7; |
| Novosibirsk oblast – 57; | Novosibirsk oblast – 17; |
| Omsk oblast – 199; | Omsk oblast – 11; |
| Tomsk oblast – 265. | Tomsk oblast' - 31 |

Source: Obzor Normotvorchestva subiektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii Sibirskogo Federal'nogo Okruga v Sfere Gosudarstvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby za period s 24.11.2012 po 23.05.2013.

---

[172] For more information, see http://pda.pfo.ru/?id=21488.

**7.3 How do we explain cross-regional variation?**

Based on the previous analysis, there are several alternative explanations of the discrepancies in PCS reform implementation on a cross-regional basis. These explanations include: the reluctance of the Federal powers to enforce decisions at the level of Russian regions, the problems of economic scarcity, the conflict and competition of CSR with other reform projects (PAR), and finally, the choices made by the regional powers in terms of the scope of reform and the type of policy instruments of their regional programs.

Some explanations discussed here do not stand the test of cross-regional variation. For example, I have pointed out that a resource-based explanation for the success or failure of the reform (i.e. the lack of funding) is not completely persuasive because some comparatively poor subjects are doing better than their prosperous neighbours.[173] Specifically, data presented in Zubarevich (2002) demonstrates that, in the early 2000s, the Republic of Chuvashia was a laggard in terms of economic development (measured by regional product per capita); however, this region has demonstrated greater success in terms of CSR implementation than its comparatively more prosperous neighbours. By contrast, St. Petersburg, which has always been one of the most economically advanced cities of the Russian Federation, proceeded more slowly in terms of policy implementation than its economic position might suggest. Experimental work conducted in early 2000s by St. Petersburg's regional authorities was overly generic and even theoretical; in addition, the city failed to adopt a comprehensive approach toward implementation of federal level initiatives (probably, due to the size and complexity of the city's public sector).[174] All in all, the success or failure of the reform process did not correlate quite clearly with the state of economic development, and each region has faced unique problems of the reform development and implementation.[175]

To explain the comparative success of regions lagging behind in terms of economic development, it is important to point out several issues. First, we need to consider *the scope of freedom* provided by the federal center to the regions in terms of choosing the focus, sequence,

---

[173] It is important to note though that a resource-based explanation for the success or failure of the reform is one of the most widespread in policy implementation research at the regional level. Nearly all expert interviews, official reports, and other reliable sources of data, point to the lack of federal resources as a major obstacle to successful reform. However, in what follows, I will counter this argument with the use of data on economic development as opposed to reform progress.

[174] In this respect, the city performed equally well as Samara and Krasnoyarsk (prosperous regions in the Volga Federal District where Chuvashia was located).

[175] The success or failure of the reform correlates more closely (though not precisely) with the human development index; however, this correlation is also not clear-cut.

and coordination mechanisms of the reform. Secondly, we have to consider how this freedom to choose was utilized by regional level governments, as well as what role these policy choices have played in center-periphery relations.

As was discussed previously, different regions have opted for various strategies of implementing public sector reforms. At the experimental stage, they had to decide among only a few different policy fields and policy instruments; however, even at this stage they managed to proceed quite differently, often arriving at completely different results. For example, in Krasnoyarsk, reforms were managed by a single coordination body, the Centre of Strategic Analysis of Krasnoyarsk region, which prepared and adopted policy implementation mechanisms within the framework of the ongoing reform project. Between 2002-2003, the Krasnoyarsk experimental program had also focused on reforming a single department belonging to the federal authorities (the Regional Department of the Federal Employment Service). Experts observe that this initial experimental project did not achieve all of the goals of the reform; however, it succeeded in establishing federal-regional cooperation mechanisms, as well as in defining unique features of the Krasnoyarsk employment service; it has ultimately created the necessary building blocks for subsequent policy developments. A. Medvedev (2004) argues that the outcomes of experimental project in Krasnoyarsk demonstrated early on that the experience of an individual region could not be replicated in all of Russia's regions, due to the diverse conditions, structures, and processes within the same policy field on a cross-regional basis (196-201). Thus, the reform of administrative structures and processes should have been accompanied by reforms in other relevant policy fields.

In Chuvashia, reforms were implemented on a comprehensive basis, and they logically started with the development of a legal framework, including the regional-level program "On the Reform of the State Service of the Chuvash Republic (2003-2005)." This project encompassed several ministries and included numerous important framework documents, covering some of the most important dimensions of the reform:

1) A Strategic Plan of Action developed by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chuvash Republic for the executive organs of power;

2) The schedule regulating productivity and performance-based supplementary benefits/bonuses; and

3) Policy implementation and policy enforcement procedures regulating sanctions in the case of non-compliance with the requirements of the program.

188

Chuvashia was one of the first Russian regions to sign documents with the Federal powers concerning pilot reform projects. The pace of implementation since then has been unprecedentedly dynamic.

**Table 23  CSR legislation of the Chuvash Republic**

*2002-* Republican Program "On the Reform of State Service in the Chuvash Republic (2003-2005)"; introduction of "Experimental methods of prognosis, financing, evaluation, stimulus, and technical assistance in state and municipal organs of the Chuvash Republic" (2003-2005). [Programma po reformirovaniiu Gossluzhby]

*2005 –* The Law of the Republic of Chuvashia No. 11 (12.04) "On the State Civil Service of the Republic of Chuvashia." [O gosudarstvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhbe]

*2006 -* Republican Program "Implementation of Administrative Reform in the Republic of Chuvashia from 2006-2013", adopted by Government Decree No. 98 on April 14, 2006. (under the charge of the Ministry of Economic Development).

*2011 –* Republican Program "On the Federal Targeted Program 'Development of Civil Service in Chuvash Republic'," Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 90 on March 18, 2011 (Ministry of Justice in charge).

*2009 –* Amendments to the Federal Targeted Program adopted by Government Decree No. 100 on March 31, 2009.

*2013 –* Amendments to Regional Law No. 11 "On State Civil Service in the Republic of Chuvashia."

Source: Author, based on Chuvash Ministry of Justice. *Dnevnik Reformirovania Gossluzhby Chuvashii*, http://rudocs.exdat.com/docs/index-239543.html

**Table 24 CSR legislation of Krasnoyarsk region[176]**

Regional Charter

*2005 -* Law of Krasnoyarsk Region No. 14-3514 "On the List of Posts of Civil Service in Krasnoyarsk Region", June 9, 2005 [Reestr Dolzhnostei Gosudarstvennoi Grazhdanskoi sluzhby]

*2005 -* Law of Krasnoyarsk Region, No. 17-4314 "On Organization and Regulation of the State Service in Krasnoyarsk Region", December 20, 2005 [Ob osobennostiakh organizatsii I pravovogo regulirovaniia gosudarstvennoi sluzhby]

*2008 -* Law of Krasnoyarsk Region, No. 6-1939, "On the Government of Krasnoyarsk region and Other Executive State Institutions in the Region", July 10, 2008,

*2008 -* Decree of the Governor of Krasnoyarsk Region, No. 116, "On the Structure of the Executive State Institutions in Krasnoyarsk Region."

*2008 -* Regulations On the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development of Krasnoyarki Krai. Approved by Government Decree No. 55-p on August 27, 2008.

*2009 -* Law of Krasnoyarsk Region, No. 8-3610, "On Anti-Corruption in Krasnoyarsk Region."

---

[176] Krasnoyarsk is one of only a few Russian regions, where the goals of PAR and CSR were included on the list of priorities in regional strategic documents (developmental program). One of these documents issued for the period of 2004-2010 contained (1) administrative reform; (2) civil service reform; and (3) a results-oriented budgeting system.

Morozova (2004) argues that the basic features that distinguished Chuvashia from the rest of the experimental regions [in addition to *the scope of the reform*] were:

(a) the presence of a strong political willingness to reform; and

(b) an effective policy communication strategy, which managed to reach nearly all levels of public bureaucracy at the Republican level (282-285).

The first explanation has much to do with the extent of cooperation efforts taken by the federal and regional powers. The second explanation originates in regional policies and documents proliferating since the start of the current wave of CSR.

It is important to emphasize that Chuvashia's regional programs have evolved and improved in recent years. For example, its first Regional Program "On the Implementation of Administrative Reform for the period of 2003-2005," contained goals, which seemed to be overly *generic*. CSR has been viewed as a part of public administrative reform, and there were just a few aspects of the program that related to the quality of the civil service. However, the next program "On Civil Service Development in the Republic of Chuvashia" (2011) established precise goals, which could be easily measured. [177] This Program created policy implementation and control mechanisms; it also clearly identified the major implementation agency of the reform process, i.e. the Republican Ministry of Justice.

Overall, Chuvashia has not only managed to establish an effective and working relationship with the Federal center, but it has also effectively utilized some pieces of advice given by the Federal powers in terms of ensuring bureaucratic involvement and support. For example, in 2004-2005, the federal government adopted general requirements on the Reform Communication Strategy at the federal level (*Kontseptsia Informatsionnogo Soprovozhdeniia Reformirovaniia Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby*), suggesting that regions follow the program by linking the basic ideas of CSR reform to their specific local conditions. Subsequent research conducted in at least 4 experimental regions by the Higher School of Economics (2004) demonstrated that only a few of these regions managed to follow up on the federal recommendations by adopting regionally unique reform communication strategies. Chuvashia achieved the most outstanding progress in terms of communicating the goals of CSR at all

---

[177] For example, the goals of the program were to achieve by 2014: 1) merit-based recruitment in at least 70 % of civil service vacancies at the regional level; 2) a pool of civil servants covering at least 90 % of the existing civil service positions; 3) a pool of civil servants covering at least 60 % of municipal positions; 4) 33% of civil servants taking a professional development program under social contract with the federal government; 5) 15% of municipal civil servants taking a professional development program under social contract with the federal government; 6) public opinion surveys on the effectiveness of civil and municipal services in the Chuvash republic; 7) public opinion surveys on access to information, openness, and transparency of the Chuvash executive organs of power.

bureaucratic levels. It has utilized research data gathered by the Higher School of Economics to improve the image of civil servants in the eyes of the Russian public, thus contributing to the civil service's growing prestige.[178]

The governments of other regions, such as Samara, Krasnoyarsk, Saratov, Khanty-Mansiisk, and Tatarstan developed random policy initiatives and postponed CSR to the end of the last decade. Most of these regions prioritized the restructuring of regional state institutions, whereas the goals of their CSR programs were overly generic. For example, the Program "On the Development of the Civil Service in Samara Region (2009-2013)" outlined goals such as: (1) the improvement of the civil service system, (2) the formation of a professional civil service; (3) the development of a model of civil service management; (4) the development of anti-corruption measures; and (5) the development of control mechanisms over civil service reform implementation with the use of public opinion polls and civil engagement. The Program did not mention any specific actors of the reform. As with the program previously pursued by Chuvashia, Samara's program has not been focused on any specific agency or set of measures to improve the regional level bureaucracy and public administration. Most of these measures were overly hectic and inconsistent to bring systemic changes in entrenched bureaucracies.

The reluctance of Russia's regions to adopt civil service reform programs could be partly explained by the peculiarity of the reform funding process, even though this explanation (as I said earlier) does not work well if isolated from other variables of policy implementation. According to federal legislation, CSR at the regional level was funded by regional budgets, with federal resource inputs only available on a competitive basis. Each year, the Federal Government Approved Decree "On the Support of Public Administrative Reform Implementation in Russian Regions", allocating some resources for the regions, which were disbursed by the Ministry of Economic Development. [179] Reform projects that won federal level competitions were more likely to succeed in receiving additional support distributed by the federal powers. However, federal funding did not cover all dimensions of the reform process at the regional level. The Ministry of Economic Development traditionally focused on public administrative rather than civil service

---

[178] Currently, Chuvashia is the only region that supports a working web page dedicated to the civil service reform progress (information on this page is continuously updated and modified). Unfortunately, Chuvashia's experience has not been replicated anywhere else. For more information, see Portal of State Services of the Chuvash Republic *http://gosuslugi.cap.ru/,* and the web-page of the Head of the Chuvash Republic *http://cap.ru/default.aspx?gov_id=712*

[179] Postanovlenie Pravitlstva RF (no. 281), April 23 2010 «Ob okazanii podderzhki provedeniia federalnymi organami ispolnitelnoi vlasti i vysshimi ispolnitelnymi organami gosudarsvennoi vlasti , Rossiiskoi Federatsii administrativnoi reformy v 2010 godu» ".
http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/1207531

reforms; it has also prioritized reform dimensions that introduce the principles of new public management into public administration.[180]

Generally, the competitive allocation of resource inputs from the federal government has served as an effective tool for 'managing' Russia's regions – one that is in line with Moscow's recentralization strategy. This approach has reduced the likelihood of the mismanagement of funds, enabled the allocation of resources on a targeted basis, and has also incentivized regional officials to be more efficient in order to win the support of the federal centre. At the same time, regional heads systemically complained about the scarce resources allocated for the purposes of CSR. These complaints were also accompanied with the lack of understanding of what exactly reforms were trying to achieve.

Some experts attribute the problem of regional disengagement to the mistakes of the federal communication strategy of PCS. For example, Morozova (2004) argues that the federal authorities have not managed to develop an *efficient policy in the area of reform communication* over the last 20 years. The basic strategy adopted by the federal government has been to "tell various regions the same things," without any active engagement strategy that would build allies (rather than opponents) of civil service reform.

In this respect, Aleksandrova et al. (2007) provides data in support of my earlier finding: the Russian strategy of reform communication rests on the old patterns of policy-making, which delivers information to civil servants via the same channels as it uses for the public. Specifically, Alexandrova demonstrates that between 2005 and 2007, nearly 65 % of civil servants in the Russian Federation received their information on public sector reforms from the mass media, rather than from federal methodological guidelines, seminars, or other more targeted educational initiatives. This observation is alarming in view of the existing Federal-level guidelines of the reform communication strategy.

Another related problem concerns the lack of information on the goals and purposes of the reform process. For example, according to a study conducted by the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law Under the Government of the Russian Federation (Tikhomirov and Gorokhov 2009), only 50 per cent of civil servants were aware of Federal Law No. 79 "On the State Civil Service" in 2008. Moreover, another study showed that 15-40% of civil servants

---

[180] Generally, the competitive allocation of resource inputs from the federal government has served as an effective tool for 'managing' Russia's regions – one that is in line with Moscow's recentralization strategy. This approach has reduced the likelihood of the mismanagement of funds, enabled the allocation of resources on a targeted basis, and has also incentivized regional officials to be more efficient in order to win the support of the federal centre.

approved of the way the reform was being handled regardless of their awareness of the reform progress (Alexandrova et al).



**Figure 2 CSR Communication Channels (% of responses to the number of state employees)**[181]

The rate of approval seems to be higher in those regions where civil servants are better informed about the goals of the reform process (Krasnoyarsk and Chuvashia). However, the number of state employees who approve of the reform does not compare to the number of indecisive respondents who either hide their feelings about the reform or simply do not have any opinion on the reform process whatsoever (the overall number of indecisive respondents is relatively high in all regions of the Russian Federation).

---

[181] Source: Aleksandrova, Anastasiia, Bychkov, Dmitrii, and Grishina, Elena. 2007. "Kadrovyi Potentsial Grazhdanskikh Sluzhashikh kak Resurs Reform Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia". *Problemy Upravleniia: Teoriia i Praktika* (1), 57.

**Figure 3 Regional Discrepancies in Civil Servants' Approval of CSR[182]**

In previous chapters, I advanced several intermediate propositions concerning the unsuccessfulness of reform implementation as a result of suspicion of or anxiety about the reform emanating from low-level bureaucrats, as well as a lack of professionalism among civil servants. Specifically, it was argued that when the reforms were launched, both federal and regional public sector employees were anxious about the prospects of their career paths and, as such, they provided little support for the reform.[183]

However, data provided above does not confirm this assumption. For example, the following chart demonstrates that the percentage of state bureaucrats expecting massive layoffs as a result of the reform process is less than 30%. In fact, negative expectations appear to be correlated with either a lack of stability and predictability within the lower levels of civil service (group of specialists), or with a lack of information about the goals of the reform. Civil servants consistently demonstrated a lack of understanding of the objectives and priorities of CSR, yet they generally approved of the idea of developing sound policy-making mechanisms, which might improve the quality of life of civil servants. Another important observation made by Alexandrova is that economically prosperous regions seem to be less informed about the goals

---

[182] Aleksandrova, Anastasiia, Bychkov, Dmitrii, and Grishina, Elena. 2007. "Kadrovyi Potentsial Grazhdanskikh Sluzhashikh kak Resurs Reform Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia". *Problemy Upravleniia: Teoriia i Praktika* (1), 61.

[183] Some Russian journalists describe this process as 'bureaucratic sabotage', i.e. tacit resistance to the proposed reform measures.

194

and priorities of the reform process, yet they have shared approval of the general trajectory of public policy change.



**Figure 4 Expectations of Civil Servants Concerning the Outputs of CSR** [184][185]

It is important to remind that the federal strategy of the reform process has failed not only in terms of the choice of reform communication channels, but also in terms of the language of the reform and the way the goals of the reform were delivered to civil servants. While the basic concepts of the New Public Management ideology, such as efficiency, productivity, and quality of governance seem to have been relatively easy to comprehend, terms such as results-oriented budget system, service to the public, or performance management appear to have been more difficult to follow for some groups of civil servants. Experts observe that civil servants at various levels of Russian bureaucracy possess different levels of education and expertise. Therefore, they perceive the goals of the reform quite differently.

---

[184] Aleksandrova, Anastasiia, Bychkov, Dmitrii, and Grishina, Elena. 2007. "Kadrovyi Potentsial Grazhdanskikh Sluzhashikh kak Resurs Reform Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia". *Problemy Upravleniia: Teoriia i Praktika* (1), 59.

[185] It is obvious that fear as a motive for non-implementation does not work as an explanation for reform failure, due to the generally positive expectations on behalf of civil servants. Less than 25 % of civil servants expected massive employment layoffs as a result of public administrative and civil service reforms.

Consensus on the reform process has never been the ultimate building block of the reform. For example, in the early 2000s, the federal government proclaimed its intention to create a competitive economy via state modernization. Meanwhile, for the street-level public official, it has never been clear how exactly his or her work related to the goal of economic prosperity. For example, if he or she stopped taking bribes, would the state become more prosperous and competitive? How likely was it that civil servants would change their usual behavior if state extortion had already taken root in the upper echelons of the Russian bureaucracy (i.e. if corruption has already become the norm)?

Some goals of the reform, such as the re-orientation of state bureaucrats from serving the state to serving the public, were rejected on an ideological basis at all levels of the public administration. Experts observe that public officials are accustomed to thinking about themselves as representatives (if not holders) of state power. Thus, when reform implementation began, one of the major difficulties was to prove to state bureaucrats that serving the public, or at least serving the state, was the ultimate goal of their daily professional work.

 It is important to note that both regional and federal-level bureaucrats have been more perceptive to ideas related to improving quality of life, career prospects, and social protection in public administration. Thus, focusing on issues related to the daily needs of civil servants (both personal and professional) might produce better results in building reform alliances at various levels of the public bureaucracy. The World Bank (2006) also suggested that new incentive schemes must be developed to make sure that reforms were successfully managed on a cross-country basis. These incentives must include financial elements to support regions that lag behind, as well as award those that have already made significant reform progress.

Getting back to the discussion of cross-regional variations, it is important to emphasize that federal policies were an important, though not decisive, constraint upon the process of reform implementation. Those regions where reforms were properly *coordinated and communicated* to the public and state employees (based on the initiative of local authorities) enjoyed greater success in both policy implementation and policy outcomes. Moreover, some of the regions were able to effectively overcome the problems associated with the federal strategies of PCS by developing regionally unique reform programs.

In a similar vein, the scope of the reform has also significantly impacted reform progress, with comprehensive projects on a cross-regional basis proving to be considerably more successful than the nation-wide comprehensive approach toward the reforms. It would be reasonable to suggest that some obstacles to the successful implementation of CSR policy stemmed from conflicts and competition with other reform programs unveiled at the start of Putin's presidency.

196

To recall, civil service, public administrative, and budget reform projects were launched simultaneously, and each of them required significant resource inputs. In 2004, these reforms were united into a joint project entitled "The Reform of State Administration." However, the adjustment described above did not result in a more effective allocation of resource inputs.

**Table 25 Regional Developmental Goals in 2004-2005 (17 regions)[186]**

| *Regions* | *Strategic Dimensions of the Reform* |
|---|---|
| *Volga Federal District – this district advanced further than other districts in terms of prioritizing some of the dimensions of PAR and CSR into regional social and economic programs.* | |
| Saratov Oblast | Formation of a regional reform ideology; favorable social and economic conditions; favorable conditions for the development of small businesses. Implementation mechanisms: opening access to information, conflict of interest commissions with the involvement of non-profit organizations. |
| Udmurtia Oblast | Effective relationships between the state, businesses, and local governments (mechanisms of implementation are not included). |
| Republic of Chuvashia | Openness of the executive organs of power. Implementation mechanisms: development of information-analytical system (web-site containing information on the organs of the state executive), a system of electronic services in the area of procurement. |
| Perm Oblast | Effective partnership between the state and civil society. Implementation mechanisms: involvement of business representatives in the process of program implementation; development of civil society, sub-national programs: "Development of the Social Sphere", "Economic Policy and Modernization". New methods of analytical assessment and prognosis of social and economic development in the region. |
| Republic of Tatarstan | The strategy of social and economic development of Tatarstan for the period from 2002-2006 includes provisions for the improvement of productivity and effectiveness in public administration (it includes indicators of effectiveness and allocates responsibility for the fulfillment of those indicators). |
| Perm, Udmurtia, Chuvashia | All programs contain provisions on raising the quality of regional budget expenditures, transparency of budget processes, and effectiveness of the regional targeted programs. |
| *Northwestern Federal District – only two regions - St. Petersburg and Novgorod incorporated some of the dimensions of PAR and CSR into their reform priorities in regional strategic documents* | |
| St. Petersburg | Improvement of the quality of regional management, including the development of civil society, service-orientation of the local administration, and improved professional qualifications of state employees. |
| Novgorod region | Regional plan of social and economic development in 2004 included provisions on opening access to information on state organs, strengthening the quality of regional management discipline, *anti-corruption measures* (control over budgeting and finance (mis)management,; control over the implementation of the custom, tax, and property laws). Another implementation mechanism – the regional law on social procurement, adopted earlier. The program of social and economic development included measures on raising the effectiveness of results-oriented budget expenditures. |
| *The Siberian Federal District- Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk were the only regions which included some of the dimensions of PAR and CSR into their strategic regional documents early on in the process.* | |
| Irkutsk region | Development of new information technologies, finance policies, budget policies, strengthening the rule of law, opening access to information, |

---

[186] This table is based on the study of regional developmental programs.

| | |
|---|---|
| | development of a results-oriented budgeting system, competitive social procurement system, etc. |
| Krasnoyarsk region | "The Social and Economic Development of Krasnoyarsky Krai (2004-2010)" included three building blocks: 1) administrative reform implementation (opening access to information, transparency, strategic planning mechanisms, control over the organs of state executive); 2) civil service reform implementation (improving the quality of organizational culture in civil service; formation of a pool of civil servants; development of methodological guidelines on the reform process; improvement of the system of motivation and stimulus); and 3) creation of a results-oriented budgeting system. |
| Republic of Altai | Formation of conditions conducive to the development of a positive business and investment climate; bringing to order some of the existing regulatory functions of the state apparatus, improving transparency and effectiveness of budget expenditures, introducing the competitive allocation of regional project funding. |
| *Urals Federal District* | |
| Tyumen Oblast | "The Regional Social and Economic Development Plan of Tyumen Oblast" focused on provisions concerning reform of the regional budget system, including the effectiveness of regional finance, criteria of budget expenditure effectiveness, and so on. The program established conditions for the competitive procurement of products and services, and from the federal government, which were necessary for the reform implementation processes. |
| *Central Federal District* | |
| Vladimir Oblast | 1) Institutional development; 2) Improvement of regional management; 3) Development of civil society; dialogue between the state and civil society. |
| Moscow and Moscow Oblast | CSR and PAR do not feature in the regional social and economic programs as a separate reform dimension; they are linked with other reform dimensions. For example, regional security, as discussed in the "Concept of Social and Economic Development in Moscow," stipulates the development of an effective personnel system in law enforcement agencies, etc. |
| Vladimir Oblast | The program is focused on budget policies, raising the effectiveness of regional budget expenditures, including budget planning mechanisms, and a results-oriented budget system. |
| | All regional programs contain measures to improve transparency and accountability in the civil service, open access to information about public service and public administration, and strengthen norms concerning the development of public procurement legislation. |
| *Southern Federal District* | The goals of PAR and CSR did not figure as priorities in regional developmental programs at this point in time. |
| Republic of Dagestan | Institutional reform; improvement of the existing legislative framework; bringing to order some of the existing regulatory functions of the state; development of an information-analytical data base; access and exchange of information between different organs of the state executive. |
| Volgograd Oblast | "The Programs of Social and Economic Development of Volgograd Oblast for (2001-2005) and (2004-2005)"; development of new technologies in public administration (*kompiuterizatsia*, *informatizatsia*); opening access to information to the public on the organs of state executive. |

Source: Based on World Bank 2005 (9-14).

198

www.manaraa.com

**7.4 The Role of CSR in Centre-Periphery Relations**

The events of recent years demonstrate numerous examples of struggles for power and authority between Russia's federal and regional political elites, leaders and institutions, groups and organizations at all levels of the state apparatus. The reason for such sharp conflicts emerges from the direct link between public sector reforms and the (re) distribution of power in a system of state administration. In this sense, issues of public sector reforms are issues of power, and in order to understand the meaning and trajectories of some of these reforms, we have to study not only regional strategies, but also implicit choices policy leaders take when building their reform projects.

Evidence suggests that the Russian political system has undergone a great degree of political centralization in recent years, arriving at reforms, which considerably reorganized the federal and regional organs of power. The system, which emerged in this process, appeared to be highly centralized, and in this respect, it was radically different from the happenings during the early and mid-1990s. To remind, immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, most Russian regions exercised a great level of autonomy in terms of redistributing economic resources, industrial (re)development, and other critical areas of policy-making. The major trends were the localization of politics, and the monopolization of control over resources into the hands of chief executives. However, beginning in 2005, President Putin wrangled the power to appoint governors into his own hands, and the locus of control significantly shifted from the regional level to the federal center. Some regions (e.g., Tatarstan, Khanty-Manskiisk Okrug, and others) maintained informal influence and bargaining power in their relationships with the federal centre. However, even these regions became subjected to the recentralization dynamics fostered by the federal government.

Based on ideas behind the logic of centralization, the Federal level initiatives in the last 13 years should have resulted in establishing greater control over the regional policy-making processes, including the process of implementing federal laws at the regional level. Meanwhile, a closer look at the Russian regions demonstrates that the amount of discretionary powers of state bureaucrats at various levels of public administration did not substantially change due to the shift of loyalty of the regional governors from the regional to the federal level. The system of 'centralized authoritarianism' constructed under Putin, which replaced the 'decentralized' semi-democratic system of the Yeltsin era, has undoubtedly strengthened accountability of regional leaders to top-level federal officials. However, much of the power at the regional level has

199

remained concentrated within the executive (as was common at the regional level during the 1990s), and the quality and professionalism of regional bureaucracies did not change.[187]

In an attempt to explain the dichotomy of political centralization versus control over the policy-making processes, it is useful to refer to Gelman and Ross (2010), who doubted the mainstream view of an unequivocal centralization, arguing that the latter was not as overwhelming as it would have been suggested. In the preface to "Sub-National Authoritarianism" (2010), the authors assert that in the 2000s, Russia "established a new centralized party-based subnational authoritarian system (SNA)", which was different from both the centralized bureaucratic regimes (in post-Soviet Central Asia and Belarus), and the decentralized regimes of the 1990s. The system described here allocated some degree of freedom at the regional and local level, depending on the way regional heads satisfied the criteria established by the federal center. In this respect, the main features of this system were "the dominance of patron-client ties, negative incentives for loyalty of local actors and citizens, small side-payments, and the lack of meaningful actors who are able to challenge SNA regimes from below"(13).

Gelman and Rosss do not elaborate on the extent of influence federal powers enjoy over the policy-making processes at the regional level. However, the study provides a useful perspective on the reasons for the reasons of the so called "selective" implementation stalemate. It is observed that the contradictory trends of the *localization of politics* versus the *recentralization of control* by the federal government have created an important policy-making dynamic, which significantly impacted the context and structure of the development of PAR and CSR in Russia's regions. On the one hand, "the centre [has nearly always] tended to use its coercive capacity to assert administrative control over sub-national politics and government through bureaucratic appointments and dismissals." On the other hand, "the centralized administrative control often co-exist(ed) alongside the relative autonomy of regional regimes, which emerged as a by-product of the principal-agent relationships operating within the state bureaucracy" (13). All in all, the shift

---

[187] Moscow's concerted efforts at recentralization over the past thirteen years should have resulted in the establishment of greater control over the regional policy-making processes. However, a closer look at the Russian regions demonstrates that the amount of discretionary powers exercised by state bureaucrats at various levels of public administration did not substantially change following the shift in regional governors' loyalty from the regional to the federal level. The system of 'centralized authoritarianism' constructed under Putin, which replaced the 'decentralized' semi-democratic system of the Yeltsin era, has undoubtedly strengthened the accountability of regional leaders to top-level federal officials. However, much of the power at the regional level has remained concentrated within the executive (as was common at the regional level during the 1990s). As such, the shift in loyalty from the regional to the federal level under President Putin should not automatically be equated with the establishment of greater control over mid and low-level state employees.

of loyalty under President Putin should not be equated with establishing greater control over the mid-level and bottom-level reform processes. Neither does it entail the improved capacity of the federal center to enforce its decisions in all Russian regions.

To explain the growing discrepancies of PCS implementation on a cross-regional basis, it is important to place regional cases discussed earlier in a broader context of centre-periphery relations. It is also vital to recognize that regions of Russia are characterized by the varying degree of political stability, bureaucratic engagement and capacity for reform. For example, some regions may be occupied with the conflict over resource allocation and a parallel process of political mediation. Other regions may simply use PAR and CSR to preserve their power bases and status quo. In what follows, I elaborate on the contextual issues of CSR developments further. However, information on regions is very scarce, and the study requires collecting more information.

Previously I observed that the federal legislation in the area of CSR relied on a hands-off approach toward the process of law enforcement at the regional level. Not only did federal powers abstain from dictating a universal reform model, they have also let regions decide on specific communication strategies and policy instruments tailored to the needs of individual regions. In this context, regional participants of the reform developed several basic approaches toward implementation, based on their understanding of the federal strategy, as well as the prospects of cooperation with the federal centre. In the first case scenario, regions exemplified formal <u>compliance,</u> while waiting for the directions from above (in this case, we may find a great number of policy documents formally adhering to the federal guidelines, yet containing no implementation mechanisms). In the second scenario, regions adhered to the strategy of <u>innovation,</u> where they tried to speed up the process of implementation through policy innovation by filling the gaps of the federal reform strategy. Evidence suggests that many regions attempted to strike a balance between the two strategies mentioned above. However, quite often they would remain passive objects of the reform process, which incentivises regions to follow the federal hands-off approach.[188]

---

[188] Given the fact that most Russian regions chose diverse approaches to the reform process, we may expect that much of the so-called 'inertia' or 'non-implementation' at the regional level remains unobserved, which is possible due to the principles of multi-governance system in Russia. Another important problem is that the speed and effectiveness of reform implementation at the regional level is ineffectively measured by simple statistics (i.e. the number of legislative documents adopted by regional state institutions and the level of compliance with federal legislation, measured by the number of cases indicating discrepancies or conflict between federal and regional legislation). For more information, see the Ministry of Justice's official statistics.

One of the most vivid examples of innovation in the area of CSR occurred in the Republic of Chuvashia, where all the necessary prerequisites for speedy implementation converged to produce policy changes. It is well known that in the early 2000s, the President of Chuvashia, Nikolai Federov, has enjoyed working and productive relationships with the Federal centre. At the same time, the regional leader possessed extensive experience in the area of public sector reforms. For example, in 1994, one of Fedorov's first decisions as regional president concerned the reorganization of Chuvashia's organs of power, which strengthened the effectiveness of the regional executive system. Beyond that, Federov regularly reported to the federal powers on the achievements in the agricultural and social sectors, proving himself not only as a loyal subordinate, but also as an effective manager. By the turn of millennium, Chuvashia had become one of the most stable regions in the Russian Federation; it had also enjoyed a steady economic progress and a relatively low level of crime (overview of publications, reference).

The preliminary analysis of contextual factors in policy-making process suggests that Chuvashia's leadership enjoyed a great degree of political stability during the last 13 years, which may probably had served as an incentive to focus on policy measures to preserve the status quo. Other regions (comparatively less stable than Chuvashia, yet more dynamic than the rest of Russian regions) – Krasnoyarsk and Samara - exemplified a greater level of political volatility and conflict following the years of Yeltsin's Presidency. Thus a number of policy efforts were taken in these regions with the narrowly focused (or vaguely stated) goals and policy mechanisms.

Krasnoyarsk Region, in particular, offers us vivid example of an efficient, yet limited implementation process. In this case, regional leadership has definitely contributed to the process of reform initiation, when regional governor Alexander Khloponin approached the federal powers in the early 2000s with an offer to conduct experimental work on PAR on its territory. At the same time, reforms in this region did not go beyond ideas advanced by MERT. One of the obstacles to effective implementation concerned the size and complexity of Krasnoyarsk public administration, which belongs to the second largest subject of the Russian Federation (nearly half of the Siberian Federal District). Second, political leadership of Krasnoyarsk Region has never been stable. To remind, Khloponin came to power in 2002, right after the accidental death of the Governor Alexander Lebed, and as a result, he was not supported by a clear majority of the region's electorate. President Putin nevertheless exercised his emergency powers to appoint this

candidate as Governor of Krasnoyarsk Region in October 2002.[189] This decision was made in view of Khloponin's political mediation skills and experience as an effective business manager.[190]

The last example of an attempted reform concerns the region of Samara, where different political and industrial groups engaged in disputes for control of the regional legislature. The conflict first emerged in 2006 between the mayor and representatives of several industrial groups in the region. Later it has also involved Governor Titov, who opposed the industrial lobby. In 2007, representatives of the Presidential Administration asked Governor Titov, who had been in power for over 16 years, to resign as a result of losing control over the regional political processes. The position of Governor was offered, in turn, to the head of the Industrial Group "Avtovaz," Vladimir Aryatkov.

The appointment of Aryatkov has brought greater unity to the political regime in Samara region, and even though it did not end up in eradicating corruption, the processes of policy formulation and policy implementation have become more consistent. The overall quality of regional reform programs and regulations in Samara region did not improve. However, Aryatkov has succeeded in mobilizing resources for regional development from the federal centre, and has distanced himself from the local mafia and industrial lobby groups.

It is important to emphasize one more time that the strategies of PCS reforms in Chuvashia, Samara and Krasnoyarsk greatly diverged, depending on the criteria observed previously. Whereas in Chuvashia reforms have gradually progressed from the launch of administrative reform program to the narrowly targeted civil service reform measures, in Samara and Krasnoyarsk the reform agenda was limited to the goals of NPM only (i.e. cutting down the number of state employees, introducing results-oriented budgeting and payment mechanisms, and other basic objectives of NPM).[191]

Similar to other regions, the fist Chuvashia's Program "On the Reform of State Service in the Chuvash Republic for the Period of 2003-2005" was heavily focused on issues of public

---

[189] The actual power of the President to appoint governors on a regular basis came into effect in 2004.

[190] Prior to this decision, Khloponin had spent most of his career as a businessman (starting as a co-founder of the joint-stock company "International Finance Company" from 1992-1996). In the early 2000s, he gained a reputation for his interest group mediation skills when persuading other regional businessmen to register their businesses and pay taxes locally, thus improving the economic situation in Krasnoyarsk. Starting in 2004, Khloponin became the head of an interregional organization called "The Siberian Agreement." He also initiated the process of amalgamation of several neighbouring regions into Krasnoyarsk region. In 2010, President Medvedev appointed Khloponin as a representative to the North Caucasus Region.

[191] Krasnoyarsk initiated its public administrative reform with the goals of cutting down the number of state employees, introducing results-oriented budgeting and payment mechanisms, and other basic objectives of the New Public Management ideology. Sometimes, however, these efforts were pursued to the detriment of other dimensions of reform, and specifically, to the CSR process.

administration (probably, due to the involvement of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade). However, in the subsequent years, the emphasis shifted gradually to improving the quality of the civil service in public administration. All regions attempted to restructure their systems of public administration. However, it was only Chuvashia, where policies were followed up by the working implementation mechanisms and enjoyed some degree of continuity. For example, the Decree No. 98 (2006) included several administrative reform priorities, such as: improving the structure of the regional organs of power; standardizing regional and municipal services; introducing a results-oriented management system, and improving access to information. The program also emphasized the need to develop an effective civil service.[192] In 2006, the President established a Commission on Public Administrative Reform, which became responsible for reform coordination at the regional level. Finally, in March 2011, the Cabinet of Ministers of Chuvashia adopted the program "On the Development of the Civil Service System in Chuvashia for the Period of 2011-2013."[193]

Summing up this discussion, we have to consider several important variables of policy implementation to explain the cases of cross-regional variation observed earlier, i.e. the relationship of *cooperation versus competition* between the federal centre and Russian regions, *the level of unity of the regional political elite* and *regional capacities* to reform the highly complex system of public administration. Most of these variables appear to be closely intertwined, yet they all 'feature in' the study of cross-regional variations.

It is important to emphasize that Russian regions are not completely independent from federal strategies of PCS reforms. In this respect, it is important to observe that a significant number of policy implementation stalemates originated quite recently from tensions between the principles of multi-level organization and a logic of political recentralization advanced by President Putin. For example, recent initiatives in the area of civil service entrusted regional powers with a significant share of constitutional decision-making powers. However, the process of policy implementation was not 'controlled' from above, and it did not go equally well across the Russian regions. Evidence suggests that regions were generally reluctant to initiate independent reform projects in view of political centralization agenda in recent years, whereas

---

[192] It is noteworthy that the policy-making system of Chuvashia featured a greater level of continuity than in other regions.

[193] In 2002, Deputy Minister, Michael Dmitriev, approached Fedorov (as well as the governors of Samara and Yaroslavl Oblasts), with a request to participate in the development of an experimental public administrative reform project. The end result of these negotiations was the launch, in 2003, of the Program "On the Reform of State Service in the Chuvash Republic for the Period of 2003-2005." The program was heavily focused on issues of public administration (probably, due to the involvement of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade). However, in the subsequent years, the emphasis shifted gradually to improving the quality of the civil service in public administration.

federal powers were either not able or not willing to enforce their decisions in all regions, due to the division of power principles advanced by the Russian constitution (1993).[194] Thus the developments of recent years follow the two varying logics of the Russian institutional and political transformation.

It is important to note that the overall ideological framework of the reform has changed over the last couple of years. For example, in the period between 2000-2010, most reforms were subordinated to the goal of *political recentralization*. However, beginning in 2010 (during Medvedev's Presidency), the reforms were amalgamated into the state *modernization project*,[195] which witnessed the removal of *siloviki* from top-level government positions (such as the Presidential *polpredy*), and a shift of the locus of control into the hands of top-level state bureaucrats. The expansion of the role of public bureaucracy in policy formulation, management, and control may be described, from a Western perspective, as a natural shift toward the ultimate professionalization of the state apparatus.[196] However, it may also be qualified as a process that could lead to the politicization of the public bureaucracy, or the centralization of the decision-making process into the hands of state bureaucrats.[197]

Current legislation allocates a significant portion of the decision-making power within the hands of Russia's ministerial officials and departmental managers (*direktora*), who are exempt from the process of meritocratic recruitment, at both the federal and regional level. This situation allows for the perpetuation of inefficient patterns of bureaucratic organization in Russia, despite major organizational changes in the framework of PAR.[198]

---

[194] The process of political centralization was recently accompanied by the strict selection of regional heads and mayors. However, this selection depended on leaders' capacity to maintain political control, whereas the delivery of substantial policy outputs was an important yet not a priority selection criterion.

[195] See Mdevdev D. (2009) "Rossiia Vpered!", Accessed July 15 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5413

[196] Bureaucrats are probably more manageable than generals and security forces.

[197] Whether this process is good or bad may be decided on the basis of such factors as the quality, continuity, effectiveness, and transparency of policy formulation and policy implementation practices.

[198] Some of the basic methods for maintaining the status quo may be described as a strategy of 'sabotaging' the law at the stage of policy formulation; 'selective' or 'postponed' implementation; and finally, a "feigned" implementation process, which is characterized by a formal legal attitude toward implementation, where the adoption of the follow-up legislation does not lead to any substantial change in policy practices.

**Table 26 Legislative developments in selected policy areas**

*Commissions on the Competitive Recruitment of Civil Servants*

---

### Regulation

The rules of the competitive recruitment process in Russia are regulated by the Decree of The President of the Russian Federation No. 112  "On Competitive Recruitment in the Civil Service of the Russian Federation" [*"O konkurse na zameshchenie vakantnoi dolzhnosti gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhny Rossiiskoi Federatsii"*], adopted in February 2005; by Article 22 of Law No. 79, 2004, and by Presidential Decree No. 82 "On Amendments to Decree No.112," adopted on January 22, 2011.

### Implemenatation norms and process

Commissions on the competitive recruitment of civil servants in federal and regional state institutions were formed between 2008 and 2010. However, implementation norms emerged inconsistently  on a cross-ministerial and cross-regional basis. For example, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation adopted Order No. 385, "On the Commissions Filling Vacancies in the Civil Service," on December 27, 2006. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the RF adopted a similar decree, No. 472, on December 29, 2008, while the Federal Tax service adopted relevant norms in 2009, the Federal Registration Service in 2010, and the Federal Statistics Service followed suit in 2011. Finally, the Ministry of Labor adopted relevant norms on July 18, 2012 (No. 27). This list is not exhaustive.

At the regional level, the timing of implementation process has also been differentiated. For example, the Ministry of Trade of **Krasnoyarsk region** adopted an Order "On the Competition Commission in the Ministry of Trade," on May 12, 2008; the Ministry of Health of the same region adopted a relevant order (No. 69) on February 17, 2009, while the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development adopted a similar order (No. 894) on December 31, 2009. **The Chuvash** Ministry of Justice adopted regulations on Commissions (Order No. 253) on the 26th of May, 2010; the Ministry of Agrarian Development adopted relevant legislation (Order No.49) in 2013; the regional departments of federal organs in the same region also formed their own commissions during the same period (2010-2013).[199] Overall, Chuvashia has lagged behind in terms of the development of separate regional norms on meritocratic recruitment. **The Tatarstan** Ministry of Justice adopted the new norms on competition on August 17, 2006 (No. K-118/03-02) and the Republic's Ministry of Education and Science adopted similar regulations on July 9, 2008 (No. 1590/08). These activities were based not only on federal legislation, but also on regional norms, such as the Law of Tatarstan "On Civil Service" (No. 3), adopted on January 1, 2003, as well as on the norms on the cadre of civil servants (adopted by Decree No. 127, on March 14, 2011.[200]

---

[199] Other examples include the Ministry of Economy of Ulyanovsk Region, which adopted relevant legislation (No.80) on April 29, 2011; and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of Bashkortostan, which adopted regulations (No. 138) on July 29, 2013.

[200] It is important to note that the process of competitive hiring has also taken place within the offices of the plenipotentiary representatives of the President of Russian Federation. These changes were regulated by federal legislation.

### Regulation

Commissions observing requirements for the official behaviour of civil servants are regulated by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 269, adopted on March 3, 2007. One of the basic features of the Decree is it's **advisory function**. The Decree recommends departmental heads to explain civil servants the undesirability of conflict of interest, according to the current legislation. At the same time, there are no law enforcement mechanisms associated with conflict of interest regulations. [201]

Other legislative documents regulating requirements for the official conduct of civil servants: Federal Law No. 273-FZ, December 25, 2008 "On Counter-Corruption," (*Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, No. 52, Article 6228, 2008); Presidential Decree No. 821 "On Commissions Observing Requirements for the Official Conduct of Civil Servants" (adopted on July 1, 2010) (*Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, No. 27, Article 3466, 2010); Presidential Decree "On Implementation Measures of the Federal Law On Counter-Corruption" (*Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, No. 30, Article 4070, 2010)

### Implementaiton norms and process

The norms on the commissions observing officials' conduct of Decree No. 269 and Law No. 79, were implemented no earlier than 2010 at the federal level, and between 2010-2013 at the regional level. For example, The Ministry of Justice issued regulations on the Commissions on the Official Behaviour of Civil Servants on September 9, 2010 (Order No. 218 of the Ministry of Justice). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its Order on September 10, 2010 (No. 16227). The Ministry of Labour adopted its regulations on November 1, 2010 (Order No. 311), and the Federal Service on Drug Trafficking issued its relevant order, No. 212, in 2007 (it was one of the front-runners in terms of implementation process).[202]

Regional departments of the federal ministries, as well as regional ministries, adopted major decrees in relevant areas between 2010 and 2013. However some regions, as it should have been expected, advanced more actively than others. For example, the , of Murmansk region

---

[201]PD no 269 (2007) establishes the following process for ethcs commissions: (1) Commissions are to be established by federal and regional organs of power. (2) The commissions consist of representative(s) for the employing organization; state organ's representatives entrusted with civil service administration; experts hired by the state organ's representatives entitled with civil service administration. (3)The following information is needed to process cases: (a) a complaint or information submitted by law enforcement, judicial, and/or other state agencies, public officials, and citizens on the civil servant's actions which defame his honour (Article 18 of the Federal Law); (b) a complaint or information about a conflict of interest situation.

[202] The Ministry of Labour and Social Development advanced further than others, as it adopted the Code of Ethics and procedure for appealing an outcome of competition, Prikaz Ministerstva Truda i Sotsial'nogo Razvitiia No 604 of December 17, 2012 "Ob Utverzhdenii Kodeksa Etiki I Sluzhebnogo Povedeniia Federal'nykh Gosudarstvennykh Sluzhashikh Ministerstva Truda I Sotsial'noi Zashity RF" [Order of The Ministry of Labor and Social Development no. 604 on the Code of Ethics for the Federal Civil Servants working in Mintrud], http://www.minpromtorg.gov.ru/docs/other/50

adopted its Decree "On Commissions" No. 247 in May 2013, whereas the Krasnoyarsk Regional Ministry of Industry and Trade adopted the same regulations by Decree No. 7 on December 5, 2012, and Chuvashia's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade adopted its relevant regulations on February 22, 2011 (Order No. 36).

Regional **Ministries of Health** were among the front-runners in terms of reform implementation. For example, the Krasnodar Regional Ministry of Health issued its Decree "On Commissions" No. 120, on September 3, 2008; the Krasnoyarsk Ministry of Health issued its Decree "On Commissions" No. 90, on 2 March 2009; Chuvashia's Ministry of Health and Social Development adopted its Order No. 358 "On Commissions" on April 11, 2011; and finally, the Murmansk Health Ministry adopted Order No. 191 "On Commissions" on March 11, 2011. On a countrywide basis, the Ministries of Transportation, Communications, and Migration Service have tended to lag behind, even in regions that were considered to be front-runners of the reform implementation process.

It is noteworthy that the regional commissions were created at the same time as in the federal Russian ministries (around 2010). For example, the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan issued Decree No. 539 "On Commissions in the State Council of the Republic" in 2010. The President of Chuvashia formed the "Commission Observing Requirements of Official Behavior of Civil Servants Acting as Departmental Heads (*rukovoditeli*) of the Executive Regional Organs of Power, First Deputy Heads and Deputy Heads" as early as on September 2, 2009 (Decree No. 57). Krasnoyarsk issued a decree "On the Commission of the Governor," No. 603, in August 2010. Finally, the Murmask Regional Governor issued a similar decree in July 2009.

The lack of actual implementation: some regional departments of the **Federal Migration Ministries (OFMS) reported that they did not hold commission sessions at the regional level due to the absence of conflict of interest cases in the relevant service**.

---

**7.5 Conclusion**

The study of public administrative reform in Russia's regions is challenged by the fact that it is difficult to separate administrative reforms from major political, constitutional, or cultural transformations. Starting from the early 1990s, these reforms have been implemented simultaneously, leading to the creation of a highly complex institutional system. Similarly, changes to public administration and the civil service seem to be deeply entrenched in broader institutional arrangements. In this respect, when evaluating administrative reforms in the Russian regions, it is very important to take into account not only implementation strategies, but also the institutional constraints and contingencies of the policy implementation process.

This study suggests that there are several critical issues associated with the process of reform implementation on a cross-regional basis. These issues are: (1) the wide-ranging levels of capacity present in various regions (regional leadership, the unity of the regional political elite, relationships of cooperation versus conflict between the federal and regional powers, and other

institutional features); (2) the federal strategy of the reform process, including the clarity of the goals, reform communication strategy and the scope of freedom given by the federal powers to the regions in terms of implementation; (3) and finally, the strategies of regional policy leaders, specifically, the ways they utilized policy options in view of the varying logics of institutional and political transformation).

The diverse capacities of individual regions affected aspects of the reform such as the speed and the scope of change at the local level, the ability to cooperate with the federal centre, and the capability of regional powers to innovate rather than simply follow federal-level guidelines. For example, Chuvashia advanced further than the rest of Russia's regions because of its comparative advantage in terms of policy continuity dating back to 1994 and a greater degree of political stability. Samara Oblast also produced relevant legislation in the area of PAR and CSR, but only made significant progress after the change to its political leadership and accompanying stabilization in its regional politics. Krasnoyarsk's public sector reforms may be considered as relatively successful; however, even in this case, there was a lack of political commitment to reform due to the recurring political conflicts.

The federal strategy of reform encouraged the regions to participate actively in the policy implementation process; however, federal legislation, formally adhering to the principles of federalism did not require all regions to follow through on federal guidelines. In this context, regions exemplified a willingness to cooperate with the federal powers, but not all of them prioritized the process of civil service reform in their regional developmental programs.

The failure of many regions to recognize the importance of CSR should be attributed to both the misguided federal strategy of PCS and a range of value preferences made by the regional developmental programs. As was previously discussed, in the early 2000s, the federal powers selectively prioritized some policies to the detriment of others, which was in line with Moscow's policy of political centralization, strengthening the rule of law, and ensuring compliance with the federal centre. The process of political centralization has been accompanied by the strict selection of regional heads and mayors, whose capacity to maintain political control was valued higher than the delivery of substantial policy outputs. In this respect, most regions have simply replicated the example set by the federal centre, waiting for the directions coming from the federal centre. In this sense, compliance of regional heads with the federal legislation could have been easily confused with the effectiveness of regional leaders, whose primary goal was to 'fit in' the new model of power distribution amidst institutional and political tensions.

One of the failures of the federal government concerns the lack of an efficient civil service reform communication strategy. This study demonstrates that the federal government did

not elaborate sufficiently on the goals of the reform. Moreover, the federal strategy has treated civil servants as if they were not even part of the reform process – having no more say in the development of CSR strategy than the average Russian citizen reading about it in the newspapers and hearing about it from the news. In this respect, it is not surprising that the federal strategy has failed to build allies among civil servants; federal powers relied on a traditional method of information dissemination, via mass media, rather than using potentially more effective channels of communication, such as those associated with 'engagement strategies' (e.g., seminars, inter-departmental conferences).

The process of PCS implementation is characterized by numerous inconsistences on a cross-regional basis. For example, it is observed that by the end of the last decade, civil service reform programs were adopted in most of Russia's regions. The main areas of focus concerned: the legal status of civil servants; the process of hiring, promoting, and firing civil servants; the creation of a pool of civil servants; and the improvement of civil service ethics. All of these areas were regulated by federal or regional presidential and ministerial decrees. In addition, regional powers developed civil service commissions coordinating the process of CSR on a cross-departmental basis. In terms of implementation, many regions have lagged behind in areas related to meritocratic recruitment and conflict of interest regulations.  In some Ministries and regions commissions on ethics were not adopted until 2011-2013; the same trend could be observed with regard to the hiring commissions.

This study suggests that those regions, where reforms were effectively coordinated and communicated to civil servants, advanced further in terms of achieving desired policy outputs. The scope of reform programs, along with the timing and sequence of reform measures, has also contributed greatly to the success or failure of reforms. For example, comprehensive reform projects have turned out to be more efficient at the regional than at the federal level; at the same time, those programs that were adopted earlier on have often lacked precision, even though they contributed to the overall quality of regional development.

Getting back to the discussion of regional diversity, it is important to note that the capacity of regional powers to participate in the process of policy formulation appears not to have been completely compromised as a result of the policy of political centralization. The shift of loyalty to the federal centre and the agenda of strengthening the rule of law, have forced regional powers to participate more actively in federal reform initiatives. However, regional powers have commonly tried to strike a balance between the two strategies of compliance and innovation, while keeping in line with the general strategy of political and administrative transformation.

The policy of strengthening the rule of law has constrained regional public officials in their ability to devise laws inconsistent with federal legislation. However, the same policy has not affected civil servants' ability to feign or delay the process of policy implementation. In many cases where the norms of the law were unclear, policy implementers could simply use the old patterns of behaviour, or adhere to the directions of departmental heads, whose influence expanded under the new legislation. Many of these processes remain unobserved. As such, it is still difficult to say definitively whether or not reform measures in the area of civil service reform have produced significant policy outputs.

**CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION**

**8.1 Introduction**

Building on the prolific literature of post-Communist change, cross-country comparisons and an in-depth analysis of the Russian case, this dissertation identifies the sources of variation in civil service reform progress after the Soviet Union collapse. The study draws attention to the role of contextual variables of policy change, such as political leadership and institutional capacities of the post-Communist governments, and argues that state executive capacity increases only as a result of reforms, which pursue genuine rather than symbolic goals to improve the culture and operation of state institutions. Civil service reforms, in particular, require a great amount of political support in all stages of policy-making process due to the specific characteristics of CSR policy field (concentration of costs in the government, high administrative and technical content, limited participation of the public and a long duration of the reform process). Thus policy efforts, which are 'locked' into systemic inefficiencies, are likely to progress only in case if there is an unequivocal political support for the reform, or when significant changes occur within the national policy-making setting.

The study confirms that certain features of hybrid, and especially autocratic, regimes, such as executive centralization, or the extent of freedom political leaders enjoy when framing their policies, create an image of a system, which seems to be 'effectively managed'. However, the very nature of an autocratic system leaves no other option for the top-level executive, but to closely follow (or control) implementation whenever they are genuinely concerned with the results.[203] Similar reasoning (the need to control implementation) is quite relevant for a wide range of democratic systems alike; however, control mechanisms appear to be less time consuming and less expensive in cases where transparency, accountability and rule of law (at least, in an ideal model) are widely accepted.[204] In any context, bureaucratic reforms require some level of executive institutionalization (the right balance between centralization-

---

[203] The role of executive leadership increases at the stage of policy implementation, where the crucial task of any government is to control (or closely follow) compliance of policy implementers, while mobilizing resources to overcome resistance. Thus to understand whether state executive is committed enough to reforms it is necessary to carefully observe whether reforms go any further than formal legal change and whether political leadership is involved in implementation process.

[204] Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, provide institutional and cultural underpinnings for the irrational use of power. This feature of an autocratic system significantly affects coherency and material effects of implementation stage.

decentralization dynamics), and they are more likely to succeed when a less comprehensive approach is taken, and reforms start from a smaller issue, such as merit-based rules, or a juncture of issues (personnel policies), which is followed by efforts to create effective policy control and appraisal mechanisms. Democratic culture, by contrast, takes time to develop, and it requires the aforementioned institutions to be deeply entrenched.

The empirical findings of my dissertation suggest that the failure of CSR in post-Communist countries should not be taken for granted, as comparisons across nations and regions suggest variation in reform paths and outcomes. Nearly all countries of the former Soviet world experienced profound difficulties in reforming the areas of ethics, political neutrality, and meritocratic recruitment. However, the reasons for the lack of progress in these policy sectors (political interests, path-dependent thinking, the nature, goals, and purposes of CSR) differed. The study of regional cases in Russia, such as Chuvashia, Samara, Krasnoyarsk and others, suggests an interesting combination of interconnected factors, such as financial scarcity, efforts made by the federal government to control the process of implementation, and regional politics behind civil service and administrative changes. Similarly, country cases, such as Hungary and Estonia, demonstrate that the integrity of the proposed solutions (a coherent reform strategy) significantly contribute to reform success, whereas a lack of political actors genuinely interested in reform, or disorientation of the top-level political elite concerning the trajectory of change (such as in case of the Czech Republic prior to EU accession, or in Russia today), result in a strategy of nominal rather than real change.[205]

To explain the puzzle of CSR (e.g. the lack of reform amidst conditions, which presented themselves as a clear opportunity for change), I have employed the concept of 'driving forces of change', first, as a way to explain the dynamics of policy change (implementation versus non-implementation), and second, as a way to situate my research in a broader theoretical literature. While the approach I have taken to explain CSR progress may seem to be overly generic, it fits well in a debate on the role of structural and agential variables of post-Communist change – a subject that most scholars were dealing with immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. I have also revisited different waves of policy implementation literature (Pressman and Wildawsky, 1973, Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983, and others), and distinguished between the necessary and sufficient conditions of change, with the first category of reasons covering actors genuinely interested in the reform and state executive capacity defined as legal rationality, professionalism,

---

[205] Specific stories include Russia, where reforms progressed in a dynamic fashion after the change of leadership in the early 2000s; Hungary and Estonia, where ideas of CSR have been part of a coherent democratic transition process; and finally, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where the lack of policy actors genuinely interested in the reforms translated into an obvious policy implementation stalemate.

expertise and operational capacities of state bureaucracies. Various strands of theoretical literature have pointed out the dichotomy of political willingness and state capacity to instill policy changes. However, my study has taken this discussion further and established some level of methodological clarity when operationalizing these concepts.

My approach is largely based on a critique of the existing literature on policy implementation in post-Communist states. I emphasize that there is no single theory of implementation in a non-democratic political context. Moreover, scholarly approaches that have been developed to date face formidable challenges, which include their tendency to focus on a single dimension of bureaucratic reform (patronage politics, corruption in government etc.), and their reluctance to embrace both structural and agential factors in explaining policy changes. For example, the 'legacies of the past' and the sequential theory of democratization examine the process of institutional change and its impact on state capacity and bureaucratic performance. However, these perspectives neglect the cases of deliberate policy choices informed by the regime's survival concerns, which lead to the reversal of policy trends established immediately after the fall of Communism (primary examples are Estonia and Russia). Equally important, a single dimension of study, which prevails in most scholarly research, prevents us from identifying some of the broader trajectories of post-Communist transformation.

One of the major problems of Western policy implementation literature is that it has commonly downplayed the role of agential factors (described in my study as policy leadership) in defining the course of reforms. Recently, efforts have been made to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches in the study of policy implementation dynamics (Mazmanian and Sabaier, Matland, and others have emphasized various types of implementation, sequence and interaction effects among reform components, trying to move beyond a single dimension of change). However, these studies have not effectively accounted for the discrepancies between real and symbolic action (e.g. the idea that that not all reforms are initially designed to fulfill promises policy elites make). The meaning of reforms is decided at the stage of implementation (where interactive relationships among various actors matter); however, we must understand that the role of leadership goes beyond the process of policy formulation and policy enactment, as it includes efforts made on behalf of policy leaders to overcome resistance and mobilize support for the reform. The role of leadership is particularly important in autocratic systems where the decision-making is skewed toward the executive, and bureaucrats are more likely to be treated as insignificant policy actors.

The study asserts that policy-making literature provides us with invaluable tools to better understand the process of CSR after the Soviet Union collapse (policy dynamism models, for

example, may be useful in a study of comprehensive reforms covering more than one area of civil service). Research in a post-Communist context, accordingly, provides us with an ideal setting for the study of leadership and capacity-building problems.[206]

This thesis is divided into eight chapters, which include comprehensive theoretical review and case studies, focusing on the dynamics of CSR during the period of 2000-2014. The scope of research is intentionally broad, and one of the goals of this approach is to situate research in a broader international context. For example, the study suggests that policy diffusion processes affect nation-states worldwide; however, it would not be rational to mix these trends (including their achievements and failures) with historical conditions dating back to the mid-20th century. Currently, most national governments tend to experiment freely with foreign-born ideas (post-Communist governments, in particular, seek support in view of an extended ideational crisis); this process, however, does not mean convergence of strategies and policy outcomes.

The early chapters of my study draw a clear line between diverse policy-making trends in national and international arenas, arguing that transitional and developmental states tend to adopt policies that may not reflect the most optimal policy choices. In recent years, proposed solutions to the seemingly congruent problems (the lack of flexibility, responsiveness, and inefficiency of national bureaucratic organizations) increasingly converged around the goals of civil service modernization. However, this process relied on the conflicting strategies of neo-Weberianism and the New Public Management paradigm. International experience, in this respect, suggests that the process of policy diffusion tends to neglect the structural conditions of policy change, such as culture and institutions. In this context, reforms may not go any further than a change in vocabulary, because some conditions, such as a tradition or a spirit of rationality, cannot be easily copied from one country to another. This so-called spirit of rationality is an intrinsic feature of democratic policy-making, which relies, among other things, on a rational public administration system. Thus, to explain the discrepancy between international policy trends and their domestic consequences, we need to take into account the role of foreign born ideas and their relationship with a wide range of endogenous pressures.

It is important to bear in mind that recent criticisms of policy diffusion process neglect the role of national policy actors, as well as the fact that nearly all decisions, regardless of their origin, are filtered through the policy preferences of individual policy-makers, which is followed by a continuous round of events associated with bureaucratic politics. As such, similar policies

---

[206] This research, however, meets considerable obstacles, such as the lack of complete information about what is going on beyond formal legal change, and research instruments, which may not be fully applicable to the study of post-communist policy process.

appear to be adopted for a variety of reasons (largely, utilitarian, or political), and, quite predictably, they produce diverse unexpected effects in a variety of policy contexts. Diffusion literature provides us with valuable insight on the risks and opportunities of the so-called 'policy learning process'. However, my study suggests to take one step further and look at the national governments (in a post-Communist context) as active policy makers who struggle with an extended ideational crisis, and as result, borrow, utilize and transform ideas coming from abroad the way it suits them best (the Russian case is a prime example).

The first and the second chapters of this dissertation suggest that the gap between democratic and non-democratic systems should not be overexaggerated, because the survival interests motivate actors in most societies. In this respect, what is crucial for the reform progress is re-aligning a wide range of formal and informal institutions in policy designs, as well as understanding how various groups of actors think, behave and interconnect. However, it would not be practical to draw a clear analytical line between the groups of policy formulators and policy implementers in systems, where the process of policy formulation is heavily 'skewed' toward the executive, or where the pattern of patronage is prevalent in public administration. In this respect, my study intentionally blurs the distinction between the two groups, suggesting that implementation starts from the very point of policy enactment, where each subsequent program, or law, could be described as an important step in a course of policy goal attainment. All actors, in this perspective, (experts, political elites, state bureaucrats, etc.) engage in the legislative or administrative decision-making process; however, the salience of individual participants varies depending on a specific policy context (or policy making stage).

The study opens up with the hypotheses, centering on the role of political leadership, institutional settings and strategies of civil service reform in defining varying paths of intractable implementation processes. However, the analysis of the collected data, detailed in the subsequent chapters, suggests the importance of interactive relationships between policy actors and institutional settings of the post-Communist states. First, the study suggests that legacies of the past 'take over' the so-called 'failed' reform projects (projects which relied on inappropriate strategies, or did not pursue any substantial goals).[207] Second, reform strategy is commonly

---

[207] For example, Hungary and Poland experienced significant pressures to reform prior to the collapse of the Communist rule, yet during the 1990s, their PCs strategies considerably diverged. Central Asian societies have also developed similar cultural attributes, which spanned across centuries to result in the expansion of clan politics during these days; however, my study suggests that Kazakhstan, in recent years, has outrun the Czech Republic, and its reform outputs (the new pieces of legislation) appeared to be more prolific. It would be unreasonable to deny the role of history altogether, as there is much evidence in its favour (ultimately, the Czech Republic had one of the most conservative regimes during the Soviet times, whereas Hungary developed rational public administration starting from the 15th century). At the same

informed (or defined) by the extent of political commitment, as well as by the state of institutional capacity to instill changes. For example, the choice of a comprehensive approach toward CSR may be treated as a sign of political willingness to take reforms further than formal declarations. However, the same decision may be indicative of historical legacies, described by one of my interviewees (Prof. Kudiukin) as a repeated effort to 'jump over the necessary developmental stages' in a process of goal attainment (a feature, which defines the character of national decision-making style).

To explain various cases of reform success and failure in modern times, we have to consider the origins of public officials' commitment to reforms, which, according to the dominant theoretical framework of my research, may include political (legitimacy) concerns of socialized actors, who take decisions within constraints imposed by national history.

## 8.2 Lessons Learned From the Country Cases

The initial premise of my study offered a distinction between the two instances of successfully initiated and sustained reform, arguing that the two stages of policy-making may depend on different approaches (Rodrick 1996). Based on this premise, the initiation of reform requires 'strong leadership' (independence or autonomy for the executive), while the consolidation of reform necessitates "building of legislative and interest-group bases of support," which consists of regulations and steps taken to develop reform initiatives in line with the achieved consensus. The findings of my study confirm that countries lacking policy leadership did not progress quickly in terms of adopting and implementing civil service laws. At the same time, a change of the top-level executive presented itself as a clear case of 'window opening' for those actors who were previously interested but incapable to instill changes. For example, in the early and mid-1990s, the main obstacle to policy implementation in Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, and other post-Communist countries was the absence of executive willingness and capacity to launch an effective CSR. The same is true for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where no dedicated advocates of civil service reform emerged during the 1990s. The Russian state presents us with a classic case of comprehensive public sector reforms, which became possible due to the change of executive in the early 2000s. At the same time, the Russian case suggests that leadership is an important, but insufficient condition for policy progress, and to explain why reforms stalled in

---

time, not all historical events matter, and not all things that we observe (for example, patronage in state administration) may be directly attributed to the past.

certain policy areas we have to look more closely at the conditions that shape politics and administration.[208]

To understand the reasons for the diversity of reform paths in post-Communist states, it is important to take into consideration not only national leaders' 'ways of thinking' and 'doing things' (cognitive paradigms), but also the capacity of individual states to carry out and sustain comprehensive policy programs. In this respect, it is useful to view CSR as a part of the broader context of state-building efforts, which aim to adjust and improve state capacities via the process of state modernization. This study suggests that many countries in the post-Communist world have lost direction since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. While these countries formally adhered to the principles of democratic governance rooted in the market economy, various state-building efforts, such as the institutional reorganization of the bureaucratic system, appeared to be internally conflicted. Observed experiences within the post-Communist region provide us with only a few examples of policy programs characterized by conceptual clarity and a sense of purpose. One of these examples is the case of Estonia, which, from the outset, established a set of policy measures with a strong market-oriented focus. Another case cited in my dissertation is Hungary, which had been following a neo-Weberian pattern of reform up until the last several years.[209] Evidence suggests that the remaining cases of post-Communist CSR did not adhere consistently to any set of reform principles, and that they commonly commenced reforms from a wrong point (e.g. skipping, or not prioritizing enough, issues of political neutrality and meritocratic recruitment). In this context, state capacity to formulate and implement coherent reform programs is one out of the many important preconditions for a consistent implementation process, and this variable may be used effectively to evaluate both the level of political commitment and the extent of policy-making expertise.

When exploring the reasons for reform or 'no reform', it is important to mention that neither the prospect of accession to the EU, nor the process of institutionalizing a party system fully accounted for the diversity of reform paths chosen immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the chapter on comparative reform experiences suggests, nearly all Central and Eastern European states were promised accession in the early 2000s; however, policy implementation measures progressed faster in those countries where the state executive capacity was strengthened with the expansion of the power of the top executive (such as Prime Minister in

---

[208] The chapters on Russia reveal that CSR policy shifts occurred alongside the change in Presidents (from Yeltsin to Putin, and from Putin to Medvedev); however, the general course of action stayed the same, and a great number of significant policy areas remained unreformed.

[209] In a sense, the Hungarian neo-Weberian model of CSR was polar opposite to market-based Estonian reforms. At the same time, each of the two countries has managed to develop a clear and comprehensive reform strategy.

Hungary), or due to the nearly universal consensus over the course of action after the fall of Communism (Estonia). In a similar vein, those countries, where significant reform experience accumulated prior to the accession period (either before the collapse of the Soviet Union, or in the early to mid-1990s) provided favorable conditions for change. However, not all of these countries were able to build upon the pre-existing conditions and experience.

It is important to mention that ideational vacuum, as well as internal resistance to reform, systemically paralyzed the process of policy making in many other, seemingly successful, states (Czech Republic and Poland). This problem intensified in recent years, with the increasing economic pressures upon national governments. However, the general trend of non-implementation prevailed until these days, and it served an important role of accommodating forces with deeply entrenched interests in the old Communist institutions.[210]

While a significant portion of my work elaborates on the role of the executive capacity of post-Communist states, an analysis of the detailed data suggests that strong executive is not to be equated with policy leadership (actors genuinely interested in policy changes). The former (executive strength), when taken to the extreme, may lead to over-centralization in politics, and an increasing amount of decisions taken behind the closed doors to simply perpetuate one's power (with the use of such tools as executive accountability and subordination). In this respect, it is important to mention the case of Poland, where, in recent years, the presence of a 'strong leader' variable has resulted in unexpectedly negative shifts in the CSR policy-making process and the deteriorating quality of policy documents. Another example is provided by the cases of post-Communist transformation in Central Asia (such as in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan), where the will to reform the existing civil service has been compromised by the views and personalities of authoritarian political leaders. All in all, this study suggests that reforms, which occur internationally in the area of bureaucratic reorganization, quite often result in a significant tradeoff between the extent of political centralization and the content of the proposed solutions. In this perspective, executive strength may be as harmful as executive weakness, as both may limit the scope of CSR to the goals of state control and subordination.

---

[210] As I mention in Chapter 4, the worst and the best case scenarios of civil service reform in the CEE region – the Czech Republic and Hungary – share much in common in both the structure of their basic political institutions and the effects of their early institutionalization processes. Both the Czech Republic and Hungary are commonly described as success stories of post-Soviet state-building (O'Dwyer 2006), based on the idea that these countries (unlike Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia) have managed to escape the pattern of rapid administrative expansion immediately after the collapse of Soviet rule.

It is important to emphasize that executive centralization is one feature, which may be part of a wide range of authoritarian (or hybrid) systems, but it may also characterize some of the existing democratic regimes. To draw a clear line between the two concepts, we have to consider the nature of executive leadership, which may be democratic, yet comparatively centralized (or by contrast, centralized and undemocratic). Excessive centralization is more likely to 'skew' the decision-making process; however, at least some level of political centralization is necessary to avoid a stalemate and make reforms happen.

The Russian case presents us with an obvious example of a tradeoff between the level of centralization and the decision-making outputs. Given the fact that state executive has dominated the remaining institutions since the 2004 re-election of Vladimir Putin, most decisions were likely to reflect the views of a narrow group of policy actors, including members of the Presidential Administration. It would be fair to emphasize that the current stage of CSR proved to be more inclusive of policy experts who acted as a major driving force of reforms; however, most of the proposed policy initiatives remained internally conflicted, and as such, did not take into account objections or interests of the mid-level and lower-level bureaucrats. It is also important to consider that, prior to the current period, there were several efforts to reform the civil service and public administration, most of which have failed due to the lack of political commitment to the reform. The obstacles to the reform process have diverged slightly from one historical period to another. For example, in 1992-1993, the reform strategy suffered from a lack of clarity, coupled with conflict over the direction of change and a severe resistance to reform on behalf of public officials. In the mid-1990s, the volatile political process, combined with a lack of political will to reform, paralyzed the system, leading to a state of institutional inertia. Beginning in 1999-2000, policy-makers attempted to work out a strategy that would resolve the problems that had accumulated during the years of political transformation. However, this strategy turned out to be unfeasible, and it has produced inconsistent results.

The final stage of the reform process in Russia (2007-present) entailed a change in policy leadership, exemplified by a significant turnover of major participants of the reform, as well as a tendency to entrust civil servants with responsibility for policy formulation. This stage has also been characterized by a nearly universal acceptance of the need to reform, which, however, has been compromised by tensions and conflicting views between top-level political elite, the expert community, and the public bureaucracy (major policy actors in the field of CSR). Interestingly, top-level policy elites in Russia have never been unified in terms of setting the priorities of the reform process: some have insisted on fighting corruption, while others have preferred to focus on executive accountability and control. In recent years, the community of research experts has

220

struggled fervently over the merits of new public management ideology or the neo-Weberian principles of public administration. Finally, state bureaucrats have become clandestine participants in the reform process, whose interests and perspectives have also influenced the key stages of policy formulation and policy implementation.

Looking back over the history of the current wave of reform, it is clear that the only group of policy actors genuinely interested in the agenda of bureaucratic reorganization has been the community of experts, which has promoted the ideas of an open civil service model since the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s, the political leadership welcomed suggestions on state modernization as a part of its electoral campaign. However, as subsequent events demonstrated, the 'window of opportunity' was only opened halfway. The center quickly squeezed experts out of the process, and instead empowered top-level civil servants with policy formulation and implementation functions. Part of this process has been quite natural and even predictable, as experts' ideas remained internally conflicted (agreement on a coherent model, centering on either meritocratic or an open, position-based system, has not been reached). Some (if not most) of those ideas appeared to be unpopular among the mid-level or even the top-level civil servants. As a result of this split, a large amount of resources and knowledge accumulated by experts was 'wasted' and left behind the doors of conservative state institutions.

Given the level of disagreement surrounding civil service reforms behind the scene of formal legal change, it is rather unsurprising that the first wave of policy adaptations emerged in the early 2000s as an attempt to reconcile differences among the aforementioned policy actors. The strategy of NPM proved to be a suitable match due to its neutral language and its excessive focus on effectiveness and efficiency concerns.[211] However, this approach became rigorously opposed and rejected at subsequent stages of the reform (in light of the growing disagreement over its unfeasible nature). Overall, judging by the quality of the policy-making elite, and by the content of the major legislative documents that emerged as a result of the artificial consensus among policy actors, the current wave of Russian CSR may be described as a 'second-order change' (Hall 1993), in which the basic categories of instruments used to affect policy diverge from the earlier historical periods. This stage of the reform did not fundamentally alter ideas about the mission and rationale of bureaucratic organization, and, as such, it did not achieve the goal of 'paradigmatic' policy shift.

---

[211] Consensus-building process has been incredibly difficult for policy-makers in Russia starting from the mid-1990s, when a special institution was established within the Russian Duma (*Soglasitalnaiia Komissiia*) to reach consensus on some of the most important policy initiatives).

221

Returning to the dichotomy of political willingness versus state capacity to reform the civil service, it is important to emphasize that recent efforts at bureaucratic reorganization in Russia have revealed significant flaws within policy leaders' ability to evaluate the risks, options, and consequences of proposed solutions.[212] The strategy of gathering resources in support of comprehensive change (the mobilization strategy discussed earlier) has been an equally troubled process. For example, the findings of my research clearly highlight that mistakes were made in causation during the process of policy diffusion. This problem has been exacerbated by a variety of institutional constraints, which include Russia's system of multi-level governance, the dominant role of the executive branch, and other features, which fundamentally affect the structure and process of decision-making at all levels.

One problem that cannot be ignored concerns the fact that the core of the Russian public bureaucracy is located at the regional level, with the key areas of responsibility being shared between the federal and regional powers. In this respect, my study suggests that a significant number of policy implementation stalemates at the regional level originate from tensions between the principles of Russia's multi-level organization and the logic of political recentralization of the Russian state apparatus. Russia's current system of 'centralized authoritarianism', which replaced the 'decentralized' semi-democratic system of the 1990s, has obviously strengthened the accountability of regional leaders to top-level federal officials (at least in certain policy areas). However, much of the power at the regional level has remained concentrated within the executive, and as a result, the quality and professionalism of the regional bureaucracies has not improved.

Taking into consideration such aspects of the reform as policy continuity, funding, and legislative support in the area of CSR, the main problem of implementation process in recent years concerned not so much the lack of congruence between real and symbolic effort (executive involvement has been clearly demonstrated in the Russian case), but rather the so called 'selective treatment' of reform priorities based on real, yet conflicting tactical choices of various policy actors. A relationship that is currently established between the top-level executive and public bureaucracy involves bargaining over the content of the newly adopted norms (exemplified by regulations in areas such as conflict of interest, or declarations of income). This process is also exacerbated by a significant delay in specification of the newly adopted norms, or cases of non-

---

[212] For example, top-level policy-makers have obviously underestimated the extent of stakeholders' resistance; issues of power have also been blindly omitted by allocating significant decision-making capabilities into the hands of opponents of civil service reform.

implementation, which occur due to the lack of control mechanisms.[213] My research suggests that reform outcomes in a significant number of policy areas emerge as a result of the continuous 'recalibration' of and adjustments to minor areas within the proposed legal and administrative norms, which reflect both the explicit and implicit agendas of major policy players. Political commitment to the goals of CSR, in this respect, should be described as being sensitive to the concerns of bureaucratic interests, even though the nature of the relationship between the state executive and its administration requires further explanation.

Overall, this study suggests that the perils of the dichotomy of willingness versus capacity lie in the existing power structure of the Russian state, as well as in a number of conflicted assumptions about the nature, the goals and mechanisms of policy process. Comprehensive reform strategy, for example, has proved to be one of the most fundamental reasons for the loss of control over implementation stage, and it has most likely indicated the tendency of the Russian historically bounded (or empowered) expert community, along with policy practitioners, to 'jump over the stages' in policy making process[214] One would also add to this explanation an assumption, shared by some members of the post-Soviet elite and policy experts, that the adoption of a new legislative framework automatically translates into the process of policy implementation, or yet another interesting assumption that all aspects of bureaucratic behavior should be regulated in order to ensure compliance, even though control mechanisms over a large number of bureaucratic organizations are not in place. A great number of problems of policy implementation concerns the locus of administrative decision-making power (sources of by-laws and other regulations) and a growing tendency on behalf of the Russian government to use federalism (and law in general) selectively as an excuse and rationalization of its political agenda. Federalism may work in some cases, such as CSR, where regional powers are left with an option of advancing reforms at their own expense; however, tactical choices and decisions made by the government may not necessarily reflect the goals pronounced in official documents.

In view of the obstacles detailed above, the greatest challenge Russia and other transitioning states currently face concerns the level of consensus (or conflict) surrounding the reform, and state capacity to formulate and implement contextually appropriate reform strategies. Russia shares much in common with the rest of post-Soviet world; however, its recent comprehensive reform efforts, driven internally and developed over many years, represent an interesting case to study and learn more about the problems of policy-making.

---

[213] Even in cases where reforms are 'controlled from above', significant problems emerge in measuring the quality, not just the quantity, of policy outputs.

[214] Comparisons with the Russian Revolution might not be appropriate here, yet they nearly always come to mind the moment we start thinking about the style of decision-making lasting until this day.

It is important to mention that all systems of policy-making across the post-Communist region (including Russia) suffer from similar problems in their implementation capacity, which is associated with a lack of policy-making expertise. While inconsistency in the content of newly adopted laws stems from a wide range of political reasons (issues of conflict, a lack of commitment and/or an ideational crisis), the quality of policy appraisal tools and feedback mechanisms indicate the level of policy-makers' capacity to follow the process of policy implementation. Generally, in a wide range of hybrid regimes, the outcomes of policy-making appear to be contextually determined, and the more autocratic political regimes are, the more flexible and insignificant their formal rules of the game turn out. Certain features of hybrid, and especially autocratic, regimes, such as executive centralization, or the extent of freedom political leaders enjoy when framing their policies, create an image of a system, which seems to be 'effectively managed'. However, the very nature of an autocratic system leaves no other option for the top-level executive but to closely follow (or control) implementation whenever they are genuinely concerned with the results.[215] In any context, bureaucratic reforms are more likely to succeed when they start from a smaller issue (such as merit-based rules), or a juncture of issues (personnel policies), which is followed by efforts to create effective policy control and appraisal mechanisms. Democratic culture, by contrast, takes time to develop, and it requires the aforementioned institutions to be deeply entrenched. The developments described here are not likely to happen in a place where an idea of a strong state (or strong institutions) is normally confused with practices of an autocratic system.

## 8.3 Concluding Remarks

This dissertation confirms that inconsistent and largely intractable reform progress across the post-Communist countries and sectors of CSR appear to be contextually driven, and that the reasons for variation in policy consequences on a cross-national basis can be attributed to the complex relationships between nascent policy actors, their 'survival strategies,' and the institutional capacities of the newly-emerged states. The first comparative chapter of my work (Chapter 4) claims that convergence is not what's happening, despite the growing tendency of national governments to experiment with foreign-born ideas. The final chapters offer an in-depth analysis of the Russian case, and claim that the politics of bureaucratic reform in this country

---

[215] Authoritarian regimes provide institutional and cultural underpinnings for the irrational use of power. This feature of an autocratic system significantly affects coherency and material effects of implementation stage.

224

must be defined in terms of leadership, state capacity, executive centralization and the transformation of the Russian political regime in 2004-2014. In Russia, CSR presents itself as a conflicted political project, and as such, it entails multiple cross-cutting difficulties associated with the lack of consensus and state capacity to follow through its own comprehensive reform initiative. Issues such as coherency of reform strategy and the extent of executive institutionalization affect both nation-states (Hungary, Czech Republic, Russia, the Baltic states) and Russian regions. Thus, comparisons of Russian regions arrive at similar conclusions as the study of CEE states, where reforms have allegedly been motivated by the dynamics of regime change.

While explanations of non-implementation are the most difficult to evaluate, they are as useful as cases of successful policy implementation. Both scenarios account for specific 'value choices' made by leaders at various stages of the reform, and both strategies could be used to evaluate resources needed to ensure successful reform progress.

It is important to bear in mind that comparative studies of post-Communist states have not fully explained the role of bureaucratic politics in defining regime stability and change. Many research projects have emphasized the role of the informal processes of democratization, liberalization and privatization. However, explanations of this kind did not pay much attention to issues of state-building, which appear to be important for the performance of state institutions. The limitations of existing approaches become obvious when we start thinking about democratization as just one of the many prerequisites of a well functioning state, which, among other things, also requires a rational and well functioning bureaucracy. In this respect, the difficulties that we currently face in finding successful cases of civil service reform proves the point that post-Communist public bureaucracies have been quite resistant to any sort of institutional transformation, even though the lack of formal progress might have served the goal of preserving and maintaining regime stability.

The last point (e.g. the importance of bureaucratic reform in either fostering democratic change or in maintaining regime stability) may be applied as a useful explanatory variable for the lack of progress during the current stage of reforms, when the pressure for democratization has been exhausted, and national governments seem to be guided by their survival rather than ideological concerns. At the same time, there might be many more factors at play, whereas 'survival strategies' could simply play role of intervening, rather than causal variables.[216]

---

[216] Currently, there is not enough evidence to confirm that CSR developments originate from the survival strategies of the newly-emerged political regimes; however, comparative chapters of my research point to the possibility of such a relationship.

The most significant contribution that this dissertation makes is to the field of post-Communism, including politics of bureaucratic reform, democratization, and state-building literature. More broadly, the study contributes to comparative politics literature, in particular the 'legacies of the past' approach and the 'agency-structure debate', which focus on the course of post-Communist transformation. In an effort to decipher the meaning of reform strategies, my dissertation explores a number of relatively new areas of research (e.g. policy-making process of hybrid and autocratic regimes; comparative policy leadership, and the study of policy implementation dynamism), and as a result, it bridges the gap between Western policy implementation scholarship and the study of post-Communist transition.[217] Overall, the study has makes a number of interdisciplinary contributions by working on the ways to improve methodology of policy implementation research with a clear operationalization of reform leadership, strategy, institutional and structural constraints upon state executive. Scholars and practitioners alike may use the methodology advanced by this dissertation in cases, which involve single countries and cross-country comparisons.

This dissertation also addresses, yet does not fully resolve several fundamental difficulties associated with issues of bureaucratic engagement and reform measurement. The first difficulty pertains to the process of opening up bureaucracy for social research; the second problem concerns the lack of definite criteria of policy implementation progress. To avoid these barriers, I suggest that we look beyond the façade of legislative process, which tends to replicate earlier norms, including their excessive imperfections. Administrative decision-making, in this respect, is more helpful in clarifying the direction of change, even though the extent of implementation progress is difficult to track, regardless of our analytical focus. All in all, this study suggests that it is important to pay attention to the incremental changes that accompany the reform. These minor changes (stemming from contextual developments rather than from a shift in preferences), such as the tactical decisions made by political and bureaucratic actors engaged in interpretations and normative adjustments of the reform, may fundamentally transform the meaning and consequences of proposed solutions. In this context, reform leadership may not be effective in mobilizing support for the reform if it relies on conventional tools alone (e.g. funding

---

[217] Efforts to apply the lens of Western policy implementation literature to the study of post-Communist transition are not completely new. Some scholars have successfully utilized John Kingdon's 'policy stream approach' to the study of Russia's regional policy, police reform, etc. However, my research refers to a different model, advanced by economic literature, which views both policy initiation and implementation as a product of efforts to mobilize support and overcome resistance. The study suggests that the dynamic of reform in hybrid and even authoritarian systems is more complex, and that none of the existing models may fully account for the flow and interaction of ideas, interests and institutions in defining the trajectory of policy-making change.

and legislative support). Strategies that treat civil servants as insignificant participants in the reform, or as a uniform entity, are also likely to be unsuccessful.

To summarize, Western scholarship should pay greater attention to the structure and outcomes of policy-making systems in post-Communist states, including their decision-making and policy implementation structures. These countries provide us with useful examples of historical contingencies and path-dependent transformations, highlighting the role of interaction among domestic and international policies, as well as the diverse paths taken by reformers depending on their policy-making preferences.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Personal Interviews (Non-Confidential)

Goncharov V. (Former) Head of the Legal Department in the Moscow city Government (Pravitel'stvo Moskvy); interview by author, Russia, Moscow, 2010.

Jakobson, L. (first vice-rector of the Higher School of Economics); interview by author, Russia, Moscow, October 2010.

Klimenko A. (Vice-Chancellor of the National Research Institute "Higher School of Economics"); interview by author, Russia, Moscow, October 2010.

Kudiukin P. (Professor of the National Research Institute "Higher School of Economics"); interview by author, Russia, Moscow, 2010.

Klishch, N. (Lecturer at the National Research Institute "Higher School of Economics"); interview by author, Russia, Moscow, 2010.

## Legal Documents, Official Statistics and Government Publications

Annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly (2000-2014) [Ezhegodnye poslaniia Presidenta Rossii Federal'nomu Sobraniiu], http://www.kremlin.ru

Federal'naia programma "Reformrovania i razvitie sistemy gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (2009-2013), (Federal Program "On Reform and Development of Civil Service System in Russia") *Rossiiskaia Gazeta Federal'nyi Vypusk,* no. 4867, March 13, 2009.

Federal'nyi zakon no. 210 (July 27, 2010) "Ob organizatsii predostavleniia gosudarsvennykh I munitsipalnykh uslug".

Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarsvennoi Statistiki, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/#

Federal'nyi zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O gosudarstvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (The Federal Law "On State Civil Service of the Russian Federation", no.79, *Rossiiskaya Gazeta Federal'nyi Vypusk,* no. 3539, July 31, 2004.

Federal'nyi zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob osnovakh gosudarstvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby" (The Federal Law "On the Basic Principles of State Civil Service", no. 119, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, August 5, 1995.
http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/federal_zak/fed5.html.

Government Resolution no. 281 "On the financial assistance of administrative reform in the Federal executive state institutions in Russian regions" (April 23, 2010). Accessed August 26, 2013.http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/12075311/

228

www.manaraa.com

Government Resolution. 2010. Rasporiazhenie Pravitel'stva RF no. 1569 "Ob Okazanii Podderzhki Provedeniia Federal'nymi Organami Ispolnitel'noi Vlasti I Vysshimi Organami Gosudarsvetnnoi Vlasti Sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii Administrativnoi Reformy v 2010 godu". *Rossiiskaia Gazeta, February 3, 2011.*

Informatsia o realizatsii meropriiatii po provedeniiu administrativnoi reform v gosudarsvennoi sluzhbe zaniatosti naseleniia Chuvashskoi Respubliki i tsentrakh zaniatosti naseleniia za 2011 god. Accessed August 26, 2013. HTTP://CAP.RU/SITEMAP.ASPX?GOV_ID=31&ID=1157321

Kontseptsiia Reformirovaniia Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Rukovodiashchii Dokument, by the President of the Russian Federation, no. 1496 of 15 August 2001 (Concept of State Service in the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation, no 1496 of August 2001). Accessed July 16, 2013. http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/%20DocumShow_DocumID_23084.html

Korshunov, Lev. 2007. O Praktike Primeneniia Federal'nogo Zakona "O Gosudarsvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii I Perspektivakh razvitiia zakonodatel'stva o gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhbe", In Federal'noe Sobranie. Gosudarsvennaia Duma. Komitet po Delam Federatsii I Regional'noi Politike, Accessed August 25, 2013. http://pvlast.ru/archive/index.376.php

Prikaz Ministerstva Truda i Sotsial'nogo Razvitiia No 604 of December 17, 2012 "Ob Utverzhdenii Kodeksa Etiki I Sluzhebnogo Povedeniia Federal'nykh Gosudarstvennykh Sluzhashikh Ministerstva Truda I Sotsial'noi Zashity RF" [Order of The Ministry of Labor and Social Development  no. 604 on the Code of Ethics for the Federal Civil Servants working in Mintrud], http://www.minpromtorg.gov.ru/docs/other/50

Ministersvo Iustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation). Obzor Normotvorchestva Sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Voprosam Gosudarstvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby Sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Overview of the Legal Activity of the Russian regions on issues related to the state civil service) (6 June, 2011), http://minjust.ru/ru/node/1582

Nechaeva, Tatiana, Kirilin, Alexei. 2013. Kommentarii k Federal'nomu Zakonu no. 79-FZ "O Gosudarsvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii", adopted on 27 July 2004. Moscow: Delovoi Dvor, Accessed September 1st, 2013,
 http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=CMB;n=17172

Polizheniia o ministerstve ekonomiki i regional'nogo razvitiia Krasnoyarskogo kraia, utverzhdennogo postanovleniiem Pravitel'stva Krasnoyarskogo kraia no. 55, August 27, 2008. http://zakon.krskstate.ru/0/doc/497

Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no. 249 ot 22 maia 2004 goda "O merakh po povysheniiu resul'tativnosti biudzhetnogo protsessa". http://www.rg.ru/2004/06/01/budzhet-dok.html

Postanovlenie Kabineta Ministrov Chuvashskoi Respubliki "O Respublikanskoi Tselevoi Programme "Provedenie Administrativnoi Reformy v Chuvashskoi Respublike v 2006-2013 godakh" (Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Chuvashia "On the Republican Targeted Program "Implementation of Administrative Reform in the Republic of Chuvashia in 1006-2013""), ConsultantPlus, Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.chulaws.ru/index.php?ds=1447318

Postanovlenie Pravitlstva RF (no. 281), April 23 2010 «Ob okazanii podderzhki provedeniia federalnymi organami ispolnitelnoi vlasti i vysshimi ispolnitelnymi organami gosudarsvennoi vlasti , Rossiiskoi Federatsii administrativnoi reformy v 2010 godu» ". http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/1207531

Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rosiiskoi Federatsii "O Tipovom Reglamente Vzaimodeistviia Federal'nykh Organov Ispolnitel'noi Vlasti" (Resolution of the Government "Standard Regulation of Interaction among the Federal Organs of the Executive Branch of Power", Resolution by the Government of the RF, no. 30 of 19 January 2005. http://www.rg.ru/2005/01/25/reglament-fedorgany-dok.html#comments

Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, "O Tipovom Reglamente Vnutrennei Organizatsii Federal'nykh Organov Ispolnitel'noi Vlasti" (Resolution by the Government no. 452 of 28.07.2005 "Standard Regulation of the Internal Structure of the Federal Executive", *Rosiiskaia Gazeta, 5 August 2005. http://www.rg.ru/2005/08/05/reglament-dok.html*

Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O Programme razvitiia biudzhetnogo federalism v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2005 goda" (s izmeneniiami i dopolneniiami). (Government Statutory Act "Program of Budget Federalism Development in the Russian Federation until 2005", no. 584 of 15 August, 2001.Informatsionno-pravovoi portal Garant, http://base.garant.ru/183645/

Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva RF no. 862, 30.07. 1998 "O Kontseptsii Reformirovaniia Mezhbiudzhetnykh Otnoshenii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1999-2001" (Government Statutory Act "Concept of State Finance of the Organs of State Power"). Accessed on July 26, 2013. http://base.garant.ru/179167/.

Proekt Kontseptsii Administrativnoi Reformy. 2003. *Indem Foundation*, March. Accessed April 10, 2012. http://www.anti-corr.ru/rutxt/2003/admin_reform/index.htm

Rasporiazhenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 1021 "Kontseptsia snizheniia administrativnykh barierov i povysheniia dostupnosti gosudarsvennykh uslug na 2011-2013 gody" (July 10, 2011).

Rasporiazhenie Predsedatelia Gosudarsvennogo Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan no. 539 –P "O Komissii po sobliudeniiu trebovanii k sluzhebnomu povedeniiu gosudarsvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashik Respubliki Tatarstan I uregulirovaniiu konflikta interesov v apparate gosudarsvennogo Sovet Respubliki Tatarstan" (October 6, 2010). Accessed September 1, 2013. http://www.gossov.tatarstan.ru/organization/apparat/komiss_ureg_konfl/raspor1

Rasporiazhenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Kontseptsia administrativnoi reformy i plan meropriiatii po provedeniiu administrativnoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2006-2008 godakh"  (Order by the Government "Concept for implementation of administrative reform in Russia and Action Plan, approved by the Decision of the Government of the RF, no. 1789-p of 25 October 2005. *www.belregion.ru/docs/rasp_1789.rtf*[218]

Sovet Federatsii RF, 2010. "*Analyticheskii Vestnik Sovetafederatsii RF*", 14 (400). Accessed  28 July 2013. http://www.budgetrf.ru/Publications/Magazines/VestnikSF/vestniksf_index13.htm

---

[218] Some of these documents deal specifically with implementation issues.

Ministerstvo Justitsii Chuvashskoi Respubliki [Chuvash Ministry of Justice]. Dnevnik Reformirovania Gossluzhby Chuvashii [Diary of Civil Service Reform in Chivashiia], Accessed Nov 13, 2014, http://gov.cap.ru/SiteMap.aspx?gov_id=25&id=100799

Ministerstvo ekonomicheskogo razvitia Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2004. Otchet o nauchno-issledovatelskoi rabote 'Razrabotka tipovykh trebovanii k protsessam informatizatsii organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti, vkliuchaia razrabotku edinoi metodologii postroenia 'elektronnogo pravitelstva' (2003-2004), vypolnennoi po zakazu Ministerstva ekonomicheskogo razvitia Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (Analytical report on 'electronic governance' project, conducted by Fond Ekonomicheskikh issledovanii "Novaia Ekonomika" by request of the Ministry of economic development and trade of the RF), Moscow. Accessed June 13, 2014. http://bigc.ru/government/actual/e-government/federal/project_4/

Ukaz Presidenta "O Komissiakh po Sobliudeniiu Trebovanii k Sluzhebnomu Povedeniiu Gosudarstvennykh Grazhdanskikh Sluzhashchikh RF i Uregulirovaniiu Konflikta Interesov" (Presidential Decree no. 821 of 1 July 2010 " On Commissions Dealing with the Standards of Conduct and Conflict of Interest Regulations"). *Rosiiskaia Gazeta, 7 July 2010, no. 5226.*Accessed July 28, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/2010/07/07/komissii-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 814 of 16 July 2009 " O vnesenii ismenenii v Ukaz Presidenta RF of 12 August 2002, no. 885" "Ob Utverzhdenii Obshchikh Printsipov Sluzhebnogo Povedeniia Gosudarstvennykh Sluzhashchikh" i obshchie printsipy utverzhdennye etim ukazom (Decree of the President "On Amendments to the Decree of 12 August 2002, no. 885 "On basic principles of office behavior of civil servants"). *Rossiiskaia Gazeta 17 July 2009, no. 4955.* http://www.rg.ru/2009/07/17/ukaz-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rosiiskoi Federatsii 'Reformirovanie i razvitie gosudarstvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby' (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no.261 of March 10, 2009 "On Federal Program "Reformation and Development of the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation 2009-2013"). *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 11 March, 2009. Accessed April 16, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/2009/03/11/ukaz-dok.html.

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "On the list of positions of the Federal Service, which require submitting income information prior to the appointment procedure" (O perechne pozitsii gosudarsvennoi federal'noi sluzhby, kotorye trebuiut prodeostavleniia svedenii o dokhodakh…), no. 557, May 18, 2009.
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=144384
Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "On the rules of submitting income information by civil service candidates" (O poriadke predostavleniia svedenii o dokhodakh…), no. 559, May 05, 2009.

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "On the placement of income information submitted by civil servants" (Ob utverzhdenii poriadka razmesheniia svedenii o dokhodakh, ob imushestve I obiazatel'stvakh imushestvennogo kharaktera lits, zameshaiushikh gosudarsvennye dolzhnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, federalnykh gosudarsvennykh sluzhashikh I chlenov ikh semei na ofitsialnykh saitakh federalnykh gosudarsvennykh organov I gosudarstvennykh organov subiektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii I predostavleniia etikh svedenii obsherossiiskim sredstvam massovoi informatsii dlia opublikovaniia), no 561, May 5, 2009. Accessed September 6 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/20/ukaz561-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii On the procedure of validation of income information submitted by civil service candidates (O proverke dostovernosti I polnoty svedenii, predstavliaemykh grazhdanami, pretenduiushimi na zameshenie dolzhnostoe federal'noi gosudarsvennoi sluzhby, I federal'nymi gosudarsvennymi gosudarstvennymi sluzhashimi trebovanii k sluzhebnomu povedeniiu), no. 1065, September 09, 2009.

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii " Ob utverzhdenii obshchikh printsipov sluzhebnogo povedeniia gosudarsvennykh sluzhashikh (v redaktsii Ukaza no. 814, 16 July 2009)" no. 885, 12 August 2002, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, July 17, 2009 Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2009/07/17/ukaz-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 1456 "On a contract-based professional education of the federal civil servants" (O podgotovke kadrov dlia federalnoi gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby po dogovoram na obuchenie", no. 1456, December 12, 2009).

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Voprosy Federalnoi Gosudarsvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby", 30 April, 2008, Sobranie Yakonodatelstva RF 2008, no.18.

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "On State Service Reform Commission" under the President of the Russian Federation (O komissii po reforme gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii), no. 1775,  December 12, 2008.

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob utverzhdenii polozheniia o poriadke provedeniia eksperimentov v khode realizatsii federal'nykh program razvitiia federalnoi gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby no. 722, 6 June, 2007 (v redaktsii Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 1643, 6 December 2007),  http://www.pfo.ru/?id=64318

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O Dopolnitel'nom professional'nom obrazovanii gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashikh Rossiiskoi Federatiss" (v redaktsii Ukaza Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 6 December, 2007, no. 1643)

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob ischislenii stazha gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby Rosiiskoi Federatsii dlia ustanovleniia gosudarstvennym grazhdanskim sluzhashim Rossiiskoi federatsii ezhemesiachnoi nadbavki k dolzhnostinomu okladu za vyslugu let na gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii, opredeleniia prodolyhitelnosti eyhegodnogo dopolnitelnogo oplachivaemogo otpuska ya vzslugu let i raymera pooshrenii ya beyuprechnuiu i effektivnuiu gosudarsvennuiu grayhdanskuiu sluyhbu Rossiiskoi Federatsii", 19 November 2007 no. 1532, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 23 November 2007, Federalnyi Vypusk no. 4526, http://www.rg.ru/2007/11/23/stazh-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O komissiakh po sobliudeniiu trebovanii k sluzhebnomu povedeniiu gosudarsvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashikh Rossiskoi Federatsii I uregulirovaniiu konflikta interesov", no. 269, 3 March 2007, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Federalnyi Vypusk no. 4310, http://www.rg.ru/2007/03/07/sluzhba.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O denezhnom soderzhanii federal'nykh gosudarsvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashikh" (v redaktsii Ukaza Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii), no. 763, 25 July 2006 (v redaktsii ukaza presidenta no. 1808, 23 December 2008), http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901990553

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii no.1574 "O Reestre Dolzhnostei Federal'noi Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby". Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Federal'nyi Vypusk no. 3968, January 12, 2006, Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2006/01/12/reestr-dolzhnostej-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Reestr Dolzhnostei Federal'noi Gosudarsvennoi Slyzhby", utverzhdennyi Ukazom Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 1574, 31 December 2005, I v Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii no. 763, July 2006. *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 20 March, 2010. Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2010/07/26/reestr-site-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii " O provedenii attestatsii gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashikh Rossiiskoi Federatsii, no 110, 1 February, 2005, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, Federal'nyi Vypusk no. 3689, 3 February, 2005 Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2005/02/03/gossluzhashie-attestacia-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii " O poriadke sdachi kvalifikatsionnogo ekzamena gosudarsvennymi grazhdanskimi sluzhashimi Rosiiskoi Federatsii i otsenki ikh znanii, navykov I umenii (professional'nogo urovnia), no 111, 3 February, 2005, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, Federal'nyi Vypusk no. 3689, 3 February, 2005 Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2005/02/03/kvalifikacia-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O konkurse na zameshenie vakantnoi dolzhnosti gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby" no 112, 1 February, 2005, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, Federal'nyi Vypusk no. 3689, 3 February, 2005 Accessed August 25, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2005/02/03/konkurs-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O poriadke prisvoeniia i sokhranenia klassnykh chinov gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii federal'nym gosudarsvennym grazhdanskim sluzhashim, no 113, 1 February 2005. Federal'nyi Vypusk 3689, http://www.rg.ru/2005/02/03/klass-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O primernoi forme sluzhebnogo kontrakta o prokhozhdenii gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii I zameshenii dolzhnosti gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii no 159. 16 February 2005, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Federal'nyi vypusk no 3703, 18 February 2005, http://www.rg.ru/2005/02/18/gossluzhba-dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniia o personal'nykh dannykh gosudarstvennogo grazhdanskogo sluzhashego Rosiiskoi Federatsii I vedenii ego lichnogo dela", no 609, 30  May 2005, Consultant Plus, 23 November 2008, http://www.pfo.ru/?id=64323

Ukaz Presidenta Rosiiskoi Federatsii "O reforme gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no.1336, November 19 2002 "On Reform of the Public Service of the Russian Federation 2003-2005"). *Rossiiskaia Gazeta,* 23 November June, 2002. Accessed April 16, 2010. http://www.rg.ru/2002/11/23/gosslujba-dok.html.

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Voprosy Struktury Federal'nykh Organov Ispolnitel'noi Vlasti" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 649 of 20 May 2004 "Issues of Federal Executive Authorities Structure". *Rossiiskaia Gazeta,* 22 May 2004. Accessed on July 26, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/2004/05/22/ykaz_dok.html

Ukaz Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii "O Merakh po Provedeniiu Administrativnoi Reformy v 2003-2004 Godakh" (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 824 of 23 July 2003). *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 23 July 2003. Accessed on July 26, 2013. http://www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/824-03.shtm

Ukaz Presidenta Rosiiskoi Federatsii "O kvalifikatsionnykh trebovaniiakh k stazhu gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby (gosudarsvennym sluzhbam inykh vidov) ili stazhu raboty po spetsial'nosti dlia federal'nykh gosudarsvennykh sluzhashchikh (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 1131, September 27, 2005 "On the qualifying requirements to the years of public service (including civil servants) and qualifying requirements to the years of service in the Federal civil service"), s izmeneniiami ot 26 iiulia 2008. Accessed on 25 August, 2013, http://www.frskuban.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=398:-----27092005--1131-q--------------------q&catid=122:2009-10-14-05-48-15&Itemid=182

Ukaz Gubernatora Kraia no. 116 –ug «O strukture organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti Krasnoyarskogo kraia», July 10, 2008. http://zakon.krskstate.ru/0/doc/485

Zakon Chuvashskoi Respubliki "O Gosudarsvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhbe Chuvashskoi Respubliki" (The Law of the Republic of Chuvashia no.11 "On the State Civil Service Reform), Information Data Base "Chuvash Republic", March 23, 2005. Accessed 25 August, 2013, http://base.consultant.ru/regbase/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=RLAW098;n=55565

Zakon Krasnoyarskogo Kraia no. 14-3514 «O Reestre Dolzhnostei Gosudarsvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby Krasnoyarskogo Kraia», June 09, 2005.

Zakon Krasnoyarskogo Kraia no. 17-4314 «Ob osobennostiakh organizatsii i pravovogo regulirovaniia gosudarsvennoi grazhdanskoi sluzhby Krasnoyarskogo Kraia», December 20, 2005, http://zakon.krskstate.ru/0/doc/2512

Zakon Krasnoyarskogo Kraia no. 6-1930 «O Pravite'stve Krasnoyarskogo Kraia i inykh organakh ispolnitel'noi vlasti Krasnoyarskogo Kraia», July 10, 2008, http://zakon.krskstate.ru/0/doc/677

Zakon Krasnoyarskogo Kraia no. 8-3610 «O Protivodeistvii korruptsii v Krasnoyarskom krae»,July 7, 2009, http://zakon.krskstate.ru/0/doc/1857

Zakonodatel'naia Duma Tomskoi Oblasti. «Obzor Normotvorchestva subiektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii Sibirskogo Federal'nogo Okruga v Sfere Gosudarstvennoi Grazhdanskoi Sluzhby za period s 24.11.2012 по 23.05.2013". Informatsionnyi Biulleten' no. 3 (96), http://duma.tomsk.ru/page/12219/

**Books, Newspapers and Periodicals**

Aarevaara, Timo. 1999. "Restructuring Civil Service in Russian Public Administration". Ministry of Finance, Public Management Department, Research Reports no. 17.  Helsinki. Accessed July 26, 2013. *unpan1.un.org/.../public/.../unpan003983.pdf*

Adel, Abdellatif. 2003. "Good Governance and Its Relationship to Democracy and Economic Development". Global Forum III on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity". Seoul 20-31, UNDP. Accessed 29 August, 2012.

Adler, Paul S., and Borys, Bryan. 1996. "The types of bureaucracy: enabling and coercive", *Administrative Science Quarterly* 41, (1): 61. Accessed on 28 Aug.2012.

Akhunov, Pulat. 2012. Uzbekistan. Kto Zaimetsia Reformami? *Fergana News.* Last updated October 1, 2012.  http://www.fergananews.com/articles/7504

Aleksandrova, Anastasiia, Bychkov, Dmitrii, and Grishina, Elena. 2007. "Kadrovyi Potentsial Grazhdanskikh Sluzhashikh kak Resurs Reform Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia". *Problemy Upravleniia: Teoriia i Praktika* (1):53-70. Accessed 26 July 2012. http://www.urbaneconomics.ru/publications/?mat_id=399

Antoshina, Natalia. 2011. Doklad "Ob Opyte Realizatsii Reformirovaniia i Razvitiia Gosudarstvennoi Slyzhby v PFO". Paper presented on the Russian Conference on the Reform and Development of Civil Service System. Accessed on August 26, 2013, http://pda.pfo.ru/?id=21488

Arkhangelskaya, Natalia. 2003. Politika. Reforma Gossluzhby. Stekliannyi Potolok. *Expert* 8 (362): 60-64. Accessed July 26, 2013. http://expert.ru/expert/2003/08/08ex-gosslug1_33954/

Ashimbayev, Daniyar. 2002. "Staff Decides Everything." *Continent*, March 20–April 2 (Russian).

———. 2007. "Nur Otan Won Elections from Itself." *Central Asia* September 3. (Russian). ⟨http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1188811920 ⟩. (October 1, 2007).

Atkinson, Michael and Coleman, William. 1992.  Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance, *Governance,* 5 (2): 154-180.

Barabashev Alexei, Klimenko Andrei. 2010. "Retrospektivnyi analiz napravlenii modernizatsii sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniia i gosudarstvennoi sluzgby", Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo i Munitsipalnogo Upravlenia, no. 3:43-44.

Barabashev, Alexei, Zaytseva, Tatiana, Krasnov, Mikhail, Obolonsky, Aleksandr. 2007. Risks of Public Service Reform in Russia, no. 2-3: 91–124.

Barabashev, Aleksei. 2005. "Russian Civil Service and Its Reform in Comparative Perspective"). Accessed July 26, 2013. www.pmranet.org/conferences/.../pmra.**barabashev**.straussman.2005.doc

Barabashev, Alexei, Zaitseva, Tatiana, Kozbenko, V. 2003. Reforma Gosudarstvennoo Sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2000-2003 godakh. Moskow: Higher School of Economics.

Barsukov, Yurii and Buturin, Dmitrii. 2012. "Minekonomiki Darovali Eticheskii Kodeks" (Ministry of the Economic Development has been granted with an Ethics Code), *Kommersant*, Novermber 20. Accessed July 26, 2013, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2071182

Barzelay, Michael.2001. *The new public management: improving research and policy dialogue.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Beblavy, Miroslav. 2002. "Management of Civil Service Reform in Central Europe." In *Mastering Decentralization and Civil Service Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe*. Edited by Gabor Peteri, 56-72. Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002. Accessed April 16, 2013. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/june2004seminar/Chapter3.pdf

Bell, Stephen. 2002. "Institutionalism". In John Summers (Ed.), *Government, Politics, Power and Policy In Australia,* 7th edition, 363-380. NSW Australia: Pearson Education Australia.

Beisembaev, A. 2010. "Systema Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby Respubliki Kazakhstan: Tendentsii i Perspektivy". *Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo i Munitsipal'nogo Upravleniia* (3): 100-124.

Bercik, Peter, and Nemec, Juraj. 2000. "The Civil Service System of the Slovak Republic". In Verhejen, Tony, Kotchegura, Alexander. (Eds.). 2000. *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe.* Edward Elgar publication, 184-205.

Brewer, Gene A. 2004. "Does Administrative Reform Improve Bureaucratic Performance? A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis." *Public Finance and Management* 4 (3): 399-428.

Brym, Robert J., and Gimpelson, Vladimir. 2004. "The Size, Composition and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in 1990s." *Slavic Review* 63 (1): 90-112.

Blokland, Hans. 2006. *Modernization and its political consequences: Weber, Mannheim and Schumpeter*, translated Nancy Smyth Van Weesep. New Haven : Yale University Press.

Bouckaert, Geert. 2009. *Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe,* Halduskultuur, 10, 94-104.

Butcher, Tony, and Massey, Andrew, Eds. 2004. *Modernizing Civil Services.* Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar.

Cameron, David, 2007. "Post-Communist Democracy: The Impact of the European Union," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 23, July-September.

Cameron, David, 2009. "Creating Market Economies after Communism: The Impact of the European Union," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 25, January-March.

Cameron, David, 2012. "Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol.28, January-March.

Campbell, John. 2007. "Institutional Reproduction and Change". In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis*, edited by Glenn Morgan, John L. Campbell, Colin Crouch, Peer

Hull Kristensen, Ove K. Pedersen, and Richard Whitley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Accessed July 26, 2012.
http://desinuam.org/desin/imagenescampbell/uno-a.pdf

Chackerian, Richard and Mavina, Paul. 2001. "Comprehensive Administrative Reform Implementation: Moving Beyond Single Issue Implementation Research". *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 11 (3): 353-378.

Christensen, Tom, and Lægreid, Per. 2009. "Democracy and administrative policy: Contrasting elements of NPM and post-NPM." Paper presented at EGPA Annual Conference 'The Public Service: Public Service Delivery in the Information Age', Study Group VI: Governance of Public Sector Organizations, Malta, September 2-5, 2009. Accessed on 9 Jul. 2012. http://www.egpa2009.com/documents/psg6/Christensen%20&%20Laegreid .pdf.

———. 2007. Eds. *Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Cohen, John M. and Peterson, Stephen B. (1999) *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Considine, Mark. 2005. *Making Public Policy: Institutions, Actors, Strategies*. Cambridge: Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2005.

Dmitriev, Mikhail. 2006. "Kuda Propal Zakon o Korruptsii?" *Noavaya Gazeta* 93, December 07. Accessed April 16, 2013.
http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/93n/n93n-s00.shtml

Dmitriev M. (2006) "Syrievuiu Iglu Smenit Igla Importa". *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 27 February. Accessed July 26, 2013. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2006-02-27/1_korruption.html
Deliagin Michael. 2007. "Itog Administrativnoi Reformy – Biurokraticheskii Paralich". *Rossia i Sovremenny Mir* (1): 161-170. http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=9447770

Dukenbaev, Askat. 1999. "Administrative Reform in Kygyzstan: Problems and Perspectives". American University of Kyrgyzstan. [Online] Accessed August 1, 2013.

Dabla-Norris, Era, Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, and Norregaard, John. 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization in Russia: Economic Performance and Reform Issues". Paper presented at Conference on Postelection Strategy, International Monetary Fund – IMF. Moscow, 5–7 April. Accessed on July 26, 2012.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/invest/pdf/norris.pdf

Dabla-Norris, Era, Martinez-Vazuez,  Jeorge, and Norregard, John. 2000. Making Decentralization Work: The Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ISP Working Paper No. 9. Accessed July 26, 2012.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/norris.pdf

Dery, David. 2002. "Fuzzy Control." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 12 (2): 191–216.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2005."The Rise and Demise of the New Public Management",  Post-Autistic Economics Review, issue no. 33, 14 September 2005, 17-28, accessed 26 July 2012.
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue33/Drechsler33.htm

Duvanova, Dinissa. 2007. Research notes on Post-Communist Civil Service Reforms and Good Governance. CSDP. Princeton Univerwity. December 13.Accessed July 26, 2013.

Duvanova, Dinissa. 2007. Bureaucratic Corruption and Collective Action: Business Associations. *Comparative Politics* 37 (4):441-61.

Edvins, Vangas, and Balanoff, Howard. 2000. Latvia: A Civil Service System in Development. In Verhejen, Tony, Kotchegura, Alexander. (Eds.). 2000. *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe.* Edward Elgar publication, 267-297.

Eriksen, Svein. 2007. "Institution Building in Central and Eastern Europe: Foreign Influences and Domestic Responses", *Review of Central and East European* Law (32): 333-369.

Emrich-Bakenova, Saule. 2009. Trajectory of Civil Service Development in Kazakhstan: Nexus of Politics and Administration. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions* 22 (4): 717-745.

Faletti Tlia G. 2006. "Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something New." APSA-CP, *Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association* 17. 1 (Winter): 9-14.

Gajduschek, Gyorgy. 2007. "Politization, Professionalization, or Both? Hungary's Civil Service System." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40: 343–362.

Gaman-Golutvina, Oxana. 2008. The Changing Role of the State and State Bureaucracy in the Context of Public Administration Reforms: Russian and Foreign Experience. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 24 (1):37-53.

Ganev, Valentin. 2001. "Dysfunctional Sinews of Power. Problems of Bureaucracy-Building on the Postcommunist Balkans". Paper presented at the conference on "Civil Society, Political Society and the State: A Fresh Look at the Problems of Governance in the Balkan Region," Split, Croatia, November 23-24.

Garvey, Gerald. *Facing the Bureaucracy: Living and Dying in a Public Agency* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993).

Gazeta kz. 2007a. "New Akim of South Kazakhstan Is Not Planning Reorganization of Regional Akimat Staff." http://www.gazeta⟩ (September 2, 2007). (Russian). http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=95146⟩. (September 3 2007).(Russian).

Gel'man, Vladimir and Ross, Cameron. 2010. *The Politics of Sub-National Authoritarianism in Russia*, edited by Vladimir Gel'man and Cameron Ross. Aldershot: Ashgate.

George, Alexander and Tim McKeown. 1985. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational decision Making." in Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, eds., *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, Greenwich, CT. JAI Press, 43-68.

Győrym Istvan (1999). The Civil Service System of Hungary, In Verhejen, Tony, Kotchegura, Alexander. (Eds.). 2000. *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe.* Edward Elgar publication, 131-158.

Gudkov, Lev. 2010. *Problema Elity v Sovremennoi Rossii – Razmyshlenia nad Rezultatami Sotsiologicheskogo Issledovania*. Edited by Lev Gudkov, Boris Dubin, and Iurii Levada. Moscow: Fond Libaral'naia Missiia.

Goetz Klaus. 2001. Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8 (6):1032-1051.

Goetz, Klaus, Wallman, Hellmut. 2001. "Governmentalizing Central Executives in Post-Communist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison", *Journal of European Public Policy* 8 (6) December: 864–887.

Ghindar, Angelica. 2009. "Why Go Democratic? Civil Service Reform in Central and Eastern Europe". PhD Diss. University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, 2009.UMI: 3362793.

Grindle Merilee, and John W. Thomas. 1991 *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2007. *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2008. Beyond Clientalism: Incumbent Capture and State Building. *Comparative Political Studies 40th Anniversary Special Issue*, April/ May.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2006. The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions: Post-Communist Party Competition and State Oversight. *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (10):1-30.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2004. Political Competition and the Politicization of the State. *Comparative Political Studies*, December.

Hall, Peter and Rosemary, Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44 (5): 936-957.

Hashimov, Shukhrat. 2008. "Why Does One Hand Slap the Other?" *Respublika*, December 12: 8 (Russian).

Higher School of Economics. 2004. "Reforma Gossluzhby v Rossii – Issledovanie Gosudarstvennykh i Munitsipalnykh Sluzhashikh", Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2004. Accessed Jul 9.2012. http://www.politanaliz.ru/articles_570.html.

Howlett, Michael. 2002. Do Networks Matter? Linking Policy Network Structure to Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Four Canadian Policy Sectors 1990-2000. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35 (2): 235-267.

Hunold, Christian, and Peter B. Guy. 2008. *Bureaucratic Discretion and Deliberative Democracy*. IGI Publishing Hershey, PA, USA.

Huskey, Eugene. 2012. "De-bureaucratizing the State," in Lena Johnson and Stephen White (eds.), *Waiting for Reform under Putin and Medvedev*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huskey, Eugene. 2012. "Legitimizing the Russian Executive: Identity, Technocracy, and Performance," in Per-Arne Bodin, Stefan Hedlund, and Elena Namli (eds.), *Power and Legitimacy: Challenges from Russia*. London: Routledge.

Huskey, Eugene, 2012. "The Challenges to Deregulating Russia: Business Registration Policy and Practice under Putin," in David Linnan (ed.), *Legitimacy, Legal Development & Change:*

*Law and Modernization Reconsidered. Burlington*, VT: Ashgate.

Huskey, Eugene. 2012 (January)."The Bureaucracy," in Graeme Gill (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics*. New York : Routledge.

Huskey Eugene. 2011. "The 2010 Referendum and Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan" (with David Hill), *Electoral Studies*, 30 (3).

Huskey, Eugene. 2009. *Russian Bureaucracy and the State: Officialdom from Alexander III to Vladimir Putin*. Co-editor and contributor, with Don Rowney. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huskey, Eugene. 2011 (May-June). "Narrowing the Sites and Moving the Targets: Institutional Instability and the Development of an Opposition in Kyrgyzstan" (with Gulnara Iskakova), *Problems of Post-Communism*, 58 (3): 3-10.

Huskey, Eugene. 2010. "Elite Recruitment and State-Society Relations in Technocratic Authoritarian Regimes: The Russian Case," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, no. 4,  363-372.

Huskey, Eugene. 2005. "The Politics-Administration Nexus in Post-Communist Russia". The Paper Prepared for the ICCEES Conference, Berlin, July 26.

Huskey, Eugene. 1999. Presidential Power in Russia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

ICPS. 2007. "Administrative reform: Government stalls, ICPS holds public talks". ICPS newsletter  no. 4 (351), Kyiv, Ukraine, 5. Accessed July 26, 2013. http://www.pasos.org/www-pasosmembers-org/news/administrative-reform-ukraine-s-government-stalls-icps-holds-public-talks

Igaliev, Marat, and Igalieva, Dina. 2005. "Major Development Trends among Kazakh Regional Elite in 2004." *Analytic* 1 (25): 34–38 (Russian).

IGPDE Institut. 2011. Public Management Outlook. IGPDE Newsletter "Research", no. 37, April-May. Accessed July 26, 2013.

Innocente, Caterina. 2012. 'A Russian Pro Forma: Falsified Declarations of Income Speak Volumes' [Online], May 3,  http://imrussia.org/en/economy/233-fake-economy

International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS). 2001.  "Reform of public administration in Latvia— a useful example for Ukraine", Newsletter , no. 135, 24 December.

Izdebski, Hubert, and Kulesza, Michal. 1999. *Public Administration. An Introduction*.Warsaw: Liber.

Jacoby, Henry. 1973. *The bureaucratization of the world*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA

Jakobson, Lev. 2010. "The Ambivalent Effect of Public Procurement Reform." Paper presented at the VII World Congress (ICEES). 26-31 July, Stockholm.

Jakobson, Lev. 2002. "Reforma Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby: Interesy i Prioritety", *Obshestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost', 3,* 5-22.

Jakobson, Lev. 2001. "Public Management in Russia: Changes and Inertia". *International Public Management Journal* 4 (1): 27-48.

———. 2011. "Public Management in Russia: Changes and Inertia." *International Public Management Journal*, 4 (1): 27-48.

Jasaitis, Edwards. (1999). "Lithuania: A Civil Service System in Transition". In Verhejen, Tony, and Kotchegura, Alexander. (Eds.). 1999. *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe.* Edward Elgar publication, 299-323.

Johannsen, Lars, and Norgaard, Ole. 2001. "Governance and State Capacity in Post-Communist states." Paper prepared for Workshop no. 2, 'Political transformation in Soviet successor states: the politics of CIS states in comparative and theoretical perspective.' ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Institute of Political Studies, Grenoble. Accessed April 16, 2013. http://pure.au.dk/portal/en/publications/governance-and-state-capacity-in-postcommunist-states(17aa7590-1320-11db-bee9-02004c4f4f50).html.

Kamrack, Elaine C., "*Government innovation around the world".* Ash Institute for Democratic reform and Innovation, November 2003, Web. 30 Aug. 2012,http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/25/2551.pdf

Kaufman Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2007. "Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999979

Kaufman Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2007. "Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2007" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148386

Kettl, Donald. 2000. "The Global Public Management Revolution. A Report on the Transformation of Governance". Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Khan, Mohammad. 2001. Problems of Democracy: Administrative Reform and Corruption. *BIISS Journal* 22(1):1-24.*Review of European and Russian Affairs* 8 (1), 2013 1

Kingdon, John. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, Public Policies (2nd Edition). New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Klimenko. (2005). Mekhanizmy Novogo Gosudarstvennogo Upravlenia i modernizirovannoi biurokratii v kontseptsii administrativnoi reform. *Chinovnik* 5 (39) http://chinovnik.uapa.ru/modern/article.php?id=605.

Knill, Christoph. 1999. "Explaining Cross-National Variance in Administrative Reforms: Autonomous versus Instrumental Bureaucracies", *Journal of Public Policy,* 19 (2): 113-139.

Knott, Jack. 1998. "A Return to Spoils: TheWrong Solution for the Right Problem." *Administration & Society* 29 (6): 660–669.

Knox, Colin. 2008. Kazakhstan: modernizing government in the context of political inertia. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 74:477.

Kommersant. 2013.Glavam Gosuchrezhdenii Dali Pravila Zakonnogo Obogasheniia. Kommersant no.45 (5076), 16.03.2013.

Konov Alexey. [2006?]. "Public Service and Administrative Reform in Russia." Report by the Working Group on Public Sector Quality. Accessed April 16. 2013. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN025557.pdf

Korshunov, Valerii. 2007. Administrativnaia Reforma – Vazhnyi Shag na Puti Politicheskoi Modernizatsii Kazakhstana. *Казахстан в глобальных процессах (4): 99-110. Accessed* 31 August, 2013. http://iwep.kz/stariysite/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=120&Itemid=44

Kotchegura, Alexander. 2008. *Civil Service Reform in Post-Communist Countries. The Case of the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic.* Leiden: Leiden University Press.

Kozhahmetov, Asylbek. 2007. "Urgent Problems in Kazakhstan's Public Administration Reform." *KUB*, March 19. (Russian). http://www.kub.info/article.php?sid=16758⟩. (March 20, 2007).

Krasnov Mikhail, and Satarov, Georgyi. History of the first attempts to administrative reform (1997-1998). *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, 2. Accessed on July 26, 2010. http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2004/2/2004_2_18.html

Krepak, Petr. 2001. "Monitoring Civil Service Reform in Kazakhstan: Achievements and Costs: In Search of Ways to Improve Civil Service." Public Policy Initiative: Applied Policy Research. Alamty (Russian).

Kulikov, Maksim. 2004. Kommentarii. Reforma Gossluzhby. Peremena Vyvesok. *Vedomosti,* No. 68, April 20. Accessed July 31, 2013. http://dlib.eastview.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/browse/doc/6163875

Kurdycka B., 2002 "Zmiany w pozycji i statusie urzędników administracji publicznej. Nowe wyzwania i trendy" in: *Służba cywilna* nr. 4.

Legro, Jeffrey. 2000. "The Transformation of Policy Ideas". *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 419-432.

Levchenko, Alexei. 2009. "Chinovniki Peregruzili Rossiiu. Chislo chinovnikov v rossii uvelichilos v 10 raz". 19 March, 2009, *Gazeta.ru*, Accessed September 5, 2013, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2009/03/19_a_2960575.shtml

Levitsky, Stephen and Way, Lucan A. 2010. "Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field". *Journal of Democracy* 21. No.1: 57-68.

Levitsky, Stephen and Way, Lucan A. 2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April): 51-65, **"**Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field,**"** Journal of Democracy 21, no.1 (January 2010): 57-68.

Levi, Margaret. 1997. "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis". In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure.* Edited by Mark LichBach and Alan Zucherman. Cambridge University Press.

Liter. Kz. 2005. "Model of Kazakh Civil Service Is Almost Ideal." January 29. http://www.liter.kz/print.php?Ian=rssian&id=151&pub=924). (June 15, 2007). (Russian).

Lodge, Martin. 2003. Limitations of Policy Transfer. *Political Studies Review* (1): 179-193, Accessed on 13 September 2012.

Lukes, Steven. 1975. Power: a Radical View. London: Macmillan, 1974 and New Jersey: Humanities Press (Trans. into Spanish, Japanese, Polish and in part into French)

Lynn, Laurence E. 2010. What Endures? Public Governance and the Cycle of Reform (105-125). In Stephen P. Osborne, *The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.

Lynn, Laurence E. 2006. "The New Public Management as an International Phenomenon: A Skeptical View", in Eric E. Otenyo, Nancy S. Lind (ed.) *Comparative Public Administration (Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Volume 15*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 573-591.

Lynn, Laurence E. and Stein, Sydney. 2000. "Globalization and administrative Reform: What is Happening in Theory?" Prepared for publication in Public Management and based on a presentation at the Closing Plenary of the Fourth International Research Symposium on Public Management (IRSPM IV), Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 10-11 April, 2000. http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_00_4.pdf

Lynn, Laurence. 1998. The New Public Management: How to Transform a Theme into a Legacy, *Public Administration Review* 58(3): 231-7.

Majcherkiewicz, Tatiana. 2005. "Nomenklatura Versus Civil Service: Defining Politico-Administrative Relations under Miller's Government. Paper Presented at 13th NISPAcee Annual Conference, "Democratic Governance for the XXI Century: Challenges and Responses in CEE Countries", Moskva, 19-21.05.

Majcherkiewicz, Tatiana. 2001. *An Elite in Transition: An Analysis of the Higher Administration of the Region of Upper Silesia, Poland 1990-1997* (niepublikowana praca doktorska). London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, Sociology Departament.

Majcherkiewicz, Tatiana, and Gadowska, Kaja. 2005. "Political Clientalism in Public Administration: A Case-Study of Institutional Changes in the Post-Communist state of Poland". Paper presented at the 13th NISPAcee Annual Conference, "Democratic Governance for the XXI Century: Challenges and Responses in CEE Countries", Moscow, 19-21 May. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan023770.pdf

243

Majcherkiewicz, Tatiana. 2004. Decentralisation and Efficient Regional Governance in Poland. Politico-administrative relations in Polish regions, 1989-2001, Proceedings of the NISCPcee 11th Annual Conference on Capacities to Govern Challenges facing the CEE countries Bucharest, 10-12.04.

Majcherkiewicz, Tatiana. "Between the Pool of Spoils and Shallow Professionalism – the Role and Cadres of the Political Cabinets of Ministers and Prime Ministers of Poland in the Period, 1997-2006". University of Cracow. [Online]. Accessed 1 August, 2013.

Majone, Giandomenico. 1989. Evidence, argument, and persuasion in the policy process. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Manning, Nick and Parison, Neil. 2003. *International Public Administration Reform. Implications for the Russian Federation*. The World Bank. Washington DC.

Makeyenko P., Gabrielian V., Holzer M. 1999. "The New Russian Bureaucracy: What is new about it?" *International Journal of Public Administration* (22): 13-37.

Matei, Lucia, and Lazar, Corina. 2009. "Development and regulation of civil service in Central and Eastern European states. A comparative analysis in view of good governance". Paper presented on IIAS Conference, Helsinki, July 28. Accessed July 26, 2013.

Matland, Richard. 1995. "Synthesizing Policy Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation". *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 5 (2): 145-174.

Mazmanian, Daniel, and Sabatier, Paul. 1981. *Effective Policy Implementation*. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass: D.C. Health.

Medvedev, Dmitry. 2009. "Rossiia Vpered!", http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5413

Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Henrik. 2009. "Sustainability of Civil Service Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe Five Years After EU Accession", Sigma Papers, No. 44, OECD Publishing. Accessed April 16, 2013. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5kml60pvjmbq.pdf?expires=1366153532&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=AC6282848E27BF0CF002230F45713193 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml60pvjmbq-en.

Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Henrik. 2012. "Civil Service Professionalization in the Western Balkans". SIGMA Paper, no. 48. GOV/SIGMA (48). Accessed July 26, 2013.

Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Henrik. 2009. "Varieties of legacies: a critical review of legacy explanations of public administration reform in East Central Europe". *International Review of Administrative Sciences* (75): 509-528.

Mendras, Maria. 2002. "The State is Weak, Administrations are Strong. Assessing the Functionality of Bureaucracies in Russia." Paper presented at the Honesty and Trust Project workshop Collegium, Budapest, 13-14 December:1-25. Accessed April 16, 2013. www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/mendras/pub02.doc.

Morozova, Elena. 2004. "Praktika Informatsionnogo Soprovozhdeniia Reformy Gosudarsvennoi Sluzhby v Regionakh". In "Strategiia Reformy Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia v Rossii i ee

Realizatsiia na Regional'nom Urovne". Proceedings of the Conference, September 28–29 сентября 2004 (282-285).

Morozova, Elena. 2004. "O Provedenii eksperimentov i osushestvlenii pilotnykh proektov po vnedreniiu novykh podkhodov organizatsii gosudarstvennoi sluzhby v Chuvashskoi Respublike". In "Strategiia Reformy Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia v Rossii i ee Realizatsiia na Regional'nom Urovne". Proceedings of the Conference, September 28–29 сентября 2004 (182-191).

Nee, Victor, and Ingram, Paul. 1998. "Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure". In *The New Institutionalism in Sociology*. Ed. By Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

Nigro G. L., Kellough J. E. 2006. The States and Civil Service Reform: Lessons learned and Future Prospects, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Novoselova Natalia. 2010. Konflikt Interesov na Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhbe: Nekotorye Problemy Pravoponimania, *Admnistrativnoe Pravo i Protsess* (6). Accessed August 25, 2013. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=CJI;n=49888

Nunberg, Barbara. 1999. *The State After Communism: Administrative Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

*Obolonskyi Aleksander. 2011. Grazhdanin i Gosudarstvo: Novaia Paradigma Vzaimootnoshenii. Problemy Upravleniia – Teoriia i Praktika (1), 5-16.*

Obolonsky Aleksander. 2006. Storonniki i Protivniki Reformy Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby, *Obshestvennye Nauki i sovremennost* (5):43-49.

O'Dwyer, Conor. 2006. *Runaway State-Building: patronage politics and democratic development.* Johns Hopkins U. Press.

OECD.1997. "Country Pofiles of Civil Service Training Systems", *SIGMA Papers*, No. 12, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml6g5hxlf6-en

O'Loughlin, Michail. 1990. "What is Bureaucratic Accountability and How Can we Measure It?" *Administration and Society* 22 (3):275-302.

Oleinik, Anton. 2008. Reforming the State Without Changing the Model of Power. On Administrative Reform in Post-Socialist Countries. London and New York: Routledge.

Oleinik, Anton. 2009, ed. *Reforming the State without Changing the Model of Power? On Administrative Reform in Post-Socialist Countries*. London and New York: Routledge. 2009.

Oleinik Anton. 2006. "Administrativnaia Reforma – Nezachet po Kachestvu Vlasti". *Vedomosti*, no. 225, 29.11. 2006, (1752), http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2006/11/29/116666

Parison, Nill. 2000. "Russia: Public Administration Reform, Issues and Options." The World Bank Conference on Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, April 5-7. Accessed April 16. 2013. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/invest/pdf/parison.pdf

Parsons, Wayne. 2001. "Modernizing Policy-Making for the 21st Century". *Public Policy and*

*Administration*, 16(3):93-110.

Perlman, Bruce, and Gleason, Grefory. 2007. "Cultural Determinism Versus Administrative Logic: Asian Values and Administrative Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan". *International Journal of Public Administration,* 30 (2): 1327-1342.

Peters, Guy. 2010. "Democracy and Bureaucracy". *Public Organization Review* 10:209–222.

Peters, Guy P. 2006. Debating Governance. Authority, steering and democracy: Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pew Global Attitudes Research Project. 2009. *"The Pulse of Europe 2009: 20 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall. End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations",* November 2. Accessed July 26, 2012.
 http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-reservations/

Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-267.

Pigarev, Artem, 2007. "Vladimir Putin Prinial Otstavku Konstantina Titova", Kommersant-online, 27 August, Accessed 25 August, 2013, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/798867

Polidano, Charles. 2001. "Why Civil Service Reforms Fail?" IDPM Public Policy and Management Working Paper no.16. Accessed July 12 2012. http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=447.

Politt, Christopher, and Geert Bockaert. 2004. *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Popva, Olga, 2006. "Ushel po Sobstvennomu Zhelaniiu", Ekspert no. 21 (515), 5 June, Accessed August 25, 2013,
http://expert.ru/expert/2006/21/vozvraschenie_pered_uhodom/

Prescott, Elizabeth. 2007. "The Politics of Disease: Governance and Emerging Infections." *Journal of Global Health Governance* 1 (1) . Accessed on 28 Aug. 2012.

Pressman, Jeffrey, and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or Why It's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This being  a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes.* University of California, Berkeley.

*"*Putin Prinial Otstavku Gubernatora Samarskoi oblasti Konstantina Titova. Vremennym i.o. nazanchen glava AvtoVaza", Accessed August 29, 2007,
http://www.newsru.com/russia/27aug2007/artyakov.html

Randma-Liiv, Tiina. 2008. New Public Management versus Neo-Weberian State in Central and Eastern Europe, *Journal of Public Administration and Policy. Special Issue:* "A Distinctive European Model? The Neo-Weberian State", 1(2), Winter.

Randma-Liiv, Tiina, and Tõnnisson, Kristina. 2006. "Country Public Management Profile: Estonia". NISPAcee Annual Conference. WGII: The Impact of Public Management Reforms in CEE and the CIS, Ljubljana, 11-13 May.

Riggs, Fred. 2000. "Exporting Governance?", last modified 27 November 2000 http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/aladin.htm#tri

Riggs, Fred W. 200(?). "Globalization and Public Administration". Accessed on 28 Aug. 2012, http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/glopa.htm

Rochefort, David, and Roger Cobb. 1993. Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice. *Policy Studies Journal* 21 (1), 56-71, March.

Ross, Cameron. 2003. "Putin's Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One new Step Forward, Two Steps Back." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36: 29-47.

Ryavec, Karl. 2003. *Russian Bureaucracy: Power and Pathology*. Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield.

Sabatier, Paul. 1986. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggesyed Synthesis. *Journal of Public Policy* 6 (1), 21-48.

Satarov, Georgii, Levin Mikhail, Golovoshinsky Konstantin, Rimsky Vladimir. 2002. *Zarabotnaya Plata i Korruptsiia: Kak Platit Rossiikim Chinovnikam. Analiticheskyi Doklad*. Moscow: Regionalnyi Obshestvennyi Fond "Informatika dlia Demokratii" (Fond Indem). Accessed July 26, 2012. http://www.indem.ru/satarov/ZarplCor.htm

Shabrov, Oleg. 2005. Reforma Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby: Otkrytost' ili Effektivnost'? *Sotsiologia Vlasti,* 6. Accessed July 26 2012. http://shabrov.info/Statji/transpar.htm

Shabrov, Oleg. 2005. "Reforma Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby: Otkrytost ili Effektivnost?" *Sotsiologia Vlasti,* 6. Accessed July 9, 2012. http://shabrov.info/Statji/transpar.htm

Sharov, Alexei. 2004. Osnovnye element Reformy Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia. In "Strategiia Reformy Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia v Rossii i ee Realizatsiia na Regional'nom Urovne". Proceedings of the Conference, September 28–29.

Schatz, Edward. 2004. *Modern Clan Politics: The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Smalskys, Vainius, Urbanovič, Jolanta, Minkevičius, Aleksandras. 2013 "The Development of Civil Service Reforms in Lithuania". Paper presented on NISPAcee conference, Belgrade. Accessed on July 26, 2013.

Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1990. Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools. *Journal of Politics* 52 (2): 510-29.
Schneider, Anne, and Helen, Ingram. 1993. Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy. American Political Science Review 87 (2): 334-47.

Shofield, Jill. 2001. "Time for a Revival? Public Policy Implementation: A Review of the literature and the Agenda for Future Research". *International Journal for Future Research*, 3 (3), September.

Silberman, Bernard. 1993. "Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain", University of Chicago Press.

Smorgunov, Leonid. 2008. "Administrativnaya Reforma v Regionakh – Mesto IKT v Strategiiakh Razvitiia." Sankt-Peterburgskii Gosudarstvenny Universitet. *Internet i Sovremennie Obshestvo,* IMS. Accessed on July 9, 2012. http://www.ict.edu.ru/vconf/files/10367.pdf

Solomon, Peter. 2010. "Improving Russian Justice with Foreign Assistance: Model Courts and the Tactical Approach," *Governance 23 (3)*: 437-462.

Solomon, Peter. 2008. "Law in Public Administration: How Russia Differs." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 24 (1): 115-135.

Solomon, Peter H., ed. 1997. Reforming Justice in Russia, 1864-1996. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Solomon, Peter and Foglesong, Todd S. 2000. Courts and Transition in Russia: The Challenge of Judicial Reform. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Staroňová, Katarína, and Milakova L. 2001. "Politico-administrative relations: The Case of Slovakia". In *Politico-Administrative Relations,* Tony Veheijen ed, Bratislava: NISPAcee, 268-294.

Staroňová, Katarína and Milakova L. 2003."Politico-Administrative Relations under the Coalition Government: The Case of Slovakia". In *Politico-Administrative Relations under the Coalition Governments: Lessons from the CEE Countries*, L. Vass and Tony Verheijen, eds. Bratislava: NISPAcee, 2003.

Staroňová, Katarína and Gajduschek, Gyorgy. "Politico-Administrative Relations in Slovakia and Hungary: Road to professionalization of Civil Service?" In Civil Servants and Politics: A Delicate Balance, ed. By Neuhold,Sophie Vanhoonacker,Luc Verhey. [Online] Available at: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137316813. (Accessed: 31 July 2013).

Steinmo, Sven, *Kathleen,* Thelen and *Frank,* Longstreth, eds. 1992. *Structuring Politics Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stokke, Olav. 2007. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Shaming, and International Regime Effectiveness". *Journal of Business Research*, 60 (5):501-511.

Stone, Deborah. 1989. "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas". *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (2): 281-300.

Stone, Deborah. 2002. "Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making." New York: Norton.

Stoutenborough, James W. and Oxley, Douglas R. 2011. "Improving the Likelihood of Effective Policy Outcomes: A Theory of Policy Diffusion". Working Paper, 12-13.

Taylor, Brian. D. 2011. *State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Heritage Foundation. 2013. "The 2013 Index of Economic Freedom", by the Heritage Foundation,   http://www.heritage.org/index/

Thomas, John W. and Grindle, Merilee. 1994. "Political Leadership and Policy Characteristics in Population Policy Reform". *Population and Development Review*, 20 Supp. (94): 51-70. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2807939

Tompson, William. "From "Clientalism" to a "Client-Centered Orientation"? The Challenge of Public Administration Reform in Russia". OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 563. ECO/WKP (2006)64. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. London: Birkbecke prints.

Tompson, William. 2005. "Fifteen Years of Economic Reform in Russia: What has been Achieved? What Remains to be Done?", O*ECD Economics Department Working Paper,* No. 430 (with R. Ahrend).

Transparency-Kazakhstan. 2002. "Evaluation of National Anticorruption System of the Republic of Kazakhstan." Almaty: Transparency-Kazakhstan.

Trenin Dmitrii. 2007. *Getting Russia Right*. Wahington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Temmes, Markku. 2004. "The Governance Discourse in Three Countries, A Comparison of Administrative Reform Activities in Finland, Estonia and Russia." The Paper Presented at the 12th NISPAcee Annual Conference "Central and Eastern European Countries Inside and Outside the European Union: Avoiding a New Divide." Vilnus, Lithuania, May 13-15. Accessed on April 16, 2013. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan018512.pdf Tikhomirov, Iurii, and Gorokhov Dmitrii. 2009. "Legal Monitoring of the Federal Law no. 79 'On State Civil Service in the Russian Federation." In *Legal Monitoring - Theoretical and Empirical Handbook*. Edited by Iurii Tikhomirov and Dmitrii Gorokhov. Moscow: Jurisprudence, Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law Under the Government of the Russian Federation, 287-320.

UNDP/MDGD. 2001. Civil Service Reform Paper, New York. Accessed on August 28, 2012. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan001183.pdf

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)—Kazakhstan. 2003. "Perception of Corruption in Kazakhstan by Parliamentarians, Public Officials, Private Business and Civil Society." Survey by Sange Research Center. Commissioned by the United Nations Development Program. Document No. UNDPKAZ 04.

Verhejen, Tony, Kotchegura, Alexander. (Eds.). 2000. *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe.* Edward Elgar publication.

Verheijen, Tony and Dobrolyubova, Yelena. 2007. "Performance management in the Baltic States and Russia: success against the odds?" *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 73(2):205–215.

Vildakova, Olga. 200(?). "The Reform and Modernization of Central State Administration in the Czech Republic". [Online] Accessed July 26, 2013.

Vyshaya Shkola Ekonomiki. 2004. Reforma Gossluzhby v Rossii – Issledovanie Gosudarstvennykh i Munitsipalnykh Sluzhashikh. Moscow: Vyshaya Shkola Ekonomiki. http://www.politanaliz.ru/articles_570.html

Wade, Jacoby. 2006. "Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations", *World Politics* 58 (4): 627-629.

Way, Lucan A. 2012. "Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Durability" (with Stephen Levitsky), *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (4): 869-889.

Way, Lucan A. 2012. "Deer in Headlights: Incompetence and Weak Authoritarianism after the Cold War." *Slavic Review*, 71 (3): 619-646.

Way, Lucan A. 2012. "The Sources of Authoritarian Control after the Cold War: East Africa and the former Soviet Union." *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 28  (4): 424–448.

Way, Lucan A. 2009. "Debating the Color Revolutions: A Reply to My Critics" *Journal of Democracy*. 20 (1): 90-97.

Way, Lucan A. 2005. "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine?" *World Politics*, 57 (2): 231-265.

Weber, Max. 1958. "Bureaucracy." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, John, ed. 1994. *The political economy of policy reform*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

World Bank. 2013. "Worldwide Governance Indicators". Last updated September 13, 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators

World Bank. 2006. "Administrative and Regulatory Reform in Russia: Addressing Potential Sources of Corruption". Policy Note, 1 December. http://ar.economy.gov.ru/en/main_menu_en/cooperation/eng_documents/?id4=762&i4=2

———. 2006. "Institutional Reform in Russia: Moving From Design to Implementation in a Multi-Level Governance Context. Study". World Bank Report no. 35576-RU (June). Accessed July 9, 2012. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/ Resources/Institutionaleng.pdf

———. 1996. "Republic of Kazakhstan: Transition of the State." Report No. 15353-kz.

———. 2002. "Reforming Public Institutions and strengthening Governance. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network". A World Bank Strategy. Implementation Update. November. Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/Regions2ECA.pdf

———. 2002. "Kazakhstan Governance and Service Delivery: A Diagnostic Report." Report No. 23257-kz.

———. 2005. "Kazakhstan Reforming the Public Sector Wage System Policy Paper." Report No. 31707-kz.

———. 2005. "Podkhody k Realizatsii Reformy Gosupravleniia na Regional'nom Urovne v RF", Chast I. Accessed August 25, 2013, *gov.cap.ru/home/25/admref_6_2.doc*

Yuzhakov, Vladimir. 2003. "Za pravo na vziatku zamolvili slovo", Nezavisimaia Gazeta, no. 115, 10 June, 10.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2006. *Structuring the State. The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Zubarevich, Natalia. 2010. Regiony Rossii: Neravenstvo, Krizis, Modernizatsia. Independent Institute of Social Policy, 2010. Accessed October 26, 2013.

Zubarevich, Natalia. 2005. Rossiia Regionov: v Kakom Sotsial'nom Prostransve my Zhuvem? Independent Institutte of social policy. Moscow: Pomatur. Accessed on August 25, 2013. http://www.socpol.ru/publications/book.shtm

# Appendix 1

## Governance Indicators in Selected Countries

(%)

| Country | Year | Control of Corruption | Government Effectiveness | Political Stability | Regulatory Quality | Rule of Law | Voice and Accountability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | 2012 | 21 | 40 | 36 | 38 | 31 | 16 |
| | 2008 | 18 | 41 | 67 | 45 | 25 | 18 |
| | 2004 | 11 | 28 | 48 | 33 | 16 | 18 |
| | 1998 | 17 | 20 | 48 | 35 | 16 | 28 |
| Belarus | 2012 | 37 | 18 | 46 | 12 | 18 | 6 |
| | 2008 | 31 | 12 | 63 | 9 | 16 | 7 |
| | 2004 | 17 | 10 | 53 | 10 | 9 | 6 |
| | 1998 | 33 | 25 | 47 | 4 | 23 | 23 |
| Russia | 2012 | 16 | 41 | 21 | 39 | 24 | 20 |
| | 2008 | 12 | 45 | 20 | 39 | 20 | 25 |
| | 2004 | 25 | 44 | 8 | 50 | 19 | 30 |
| | 1998 | 18 | 22 | 15 | 30 | 18 | 34 |
| Bulgaria | 2012 | 52 | 60 | 58 | 69 | 51 | 59 |
| | 2008 | 47 | 53 | 57 | 72 | 50 | 65 |
| | 2004 | 58 | 64 | 45 | 73 | 49 | 65 |
| | 1998 | 47 | 47 | 63 | 54 | 37 | 60 |
| Baltic and CEE states | | | | | | | |
| Estonia | 2012 | 70 | 75 | 74 | 80 | 76 | 75 |
| | 2008 | 80 | 78 | 65 | 92 | 86 | 83 |
| | 2004 | 79 | 84 | 65 | 92 | 86 | 83 |
| | 1998 | 71 | 72 | 64 | 91 | 67 | 77 |
| Latvia | 2012 | 63 | 75 | 61 | 80 | 73 | 71 |
| | 2008 | 62 | 71 | 53 | 81 | 74 | 70 |
| | 2004 | 60 | 74 | 66 | 79 | 68 | 70 |
| | 1998 | 59 | 60 | 41 | 78 | 57 | 71 |
| Hungary | 2012 | 65 | 71 | 69 | 79 | 68 | 70 |
| | 2008 | 68 | 75 | 70 | 86 | 80 | 76 |
| | 2004 | 76 | 79 | 75 | 84 | 78 | 86 |
| | 1998 | 76 | 82 | 88 | 82 | 75 | 82 |
| Poland | 2012 | 72 | 72 | 83 | 78 | 72 | 81 |
| | 2008 | 67 | 67 | 78 | 75 | 66 | 75 |
| | 2004 | 59 | 71 | 50 | 75 | 63 | 81 |
| | 1998 | 77 | 76 | 71 | 73 | 75 | 80 |
| Czech Republic | 2012 | 64 | 77 | 84 | 81 | 82 | 75 |
| | 2008 | 65 | 81 | 82 | 85 | 77 | 78 |
| | 2004 | 69 | 79 | 67 | 80 | 72 | 80 |
| | 1998 | 70 | 75 | 74 | 80 | 76 | 75 |

Kaufman D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2012
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999979

# Appendix 2

## Timeline of Civil Service Reforms in Countries of the Former Soviet States

| No. | State | Legislation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hungary | Civil Service Law of 1992 (separate law covering civil servants); Code of Ethics for Civil Servants |
| 2 | Lithuania | The Law On Public Officials 1995; Civil Service Law 1999 (July); Code on Professional Ethics and Conduct for Public Servants |
| 3 | Estonia | Civil Service Law of 1995; Public Service Code of Ethics of 1999 |
| 4 | Latvia | Civil Service Law (1995); Civil Service Law (2000) |
| 5 | Czech Republic | Civil Service Law of 2002 (abandoned in 2007) |
| 6 | Slovakia | Civil Serice Law of 2001 |
| 7 | Slovenia | Civil Service Law of 2002 |
| 8 | Croatia | Civil Serice Law of 2005 |
| 9 | Romania | Constitution of 1991 (revised in 2003); Civil Service Law of 1999; Deontological Code for Civil Servants of 2004 |
| 10 | Molodova | Civil Serice Law of 1994 |
| 11 | Bulgaria | Civil Service Law of 1999; Civil Servant's Code of Conduct, December 2000. |
| 12 | Poland | Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997; Civil Service Act, December 1999; Public Service Act, Code of Civil Service Ethics of 2002 |
| 13 | Serbia | Civil Servants Law of 1996 (Serbia and Montenegro); Civil Servants Law of 2005 (Montenegro); Code of Ethics for Civil Servants. |
| 14 | Montenegro | Civil Servants Law of 1996 (Serbia and Montenegro); Civil Servants Law of 2004 (Montenegro) |
| 15 | Albania | Civil Serice Law of 1999 |
| 16 | Republic of Moldova | Constitution of Republic of Moldavia of 1994; Public Service Law No. 334-XIII, May 1995; Law on Civil Service and the Statute of the Public Servant 2009; the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants 2008. |
| 17 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | Civil Service Law in the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2002; Code of Ethics for Civil Servants |
| 18 | Republic of Macedonia | Civil Servants Law of 2000; Codes of Ethics for Civil Servants of 2002 |
| 19 | Kazakhstan | Civil Serice Law of 1995; The Law on Civil Service (1999); The Law on Anti-Corruption Measures (*Zakon o Bor'be s Korruptsiei*); The Law On Administrative Procedures (*Zakon ob administrativnykh protsedurakh*); The Code of Ethics in Public Service (*Kodeks Chesti Gosudarstvennykh Sluzhashikh*). |
| 20 | Kyrgyzstan | Presidential Decree "On State service" 1996; Civil Serice Law of 1999; Civil Service Law 2004 |
| 21 | Tajikistan | Civil Servants Law of 1998; Civil Servants Law of 2007 |
| 22 | Uzbekistan | Action program; no civil service law whatsoever |
| 23 | Turkmenistan | Civil Serice Law of 1997 |
| 24 | Ukraine | Civil Serice Law of 1993 |
| 25 | Belarus | Civil Serice Law of 2003 |
| 26 | Georgia | Civil Serice Law of 1994 |
| 27 | Armenia | Civil Service Law 2001 |
| 28 | Azerbajan | Civil Service Law 2000 |

Source: Expanded, based on Matei and Lazar (2009, 6), Ghindar 2009, 47.

# Appendix 3

## CSR Coordination and Implementation Structures (Russia)

| | Reform coordination | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 | 'Roskadry'- organization created in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse to coordinate administrative change. The law "On the basic principles of the Civil Service in the Russian Federation" (1995) was prepared by Roskadry. It had three important goals: (1) to educate and increase the level of education of civil servants, (2) to create a system of civil service administration and (3) to evaluate the professional preparation of public employees (Barabashev 2005). | The dynamics of Non-Implementation; Some of the goals achieved though in the area of education. |
| 1997-1998 | No coordination mechanisms: Random initiatives were taken by expert groups, in conjunction with some representatives of state Duma | The Dynamics of Non-Implementation |
| 2002-2005 | Reform coordination:Inter-Ministerial Coordination group (MRG) and Upravlenie Programmami Reformirovania Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby); Since 2004 – Upravlenie po Voprosam Gossluzhby. Implementation institutions:Ministry of Labor (starting from 2004 – Ministry of Health), Monistry of Economic Development, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs | Expert groups, Inter-Ministerial Coordination group (MRG) |
| 2010-present | Coordination mechanisms dispersed across the body of civil service. Implementation structures have shifted to the body of civil servants in 2010. Each individual ministry is now responsible for the design and actual implementation of CSR within it's own domain. | |

Source: Author, based on Interviews 2010

**Appendix 4**

**Content of Implementaiton Measures (2003-2005)**

Dimensions of the Reform, according to the program documents

| Reform Dimensions | Content | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Improvement of the legislative framework | Analysis of the existing legal norms; development of the draft laws in the framework of reform implementation, разработка | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| New approaches toward civil service organization (personnel policy) | Introduction of service regulations (dolzhnostnye reglamenty), service contract system, the system of professional development, criteria of results assessment, conflict of interest regulations (identification and resolution mechanisms), duties and responsibilities of civil servants | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| Professional development of civil servants | Effective recruitment techniques; raising prestige of civil servants; creating the system of continuous education of civil servants, formation of the pool of civil servants; rotation of civil servants; objective evaluation system. | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| Conditions of work | Analysis of the technical and material conditions of the federal public service; development of recommendations on the improvement of those conditions | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| Reform administration system (upravlenie) | Establishing the unity of civil service; cooperation with nongovernmental organizations; recruitment, career progress, retirement, professional development of civil servants. | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| Rationalizing the structure and functions of the state institutions | Functional analysis of the structure of state institutions; removal of the redundant functions; development of the system of outsourcing; raising effectiveness of the social contract system and public procurement system; anti-corruption measures. | Program of Administrative Reform in RF (2005-2010) |
| | Testing the new methods of planning in state institutions (federal level) | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| Performance Management | Introduction of the system of planning and goal-oriented project management | Program of Administrative Reform in RF (2005-2010); The Concept of reform of the budget process in RF in 2004-2005, adopted by the Government Decree no. 249 (May 22, 2004) |
| | Developing methods of the goal oriented targeted program finance system in the federal civil service; new budget mechanisms | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |

| Standardization and Regulation | Introduction of the standards of public services; customer orientation in delivering public services; administrative regulations (administrativnye reglamenty) | Program of Administrative Reform in RF (2005-2010) |
|---|---|---|
| | Developing standards of budgetary services | Program of Reform of the Regional Finance |
| Increasing Openness and Accountability of Civil Servants | Improving access to information on the activities of state institutions;  improving relationships between the organs of state executive, municipal service , NGOs and civil society | Program of Administrative Reform in RF (2005-2010) |
| | Increasing openness of the system of public administration. | Federal Program "Reformirovanie Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby v RF (2003-2005 гг.)" |
| | Increasing transparency of budget processes and the system of state procurement. | Program of Reform of the Regional Finance |

Source: World Bank, 2005.

**Comparing CSR to Other Reform Projects** [219]

Reform Dimensions and Policy Instruments (Russia))*[220]*

| Reform Directions and Reform Management Instruments | Framework legislation for reform implementation | Reform programs and concepts | Engaging in Strategy formulation, communication | Expert and methodological support | Incentives |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civil Service Reform (2003-2005) | Framework laws and secondary legislation at the federal and regional levels | Federal program: mandatory for the federal level and recommended for the regions | Input at high political level through State Council; Advisory Councils through the Offices of presidential Representatives | Limited application, provided to selected pilot institutions | Limited application in 6 pilot regions (2003-2005) |
| | Adoption is lagging behind at the federal level preventing regions from moving ahead with implementation at the federal and regional levels | Partial, no follow up in low capacity regions | Most of them were established in 2005, and results are to be determined | Knowledge base is built in pilot regions, no effect in other regions | Created strong motivation in 6 pilot regions |
| Administrative Reform (2003-2005) | Not applied in 2003-2004; envisaged for main reform components in 2004-2008 | Concept for 2006-2008; recommended for the regions | Expert seminars at the Federal level; seminars with the regional authorities and the federal structures on implementation | Training programs being designed and planned for application | Competition for federal support |
| | Reform was partially followed by regions; | Established reform directions and reform tools | Comprehensive reform strategy drafted with input from experts; high interest and participation from regions | Expected to build capacity at the federal and regional levels | High interest at the regional level |
| Budget Process Reform (2003-2005) | Government statutory acts – advisory nature for regions; amendments to the Budget Code | Concept recommended to use for regions; Programs required under competitive mechanism | Consultations with the regions on the draft reform concepts | Federal methodologies/expert support through competitive mechanisms | Competitive distribution of finance |
| | Change was taken forward at the federal and regional level | Facilitated change in region-winners | Results to be determined | Facilitated change in regions-winners of the competition | Facilitated change |
| State Procurement | | | | | |

---

[219] Unfortunately, the study of policy implementation processes in most transitioning states is practically non-existent. The same is true for the comparative analysis of implementation processes in other areas of public sector.
[220] Table adapted from the World Bank Report (2003).

| Reform | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

# Appendix 6

## Groups, Categories and Ranks of State Service in Russia

A. Categories of State Service

| State Service<br>Regulated by the Law On the System of State Service (57-FZ, 2003), and other legislative documents | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Military** | **Law Enforcement** | **State Civil Service** |
| Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, including<br>Federal Service of Military and Technical Cooperation<br>Federal Service on the Technical and Expert Control<br>Federal Service on the Defence Procurement<br>Federal Agency on the Special Construction in Russia<br>Federal Security Service (FSB Rossii);<br>Federal Custodial Service (Federal'naia Sluzhba Okhrany, FSO);<br>Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR);<br>Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergency situations and liquidation of natural disasters (MChS Rossii), including<br>The State Fire Defence Service;<br>Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD Rossii)<br>Federal Service of Control over drug trafficking (FSKN of Russia)<br>Central Directorate of the Special Programs of the President (GUSP) | Organs of the Detection and Investigation of Crime<br>Organs of Legal Assistance<br>Organs of Law Enforcement<br><br>Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation | Presidential Administration Government of the Russian Federation<br>Federal organs of state executive (ministries, services, agencies, territorial departments of the federal organs);<br>Executive organs of the regional government, State Duma (except for the Deputees),<br>Federal Council (except for the governors),<br>Courts (except for judges) and other state departments |

B. Ranks of State Civil Service

| Civil Service Groups | Federal Civil Service | Regional Civil Service | Who appoints |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Highest Groups | State Counsellor | State Counsellor of the Region,1,2,3 category | President; in the regions – according to the regional legislation |
| The Main Group | Counsellor of State, 1,2,3 category (klass) | Counsellor of the region, 1,2,3 category (klass) | In Federal organs of the executive – by the government; in regions – in line with the regional legislation |
| The leading group | Advisor of the State Civil Service | Advisor of the state civil service in the region | A representative of the employer |
| The senior group | Consultant of the State Civil Service | Consultant of the state civil service in the region | |

258

| Junior group | Secretary of the State Civil Service, 1,2,3 category | Secretary of the State Civil Service, 1,2,3 category | |

Appendix 6 (continued)

| Groups and Categories of State Civil Servants (Russia, civil service law, 2004) [221] |
|---|
| **Directors**— their role concerns overseeing the work of state organs at both the federal and regional levels;<br>   o      The highest position<br>   o      The main position<br>   o      Leading positions<br>  2)  **Assistants (advisors)**— their job is to assist the directors of the federal and regional state institutions;<br>   o      The highest position<br>   o      The main position<br>   o      Leading positions<br>  3)  **Specialists** — their job is to professionally implement the functions of the state institutions;<br>   o      The highest position<br>   o      The main position<br>   o      Leading positions<br>  4)  **Serving specialists** — their job is to help in organizational, informational, financial, economic and other areas of state civil service.<br>   o      The highest position<br>   o      The main position<br>   o      Leading positions |

D. Excerpt from the State Register (the list of civil service positions)

| Categories of civil service positions | Civil Service Groups | Positions |
|---|---|---|
| Directors | The highest group | First Deputy of the Federal Minister |
| | | Deputy Federal Minister |
| | | Commissioner of Human Rights under the European court of human rights |
| | | Deputy Minister of the Regional Development |
| | | Deputy Federal Minister – Director of the Federal Agency |
| | | Director of the Federal Service |
| | | Director of the Department |
| | | Director (head ) of the Federal Ministerial Apparatus |
| | | Deputy Head of the Federal Service |
| | | Head of the Department |
| | | Head of the Central Administrative Board |
| | | Deputy Head of the Department |
| | | First Deputy Head of the Central Administrative Board |

---

[221] According to the new legislation, Civil Service Rank is conferred on the basis of the qualifying exam, in line with the position group. It is analogous to the military rank. Without the qualifying exam, the ranks are conferred to the following civil servants: 1) directors of the civil service departments occupying the "highest position" within the range of groups of civil servants; 2) assistants (advisors), appointed on the decision of the President; 3) those occupying the main position in any of the categories of civil service (on the decision of the Russian government).

| | The main group | Head of Administrative Board |
|---|---|---|
| | | Deputy Head of Administrative Board |
| | | Head of bureau (smaller department) |
| | | Deputy Head of bureau (smaller department) |
| Advisors | The highest group | Assistant of the Federal Minister |
| | | Advisor of the federal Minister |
| Specialists | The main group | Head of bureau in the department |
| | | Head of bureau in the Department of Commissioner of Human Rights under the European court of human rights |
| | | Head of bureau in the Federal Service |
| | | Head of bureau in the Central Administration Board |
| | | Consultant (*referent*) |
| | Leading group | Deputy head of bureau in the department |
| | | Lead Consultant |
| | | Assistant of the head of the Federal Service |
| | Senior Group | The main specialist-expert |
| | | The lead specialist-expert |
| | | Specialist-expert |
| Serving Specialists | Lead group | Lead specialist, 2 category |
| | Senior Group | Senior Specialist, 1,2,3 category |
| | Junior Group | Specialist of the $1^{st}$ and $2^{nd}$ category |

## The Social and Economic Development of Russia's Regions

*The List of Districts and Regions of the Russian Federation (Selected)*

| The List of Federal Districts | The List of Regions |
|---|---|
| Volga Federal District | Penza oblast, Permskaia oblast, Chuvashskaia oblast, Republic of Tatarstan, Saratovskaia oblast, Samarskaia oblast, Udmurtskaia oblast, Ulianovskaia oblast', Republic of Marii El |
| North-West Federal District | Vologodskaia oblast', Leningradskaia oblast, Murmanskaia oblast, Novgorodskaia oblast, St. Petersburg |
| Siberian Federal District | Omskaia oblast, Republic of Altai, Republic of Tyva, Irkutskaia oblast, Republic of Khakhasiia, Krasnoyarskii Krai, Taimyrskii krai (Dolgano-Nenetskii) Avtonomnyi Okrug |
| Ural Federal District | Tiumenskaia oblast, Cheliabinskaia oblast |
| Central Federal District | Brianskaia oblast, Vladimirskaia oblast, Moskva, Moskovskaia oblast, Riazanskaia oblast, Tambovskaia oblast, Tverskaia oblast |
| Southern Federal District | Astrakhanskaia oblast, Volgogradskaia oblast, Krasnodarskii Krai, Respublika Adygeia, Respublika Dagestan, Respublika Kabardino-Balkariia, Respublika Kalmykiia, Rostovskaia oblast, Stavropol'skii Krai |

*Source:* World Bank 2005. Podkhody k Realizatsii Reformy Gosupravleniia na Regional'nom Urovne v RF. Chast 1. Obzor Strategicheskikh Tselei I Programmnykh Napravlenii. Proekt 09.03.2005, 4-6

*Human Development Index (HDI) in Selected Regions of the Russian Federation (the start of reforms)*

| | Gross regional product (GRP) | Index of income | Life expectancy at birth | Life expectancy | Literacy | Portion of students at the age of 7-24 | Index of education | Human development index |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russian Federation | 7926 | 0.730 | 64.82 | 0.664 | 99.0 | 0.735 | 0.905 | 0.766 |
| Moscow | 17929 | 0.866 | 67.43 | 0.707 | 99.7 | 0.899 | 0.964 | 0.846 |
| St. Petersburg | 8850 | 0.748 | 66.41 | 0.690 | 99.8 | 0.866 | 0.954 | 0.798 |
| Samarskaia oblast' | 8277 | 0.737 | 65.5 | 0.675 | 99.2 | 0.762 | 0.917 | 0.776 |
| Krasnoyarskii Krai | 8438 | 0.740 | 63.37 | 0.640 | 99.0 | 0.718 | 0.899 | 0.760 |
| Stavropol'skii Krai | 4045 | 0.618 | 67 | 0.700 | 89.6 | 0.681 | 0.884 | 0.734 |
| Lipetskaia Oblast | 8388 | 0.739 | 66.34 | 0.689 | 98.4 | 0.738 | 0.902 | 0.777 |
| Republic of Chuvashia | 4292 | 0.627 | 66.05 | 0.684 | 99.0 | 0.810 | 0.930 | 0,747 |

*Source:* Zubarevich, Natalia. 2002. Tipy Regionov po urovniu sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia. Rosiiski Atlas Regionov, 264-265.

*The Social and Economic Development of Russia's Regions in 2003 (Start of CSR process)*

| Regions | Economics | Household data | Employment market | Population density | Migration | Life expectancy and Health | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | GDP | Income to subsistence level, % | Poverty rate % | Generic Unemployment | Population density | | Life expectancy, age |
| | 2002 | 2003 | 2003 | 2003 | 2001 | 1993-2003 | 2003 |
| **1. Leaders (4 out of 4)** | | | | | | | |
| Federal Capital | 2.26 | 647 | 20 | 1.3 | - | 514 | 69.6 |
| **Rich Oil Extraction Regions** | | | | | | | |
| Khanty-Mansisk Autonomous Okrug | 4.55 | 460 | 11 | 9.4 | 3 | 548 | 67.4 |
| Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug | 5.52 | 497 | 8 | 5.5 | 1 | 184 | 66.7 |
| Tiumen oblast' | 3.56 | n/a | 13 | 8.3 | 2 | 341 | 66.1 |
| **Average** | | **479** | **10** | **7.5** | **2** | **266** | **67.1** |
| **Comparatively Developed Regions (7 out of 12)** | | | | | | | |
| Republic of Tatarstan | 1.22 | 280 | 20 | 6.7 | 55 | 372 | 67.8 |
| **St. Petersburg** | **1.12** | **303** | **17** | **4.1** | **-** | **145** | **66.5** |
| Samara oblast' | 1.04 | 296 | 23 | 4.4 | 61 | 589 | 65.6 |
| Vologda oblast' | 1.07 | 254 | 20 | 4.8 | 10 | 223 | 62.5 |
| Lipetsk oblast' | 1.06 | 251 | 23 | 4.4 | 51 | 639 | 65.8 |
| Iaroslavl oblast' | 1.05 | 246 | 19 | 5.7 | 38 | 410 | 63.5 |
| Perm oblast | 1.00 | 232 | 22 | 6.9 | 18 | 104 | 62.3 |
| **Average** | **1.00** | **258** | **21** | **6.0** | **44** | **444** | **65.2** |
| **Comparatively Less developed regions (5 out of 9); Export and resource oriented regions, with greater incomes** | | | | | | | |
| Nenets Autonomou | 3.84 | 259 | 24 | 8.6 | 0.3 | -1344 | 58.9 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s Okrug | | | | | | | |
| Republic of Sakha | 1.26 | 281 | 20 | 9.4 | 0.3 | -1538 | 64.0 |
| Republic of Komi | 1.20 | 304 | 19 | 11.9 | 3 | -983 | 61.7 |
| **Krasnoyarsk Region** | **1.06** | **232** | **25** | **11.2** | **1** | **-164** | **63.0** |
| Murmask Oblast' | 0.76 | 226 | 22 | 10.0 | 7 | -1448 | 63.2 |
| **Average** | **1.00** | **250** | **22** | **9.9** | **6** | **-618** | **62.2** |
| In the "Middle" | | | | | | | |
| Urbanized territories (8 out of 33) | | | | | | | |
| Leningrad region | 0.97 | 160 | 38 | 8.7 | 19 | 1034 | 61.7 |
| Udmurt Republic | 0.91 | 181 | 31 | 6.7 | 38 | 138 | 64.3 |
| Smolensk oblast | 0.77 | 217 | 24 | 10.9 | 22 | 383 | 62.3 |
| Kalinigrad oblast' | 0.68 | 177 | 35 | 7.5 | 63 | 1032 | 61.7 |
| Ulianovsk oblast | 0.58 | 182 | 36 | 7.4 | 39 | 311 | 65.2 |
| Briansk oblast | 0.52 | 210 | 28 | 7.3 | 40 | 353 | 64.6 |
| Stavropol krai | 0.51 | 186 | 34 | 10.3 | 40 | 707 | 67.1 |
| North Osetia Region | 0.43 | 250 | 24 | 10.1 | 85 | 442 | 68.5 |
| **Average** | **0.67** | **201** | **30** | **9.1** | **35** | **399** | **64.7** |
| **Underdeveloped regions** | | | | | | | |
| **Average** | | | | | | | |
| "Outsiders" in terms of economic development (2 out of 20) | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Chuvash Republic** | **0.54** | **178** | **33** | **8.6** | **74** | **145** | **66.1** |
| Karachevo-Cherkessia | 0.45 | 175 | 38 | 19.0 | 30 | -263 | 68.1 |
| Republic of Tyva | 0.34 | 152 | 49 | 20.7 | 2 | -321 | 54.3 |
| **Average** | **0.46** | **143** | **49** | **11.6** | **3** | **-1456** | **59.5** |

*Source:* Zubarevich, Natalia. 2002. *Tipy Regionov po urovniu sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia*. Rosiiski Atlas Regionov, 262-264.[222] (translated)argins

---

[222] Zubarevich (2005) argues that the discrepancies in economic development and human development index of Russian regions are so siginificant that some regions, such as Tuva, may be compared to Tajikistan, whereas Moscow could be compared to the Czech Republic, or Hungary (the level of development), p.77.